Guil: Faithorne fe:

Hen: Do: Cary Baro de Leppington Comes Monmouthensis, et Hon.mi Ord: Balnæ Eques.

Politick DISCOURSES;

Written in *ITALIAN*

BY

PAOLO PARUTA

A Noble VENETIAN,

Cavalier and Procurator

of S^t. *MARK*:

Whereunto is added, A ſhort

SOLILOQUY,

In which the AUTHOR briefly examines the whole Courſe of his Life.

Rendred into *ENGLISH*

By the Right Honorable,

HENRY

EARL of MONMOUTH.

LONDON,

Printed for *H. Moſeley*, and are to be ſold at the *Prince's Arms* in S^t. *Paul's* Church-yard. 1657.

P.225

THE CONTENTS
Of the Several
DISCOURSES.

The First BOOK.

DISCOURSE I.

WHat was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome; and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs, having Armed people on foot. pag. 1.

II.

What success the Roman affairs would have had, if Alexander the Great had turned with his victorious Army into Italy. 18

III.

Whether was the better and more laudable advice; That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans against King Pyrrhus; Or that of the Romans in refusing their offer. 23

IV.

Which of the two famous Roman Commanders, Quintus Fabius Maximus, or P. Scipio Africanus, brought more of advantage to the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War. 29

The Contents of the Diſcourſes.

V.

Whether war being to be made againſt the Romans, Hannibals *counſel was good to carry it into* Italy. 34

VI.

Whether it was well done by the Romans, *to carry the War againſt the* Carthaginians, *into* Sicily *and* Spain; *and into* Macedonia *and* Greece, *againſt King* Philip; *whilſt* Hannibal *waged War with them in* Italy. 39

VII.

Whether the deſtruction of Carthage *was the riſe of the ruine of the* Roman *Republick.* 45

VIII.

Why Rome *could not regain her liberty after the death of* Julius Cæſar *as ſhe had formerly done, by driving the* Tarquins *firſt out, and then* Appius Claudius *and the other* Decemviri. 50

IX.

Which is the ſafer way to be taken, to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth; that which was held by Cato, *or that which was purſued by* Cæſar, 55

X.

To what Age of the City of Rome *the greateſt praiſe and merit is to be given, for the proſperity and greatneſs whereto ſhe arrived.* 59

XI.

How the Roman Empire, though it fell oftentimes into the hands of baſe and wicked men, was notwithſtanding able to maintain it ſelf in the Reign of many Emperors, and how it came to be finally deſtroyed, 67

Why

XII.

Why the Commonwealth of Rome, *though ſhe ſuffered many Defeats in divers Battels, yet did ſtill prove victorious at laſt.* 78

XIII.

Whether the City of Rome *could have maintain'd herſelf longer in the glory and majeſty of her Command, if ſhe had preſerved her Liberty, and Form of Commonwealth, then ſhe did under the Government of Emperors.* 85

XIV.

Why the Grecians *did not much extend the Confines of their dominion, as did the* Romans; *and how* Greece *came to loſe her liberty.* 93

XV.

Whether Oſtraciſm *uſed by the* Athenians, *be a juſt thing, or no; and whether it be uſeful for the preſervation of a Commonwealth.* 104

The Second BOOK.

Discourse I.

WHy the Commonwealth of Venice *hath not ſo far enlarged her Precincts, as did the* Roman *Commonwealth,* 111

II.

Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice *be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of* Piſa, *when it was oppugned by the* Florentines. 123

III.

That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate ſucceſſes of War, after the routing of the Venetian Army in the action of Giaradada. 131

The Contents of the Diſcourſes.

IV.

Whether the Princes of Italy *did well, or no, to aſſault the Army of* Charls *the Eight, King of* France, *when after having gotten the Kingdom of* Naples, *he haſted to paſs over the Mountains.* 140

V.

Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterpriſes. 146

VI.

Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to thoſe which were done by the Antients. 156

VII.

What the cauſe is why Italy *hath enjoyed ſo long peace and quiet in theſe latter times.* 164

VIII.

Whether Citadels and Strong-holds, much uſed by our modern Princes, be commodious, and of true ſafety to a State, or no. 168

IX.

Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo *the Tenth were good, or no, and his counſel ſafe, of driving Foreign Nations out of* Italy *by the help of other Tranſalpine Forces.* 179

X.

Whether the Counſel taken by the Emperor Charls *the Fifth, and by his Commanders, of not parting from the walls of* Vienna, *when* Soliman *was come with very great ſtrength from* Conſtantinople *to aſſault it, deſerve praiſe, or blame.* 185

A TABLE

Of all the more notable Things contained in the preſent

Politick Diſcourſes.

A.

Adrian the Emperor, why he reſolved to go on progreſs over all his States, and to viſit every part thereof — *Pag.* 71--91. Where he ſet the bounds of his Empire — *ibid.*

Ageſilaus, though he were King in Sparta, was obedient to the Laws of the Country — 48

Alcibiades, by too much deſire of glory, ruined his Country — 10. Had higher thoughts then the reſt of the Greek Commanders — 95

Alexander the Great, the greatneſs of his enterpriſes — 19. His Militia — 20-83 An Indian Gymnoſophiſt ſhews him how in a large Kingdom inſurrections fall out — 71. How far he extended his Empire, and in how little time — 157 and how — 159. His artifices, and laudable way, for opening the way more eaſily to his great atchievements, and greater glory — 162

Ambition precipitated Rome into very grievous diſorders — 15-16-51. When diſcovered, makes men diſtaſtefull — 58. It, and Fear raiſe in Princes minds a deſire of innovation — 164. The important miſchief of it, if once gotten into mens hearts — 106. How it is to be cured in States-men — *ibid.*

An *Army* keeping the field, how greatly beneficial — 169

Armies, maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts, taken only out of Italy — 64

Arragonian Kings of Naples, what they did for fear of the French forces — 138

Artillery, of what uſe in war — 160. That in their ſtead the Antients had miraculous Engines, called *Tormenta* — 173

Aſſaulting the Enemy in his own State, how advantagious — 34

Attalaricus King of the Goths deſcends into Italy — 76. is afterwards entertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire — *ibid.*

Attila content to loſe the day, ſo the Roman Commander might be ſlain in the battel — 89

Athens, why ſhe ſoon loſt her liberty — 5--13--54

Athenians

Athenians of great power in Greece — 94. By what people followed and favour'd — *ibid.* Too hard for the reſt in Sea-forces — *ibid.* Hinder'd by the Spartans from taking in Sicily, and from aſſaulting Perſia — 95. Why they could not enlarge their Dominion — 98

Auguſtus Cæſar, in many places enlarged the Empire — 68. Remained ſole Lord of the whole World — 71. Reduced it all to Peace, though he was troubled with ſome Inſurrections — 72. See *Octavianus*.

B.

Battails, ſubject to divers unexpected accidents — 31
When they are to be adventured upon — 192

Brutus, Junius Br. how he ſtirr'd up the people to Liberty — 51. Why he condemned his own ſons to death — 52

Brutus, Marcus Br. why he could not preſerve the liberty of Rome, recover'd by Cæſars death — 51. That he endeavored it when 'twas too late — 53

C.

Carthaginians, why they came to aid the Romans againſt Pyrrhus — 23
For a long time friends to the Romans — *ibid.* Should rather have been afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus — 25. Were ſtronger at Sea then they — 36. Often ſubdued — 45

Cato Major, cauſing figs to be brought from Carthage into the Senate-houſe, gives counſel that that City ſhould be deſtroyed — 45. How ſuch counſel might be uſeful — 49

Cato Uticenſis, what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and the People — 55. Did many times prevail againſt Cæſar — *ibid.* Founded his greatneſs upon nobler courſes — 57. What demonſtrations he received from the People of their ſingular favour to him — 58. Becauſe his manners were not ſuitable to the form of that Republick, he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmoſt — 59

Charls the Great, having freed Italy from the ſlavery of the Northern Barbarians, made his ſon Pipin King of Italy — 183

Charls the Eighth, King of France, his paſſage into Italy for the conqueſt of Naples — 140. At his return aſſaulted by the Italian Princes; and whether they were well adviſ'd in it, diſcourſed upon at large — *ibid.*

Charls the Fifth, Emperor, compared with Solyman — 22. His great wars with Francis the Firſt, King of France, and his famous expeditions — 157. Why his enterpriſes againſt the Kingdom of France proved vain — 158. Why he ſhunn'd hazarding a ſet battel with Solyman — 162. How the State of Milain fell to him — 165. Whether he was well adviſed in not parting from before the walls of Vienna, when Solyman was come to aſſault it — 185

A *City* well ordered, how it ſhould be qualified — 10. For preſerving of unity among the Citizens, whether the courſes which Cæſar took, or thoſe uſed by Cato, were more available — 56. When it is grown to a great height, 'tis a hard matter to order it aright — 14. That which aſpires to a large Dominion, muſt have two things — 121. What is moſt neceſſary for its long continuance, eſpecially ſuch a one as is caſt into the form of a Republick — 104. Of how great importance the ſituation is — 114

Citizens of singular quality banish'd from Athens for ten years ——3——104 To make them vertuous, three things necessary — 7. By what means they may acquire greatness — 56. That quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the State, and how it may be preserved —— *ibid.* & — 121

A *Citizen* very potent, how to be corrected, that he disturb not the common Quiet — 95

Cleomenes King of Sparta, accounted the riches of the Persians not worth the trouble they would stand his Soldiery —— 98

Colonies, when first used by the Romans, and how beneficial to them — 63 & 172 Of the Venetians why sent into Candy — *ibid.*

Constantine the Great divided the Empire between his three Sons — 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Constantinople — 71

Constantine son to the above-named, what part of the Empire fell to his share — 67

Consalvo Ferrante, why kept under by King Ferdinand —— 106

Consuls, of what authority in *Rome* — 2--4--5

Customs, how profitable good ones are to Cities — 10

D.

Dalmatians, with much difficulty subdued by the Venetians —— 119

Decemvirate, held the form of a Republick 50. Why Rome was able to free herself from its tyranny — 51. Why driven out from thence — 52

Decius Emperor of Constantinople, routed by the Goths, flieth, and is drown'd in a Fen — 75

Discords sprung up in Rome from War, not from Peace — 48

Dictator, upon what occasions chosen by the Romans — 12. Of what relief to Rome, and who was the first — 62. Esteemed necessary in times of great danger, and what his dignity was — 86

E.

Education good, how useful to a City or State — 9

Elephants imployed by Pyrrhus in his wars against the Romans — 26

Emperors of Rome, favour'd, assisted, and maintained by the Soldiers and the People — 69- 72- 73. Thirty at one time assum'd that title — 70. Why some were chosen to be their Companions in their lives, and their Successors after their deaths — 72. When those of Cæsars race ended *ibid.* Which were slain by the Soldiers, for desiring to reduce them to good discipline —— 73

Empire of the Romans, when it began — 68. When it began to decline — 69 The causes of its declination and ruine — 71. When it was void of worthy men and valiant Commanders — 87. became tributary to the Goths —— 76

Equality or parity of goods, why observed in Sparta 3. Of all the Citizens in government, is not good — 6. What equality is convenient for a Commonwealth, that it may last long —— 104

Event, the surest way to know what is likely to follow — 19. That War is far more subject to divers unexpected events, then any other actions of ours —— 31 That it is the master of Fools —— 38. Not the event of things, but the advice wherewith they were done, makes them either praise-worthy, or blameable--132

F.

Fabius Maximus, his action and worth —— 29, &c. Deserved to be praised not only for Prudence, but for Courage —— 31. Feared by Hannibal —— *ibid.* overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror —— *ibid.* Why he took a contrary course to that of Scipio's —— 23

Fame and Reputation, of great importance in all our actions, but especially in War —— 85

Ferdinand King, brother to Charls the Fifth, why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour, then to pull upon himself the Turks forces —— 196

Ferdinand King of Spain, why he kept under Consalvo —— 106. Not just in his league with the Venetians —— 152

Florence, why she could not keep herself in a firm state of Government free from civil dissentions —— 54

The *Florentines* succoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies, hindred the Venetians in those enterprises —— 124. Not well thought of, and indeed hated by the Italian Princes, for the correspondence which they held with the French —— 128. How their Fortresses put them to much trouble and damage, when they were seised upon by the French brought in by their King Charls the Eighth —— 171

Forts or Fortresses, of how great furtherance to a State —— 148. The doubts for which it may seem they are not available —— 168. Other more certain, and no less grievous —— 171. Why called *i ceppi della Toscana* —— *ibid.* Arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of Forts —— 172. How to be rightly disposed and regulated —— 176. The defence and praise of rearing Forts —— *ibid.* The doubts and arguments against them resolved —— *ibid.*

Fortune, what is to be understood by that name —— 18

The *Fortune* of the Romans overborn by Hannibal —— 41. Why she easily rose up again, changing for the better —— 45. When she proved cross, they still kept the same minds —— 48

Fortune very cross to the Venetians —— 106

France, the Romans put fore to it ere they could take it in —— 48. Whence the late troubles and discords arose —— 106

The *French* oftentimes assaulted Rome —— 61-63. How timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in Italy grew unlucky —— 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievements in Italy, nor to stay long there —— 166

Francesco Foscari Duke of Venice, said, That the Republick could not much increase in power, unless she made some enterprises by Land —— 115

Francis the First, King of France, how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes —— 152. For endowments of the mind, and other qualities, most eminent —— *ibid.* Though his fortune gave way to that of Charls the Fifth, whom yet he put to much trouble —— 157. Why his furious endeavor to assault Spain prov'd bootless —— 159. and as much in vain his enterprises in Italy —— 161

G.

Gnoses conquer'd by the Venetians —— 41. Whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition, and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians —— 118

The

The *Goths*, famous for the deſtruction of the Empire, and of many Provinces — 76 Their original, and why they fell down into Italy —— *ibid.* Other actions of theirs under divers Commanders —— 77. They alſo took pay under the Emperors —— *ibid.*

Government, how the quality of every one may be known — 1--2. What the right Form of it is —— *ibid.* What it was in Rome — 2. What in Sparta — *ibid.* What in Venice —— 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State — 2 The Form of the Government is, as it were, the ſoul of the State —— 131 From a Popular government men come to Tyrannie —— 54. The Change thereof in Rome, occaſioned ſo much the ſooner the end of her Empire —— 90 and of the corruption of her Militia —— 92

Greece, why the Romans ſtrove to keep her from falling into Philips hands —— 45 Had a general Council called the *Amphictiones*, like the Diets of Germany --- 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth — 93 Not being at unity in herſelf, could not compaſs any great atchievements abroad —— 95. By reaſon of her diſſentions, could not make uſe of her victories againſt the Perſians —— 97. minded Arts more then Arms —— *ibid.* Whence her victories againſt the Perſians proceeded —— 98. How ſhe came to fall into the hands of the Macedonians — 100. then, of another Philip — 101 laſtly of the Romans —— *ibid.* Why after the death of Alexander, ſhe could not recover her liberty —— 100. For the ſame reaſons, having afterwards the Empire of Conſtantinople, ſhe could not preſerve herſelf in that dignity — 103 How highly her Soldiers were eſteemed by Philip of Macedon, and Alexander the Great — *ibid.* & 104

Guido Ubaldo Duke of Urbin, why he would allow of no Forts in his Dominions —— 170--171

H.

Hannibal, upon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy —— 34 What reaſons ſhould have removed him from that reſolution —— 35

Honorius the Emperor, his cowardiſe and ſimple ſaying — 77

Hungary, whence ſo called —— 77. The occaſion of the Wars for her, between the Houſe of Auſtria and the Turks —— 195

I.

Italy, how much ſhe abounded in Soldiers — 84. The Romans meerly out of their own Citizens, and of their other Territories in Italy, were furniſh'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies —— 62. Was long obedient to the Weſtern Emperors; yet withdrew herſelf from under their command, and ſubmitted to Lords of her own —— 184

Italy, through her own Princes faule, at preſent, under the Command of Strangers —— 140. Her late Quietneſs and Peace, and from what cauſes — 164 When it began —— 165. How it may be continued —— 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Tenth, in great miſery for thirty years —— 182

Italian Princes; whether they were well adviſed in ſetting upon Charls the Eight King of France, at his departing out of Italy —— 140

Fugurth with a bitter ſaying, taxed the extreme grippleneſs and avarice of the Romans —— 13

Julius Caſar, what fierce people he conquer'd in France —— 91. Why it was difficult and troubleſome for him to tame them —— 159. He would always charge his Enemy firſt —— 187

K.

K*ingdoms* large and ample, why apt and ſubject to Inſurrections —— 72

L.

L*aws*, what benefit they bring — 17. They ought to be confirmed by good Cuſtoms —— 11. Their aim ought to be, to take away the abuſe of things, not the things themſelves —— 109

Leagues (or Confederacies) why they are made, their force and power —— 146 Made by the Chriſtians againſt the Infidels —— 147-151-156-192. Which are the firmeſt —— 147. The defects which they may, and uſe to have — 148 For what cauſes they are made —— 154. How and when men may with reaſon expect benefit by them — 154. Why they are no better eſteemed — *ibid.* That famous one of Cambray againſt the Venetians, why made, how ſoon diſſolved, and how unjuſt it was — 154-155

Leonidas, his famous victory againſt the Perſians —— 98

Lewis the Twelfth, King of France, his nature and qualities of minde —— 135 Why he conſpired againſt the Venetians; and how injuriouſly —— 132 —— 135

Ludowick Sforza Duke of Milain, how fearful he ſhewed himſelf upon the League between the French and the Venetians —— 139. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy, and then to his own great damage repents himſelf of it —— 140

Lycurgus, why his Laws proved good — 11. Had many means to help him in the ſetling of his Laws —— 12. Ordered his Republick ſo, that it ſhould not much increaſe its Dominions — 47

M.

M*agiſtracies*, the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome —— 3 They ought to be of limited authority, and for a ſhort time —— 5

Malta, why it preſerved it ſelf againſt the aſſaults of Solyman — 175

Marius, by what ways he began his greatneſs — 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth — 10--47. His diſcreet carriage in the enterpriſe againſt the Cimbri, which were come down into Italy — 194
Medici, how that Family got the ſuperiority in Florence, and kept it — 105
The *Militia* of the Greeks or Macedonians, what it was — 21. Of the Carthaginians, mercenary and incommodious — 39. Of the Romans, proved very profitable to the Commonwealth, by being in the hands of many — *ibid.* Well underſtood and practiſed by the Romans — 38-49-61-80. Afterward grew corrupted and abject — 69-73-74-75. Of the Turks, how numerous, well-order'd, and in continual Pay — 186-193-195-196. Of the Chriſtians, much inferior to that of the Turks — 186. Naval, cannot of it ſelf much enlarge the Dominion of a State — 113. The Forces thereof are increaſed and maintained by thoſe of the Land — 114

N.

Natural inclination ought to be followed in the choiſe of our actions — 58
Nicolo Orſino, Count of Pitioliano, like Fabius Maximus, and not like him--135
Nobles, why at firſt of little authority in Rome — 2. Oppoſing the Communalty, and hated by it — 4. Authors of the deſtruction of Tyrannies — 12

O.

Octavianus, why eaſily entertained by the Army after Cæſars death — 52

P.

Peace, how it remains of it ſelf, being brought into States — 164. How, in theſe laſt times it is eſtabliſhed in the minds of the Italian Potentates — 165
How Peace, Concord, and Unity amongſt Citizens ought to be preſerved by Laws — 121
Plutarch, prefers Lycurgus before Numa — 11
Pompey, ſet up by the Senate to take down Cæſar — 47. His triumphs — *ibid.* After the war with Mithridates, quitted the Army — 51. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities — 65. The laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the Romans, and facilitated his enterpriſes — 163
The *People* of Rome, of what authority in the Commonwealth — 5. How from the beginning it was of great power, and increaſed it more and more — 15 Loving liberty, how it came to loſe it — 51. Sought by ſeditions to obtain from the Senate all things, though never ſo unjuſt — 52
The *People*; That to curb it, Severity prevails more then Meekneſs — 16. That out of its natural fickleneſs, it uſeth to favour a Forein Prince, and by ſeditions and violent attempts to plot againſt the preſent Power — 170

A *Prince* ſhall do well and wiſely to have a care, that no Subject of his grow to be ſuſpected for his greatneſs —— 106. Muſt not for his own relief make uſe of Forein aids, that he may be too ſtrong for his Native forces —— 103

Princes, what ſort of Militia it is beſt for them to make uſe of in their expeditions, and other matters of War —— 155. Sage advice to them in points of War, and the choice of Commanders —— 145. Thoſe of Italy have uſed to imploy foreign Commanders, and foreign mercenary Soldiers —— 122
See more in *States*.

R.

R *Epublicks*, how their divers Forms may be known —— 6. How their continuance may be known — 18. How at laſt they grow to be Tyrannies —— 54. That a State deſerves not the name of a Commonwealth or Republick, where the Decrees of the People, and not the Laws, carry all the command — 6. For the long preſervation and quietneſs of them, nothing more neceſſary then a Parity —— 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Dominion —— 112

Rome, was a mixt, but imperfect Commonwealth, and why —— 3--11. Was too Popular —— 3. Why it could not free it ſelf from many diſorders —— 14 How long it held its greatneſs —— 68. When, and how ſhe might have freed herſelf from her many bad qualities and defects —— *ibid.* How ſhe abounded in Soldiers and Commanders —— 39--64--74--80. How ſhe made way for Monarchy —— 39. She ſcatter'd her corruptions amongſt the Nobles and the Communalty —— 50. That thoſe Citizens proved worſt oppreſſors to her, whom for the meer conſervation of her Liberty ſhe had too much exalted —— 51 Her firſt, ſecond, and third Age —— 59. Her firſt ſeven Kings, of what conſiderable benefit they were to her —— 60. At what time ſhe deſerved the praiſe of good Government —— 61

Romans, why they refuſed the Carthaginians aid againſt Pyrrhus —— 26. Refuſed to have peace with Pyrrhus —— *ibid.* For what cauſes chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians —— 39. They regarded not ſo much preſent dangers, as future —— 45. Out of one War they ſtill framed another —— 46 Why they were invincible, according to Polybius —— 78. The two pretences under which they made their moſt notorious acquiſitions —— 161. How by Colonies they kept their new Subjects in loyalty and obedience —— 173

Romulus, a man fierce, ambitious, and deſirous to enlarge his Eſtate, train'd up the People according to his genius —— 113

S.

S *Cipio Africanus*, his worth and actions —— 29--33. Why he took a courſe differing from that of Fabius —— 33. His paſſage into Sicily, of what benefit it was —— 35

Scipio Naſica, when Carthage was taken, diſſwaded the Senate from deſtroying that City —— 46. Whether that counſel of his were founded upon good reaſon —— *ibid.*

The *Senate* of Rome, what number it conſiſted of, and when firſt inſtituted —— 14 Its authority —— 4. The generous anſwer ſhe gave to the Ambaſſadors of Pyrrhus — 26--89. Little eſteemed of by Julius Cæſar —— 45. Subject to corruptions —— 50.

Severity, in what ſort of Commonwealth it doth good — 57. Was very great in Cato — *ibid.*

Sylla, brought into Rome licentious living — 51. Increaſed the Order of the Senators, to counterpoiſe the Communalty, —— Gave honors and riches to his Favorites —— *ibid.*

Soldan of Caire, how and why he loſt all his Kingdom in a ſhort time —— 160

Solyman parallel'd with Charls the Fifth — 22. His endowments of mind and fortune —— 157. His great atchievements —— 158. Why he made no great progreſs in Hungary — 159. nor at Corfu againſt the Venetians —— *ibid.* Why he made that expedition into Hungary —— 195. Had under his command four Empires, and eighteen Kingdoms —— 196

Sparta, a mixt Republick very excellent —— 5. Her Laws not written —— 11 That authority which the Kings had there, not prejudicial to it — 48. Many worthy men flouriſhed in it, by reaſon of the form of its government —— 58 For want of money, could not enlarge her Empire — 82

Spartans, when and why of great power in Greece —— 96. By what people followed and favour'd —— *ibid.* Stronger then the reſt in Land forces — *ibid.* Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls —— 171

States, whence their divers changes come — 53. How men grow deſirous of their change — 72. Are augmented and preſerved by the ſame things which gave them their beginning, and corrupted by the contrary —— 73. Where they have been ruin'd by inteſtine diſcords, the over-great height of ſome of their own hath been the cauſe — 105. That they have their beginning, increaſe, ſtay, declination, and ruine —— 86

Stilico, a Barbarian, and by nation a Hun, called to the command of the Roman Army, betrays the Empire —— 89

T.

Thebans much eſteemed of for the diſcipline of their Soldiers, called the Sacred Band —— 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, famous Commanders of theirs —— *ibid.*

Themiſtocles, what his advice was, and his Naval victory againſt the Perſians — 99

Tiberius Gracchus ſlain by the Nobles of Rome, without any revenge from the People —— 17

Tribuneſhip in Rome, of how great power, and its inſolence —— 6. Called *Sacroſanctus* —— 52

Triumph in Rome, when firſt inſtituted, and to whom firſt granted — 62

Turks, their aſſiſtance refuſed by the Venetians, and yet ſued for by other Chriſtian Princes —— 136. Why they cannot ſo ſuddenly nor eaſily do any ſignal enterpriſes by Land —— 161. Are accuſtomed, for their own ſecurity, to deſtroy the inhabitants of ſuch places as they take in, eſpecially thoſe of the better and richer ſort —— 172. Their chiefeſt ſtrength conſiſts in their Cavalry — 187 Their Law promiſeth everlaſting reward in heaven, to every one that loſeth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel —— 194

V.

Valerius Publicola, why in reforming the government of Rome, he yielded many things to the People —— 14-15. That he might have order'd the City better — *ibid.*

Venice, in time brought her Government to perfection — 12. How ſhe hath been able to preſerve her Liberty thus long — 54. What her Government is — *ibid.* When it began — 77-116. Her Founders lovers of Peace, and of an intent and end differing from that of the Founders of Rome — *ibid.* Her greateſt and moſt difficult attempts have been either in their own Defence, or for Religion, or in Aſſiſtance of others — 115. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations ſhe at her firſt beginning underwent — 117. Why ſhe made uſe of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders — 121. That for having accuſtomed to imploy Foreign Commanders, ſhe hath not been able (by reaſon of their diſloyalty) to proſecute ſuch Enterpriſes of hers as had been well begun — *ibid.*

Venetians, what courſe they took to free themſelves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces — 43. That the practice of Merchandiſing is not to be blamed in them — 116. Some of their illuſtrious and famous Princes — *ibid.* What title their Dukes aſſumed for the taking in of Conſtantinople — 118 How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been — *ibid.* That, had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders, the State of Milan had been theirs — 121. Their weighty and glorious enterpriſes by Sea and Land againſt the Saracens, for the Emperors of Conſtantinople, and againſt the Genoeſes — 129. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy — 130 Why almoſt all Chriſtian Princes entred into a League againſt them — 132-180 How diſcreetly they have continued Neutrals in the diſcords of Princes, that thereupon Peace might follow in theſe latter times — 167. Why they ſent into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry — 172

Vertue, what two vertues are neceſſary for him that propoſeth great matters to himſelf, and aſpireth after glory — 88

Vertuous, To make men vertuous, three things are needful — 11

W.

WAR, brought home to the Enemies own doors, how advantagious — 28 When it ought to be carried on with protracting of time — 31. War, and not Peace, was the cauſe of Romes ruine — 45. It is ſubject to divers ſucceſſes and chances, more then any other action of ours — 31-183-185

Wars, made by the Romans after the ſubduing of Carthage — 48. Made and maintained by them in many places at once — 65. Particulars moſt neceſſary for them — 149. The manner of Wars now uſed, is the chiefeſt cauſe why the enterpriſes of modern Princes prove not equal to thoſe of the Antients — 148

The end of the ſecond Table.

ERRATA.

Pag. lin.
4--45 After *not* read *only*.
5--7 Dele *not*.
8--17 For *licence* read *licentiousness*.
10-27 For *temperance* read *temper*.
11-38 For *them* read *those*.
15-25 Before *what* insert *do*.
ib. 48 Dele *more*.
19-19 For *of* read *only*, for *and* read *of*.
25-38 Dele *only*.
26-*ult.* After *obedience* insert *it*.
35-26 After *fighting* read *they*.
37-43 After *those* insert *rather*.
38-24 After *of* insert *all this*.
39- Before *the* insert *to*.
43-*pen.* After *or* insert *if*.
53-12 After *much* insert *the less*.
55-31 After *not* insert *only*.
60-3 After *not* insert *only*
73-17 Dele *and* (the first.)

Pag. lin.
74-27 Before *Goths* insert *great valor of the*
ibid. 31 For *Commanders* read *Soldiers*.
82-50 For *Rhodosius* read *Rhodanus*.
89--30 For *Soldiers* read *Commanders*.
112-30 For *where* read *were*.
113-48 Dele *then by*.
116-20 For *a* read *the*.
124-7 For *them into his*, read *him into their*
126-34 After *men* insert *thoughts*.
152-25 Before *Pope*, insert *with Francis King of France*.
157-5 After *if* insert *we*.
158-45 For *sadly* read *easily*.
159-26 For *Corsi* read *Corsa*.
ibid. 29 For *Curfee* read *Corsa*
176-47 After *thereof* insert *more*.
199-2 Before *not* insert *it*.
ibid. 3 Dele *it*.
203-19 Dele *be*.

THE FIRST BOOK.

The First DISCOURSE.

What was the true and proper Form of Government obſerved in the Commonwealth of* Rome; *and whether ſhe could be better ordered in Civil affairs, having Armed people on foot.

THere are many, who reflecting upon the Greatneſs of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, wonder at her ſo many proſperities, by which ſhe flouriſhed a long time, and at laſt obtained the maſtery of all other Monarchies: And thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of Arms, and management in Peace, do not care for enquiring into the reaſon thereof; ſo as ballancing thereby every of her ſeveral operations, they may know what they were that were truly worth praiſe and imitation, and what blame-worthy and to be avoided. But certainly theſe men ſeem not to know, to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are ſubject, and what the true rule and meaſure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended: For that is not ſimply the greatneſs of an Empire, to which ſhe at the beginning riſeth by Fortune, and which is increaſed by Injuſtice; but that may well be ſaid to be the true Form of Government, by which people living in peace and union, may work righteouſly, and obtain Civil felicity. He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth, without ſuffering his eyes to be dazeled with the ſplendor of the Roman greatneſs, let him conſider them nakedly, as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchaſed them, and he will find ſome things peradventure amongſt the many for which ſhe worthily deſerved to be cryed up by all men, which are more to be obſerved for the amendment of preſent Governments by their example, then for imitation, out of hopes of attain-

ing any true praiſe or apparent good. But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City, then the Form of Government, by which, as by the ſoul thereof, every good act is produced; ſo of all other obſervations which may be had of the City of *Rome*, there is not any more worthy, or of more uſe, then to examine what was the trueſt Form of her Government, that we may afterwards ſee whether ſhe might have been better ordered in Civil affairs then ſhe was, without diſordering her *Militia*; and whether ſhe could keep together the People armed, and obedient to the Laws. To know then what the condition of her Government was, and thence to comprehend whether that ſupreme excellencie were in it, as hath been thought by ſome men; following the Rule which Philoſophy teacheth us, which ſays, that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City, but that they muſt be varied according to the divers natures of the people, and according to other accidents; we muſt examine what that State was in it ſelf, and then what proportion it held with that City. But becauſe it would be too difficult a buſineſs to aſſign any certain condition unto her, which may equally correſpond to all times, ſhe not having ſo punctually obſerved one and the ſame Form continually, but varied it ſomewhat accordingly as it inclined more or leſs to a Popular State; we muſt have our eys moſt fixt upon that Age, wherein the glory of that Commonwealth did moſt flouriſh; not forbearing notwithſtanding to touch upon ſuch things in other times, as may conduce to our purpoſe.

He who would diligently conſider all the parts of the Republick, will find not only ſo much diverſity, but even contrariety in them, as he will not be able eaſily to reſolve which was her propereſt Form of Government: For if reſpect be had to the great Authority of Conſuls, eſpecially in Armies, we may, not without reaſon, believe, that that City under the name of a Commonwealth, was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom; ſince that Form of Magiſtracie did uſe ſuch Authority in managing of Arms, in concluding Peace, and in agreeing differences between potent Kings, as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of thoſe things with more abſolute power: differing from Monarchy only in this, that they kept this Authority but for a ſhort time, and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the People. But he who will conſider what a ſhare of the moſt important reſolutions of the Commonwealth the Senate had, as that which governed the publick Treaſury, the chief foundation of a State, and to which the priviledg did belong firſt to treat of, and then to reſolve of ſuch things as were to be propounded to the people, will be of opinion, that ſuch a Commonwealth did lean more towards Ariſtocracie, then any other Government. Yet paſſing on to further Conſiderations, and finding the Authority of Conſuls, Senate and Tribunes to be ſo often baffled and nullified, and the Supreme Magiſtracies oftentimes contaminated by the meanneſs of popular men who have had the exerciſe thereof, will vote otherwiſe, and think the Government to have been meerly Popular. Wherefore *Polybius* being willing, in the ſixth Book of his Hiſtories, to aſſign ſome certain Form of Government to the City of *Rome*, would not reſtrain it under any one particular Form, but called it a mixt Republick, as was that of *Sparta*. Which opinion is ſithence followed by ſome modern Writers, who treating of the differing Forms of Commonwealths, and particularly of that of *Rome*, do punctually agree with *Polybius*. And certainly they were thus far all in the right, to wit, That the divers manners of Rule by which that City was governed, could not be expreſſed by any one name. For what gives the true Form to a City, but the communication of Government? which as it is participated by Citizens, makes ſuch alteration or mutation in a State, as the Philoſopher was of opinion, that though the City did totally remain the ſame, the variation of this only was able ſo to metamorphoſe it, as it cannot be ſaid to be what it was before: For it is not the Walls, nor the Inhabitants,

bitants, but the Form of Government which makes it be ſo. Therefore he who will determine the Form of a City, muſt have reſpect to whatſoever doth therein help to the attaining of Magiſtracie, that he may infold all parts that belong to the managing of a Commonwealth. So as fit ce men of all conditions, according to the divers reſpects either of Liberty, Nobility, Wealth or Worth, were admitted into Government, theſe divers communications will not admit the aſcription of any peculiar or particular form.

Agreeing therefore herein with *Polybius*, we will now endeavour to find out what is more hard to know, and is better worth knowledg, to wit what ſort of mixture this was. For though a mixt Commonwealth may be perfect, it follows not, that all mixtures may make her ſo; nay rather where ſeveral differing parts are wound up together, ſo as a third kind of nature is produced by their connexion, ſuch a compoſition will rather increaſe the imperfection of the State, and be the reaſon why it cannot long continue under ſuch a diſproportionate mixture. And as it falls out in our bodies, which being compounded of four Elements, continue ſo long in life, as that proportion is maintained, which when it is deſtroyed, they are likewiſe waſted and corrupted; (For that part which becomes too prevalent, changeth the reſt into its ſelf, and diſſolves the form which they made when all together:) So that Commonwealth which is compoſed of divers parts, may continue in one and the ſame State, as long as the Authority of Government is proportioned with equal temperament, as it ought to be, to each part. But as ſoon as any one part begins to domineer too much, it is apparent that ſhe grows towards corruption: For the prevalent part by conſuming the reſt, doth by little and little reduce them all into its ſelf, and alters the aſpect of the City. Therefore ſuch a diſpoſition is required to this Form of Government, as no diſorder may be therein found whereby that mixture may be broken or confuſed. Wherefore as divers Faculties concur together to the forming of Man, but are notwithſtanding ſo well ordered in that union, as all of them partaking of ſome office or other, they have their ſeveral degrees of dignity; ſo divers Citizens reduced to live together in one City, though all of them may in ſome ſort participate of Government, yet the imployments muſt be diverſly diſpoſed of, ſo as ſome of them may hold the firſt place, and as certain primary Cauſes, muſt give motion to other things which are done in the Commonwealth.

Theſe conſiderations being applied to the City of *Rome*, will make it appear clearly that there was no ſuch equality nor order in her, as is to be deſired in a mixt Commonwealth to render it excellent, and long lived. For the immoderate Authority, which was by the Laws granted to divers Magiſtrates, but much more the extraordinary power which was intruſted in many Citizens, ſhews how ill that ſo neceſſary proportion was obſerved in her: And on the other ſide, the Peoples power, and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of Negotiations, gives manifeſt tokens of a confuſed diſpoſition, all Orders being mixt tother without diſtinction either of Office or Degree, and the baſer ſort being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy. Hence it was, that amongſt ſuch confuſion, many cuſtoms might be introduced, which were not onely corrupt, but even contrary one to another; as was that of prolonging the time of Magiſtrates, which was repugnant to the great Authority which was reſerved to the people; and that other of ſuffering the wealth of private men to increaſe to ſuch a height in a City, where there was no prefixt boundeur of wealth appointed by the Laws for being a Citizen. Which Laws or Cuſtoms do ſome of them tend to the power of a few, and other ſome of them are proper for a Popular State. But if we proceed further, we ſhall find their diſorders ſo far advanced, as not being able to conſiſt together in one ſubject, they were the occaſion of that Commonwealths

diſſolution. The confirming of their Authority, whoſe Magiſtracy was by the uſual time appointed by the Laws expired, was introduced at firſt with ſome appearance of advantage, but with very bad example, for that having begun important affairs in Countries far off, they might finiſh them, and weaken the Enemy before their return home. Thus was the charge of the Province left to *Marcus Fulvius*, who fought in *Aſia* againſt *Antiochus*, after he was out of the Conſulſhip; the which was done likewiſe to *Gneus Manlius* to bridle the daring *Ætolians*, and to appeaſe the affairs in *Greece*, and the like upon many occaſions was done to divers others, and very long in enſuing times, with very pernicious example, but the diſorder ceaſed not here, for, without need, the City Magiſtrates were ſo far prolonged, as the ſame were ſeen to return ten times to be the peoples Tribunes. Which made the Citizens infinitely ambitious, and afforded them occaſion by being ſo long in Power, of plotting many things, and of moleſting the Commonwealth divers waies by the peoples Inſurrections. Nor was it leſs prejudicial to permit private men to grow to ſuch immoderate riches, as equalling therein the moſt Potent Kings; there was a Citizen of *Rome* who arrived to ſuch greatneſs, as he ſaid, He ought not to be eſteemed rich who could not out of his own Revenue maintain an Army: Whence it aroſe that the Nobility, being much envied and ſuſpected by the people, the way was opened to the *Gracchi* to excite thoſe heinous diſorders which ended not but with the utter ruin of the Commonwealth.

Proviſion was long before hand by the Law againſt ſuch diſorders, *Licineus* the Tribune having inſtituted, ſo to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobility, that no Citizen ſhould poſſeſs above Five hundred Acres of Land; But theſe Orders in Civil Affairs were ſo weak and imperfect, as one Law might eaſily be broken, by introducing a contrary cuſtom: The Nobles therefore little eſteeming the Licinean Law, did very much increaſe their wealth, and fraudulently uſurping the publick Territories, which were wont to be kept for the benefit of the people, brought in Forainers to manure them; ſo as the people being become very poor, and ſeeing the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia, did very unwillingly ſuffer ſuch an injury, and did very willingly liſten and adhere unto any one who would feed them with hopes of bringing things to a juſt equality; wherefore ſuch as were ſeditious took occaſion to try Novelties, ſo as at laſt in the times of the Gracchi, recourſe muſt be had unto Arms, and civil Differences muſt be thereby decided: which (as ſhall by and by be more clearly ſhewn) might have been long before foreſeen; for ſuch Cuſtoms did much diſorder the Commonwealth, not onely in that they partook not of civil modeſty, but by their being clean contrary to the Laws of that City, which lent moſt towards a Popular State, all Authority being given by them to the People in their ſuffrages, and alſo in the moſt important State-reſolutions. So as it ſeemed reſpect was only had to the liberty of dividing the Government amongſt Citizens: All places of Magiſtracie were equally common to all, and ſmall means kept not any one far from the Commonwealth; they might marry together, Foreiners were eaſily made Free Denizens; the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magiſtrates; the manner of living was not free, but very licentious: And the ſupreme Authority of the Tribunes doth of all other things moſt clearly ſhew what that Government was, who being greatly reſpected and reverenced by all men, and called by the ſuperſtitious title of *Sacroſancti*, they were ſo inſolent in their office, as a Tyrant could hardly have uſed more ſeverity in his commands. See how boldly a Tribune of the People made *Marius Violanus*, a Nobleman, be ſeiſed on, commanding that he ſhould be ſuddenly thrown head-long down the *Tarpeian* Rock, for no other reaſon, but that in a Speech which he had made, he uſed ſome harſh words againſt the People. But the Tribune *Sulpitius*

uſing

uſing more violence, came one morning into the *Piatza* with many armed men and driving away the Conſuls who would have oppoſed ſuch an action, made *Marius* be decreed for the undertaking againſt *Mithridates*, not caring though therein he went againſt the Laws, which not being in any thing obſerved, all good Inſtitutions were made in vain, whilſt the Laws were violated and deſtroyed by the Tribunes too great power. He then who ſhall conſider theſe things, will not ſay that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular; yet many things were contrary to theſe, as hath been conſidered in perpetuating the Government of the Armies, and in the exceſſive Riches of ſome Citizens. Some Popular Commonwealths, as that of *Athens*, uſed by a quite contrary advice, to baniſh ſuch Citizens ten years from the City, who did for ſome excellent quality far exceed the reſt; In ſome others, becauſe they did in ſome ſort partake of popularity, the equallity of means, or levelling was introduced, ſo to content, and pleaſe the people, as in *Sparta*; and certainly to grant but a limited power, and but for a ſhort time, to Magiſtrates are excellent precepts of ſuch Legiſlators as will conſtitute a free City; For ſo all the Citizens may have their ſhare of Government, but none freely diſpoſe thereof, to his own proper uſe, and then indeavour to bring things to an equality, or at leaſt provide ſo, as they may not increaſe ſo immoderately, as any one Citizen may be envied or ſuſpected by the reſt, for his too great Power.

It is then no wonder, if *Rome* were much divided, ſince theſe things were not obſerved in her; for by ſuch a diverſity of Orders ſhe became a Body with two Heads, and of two ſeveral ſhapes, which occaſioned continual domeſtick diſorders in her. For the Nobility glorying in the dignity of Conſulſhip, wherein they uſed great Authority, and which they for the moſt part kept amongſt themſelves, and being alſo proud of their wealth, would uſurp all the Government to themſelves: And on the other ſide, the people, bearing ſo great a ſway in all things, and relying much upon the Magiſtracy of the Tribunes were ſo inſolent, as they would acknowledge no obedience, nor bear any reſpect to the Laws, or to the Magiſtrates thereof; but would reſolve all things according to their own fancy, and as made moſt for their advantage; which made that City, which was ſo potent in Military and Foraign Affairs, very weak in ſuch as were Civil and Domeſtick; for ſuch a diviſion of power in men of contrary minds, keeps the forces of the City, with much prejudice divided; whilſt the one of them conteſting with the other, they hinder the reſolutions and executions of important Affairs, as it often fell out in *Rome*, for neceſſity urging to liſt Forces to march againſt the Enemy, the Tribunes were preſently ready to incenſe the people, ſo as there was none that would give a name to the Militia, which Inſolencies were increaſed by the peoples being able to do it ſafely. For, the Tribunes minding nothing elſe but how to make their Faction powerful, accepted of the Appeals of every popular man, though in unjuſt cauſes, to the end that the people might be the more reſpected by the Nobility, and more ready and bold to raiſe ſeditions, whereby they did always increaſe their power, and had by theſe means obtained many things from the Senate. The Nobles likewiſe, no leſs ſollicitous to increaſe their authority, that they might keep back the Peoples inſolencie, ſought always to keep them low, and did with like endeavours maintain thoſe of their own Order in all Judgments. So as in puniſhing or in abſolving of faults, it was oftentimes a thing of greater conſideration, whether the party concerned were a Nobleman or a Plebeian, then whether he were guilty or innocent: And hence great prejudice aroſe unto the Commonwealth; for all Juſtice was ſoon corrupted, without which no good Order can be kept; and each Party, valuing the publick welfare but a little out of a deſire of their own greatneſs, the City was reduced

duced oftentimes into eminent dangers. Thus the Roman Plebeians, thinking almoſt that they had not a common Country, but that it did only belong unto the Nobility, forſook it, and retired into the *Aventine*; valuing more the increaſe of their own power, by neceſſitating the Senate to yeld to their deſires, then their putting the City into ſuch a diſorder. The Nobles likewiſe more ſollicitous to abaſe the People, and to increaſe their own fortunes, then to preſerve peace and union in the City, did nouriſh Civil diſcord by uſurping the Common goods, and by reducing the People to great Poverty through Uſury.

By this diſcourſe it may be comprehended, how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government: But it may be more clearly ſeen, by comparing this Commonwealth with that of *Sparta*, which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt Government, and preſerved it a long time free from all diſcord, by vertue of her moſt excellent Laws. In *Sparta*, the Princes power ended not but with his life, to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the Laws be obſerved, he might the better do it, being detained by no ſelf-reſpect from depoſing of Magiſtrates, or from being judged by the People. But his Authority was notwithſtanding ſo limited, as he was rather a *Cuſtos* of the Common Liberty, then a true Prince in the City. The People had as great a ſhare in Goverment, as their condition required: For it being they who were to make uſe of the Magiſtrates, it ſeemed they might better know their abilities; as we ſee it falls out in other Trades, that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to uſe it, then by the maker thereof. The People had the power given them of chooſing and of correcting Magiſtrates; but greater authority was granted to the Senate, which was placed as in the midſt to defend the Commonwealth from the Princes power, and from the peoples inſolencie, to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other. Now let us ſee how in the joint union of theſe three Governments, certain Conditions were appropriated unto every of them; but neither ſo many, nor yet ſuch as made them of clean contrary qualities, but ſo as they might very well be united in one and the ſame perſon. The Prince had perpetuity of power; but this ſtood ſo corrected by the Laws, as it might eaſily conſiſt with the other States. The Senate, which was made up of Forty eight of the prime Citizens, repreſented a true Ariſtocratical Commonwealth; but becauſe they acknowledged their Dignity from the People, their power was not ſuch as bereft others of their Liberty. But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and puniſhments, as it was not dangerous, ſo it afforded place for a modeſt Popular State, and rendred that Government more perfect, by mixture of all the three beſt. But above all things elſe, there was a miraculous proportion obſerved in *Sparta*, in ſharing out thoſe things, which uſe to cauſe Civil diſſentions amongſt Citizens: For the Noblemen had the greateſt part in Honors, but the People were equal to them in Wealth, all the Revenues being in common; ſo as the ambition of the one, and the neceſſities of the other were ſatisfied, and all of them being content, they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility, ſo as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient Reipublicks. And if at the firſt ſhe had been a little more large in communicating her Government, by encreaſing the number of her Senators, ſo as there had been no occaſion in *Theopompus* his time, for the better regulating their too great Authority, of introducing the Magiſtracy of the *Ephori*, whereby the City began to be a little too popular, and leaving *Licurgus* his antient Inſtitutions, gave it ſelf over to licentiouſneſs, nothing could have been deſired in that City to have reduced her to the higheſt pitch of perfection. Therefore as far as the *Roman* Government differed from this, it muſt be confeſt it fell ſo far ſhort of true excellencie. The Conſuls of *Rome* had great Authority, and it may be more free then became any Magiſtracy in a Commonwealth, but the little durance thereof made

it

it leſs beneficial to the the Republick: For their Power being ſoon to be given over, made them leſs diligent, and leſs bold in undertaking Publick Affairs: For Conſulſhip being laid aſide, the way was opened of revenging private Injuries by the Tribunes. So *Cicero*, who freed his Country from *Catalins* Conſpiracy, when he was out of Place, was baniſhed. But the Senate, becauſe it had not any Ordinary Magiſtracy, from whence no Appeal might be made, by which it might curb the Peoples Inſolency, had not that reſpect given to it, by which the ignorant common people is Governed: So as the people, not being held back by this Bridle, ran into ſuch licentiouſneſs, as they dared to commit divers Indignities even againſt the chief Magiſtracy of Counſulſhip; as they did when they plucked the Conſul *Camillus Heſtare* from the Tribunal, that they might by force obtain admittance to that Supream Magiſtracy. The weakneſs of the Senate was likewiſe the occaſion of the increaſe of the powerof ſome Citizens, for the peoples reſolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate, the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people, in deſpite of the Senate, was opened to ſuch as were ambitious. Thus did *Marius* cauſe himſelf to be declared Conſul, contrary to the Laws, and *Caſar* to be confirmed in his Province: And to ſuppreſs theſe mens immoderate greatneſs, which tended towards Tyranny, it was requiſite (ſince the Commonwealth had no uſual means to do it) to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities ſide, whoſe greatneſs proved afterwards no leſs pernicious, then that of thoſe whom they thought through their Authority to ſuppreſs, wherefore the City became wholly divided; ſo that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by *Sylla*, though he profeſſed to vindicate the Common welfare: And *Pompey*, to maintain his Greatneſs put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with *Caſar*: Wherefore betaking themſelves to Arms, the Commonwealth could not at laſt but fall.

Theſe diſorders were occaſioned through the weakneſs of the Senate: But the people, poſſeſſing themſelves of other mens Places, uſurpt the beſt imployments of the Commonwealth, and being equall to the Nobility in point of liberty, would without any reſpect to other things partake equally of Government. So the right diſpoſure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confuſed, which require Geometrical, and not Arithmetical proportion, in ſuch ſort, as the ſame things be not granted to all men, but to every one that which is moſt convenient for him. And certainly to conſtitute a City of that form, as all her Citizens ſhould be equal, would be no better then to make a Conſort of Muſick conſiſting all of the ſame voyces; for as the latter produceth no true Harmony, ſo doth no good concord reſult from the former. Therefore care muſt be had, that every Order may keep its own ſtate, and be neither too much exalted, nor too much abaſed, leſt the too flat, or too ſharp Tone occaſion diſſonance, as it was ſeen to fall out in *Rome*, where this juſt proportion was but badly kept, people of unequal condition and worth, being oft times made equal in Dignity, which cauſed a Government full of confuſion and diſorder, not bounded in any one Form, but diſpoſed to receive all Forms.

But if we will aſſign any particular State to the mixt body of this City, as predominate over the reſt, there can be none more properly given her then popularity. Which though it may be already comprehended, yet it will be better known by paſſing to ſome other more particular conſiderations. The ſtate of the Commonwealth is known by obſerving in whom the chief command is found, but the majeſty thereof appears clearly in the creating of Magiſtrates, in making new Laws, or repealing old ones, in making War, in diſpoſing of Rewards or Puniſhment: All which things being by many examples ſeen to lie in the power of the People, do evidently witneſs

that

that the State of this Commonwealth was Popular. The People were they who gave authority to Magiſtrates, nay even to the Senate it ſelf, by authenticating and invigorating the Reſolves thereof; and as the ſoul of that Government, they did in divers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations. So as her trueſt and propereſt Form can only be taken from them; nay, it was ſeen that the reſolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate, and were of equal force with the Peoples commands, prolonging Magiſtrates in their places, and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars. Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further ſeen, by the immoderate power of the meaneſt Citizens.

Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth, which by a certain ordinary, and as it were natural change of condition, will ſhew us what her firſt Form was. For it being changed into Tyranny, which uſually ariſeth from a Popular State, it appears that that City was formerly governed by the People, and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny; ſo as this Tranſition was eaſily made by the likeneſs of State: For, that City where the People commands with licence, may be ſaid to be ſubject to many Tyrants; nor admits it of any change, ſaving that one man becomes the maſter of thoſe diſorders, which a multitude were maſters of. There were likewiſe always many popular Pick-thanks in *Rome*, who, like the Flatterers of Tyrants, tracing the People in their humors, went a birding after favors, whereby they won credit and preferment. Which, as the Philoſopher ſays, is a manifeſt ſign, that in ſuch a City the People command, not the Laws. Which is ſeen by many experiences, of which *Marius* was an evident example; who being born of very mean parents, and applying himſelf from the begining to the Government of the Commonwealth, not guided by the glory of his Predeceſſors, or any noble action of his own which might firſt introduce him thereinto, but confiding in a certain greatneſs of ſpirit, began to think of acquiring great power, ſo as being become Tribune of the People, he betook himſelf wholly to abaſe the authority of the Nobles, as he did in publiſhing the Law of Suffrages, threatening Conſul *Cotta* to impriſon him, if he forbare not to oppoſe him. By which boldneſs he won ſo much favor with the People, as he was able to diſpoſe of them afterwards as he liſted in any affair, how unjuſt ſoever, or in working revenge upon his Enemies (as he did in baniſhing innocent *Metellus*) or to aggrandiſe himſelf; inſomuch as he, contrary to the Laws, was created Conſul, againſt the *Cimbrians*, being abſent, and in a contumacious time; and laſtly in making the Province be aſſigned unto him, which belonged to *Sylla*. By ſuch means the way was opened to the immoderate power of Citizens, which in the height of their proſperity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruine. For theſe diſorders being long before begun, were afterwards by the ſpaciouſneſs of the City ſo increaſed, as the People being become powerful by reaſon of the numerouſneſs of the Citizens, and growing more free and bold by their ſo many proſperities, not content to be equal to the Nobility, would become greater then the Laws. They baniſh'd many Citizens without hearing the cauſe; they granted places of Magiſtracie before the uſual time; they confirm'd the Authority of thoſe that were already out of it, and diſpoſed of all things, not according to civil equity, but as they liked beſt. Which things do ſufficiently manifeſt the imperfections of that Government: For the Philoſopher ſays, that that State where the People command, and not the Laws, is ſo corrupt, as it deſerves not the name of a Commonwealth, no ſort of Government being to be thereunto aſſigned. Which eaſily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful, as was that of *Rome*. But if we ſhall then conſider the Conditions of thoſe men into whoſe hands that Government was put, we ſhall thereby likewiſe find, that amongſt the ſeveral Forms of Popular States, this may be thought the moſt-

corrupt,

corrupt, as that whereinto even Artificers were admitted: which being usually but ill conditioned, and frequenting Assemblies only that they may talk together, do constitute an imperfect State, and subject to alterations. And hence it may be deduced, that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect Commonwealth, the others must partake of the same imperfection: For no such union can be framed out of two good Governments, and one very bad one, as is requisite to give form to a good Government; neither could they continue together for never so small a time. Whence it may be likewise inferred, that those other parts of the Commonwealth, which may seem to resemble Monarchy and Aristocracy, as the Consuls and Senate, came short of such perfection as is proper to those States, declining to the contrary party For many things may be observed to have been done by Consuls with more authority and boldness, then what became a Commonwealth. To pass by many other examples, *Cæsar* being confirmed in that power which he had received as Consul, usurped the Liberty of the Commonwealth. There were likewise many corruptions in the Senate, which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders: For when the Commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection, Senators were become so mercenary, as *Jugurth* having corrupted many of them, and purchased his own safety by monies, it may well be said, that the Citizens of *Rome* would have sold their City, if they could have met with a Chapman for it. Another Consideration may be added, to wit, That that Commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very Popular State which she so much affected: For it is easie to frame any Government for a short time in any whatsoever Estate; but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker, and the excellencie of Laws, is found by the long continuance thereof. Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased, cannot be said to be truly Popular; but such may be so esteemed, whereby the State is long preserved. Wherefore many things being ordered in *Rome* without this temperance, in favor of the People, they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity. Thus Licentiousness of living, frequent Meetings, Appeals to the Tribunes, Freedom in accusing, and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People, served for the building up of Tyranny, and wrought *Romes* final ruine. Which was formerly seen in *Athens*; which being constituted by *Solon* in a too Popular condition soon lost her Liberty, and was possest by a Citizen of hers named *Pisistratus*, who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him, by attributing too much to the People. So what is intended for good, proves often fatal, if not well understood.

But having discourst sufficiently of the Form of the Government, it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions, by which the perfection of every State may be the better known. In ordering a City, respect is to be had to two things; to what belongs to War, to what belongs to Peace; to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them, but by certain Laws, and may be equally preserved from forein plots, and from home discords; and to endeavour, that as she cannot always enjoy Peace, so she should not be continually molested with War. But he who will consider the Actions of the *Romans*, and the Institutions of their City, will find them so seriously addrest to Military affairs, as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves, then how to increase Empire, by making one War beget another: wherefore many Armies were instituted, and many rewards for military valor, to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy; but not any thing whereby to accustom them to Justice, Temperance, and to other civil vertues, whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity. 'Tis therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire, and such Glory in times of War; and in times of Peace, like rusty Iron, lost all

PAGINATION INCORRECT

her luſtre: So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no ſooner ceaſed, but much greater were excited at home by diſſentions amongſt the Citizens, which did not terminate till things were recalled by occaſion of War to the ſame Warlike order and diſcipline in which the City was excellently well inſtituted: Which might for a while preſerve her; but when through the want of occaſion of War, ſhe could not by that means correct her many diſorders, nor reduce herſelf to any ſetled condition for any ſpace of time, being ſtill agitated by ſtorms of Civil ſedition, ſhe muſt at laſt be miſerably loſt, when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatneſs and proſperity. For this cauſe *Scipio Naſica*, a very wiſe man, would not conſent to the deſtruction of *Carthage*, knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war, could not laſt long in idleneſs. How can that Government then be termed Good, which is ſo ill diſpoſed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end? And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuouſly, not the inlarging of her Empire? Therefore the Philoſopher ſaid well; *That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from actions which relate to things abroad, but from thoſe which are uſed amongſt Citizens.* It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth, that ſhe overcame the whole world, ſince the perfection of Government lies in making a City vertuous, not in making her Miſtreſs of many Countries. Nay the increaſing of Territories, as it is commonly coupled with ſome injuſtice, ſo is it remote from the true end of good Laws, which never part from what is honeſt. Governments which aim at Empire are uſually ſhort lived; which denotes their imperfection: Which happens not onely becauſe they were not better accommodated in times of Peace, but that for the great inlarging of Confines, it is neceſſary to nouriſh ambitious thoughts in Citizens, and ſuch as are too deſirous to domineer, which are eaſily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its ſelf. For it is not to be affirmed that the ſame thing can be good in reſpect of the publick, and bad in private Affairs. For the general felicity of the whole City, and the particular good of every Citizen, is one and the ſame thing, they onely differ in ſome certain reſpects. Then taking ones argument from theſe things, the end of this great Commonwealth might eaſibly be conjectured, which (as one ſaid well) *was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk.* But grant, that the lives of ſuch States may be prolonged, it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers. Let *Marius* his example ſerve us to ſee what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate deſire of Glory and Dominion; who being alwaies bred up in Arms, and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby, finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by enſuing Peace, raiſed *Mithridates* King of *Pontus*, againſt the Commonwealth, to the end, that being to make uſe of his Vallor, he might recover his former Repute. Thus *Athens* who once injoyed a peaceful condition, under *Pericles* his good Government, when ſhe turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet, to Arms and Dominion, and would change her manner of life, ſhe reaped the like Fruits of Ambition, which by ſuch Orders ſhe had ſowed in the minds of her Citizens. For *Alcibiades* out of too immenſe a deſire of Glory, was he, who of himſelf did incite the *Lacedemonians* againſt his Country, by whom ſhe was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire. For all this, you hear me not ſay, that the ſtudy of Arms ought to be neglected, which are very neceſſary in what ſoever State, to defend ones ſelf againſt the Injuries of Neighbors, and to preſerve Freedom and Liberty: Nay, *Ariſtotle* reprehends *Plato*, for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the firſt; but onely when they began to have Dominion. But though they may be uſeful for ſome other reſpects, Citizens ought not to fix their ſtudies ſo much upon Military Exerciſes, as not to know nor value any other praiſe but that of the Militia, and to place their greateſt and chiefeſt

Good,

Good, and the welfare of their City therein; But they muſt know, that a man muſt travel further to find out felicity, which is derived onely from vertuous actions, reſerved in Peace, as the true fruits of the labours of War. Let us then conclude, that this part which was very excellent in *Rome*, loſt much of that praiſe, which otherwiſe it might have deſerved for the exquiſiteneſs of its Orders, becauſe true uſe was not made thereof, as a means to obtain the true intent of the City. For if *Ariſtotle* laught at thoſe who praiſed the *Lacedemonian* Commonwealth, becauſe ſhe had made her Citizens ſo valiant in War, by her excellent Military Diſcipline, becauſe ſhe exceeded the other Cities of *Greece* in the largeneſs of her Confines; What would he have ſaid of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, where certainly Military Exerciſes were ſtudied much more, to the end, that ſhe might vanquiſh the furtheſt diſtant Nations: For in *Sparta*, too boot with ſuch Inſtitutions as appertained to the Militia, there were excellent cuſtoms for the breeding of Citizens in Civil Vertues: And it is ſeen that *Licurgus* his intention aimed not ſo much at Empire as did that of *Romulus*; the former much more reſpecting the peace of the City, and the agreement among Citizens, minding Military Affairs onely ſo far forth as they are neceſſary for the preſervation of Liberty againſt Forreign Forces. Another conſideration to be had in regard no leſs then theſe, is, that in a well-ordered City, the Laws ought to be confirmed by the Manners and Educations of the Citizens, the which is of more force to make men honeſt, then is the fear of puniſhment; nay, from hence Actions ariſe according to true Honeſty and Vertue; for they proceed from a vertuous Habit, which is only acquired by Exerciſe. Therefore where good Inſtitutions of life are wanting, the ſeverity of Magiſtrates is not ſufficient to make Citizens obedient to the Laws. For when the appetite hath already gotten power, and is accuſtomed to vice, 'tis too hard a matter to overcome her by force. Therefore *ariſtotle* ſaid, *That Laws, though very uſeful, do but little good, if men be not endued with ſuch Cuſtoms and Diſcipline as fits with the ſtate of the City.* Wherefore teaching in the eighth of his *Politicks*, how Citizens are to be made good and honeſt, he propoſed three things requireable, joyning Reaſon and Cuſtom to Nature. But Cuſtom may be thought ſo much more neceſſary then the other two, as that a mans natural inclination to Vertue, makes him not vertuous, unleſs he confirm his natural diſpoſition by habit, accuſtoming himſelf to do well. Nor can Reaſon force Appetite, but muſt firſt find it well reduced by good Education, if ſhe will make uſe thereof in vertuous operations. As much more then, as this part is neceſſary, ſo much more failing will be found in that Commonwealth, where ſuch orders were not taken by a civil way, for the good Education of Citizens: Whence it aroſe that their Laws met not with ſuch due obſervance, as did them of *Sparta*, not written in paper, but (as it were) ingraven in the hearts of every one by the force of cuſtom; wherefore ſhe proved truly miraculous, by reaſon of the excellent cuſtoms introduced by *Lycurgus*, to breed up Citizens in a vertuous and civil life. Therefore *Plutarch* comparing *Lycurgus* with *Numa*, preferred *Lycurgus*, for that his having confirmed Citizens by good cuſtoms in thoſe orders which he had introduced into the City, was the reaſon why they were long obſerved; Whereas *Numa*, contenting himſelf with bare written Laws, though good, and tending to peace, not taking any further care for the education of Citizens, could not make them be obſerved for ſo ſhort a time, but that they terminated together with his life. And it is found by experience, that *Lycurgus* his Orders were of ſuch force, as they preſerved the Liberty of *Sparta* longer then the like of any other of the antient Commonwealths. Wherefore *Philopomenes* having overcome the *Lacedemonians*, yet would he not totally tame them, and reduce them under the *Achæan* Commonwealth, till he had cancelled all the antient Inſtitutions of their City, wherein whilſt young, they were

ſo bred up to Liberty, as they could by no means be brought to undergo ſervitude.

From this diſcourſe it may then be concluded, That the Government of the *Roman* Commonwealth was of a mixt Form, but ill proportioned within its ſelf, too much inclining towards the corruption of a Popular State; and that ſhe came ſhort of the *Spartans* in three things: In the excellencie of Government, in the endeavours of Peace, and in good Cuſtoms. The other part remains now to be diſcuſſed; Whether the City of *Rome* might have received a better Form of State? For the good Orders of a City depend not always upon the Legiſlators wiſdom, but upon many other joint Accidents. The firſt thing to be had in reſpect, is the Nature of the People, with which the Form of Government ought to have a juſt proportion. Wherefore Polititians ſay, that the Legiſlator ought not only to conſider which is the beſt Form of Government, but what beſt befits every City, and ſuch other Accidents which make ſo many alterations in States, as it cannot be denied but that Fortune hath a ſhare therein. *Lycurgus* was juſtly eſteemed an excellent Legiſlator; but many things concurr'd in him which helped him very much to put his thoughts in effect: He was a King, and uſing force at firſt, as it was fit to do, he might introduce ſuch a Form of Government as would bridle the Peoples inſolencie, and increaſe the authority of the Senate; it made likewiſe much for his purpoſe, that wealth of the City lay but in a few mens hands, ſo as by beſtowing Honors upon them, he could as it were by the way of bartering the eaſilier diſpoſe them to content themſelves with an equality of Goods, whereby he ſatisfied the people of *Sparta's* deſire, who were but few in number, and conſequently but weak, and the more eaſie to be ordered in any ſort of Government. Hence it was that the Legiſlators of other Cities, though they were wiſe men, could not notwithſtanding form a Republick throughout ſo well ordered as did *Lycurgus*, becauſe they found not a Subject apt to receive ſuch a Form, and becauſe they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful, or for other ſuch like accidents, which did not correſpond well with what they did. Therefore *Solon*, though he had had the ſame intents, could not have introduced ſuch a Government in *Athens*; becauſe he was a private Citizen, choſen by the Nobility, and conſent of the People, to reform the City; ſo as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other, and his ſmall Authority took much of that reſpect and reverence from the Laws ordained by him, which ought to have been given them. Wherefore many blamed him and his Inſtitutions; ſo as at laſt, to ſhun ſuch vexation, he was forced to part from his ungrateful Country. He met alſo with another difficulty; He found the City divided, the People much accuſtomed to enjoy Liberty, and at that time much incenſed againſt the Nobility by the oppreſſions of Uſury under which they ſuffered; ſo as he was compell'd, to the end that they might reſt content with their new Government, to eaſe them in their Debts, and give them a ſhare in the Government; which he could not do without much injury to the Nobility.

The Commonwealth of *Venice* hath gotten an excellent Government; but was not at firſt governed by thoſe Laws which ſhe now is: But diverſity of Occaſions have opened the way to the wiſdom of many of her Citizens, who adding new Orders to the old, have brought her to ſuch a height of perfection. Which might the eaſilier be done, becauſe that City was free-born, and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end, to wit, to Peace and Concord, and to the Union of her Citizens. But on the contrary, other modern Republicks, the Cities wherein ſuch Governments were formed, having been formerly long accuſtomed to obey Emperors, ſince they got their Liberty by many Accidents, they knew not, as not being well acquainted therewith, how to uſe it, by reaſon of

the

the Citizens various diſpoſitions of mind: So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government, they in proceſs of time return'd under the command of one.

Theſe Conſiderations being applied to the City of *Rome*, will prove that the prudence of her Citizens, though they were very wiſe and valiant men, was not ſufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth; but they might have amended many great diſorders in her, which did much ſhorten her life. For he who will conſider the conditions of the people of *Rome*, will find them to be ſuch, as no Form of Government could better agree with them then a Popular State; for they were all warlike men, bred up even from the very firſt foundation of the City in the exerciſe of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongſt theſe, which may have a certain ſimilitude to an Ariſtocratical State, when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws, partake every man more or leſs of that Government according to their worth; (For, Military diſcipline hath a certain ſpecies of Vertue, though it be none of thoſe that do immediately ſerve to purchaſe the ultimate end of a City) yet this Government is very ſeldom met with; and though it want the true and proper Form, is commonly called by the uſual name of a Commonwealth. So as though at firſt the City of *Rome* leaned much thereunto, in a ſhort time the People had a great ſhare therein; who not knowing how to moderate themſelves, made it grow licentious. But he who will look back even to her firſt beginning, will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increaſe together with the City: For the Peoples power and liberty was great, not only after the driving out of the *Tarquins*, but even when it was commanded by Kings; that City ſeeming even from that time to be naturally more diſpoſed to the Form of a Commonwealth, then of a Kingdom. For, after the death of *Romulus*, the People being powerful, as having the weapons in their hand, and as being the firſt Founders of that City, uſurped the authority of chooſing Kings: who on the contrary ſide, that they might the better confirm themſelves in their new Kingdom, endeavoured to accommodate themſelves to the nature of the People, and to purchaſe their love by granting them many conſiderable things. So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals, as appeared in *Horatius* his caſe, who being condemned by the Magiſtrates for his Siſters death, appealed to the People, and was by them freed. In favor of them likewiſe the City was divided into Centuries, with a certain Order of a very ſmall Tax, according to which the Degrees of the Militia, and the Authority of the Publick Courts (things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State) were to be diſtributed.

To boot with theſe Laws, the great number of Citizens, which did even then ariſe to One hundred and thirty thouſand, made the Peoples party very powerful; as alſo their having been ſo ready and ſo ſucceſsful in engaging themſelves in ſo many enterpriſes for the Commonwealth, without receiving any pay for their pains. But the Nobility was a long time very weak, and in but little eſteem: For the firſt Founders of the City being Shepherds, and all of the ſame condition, there was no diſtinction of degree amongſt them, ſave what was ſoon after brought in by *Romulus*; who chooſing the Senate out of all that former number, that they might be aſſiſtant to the King in providing for things requiſite for the State, by this order he divided ſome of the worthieſt of the People in this new City from the reſt, who gave the riſe to the Roman Nobility. But even this Order was very weak; for it was at firſt inſtituted by *Romulus* but of a ſmall number of men; and though others were afterwards added thereunto, yet till ſuch time as the City got her liberty, it never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators; nay, even theſe were much leſſened by the cruelty of *Tarquinius Superbus*, and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoiſe of Regal power. So as when the City put herſelf

into

into Liberty, there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of *Optimati*: in this caſe did *Publius Valerius* find the City of *Rome*, after the driving out of the *Tarquins*, when he through *Brutus* his death, remaining ſole Conſul, was to conſtitute Laws, and new mould the Commonwealth. Wherefore deſirous to introduce a State differing from the former, under the name of Liberty, it behoved him not to leſſen, but to encreaſe the Authority of the People: For elſe they would not have indured it; and by fiding with the *Tarquins*, they might eaſily have confounded that Government, and reduced the City again under the power of Kings. For which reaſon alſo, *Brutus*, though he was firſt created Conſul, not willing to loſe the favor and aſſiſtance of the people, without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well eſtabliſhed, perſwaded his Colleague *Tarquinius Collatinus*, that to give ſatisfaction to the People, to whom the name of *Tarquin* was become odious, and ſuſpitious, to lay down his Conſulſhip: By theſe Reaſons it appears, that *Valerius* was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People, as were the Appeals from the Conſuls; The order, that upon pain of death no man ſhould enter into any place of Magiſtracy without the Peoples approbation; the petty puniſhment appointed for them who ſhould not obey the Conſuls commands, which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep. Moreover he eaſed the poor of many grievances, and made many other very Popular Laws, whence he purchaſed the name of *Publicola*.

By which 'tis underſtood, that in ordering of the Commonwealth, reſpect was to be had in many things to neceſſity and to the condition of thoſe times: yet if we ſhall conſider other Accidents, we ſhall find them much contrary to ſuch a neceſſity; for the new Legiſlator was not Prince, as was *Licurgus*, but poſſeſt a place of Magiſtracy for a ſhort time, the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known, and not much valued: So as he could not uſe force to withdraw the people from a Popular State, as it would have been needful, finding the People ſo diſpoſed, as hath been ſaid. Therefore the City being after a while to be reformed again, the Magiſtracy of Ten was choſen, with greater Authority then was that of the Conſuls, which took away all Appeals, to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all, it might without any reſpect conſtitute new Laws with great firmneſs. And if *Appius* his ambition had not ruined the buſineſs, that Commonwealth might perhaps have been reduced to ſome better condition: but yet not to any very perfect one, it being too hard a thing to order Cities well, which are already much augmented; juſt as we ſee it falls out in every particular man, who in his tender years may be eaſily made to undertake any manner of life, but when by practiſe he is ſettled in, as it were, a certain proper nature of his own, he cannot eaſily be altered from it. And if there have been any one, who hath been able to order a City already well grown, yet we ſhall find that that City was not ſo great nor potent, as was the City of *Rome*, at this time of the new Reformation; and therefore the difficulties were much leſs, it being a very hard thing, and which, as ſaith the Philoſopher, doth almoſt exceed humane power, to diſpoſe of a great multitude in an excellent Form of Government. Then as theſe things were the reaſon why this Commonwealth was not well ordered at firſt, ſo did they in time bring her to great diſorders and ſeditions, and finally to her deſtruction. For it is uſual, that the further he advanceth that is once out of the way, ſo much doth he return backwards, is ſo much the more puſled, and the further from the place he intended to go to. So the Authority of the people being by theſe new Inſtitutions alwaies to increaſe together with the greatneſs of the City, ſhe ſwarved the further from the end, true Liberty, to which ſhe ſeemed to addreſs her ſelf. And becauſe this Commonwealth was born with this infirmity, the worth of none of her Citizens, though it

were

were never ſo great, was ſufficient to cure her thereof, or to prolong her life: As it happens in our humane bodies, which contracting ſome ill diſpoſition of humours at their firſt entring into the World, are ſoon thereby oppreſt and brought to death, no natural vertue, though of force for other things, being able to afford any cure. 'Tis notwithſtanding very true, that though ſuch like accidents rendred the City uncapable of any excellent Government, by inclining her to a Popular State, yet had they not ſo determinately diſpoſed of her, but that ſhe might have freed her ſelf of many of her bad qualities, had not the ambition of her Citizens by increaſing theſe her natural imperfections, made her fall into greater diſorders.

Let us begin to conſider what *Publicola's* actions were from the very beginning of the Commonwealth, and we ſhall eaſily diſcover his ambitious thoughts by which he was moved to ſtudy ſo over-much how to pleaſe the peoples appetite in every thing. Theſe his intentions were apparently ſeen, by taking his being refuſed in the Election of the Conſuls ſo heinouſly, as that he kept a good while from the Republick, as if he had put his hand to the Government, for his own Greatneſs, not for the common Good: But much more for that having compaſt that Degree, and finding the People jealous of him, for having built his houſe in a high and ſtrong ſcituation, fearing leſt together with the Peoples Love he might looſe his own Authority and Power, he choſe ſo to humble himſelf, as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the Supreme Magiſtrate of ſo great a City; he made the Faſces, the enſigns of Conſulſhip, be held in a poſture of Homage, whilſt he made his Oration, to ſhew, (as he himſelf ſaid) That the Authority of the Conſuls was ſubject to the Authority and Dignity of the People. This his deſire of being eſteemed Popular, was the reaſon why in this new Reformation, he went not about to what was very neceſſary, to amend in part thoſe defects which could not totally be taken away; to wit, to give a juſt counterpoiſe to the Authority of the people, tempering it with that of the Senate, by very much increaſing the number of the Senators, and by apropriating the weightieſt affairs of State, to that Order, which how neceſſary it was, was afterwards ſeen, but too late put in execution; to wit, in *Sylla's* time, by whom the firſt number of Senators was doubled, yet but to little purpoſe, the Peoples Authority being already too mightily increaſed, and many ſeeds of corruption being by this means ſown abroad in the minds of the people. But *Valerius* added but one hundred to the number of the Senate, neither did make any Law in favour of them, both of which he might at that time eaſily have done. For being at the time of the new Reformation to chuſe new Senators of the Equeſtral Order, or of ſome other of the people, he would not onely have been content, but would have wone much honour, by exalting many of his Friends to that Dignity, as it was ſeen he did by thoſe few that were choſen: And the People would have had ſufficient power in the Commonwealth, if without communicating the weightieſt Affairs of the Kingdom unto them, the indemptnity of chuſing and of correcting Magiſtrates had been reſerved to them: And then that Appeals might have been granted them, by which means they would not onely have had a hand in the City Affairs, but likewiſe they might have ſecured themſelves from being injured by the Nobility (a thing much deſired by the People) and from danger of looſing their Liberties. And the Authority and Reputation of the Senate being by this means augmented, the Peoples Inſolency might the more eaſily have been moderated in thoſe accidents which afterward happened. Which though it ſeemed (as hath been ſaid) more harder to have been done in that City, for another reſpect, yet the revolutions of Government in the firſt birth of this Republick, did a little leſſen ordinary Difficulties. For paſſing from Monarchy (which in the *Tarquins* time was almoſt become Tyranny) to a new condition, the Legiſlator might have made it an Ariſtocracie; it being as it were

natural

natural in the change of States, that the Government which had wont to be in the power of a Tyrant, passes into the hands of the Nobility, who are usually the first who lay hold in pulling down Tyranny, as in *Rome*, where *Tarquin* and *Brutus* were the first Founders of Liberty.

Therefore if the People deserved to be made partaker in the new Government, for having assisted herein, much more ought the Nobility to have their dignities and priviledges increased, this common benefit of the City having had its chief rise from them; nor would the People have had any reason to complain thereof. But *Publicola*, in stead of increasing the honor of the Senate, introduced by a very pernicious example, small respect to the Magistracie of Consuls; which occasioned many disorders, which might easily have been corrected by a just fear, as is cleerly seen by many examples, but chiefly by this; that the People being in insurrection, and contumacious against the power of Consulship, the creating of a Dictator, a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence, proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult. And what more manifest sign could there be given, that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates, then that which was given upon the occasion of *Appius* his Decemvirate? For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues, as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny; yet the authority of this Magistracie, from which there was no Appeal to be made, and the severity wherewith it was administred did so bridle the people as they patiently endured all injuries; nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery, till the Senate interposed it self, and that *Horatius* and *Valerius* declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the *Decemviri*. There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority; or else, if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth, the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws, of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian, inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof: For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be offended with the Nobles, when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws; this arising amongst many other benefits from the Laws, that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one, being condemned by order of Law, not by the Judge his will.

But what hath been noted of *Publicola* in this first beginning, may also be known at all other times, and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens; who through ambition siding with the People, were the cause of their pride and insolencie. So the Consuls *Valerius* and *Horatius*, not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate, sought to have it from the People; and the whole Senate (not to multiply examples) by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls *Titus Quintus Cincinnatus*, and *Gneus Julius Mento*, who opposed them therein, had recourse unto the Tribunes, who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution: And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People, with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor. But they were so blinded by Ambition, as not knowing, or not caring for such errors, they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People, by Presents, Shews, and submiss comportment. And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of *Rome* themselvs: For it was oftimes seen, that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People, then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them. And certainly, amongst other things, the Judgment which followed upon the cause between *Menimius* and *Spurius Servilius*, was very remarkable;

able: who being both of them accuſed of the ſame fault by the Tribunes, to wit, that being Conſuls they had oppoſed the *Agrarian* Law; *Menimius*, who by intreaties and ſubmiſs carriage endeavoured abſolution, was condemned; but *Spurius Servilius* ſtoutly withſtanding the Tribunes fury, and ſpeaking ſeverely to the People, was acquitted. And *Furius* and *Manilius*, who had both of them been Conſuls, being not long after accuſed, the Nobles being willing totally to free them from ſuch danger, kill'd the Tribune in his own houſe who had impeached them; which did ſo affright his Colleagues, and the People, as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reaſſume the ſame cauſe: And all the Inſurrections which were then in the City being ſuddenly appeaſed, all of them did willingly ſubſcribe the *Militia*.

Appius Claudius was always very ſevere againſt the People; and amongſt other of his actions, the puniſhment which he took upon the Armies inſolencie was very obſervable, for he made them be decimated, every tenth man be put to death; which was ſubmitted unto without any the leaſt tumult, by reaſon of the antient opinion of the Captains ſeverity, and for the fear infuſed into the Soldiers by the ſentence of death againſt ſome Centurions who were accuſed for having been Authors of that Inſurrection. Which was ſufficient ſo far to curb them all, as though they were all of them then in Arms, every of them ſtood peaceſully ſpectators of the death of ſo many Kinſmen and Friends, and of their own doubtful chance; and (which peradventure is a greater wonder, and doth the better confirm this truth) *Appius* being accuſed for this ſentence by the Tribunes, after he had laid down the Conſulſhip, uſing the ſame ſeverity in defending himſelf, he was not held leſs guilty for having been formerly Conſul: So as the People neither willing to abſolve him, nor daring to condemn him, the cauſe was put off, and he ſuffered to depart. And in the latter times, when the Peoples power was greateſt, *Tiberius Gracchus* endeavouring to propound the obſervance of the *Licinian* Law, the Nobles, changing their habits, and ſhewing great humility, labored to win favor from the People; but ſince they ſaw they could do no good by this means, they reſolved for their laſt refuge to uſe force, and kill'd the Author of thoſe ſeditions. Which action of theirs did ſo aſtoniſh the People, as they ſuffered the Tribunes death, whom they had ſo dearly loved, and who had loſt his life in defence of their cauſe, to go unrevenged. And ſoon after, *Gaius Gracchus* reaſſuming the cauſe which his Brother had in vain endeavoured, the Nobles, uſing the ſame cunning, ſought firſt by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor, making uſe of another Tribune to this purpoſe, by cauſing other popular Laws to be propounded by conſent of the Senate. But humility avail'd no more at this time, then it had done formerly; ſo as it behoving them to betake themſelves again to Arms, they ſlew *Caius Gracchus* in the *Aventine*, and after the death of two Brothers, annull'd all the Laws made by them; nor did the People ever ſeem to reſent it. Which if it might have been done by an uſual way of a Magiſtrate, as hath been touched upon, doubtleſs theſe ruder remedies, as better ſuiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth, might have freed her from many miſchiefs.

This is likewiſe confirmed by many other experiences: For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof, threatening to create a Dictator, it kept the *Terentilla* Law from being made, of creating a Magiſtracie of five men, who were to correct the Conſuls power. But when it choſe to appeaſe the People by giving way to their importunities, it did only invite them to endeavour more novelties; ſo as Humility made them not more quiet, but more inſolent. Wherefore having obtained Appeals, they would have a Magiſtrate of their own, endowed with ſupreme authority; and having gotten the power of the Tribunes, they could not ſtop there, but would be admitted into the Conſulſhip, into the Dictatorſhip, and to all

other ſort of Dignities; and having obtained all ſort of Honors, they began to aſpire to the Eſtates of the Nobles; who being too late aware of their Error, to keep themſelves from being quite diſ-robed of every thing, and not being able to remedy themſelves by the Laws, or by Magiſtracy, they were forced to have recourſe to Arms, to moderate the Peoples Inſolencie.

Whence it may be concluded that the *Romans* not having uſed thoſe means, neither at the firſt making of their Laws, nor almoſt at any other time, in any of their Actions, which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities, which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth, was the reaſon why, remaining alwaies, as it were a diſtempered body, wherein ill humours did continually encreaſe, ſhe was alwaies ſickly, perplext by ſo many civil Diſcords, and and came to a ſhorter period of life, then ſhe ought to have done for many other of her moſt noble conditions. The example of this powerful and famous Republick, if we will well obſerſerve her civil Orders, and what proceeded from thence, and if they ſhall be meaſured by truer and more general Rules, may inſtruct us excellently well, how to diſcern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States. And ſay it will not ſerve to correct Errors, already too much confirmed by corrupt Cuſtoms; it will at leaſt be of uſe to know what value ought to be put upon every Government, and what length of daies may in reaſon be allotted thereunto, holding notwithſtanding that Diſorder, for a truer Rule then all Orders, which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Accidents; upon which our civil Actions do depend, not onely regulated by humane wiſdom, but ſubject (for ought that appears to us) in many things to a certain caſualty; though they be indeed directed by aſſured, though hidden cauſes, reſerved in the boſom of Divine Providence, whereunto our Reaſon cannot reach. Therefore if following the uſual manner of ſpeech, we ſhall in theſe our Diſcourſes, make often uſe of the names of Chance and Fortune, let them be underſtood in this true and pious manner.

The Second DISCOURSE.

What Succeſs the Roman *Affairs would have had if* Alexander *the Great had turned with his Victorious Army into* Italy.

THE Republick proved more fortunate then any other State in many things, ſo as he had reaſon on his ſide, who ſaid; That Fortune, who was uſually an Enemy to vertue, had made Truce with her, that ſhe might exalt that City to the higheſt pitch of Greatneſs. But this may chiefly be acknowledged from her, being freed from the neceſſity into which the courſe of time had brought her, of making trial of her Forces, againſt thoſe of *Alexander* the Great, who after having conquered *Darius*, and ſubjugated *Perſia*, together with other Nations, did not bethink himſelf of turning into *Europe*; and chiefly into *Italy*, rather then into the utmoſt parts of the Eaſt: Or that from having accompliſhed ſo many famous Interprizes in *Arabia*, and in the *Indies*, being as yet but in his youth, he lived no longer to

carry

carry his Victories over the other parts of the world, not as yet concerned in his Forces, though invaded by his immenſe deſire of Dominion. It will certainly be worth the conſideration, whether if *Alexander* had at firſt had any ſuch thought, or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect, to think what influence he would have had upon the Affairs of *Rome*. This doubt was put by *Livy*, who in the Ninth Book of the firſt Decade of his Hiſtories, betook himſelf to diſcourſe of what might have happened, if the *Roman* Commanders had been to have made War againſt *Alexander*. But without conſidering any thing which might make againſt his opinion, he bends all his reaſons to prove that the *Roman* Forces would have proved Victorious if they had chanced to have fought againſt thoſe of *Alexander* the Great; which he reſolves for as great a certainty, as if the effect had enſued. Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of thoſe things, which *Livy* relates of his *Romans*. We can take no ſurer way to know what would have been the ſucceſs of things not done, then to conſider what hath been done; which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things, if occaſion ſhould have ſerved. Let us then caſt an eye upon what *Alexanders* actions were in thoſe times, and what thoſe of the *Roman* Commonwealth; and we ſhall ſee what might have been expected from the worth of Force, and either of them, if trial had been made thereof.

Alexanders Enterprizes were ſufficiently famous, and known to all men, ſince the recounting of them hath wearied ſo many Writers. And *Plutarch* who writ the Lives of the valliánteſt, and moſt magnanimous men of ſo many ages; In his Preface to that of *Alexander*, excuſeth himſelf (with he doth not in relating the lives of any others) if he be not able ſufficiently to write all his actions, by reaſon of their number and worth. But the *Romans* Enterprizes in that age, were not in themſelves very great, nor very greatly cried up by others. Though thoſe which they afterwards performed, did for glory out-do, what ever was done by any other Potentate; So as Reputation and Fame (which bear ſo great a ſway in all our operations, but chiefly in what belongs to War) was without all doubt greater in *Alexander*, then in thoſe *Roman* Captains who flouriſhed in his time, when the greatneſs of the *Roman* Commonwealth was but in its riſe, and firſt beginning. But let us come to ſome further particular.

The Commonwealth had not as then inlarged her Confines, further then into *Latium*, into ſome parts of *Umbria*, and into *Picenum*, amongſt people who were very near the *Volſci*, and the *Æqui*. Their Armies were not yet marched out of *Italy*; which they did not till they made War with the *Carthaginians*. Whence it is to be gathered, that the Commonwealth was as yet but weak, and not accuſtomed to thoſe more weighty and important Actions of War, wherein in after Ages it muſt be confeſt ſhe did great and wonderful things. But at this time many vertues in the Citizens of *Rome*, and the cuſtoms of the City, not as yet corrupted, were more to be exalted then their Military valour, which though their ſouls might be full of, yet they wanted illuſtrious occaſions to exerciſe it. And thoſe ſo many famous Commanders, which as *Livy* ſays, may be paralelled with *Alexander*; *Fabius Maximus*, *Valerius Corvinus*, *Lucius Papyrius*, *Titus Manlius*, *Torquatus*, and others of that Age, what great Feats of Arms did they? The War was as yet made, as it were, underneath the City Gates; Nor did theſe as Conſuls, or Dictators lead Armies to fight againſt any ſave the *Æqui*, *Sanniti*, *Toſcani*, and other neighbouring Nations, which were but weak Commonalties, whoſe Dominions extended no further then their own Cities, and the Territories thereof: None of all thoſe Countries being as then reduced under the power of any one Lord. Yet *Livies* words, and the deed it ſelf, of having had recourſe ſo often to the Dictator, and having had War ſo many years with the ſame

Nations, ſhews how much ſo weak Potentates were feared by the *Romans*; who cannot notwithſtanding be ſaid to have been much ſuperior to them, either for ſtrength, and worth of their *Militia*; ſince it behoved to fight ſo often with them, and hardly could they after ſo many dangers, and a long courſe of time extinguiſh them, or rather make them their Companions and Friends.

Who can then juſtly compare theſe things to *Alexanders* great atchievements, to his ſo many Victories won over the greateſt and moſt potent Kings of *Aſia*? What though *Darius* his men may be ſaid to have been rude and baſe? it cannot be denied but that they were Three hundred thouſand armed men, and of that Nation wherein the Monarchy had long been: And *Alexanders* victorious Forces overran more Countries in little more then ten years, then did the *Romans* in a much longer time, when they were at their greateſt. The before-named Roman Commanders are deſervedly praiſed for divers vertues: But what could there be deſired more in *Alexander*, to make him be an excellent Commander? Who had his ſhare in more Battels then he? Who ſhewed more boldneſs in undertaking enterpriſes, greater conſtancie in proſecuting them, more hopes in effecting them? What other Commander was ever more highly eſteemed, and dearly beloved by his Soldiers? Thoſe vertues which divided amongſt many men, have made many Captains worthy to be praiſed, met all of them abundantly in him. Would *Alexander* perad venture have been afraid to paſs into *Italy*, who ſhewed his undaunteedneſs in entring into the Deſarts of *Arabia*, without any other hope of bringing himſelf and his Army ſafe back, ſave what his courage and his happy Genius promis'd him? But how eaſily might he have paſſed into *Italy*; *Greece*, which was formerly conquered by his Father King *Philip*, being at his devotion; and to boot with the abounding commodities which that Country and his own Forces might have afforded him, might not he have hoped to be received and aſſiſted by ſo many people who were expreſs enemies to the Roman Commonwealth? who would not have refuſed to have obeyed ſo great a Prince as was *Alexander*, ſo to avoid ſubmitting themſelves to the Dominion of a City like to one of theirs, and with which they had long and grievous conteſtations: Nay, the hatred and envy which they bore to the *Romans* greatneſs, would have made them all have ſided with *Alexander* againſt them. Was not *Pyrrhus* invited into *Italy* for this purpoſe by the *Samnits* and *Tarentini*? and did not many of the Cities which were under the *Romans* obedience, put themſelves for the ſame reaſon under the power of *Hannibal*, being thereunto moved rather out of their hatred to be commanded by the *Romans*, then their fear of being ſuppreſt by the *Carthaginian* Forces?

It now remains, that we conſider ſome things of *Alexanders* Militia, and of that of the *Romans*. By which it will not be hard for him who will not willingly be deceived, to know on which ſide the advantage, and the diſadvantage might have been: Since, if the number of Combatants be to be valued, who can doubt but that the Armies of which he was Lord, who was Lord of ſo many Provinces as was *Alexander*, were much to exceed thoſe which one only City, though very populous, and very warlike, as was that of *Rome*, could put together: And if *Alexander* would do moſt of his famous Actions with his *Macedonians* only, it was out of his choice and judgment, not out of any weakneſs; for he thought an Army of a few valiant and expert Soldiers fitter to undertake a great enterpriſe, then a great multitude, which oftentimes bring more confuſion then aid. So as having, when he had overcome *Darius*, made that ſo memorable Order of his Soldiers of Thirty thouſand young men, choſen out of the Flower of many ſubjugated Provinces, and made them be inſtructed in the *Macedonian* Militia, he little regarded his own *Macedonians*; whom (as it is written) he permitted out of favor, and in reward of their former ſervice, and at their own requeſts to follow his Enſigns, and to paſs

with

with him into *India* to new undertakings. But the ſo many Battels which he ſo ſucceſsfully made, may ſufficiently witneſs the excellencie of his Diſcipline in the Militia, as alſo his taking of ſo many Cities, his long Voyages, the perpetual exerciſe in military works: By which things it may be conceived, that no more Veteran Army could be found in thoſe times, which was more expert in all that belonged to the Militia, more obedient to their Captains, and more obſervant of all Military order then then was that of *Alexanders*. The ordering of Soldiers uſed by *Alexander*, which was called *Phalanx*, is at this day celebrated; in which the Ranks of Soldiers ſtanding cloſe, being as it were woven together, and covered over with great ſhields, they made a ſolid and ſafe body of an Army, able to ſuſtain whatſoever charge of the Enemy.

Livy does afterwards conſider, that the Counſel of a wiſe Senate, as was that of *Rome*, would have prevailed over any one mans Reſolves, ſuch as was *Alexander*; but he conſiders not on the contrary ſide, how that in affairs of importancie, and chiefly in matters of War, the ſupreme authority and command of one alone is requiſite. The *Romans* themſelves were of this opinion, who in caſes of great difficulty had recourſe to a Dictator, whoſe Commiſſions were not limited, but he was only charged to take ſuch care as that the Commonwealth might undergo no loſs nor prejudice. Nor for all this is the authority or reverence due to a Dictator, who is Magiſtrate but for a ſhort time, and ſubject to give an account for what he does, in this to be compared with the majeſty of a Kings command, and of ſo great and ſo eſteemed a King as was *Alexander*. How often fell it out in *Rome*, that when ſupplies were to be ſent to an Army, diſcords were importunately ſollicited by the Tribunes, and the Army hindered from being liſted? Was there any ſuch thing in *Alexander*, in whom ſupreme Authority and Empire did conſiſt? Nor did he yet want ſome more confiding Friends, whoſe counſels he was accuſtomed to make uſe of, and thoſe but a few, wiſe, and wholly intent upon the good of that Prince, upon whom all their greatneſs did depend; as Counſels ought to be in buſineſs of great weight, to the end that they may be maturely reſolved upon, and readily executed. Which happens not where many command with equal authority, and oft-times with much differing thoughts and ends.

But it may yet be more cleerly ſeen what ſucceſs the *Romans* would have had againſt *Alexander*, by looking a little forward, and conſidering the affairs of the enſuing Age. The firſt *Carthaginian* war laſted for the ſpace of four and twenty years, in which time the *Carthaginian* power was weakened by the *Romans*; but not ſo quenched, but that it could ſoon get up again and trouble the very *Romans* that were Conquerors. And when *Hannibal* paſſed with his Army into *Italy* four and forty years afterwards, *Rome* being much increaſed in power and reputation, was not the Commonwealth of *Rome* not only robb'd of all the State which ſhe poſſeſt, but the very City of *Rome* reduced into great ſtraits? And yet *Hannibal* was not *Alexander*; he had not the Fortune, the Forces, nor Authority which *Alexander* had: He led his Army a long way by Land, and the Sea was blockt up by the poſſeſſion which the *Romans* had in *Sicily*, and by their powerful Fleets at Sea, to keep him from receiving ſuccor: Nor were his own Citizens a leſs impediment to him, (who envied his glory) then were his Enemies, in keeping out his Army. But there was no ſuch thing in *Alexander*, who by a ſhort cut at Sea might have brought his Army to the Italian ſhores, and have eaſily been accommodated with all things neceſſary. Nor can that be objected to *Alexander*, which leſſened *Hannibals* honor, to wit, That he knew how to overcome, but not how to make uſe of Victory: But amongſt many of his ſingular endowments, he was very ardent and ſollicitous in proſecuting Victories; ſo as no difficulty nor danger whatſoever did ever retard him

the

the leaſt of time, from making good uſe of his proſperous Fortune. Which afforded *Plutarch* occaſion to introduce *Alexander*, ſpeaking of himſelf, in ſuch manner as he challenged all the Praiſes which was given unto him, as more due to his own merit and worth, then to the favour of Fortune.

For theſe Reaſons then, that which was firſt ſaid, may be aſſerted, that is, that it may be numbered amongſt *Romes* greateſt good Fortunes, that *Alexander* the Great bethought himſelf not ſooner of coming into *Italy*, or that he lived not long enough to do it afterwards; For had he done ſo, that Commonwealth muſt either have been oppreſſed by ſo much greater a Power, or if we will ſpeak more mildly, and with more reſpect to the *Roman* Greatneſs, ſhe muſt have run great hazard in her Fortune. And certainly, that happy Genius which guided both theſe Empires to ſuch a height of Greatneſs and Proſperity, kept them at ſuch a diſtance, as that their Forces ſhould not meet together, which had they done ſome one of their Armies muſt either have been totally routed, or at leaſt their Fame and Glory muſt have been much obſcured. The like may be ſaid to have happened in theſe latter Times, between Two Great and Fortunate Princes, The Emperor *Charls the Fift*, and the *Ottaman Sultan Solyman*, who did both of them flouriſh in one and the ſame time, and being both of them (if it be lawful to make this compariſon by reaſon of their diverſity of Faith) endued with great Emulation, grandeur of Spirit, and Warlike Worth, it ſeems that either their own Election kept them from encountring one another, or elſe that they were alwaies kept far aſſunder by ſome certain occult cauſe, ſo as they might not hazard that Glory which with ſo much labour and danger they had won in the Wars, againſt other Princes. But it was particularly obſerved by all men, and not without great wonder, and it was attributed to the ſame reſpect; That the numerous and powerful Armies of both theſe Princes being brought into *Auſtria*, and come very near one another, with an intention, as it ſeemed, to try by Battle the force and worth of themſelves and Armies, ſo great a preparation for War proved altogether vain: *Solyman* not advancing with his Camp to challenge the *Germans* to joyn Battle, as he had firſt profeſſed he would; nor *Ceſar* not budging with his men from the walls of *Vienna*, though before the approach of the Enemy, he had proudly boaſted that he would aſſault him to revenge the former Injuries done to his Brother, and to all *Germany*. But becauſe theſe conſiderations ſute not with our preſent purpoſe, and for that we may peradventure have occaſion to treat thereof hereafter; we will hear end this our preſent Diſcourſe.

The

The Third DISCOURSE.

Whether was the better and more laudable Advice, That of the Carthaginians *in offering to aſſiſt the* Romans, *againſt King* Pyrrhus, *or that of the* Romans, *in refuſing their offer.*

AMongſt many Wars made by the *Romans*, that was of very great weight and danger, which ſhe had to ſuſtain againſt *Pyrrhus*, King of *Epire*, when he paſt with a powerful Army into *Italy* in behalf of the *Tarentines*. Other Wars were made for the moſt part by the *Romans* againſt others, this was made againſt them by a King of greater power then was theirs, and of greater worth in himſelf, and of better experience in Affairs of War. Inſomuch as he deſerved after *Hannibal*, to be eſteemed the prime Commander of his, and of former Ages. This War was likewiſe commenced when the Commonwealth had not ſo well confirmed her Power as ſhe did afterwards; this being before the firſt *Carthaginian* War, which brought the *Romans* firſt to make war out of *Italy*. But as the *Romans* upon this occaſion gave many examples of their undoubted worth, ſo, opportunity of handling ſome State Affairs, from whence uſeful precepts for Civil Government may be drawn, to him who ſhall diſcourſe upon their Actions.

Whilſt *Pyrrhus* was with an Army in *Italy*, the *Carthaginians* ſent their General *Mago* with One hundred and twenty Frigats to aſſiſt the *Romans*; But the *Romans*, thanking the *Carthaginians* for this their readineſs to aſſiſt them, ſent their General back, with all the *Carthaginian* Forces.

This being the matter of Fact, it deſerves conſideration, whether the *Carthaginians*, or *Romans* are more to be praiſed for their Wiſdom and Magnanimity.

To proffer and lend aſſiſtance to one who ſtands in need thereof, eſpecially to one who hath formerly been very fortunate, is a thing befitting Great and Generous Princes; and to refuſe it, ſo it be done modeſtly, and without Arrogancy, ſhews no leſs Generoſity, ſince men do thereby appear to confide in themſelves. So likewiſe to maintain War in anothers Territories, ſo to keep it far from ones ſelf is a wiſe and uſeful counſel; and not to value preſent dangers ſo much, as altogether to neglect things of a further diſtance, is no ſmall ſign of diſcretion. But let us come to a more particular conſideration of theſe things, that we may the better ſee into them, and know what judgement to give of them, either in praiſing or diſpraiſing them.

The *Romans* were at this time in Amity with the *Carthaginians*, and had often formerly renewed their Confederacy with them: The Confines of their Dominions being as yet far diſtant one from another, whereby the occaſion of offence was taken away, did ratifie the Peace and Amity between thoſe two States: So as it was a thing well-beſeeming ſo great a Principality, as was that of the *Carthaginians*, not to forgo their friends in time of danger, though they were not bound by any particular Obligation, to aſſiſt them. And as the failing in ſuch a duty might have caſt ſome blur upon their City, ſo deſerve they no ſmall praiſe for their readineſs in performing it. But theſe things are peradventure of leſs force, and eſtimation amongſt Princes; Whence it may be worth conſideration, Whether

ther the *Carthaginians* were not perſwaded out of other reaſons to aſſiſt the *Romans* in this War. Great was the Fame of King *Pyrrhus* his Valor, and Forces at this time; and no leſs the report of his Ambition, and of his vaſt Deſigns of aſſaulting *Sicily*, and *Affrica*, when he ſhould have overcome the *Romans*. Wherefore the *Carthaginians* had reaſon to uſe all their endeavours not to make trial of their Forces and Fortune with this Prince: And nothing was more opportune for them, to keep ſuch dangers far from them, then to keep *Pyrrhus* in *Italy*; who finding himſelf more withſtood by the *Roman* Forces, thorough the aſſiſtance of the *Carthaginians*, would be neceſſitated to make the longer abode in *Italy*, and (as it falls out in long Enterpriſes) to waſte many of his People there, and leſſen that Reputation and Terror which uſually accompanies great Armies, in their firſt and unexpected Aſſaults. To make war in another mans Country is alwaies good Advice; but beſt for thoſe that are fartheſt off, eſpecially when it may be hoped that ſuch a fire may be long fed in another mans Country. The Forces of the *Romans* were ſufficiently ſtrong of themſelves, but much ſtronger being joyned with thoſe of the *Carthaginians*, and fitter to withſtand *Pyrrhus* his Forces: Who on the other ſide, having undertaken this Enterpriſe, with vaſte thoughts, and being reſolved to hazard his whole Fortune, out of a deſire of new Glory, and greater Empire, and being himſelf a valiant Commander of a valiant Army, it was not eaſily to be beleeved that he would quit *Italy*, unleſs Victorious, or elſe quite overcome and deſtroyd. If *Pyrrhus* ſhould have overcome the *Romans*, when they were abandoned by the *Carthaginians*; and being afterwards big with Reputation of his Victory, ſhould have paſſed into *Sicily*, to moleſt the Affairs of the *Carthaginians*, as his Deſign was to do when he left his Country, what danger would they have been in, or what ſuccour could they have expected from the *Romans*, ſince they had not been aided by the *Carthaginians* in their great neceſſity, and muſt have been much weakened by the Defeat given them by *Pyrrhus*? But if the *Romans* had been aſſiſted by the *Carthaginians*, and *Pyrrhus*, weary of trying his Fortune in *Italy*, ſhould have turned his Forces upon the *Carthaginians*, how could the *Romans* have refuſed to have aſſiſted the *Carthaginians*, in like manner as they had done them? Whence it follows, that thoſe men which the *Carthaginians* ſhould have ſent into *Italy*, ſhould have fought not onely for the ſafety of *Italy*, but for the like of *Sicily* and *Affrica*, and with no leſs advantage to *Carthage*, then to *Rome*. But though it had been apparent, that the *Romans* might of themſelves have reſiſted *Pyrrhus*, and have got the Victory, it had made no leſs for the *Carthaginians*, to make uſe of this occaſion, thereby to oblige the *Romans*, whoſe Power was then very great, and their Worth very much eſteemed, and their intentions of inlarging their Empire, being already known: So as it became the *Carthaginians* for their own ſafety ſake, to have an eye to the greatneſs of this new Potentate; and not being able to quell him, they had all the reaſon in the world to keep him their Friend, to the end that he might turn his Forces ſomewhere elſe, and not upon them. But what Friendſhip is more firm then that which is bound with the Tye of great Benefits? For the receiver, muſt by an occult force of Nature incline to love his Benefactor, and the doer, loves this the noble Product of his good turn in another, and by ſo doing makes himſelf be the better beloved. Great was the *Romans* need at this time, who had not as yet met with a more formidable Enemy then *Pyrrhus*, and therefore the occaſion was likewiſe great, which offered it ſelf to the *Carthaginians* to contract a near Friendſhip and Confederacy with the *Romans*.

But to this it may be objected, That by ſuccouring the *Romans*, the *Carthaginians* would draw anothers War upon themſelves; Nor was it ſo eaſie a thing to overcome the *Romans*, as that *Pyrrhus* could end that War ſo ſuddenly, or with

ſo

ſo entire Forces, as the *Carthaginians* had cauſe to fear them: Nay, rather the irritating of *Pyrrhus* by Injuries, might provoke him to revenge, and make him forgo the *Romans*, and fall upon the *Carthaginians*. But ſay that the Affairs of *Rome*, though aſſiſted by the *Carthaginians*, ſhould have ſucceeded amiſs (as things of this nature are alwaies ſubject to variety of Accidents) what hopes had the *Carthaginians* to defend either what they poſſeſſed in *Sicily*, or even the *African* coaſts, when they ſhould have ſent the greateſt part of their Shipping and Souldiers to aſſiſt the *Romans*? And why ſhould the *Carthaginians* rather fear *Pyrrhus* his Greatneſs, then that of the *Romans*? *Pyrrhus* his Dominions lay further off, and more incommodious to moleſt the *Carthaginians*, then did the *Romans*; he was but one man, and though valiant, yet his life was ſubject to various miſchances (as it proved afterwards, he being ſlain by a ſtone, thrown by a poor old woman.) But *Rome* abounded in valiant Commanders, and was come to the paſs, a man may ſay, of preſerving herſelf ſtill the ſame: So as all other Princes ought rather to have had a care to keep the *Romans* from growing ſtronger, then any other Potentate: For *Romes* power was more ſtable, and therefore like to cauſe longer, and greater dangers to others. Wherefore to keep the *Romans* long buſied in the War againſt *Pyrrhus*, by which their Forces muſt have been weakened, was the means to preſerve other States from that Ambition of Dominion which was already diſcovered to be in the *Romans*.

On the other ſide; To aſſiſt the *Romans* in ridding themſelves of the Troubles of War, eſpecially if this ſhould have happened by their obtaining any ſignal Victory, what was it but to increaſe the Reputation and Courage of others, ſo to haſten their own dangers? For being freed of ſuch incumbrances, and aſpiring after greater things (a thing which is always occaſioned by good ſucceſs) it was not likely the *Romans* would ſtand idle, but ready to imbrace any Enterpiſe, as it happened afterwards. For the firſt *Carthaginian* War enſued ſoon after the War made with *Pyrrhus*: For the *Romans* meeting with no reſiſtance in *Italy*, after the Honor which they had won in their Victory over *Pyrrhus*, they began to march with their Forces into other Countries; they paſt into *Sicily*, being invited in by the *Mamertini*, as *Pyrrhus* was firſt called into *Italy* by the *Tarentini*. And the weakneſs of *Pyrrhus* his Forces did not ſo much occaſion the Victories won in the War, asdid his inconſtancy in proſecuting Enterpriſes once begun; which though it was a natural defect in him, yet may it be believed, that his ſudden departure from *Italy* might be occaſioned by the injury done him by the *Carthaginians*, who unprovoked had taken up Arms againſt him, and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries. But it may be another greater reſpect might have moved him to aſſault the *Carthaginian* State, to wit, That he might onely have to do onely with the *Carthaginians*, as he had at firſt fought onely with the *Romans*; beginning to ſuſpect, as having already diſcovered the *Carthaginians* good will, that if he ſhould tarry longer in *Italy*, and that the *Romans* danger ſhould encreaſe, that Confederacy might be made between them and the *Carthaginians*, which was firſt refuſed: So that whatſoever he ſhould afterwards undertake againſt either of them, might afterwards prove more difficult. This was then the reaſon why *Pyrrhus*, whilſt the buſineſs in *Italy* was not yet finiſhed, nor the danger of the *Tarentines* not well ſecured, marched to go for *Sicily*; which cauſed ſo much trouble and danger to the *Carthaginian* Affairs, as if he had known how to make good uſe of his Victory, the *Carthaginians* might peradventure have been brought then to thoſe final Extremities which were deferred for another time, more for the *Romans* Glory, then for their Welfare and good Fortune. Thus what hath been already ſaid, may ſuffice for what concerns the *Carthaginians*.

Let us now ſee what the *Romans* did, and conſider whether they did well or no

in refuſing the help which was voluntarily offered them, nay brought home to them by the *Carthaginians*. The War which was made by *Pyrrhus* againſt the *Romans*, muſt be thought to be both great and difficult, being made by a Warlike Prince, who brought many many men with him, well trained up in Arms, ſo as by the very Name and Fame of his Forces, he had almoſt brought many Cities of *Italy* to his devotion, withdrawing them from the obedience of the *Romans*; and though he were a ſtranger, yet having firm footing in *Italy*, whither he was called by the *Tarentini*, he was not likely to undergo thoſe diſ-accommodations, which Armies uſe to ſuffer in another Country; but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reaſon of that terror, which things of great Fame, and not formerly known, uſe to bring with them. And the Elephants were a great cauſe of fear, the *Romans* not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Militia. In ſo much danger therefore, when the whole Reſt was at Stake, to preſume too much upon ones ſelf, and upon ones proper Forces, and to dream onely of Glory, when they were to have been more ſollicitous of Safety, hath the appearance rather of Raſhneſs, then of mature and wiſe Counſel. And why ſhould the *Romans* promiſe ſo much unto themſelves againſt *Pyrrhus*, as to deſpiſe the *Carthaginians* help, being as then accuſtomed to fight with the *Tarentini*, a weak Nation, given over to delights, of which they were reprehended by *Pyrrhus* himſelf; and being now to fight with true Souldiers, expert in all ſort of ſufferings, and all military Diſcipline, in the recent Wars made by *Pyrrhus* in *Macedonia*. And when nothing elſe, but even Fortune (which in matter of War is ſo uncertain) ſhould have proved averſe unto them in any thing, to whom could they afterwards have had recourſe for ſuccour, having deſpiſed ſo great helps, readily ſent by ſo great a Power, of ſo great eſteem and Authority, as was then the Commonwealth of *Carthage*?

Yet on the other ſide, it may ſeem no ways to agree with the *Romans* Greatneſs and Generoſity, to confeſs themſelves ſo terrified by *Pyrrhus* his Forces, as that they needed Foreign help to defend themſelves. The *Romans* might have had Peace from *Pyrrhus*, who when he came into *Italy*, ſent his Ambaſſadors to *Rome*, informing the Senate by them, that he was come to compoſe the Difference between them and the *Tarenti* with whom, if the *Romans* would have Peace, he proffered them the like. To which, anſwer was made, That the Commonwealth of *Rome* had not choſen him for their Arbitrator, neither did they fear his enmity; therefore let him firſt return to his own Kingdom, and then, as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace, and ſhould be willingly liſtened unto.

But the City of *Rome* did already begin to envy and emulate the Commonwealth of *Carthage*, which ſhe did peradventure more eſteem then open enmity with the Kingdom of *Epire*, wherewith ſhe thought ſhe ſhould not ſo ſoon have to do neither in matter of Peace nor War, though *Pyrrhus* his ambition had then brought him into *Italy*. Therefore if the *Romans* would not accept of Peace from *Pyrrhus*, they ought leſs to acknowledg their Safety from the *Carthaginians*. They likewiſe thought they might ſo much rely upon their own Forces, having valiant and well diſciplined Souldiers of their own, as that there remained no doubt of Victory in that War, then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance in War. They conſidered that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increaſed by Foreigners, and yet the power to reſiſt an Enemy not be made the greater; whilſt either the differing ends of Princes, the little agreement between Commanders, or the contrary Cuſtom and Diſcipline of Souldiers, do often occaſion many diſcords in matter of War; which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands, and diſpoſeth of all things, and where better obedience

ſhewn

ſhewn by Souldiers of one and the ſame Dominion. Therefore was it that the *Romans* did ſundry other times refuſe foreign aid; as particularly, in the War againſt *Antiochus*, when refuſing aſſiſtance ſent unto them by other Kings of *Africa*, they with their own few, but valiant Souldiers, routed *Antiochus* his numerous Army, made up of many ſeveral Nations. Such reſpects as theſe might have been liable to conſideration, even when their Faith and Friendſhip, who were to have lent aſſiſtance, had been for certain to be credited; but who could ſecure the *Romans*, who having already extended their Dominions far into *Italy*, could not grow much greater without injuring Nations further off: from being jealous of the *Carthaginians*, who were antient and powerful Lords in *Affrica*, and in *Spain*, and poſſeſſed of the greateſt part of *Sicily*; and as there were none who could more hinder the increaſe of their Greatneſs then the *Carthaginians*, ſo was it neceſſary that they being apprehended for ſuch by the *Romans*, ſhould likewiſe fear them for the preſervation of their own quiet and ſecurity. And what charity is this, might thoſe wiſe and ancient Senators of *Rome* ſay, which hath moved theſe *Affricans* to be ſo careful of us, as without any obligation of Confederacy, and not ſought unto, they ſhould ſend ſo prime a Captain as *Mago*, with ſuch a number of Frigats and Soldiers, to aſſiſt us, and to bereave their own State of ſuch defence, to preſerve the States of other men? The greater the appearances ſeemed outwardly, the more might it be ſuſpected that theſe things proceeded not from ſincerity of heart: If the *Carthaginians* had done this, becauſe they held the *Romans* to be ſo unworthy, as that they were to yeeld to *Pyrrhus* his firſt aſſault, and ſo their States might be expoſed to the ſame danger, it was not good to nouriſh ſuch an opinion in the *Carthaginians*, by which they ſhould no ſooner be quit of *Pyrrhus*, but the *Carthaginians*, who were as willing to keep the *Romans* low, as *Pyrrhus* was, might come and ſet upon them. So whilſt they ſhould endeavor to ſecure the War which was on foot, and from which, if they were the ſame men which they had always uſed to be againſt their Enemies, they had great hopes they might defend themſelves, they might have raiſed another more dangerous and difficult; if the *Roman* generoſity had not ſuffered that by anothers fraud, whereunto they ſhould onely have given conſent and ſome ſmall reward, *Pyrrhus* ſhould have been ſlain (as they were offered by an acquaintance of his, he ſhould be) though thereby they were freed from all danger; but rather to exempt the Commonwealth from ſuch a blemiſh, the *Roman* Commander choſe to acquaint the enemy with what was plotted againſt him; how could they, or ought they to tolerate that the *Carthaginians*, who had ſent aid, not out of any deſire of *Romes* welfare, but as thoſe that envied her glory, ſhould boaſt themſelves of being the preſervers of the *Roman* Liberty? If it ſhould have ſo faln out by any adverſe accident that *Pyrrhus*, who came to aſſault them, ſhould have proved Conqueror; nothing had been to be blamed but the Fortune of War, ſince they themſelves ſhould have carried themſelves gallantly and adviſedly in the maintaining of it: But if they ſhould have accepted of the *Carthaginian* ſuccour, men might think, that the *Romans* gave themſelves for overcome, before a blow was given and that they were much inferior to the Enemy, not in Forces, but in Valor: That *Pyrrhus* had not undertaken that enterpriſe out of neceſſity, but onely out of a deſire of novelty, and hopes of glory: That therefore if his firſt aſſaults ſhould be ſtoutly ſuſtained, he ſhould have enough of it, and that being invited by another occaſion, which he underſtood was already brewing againſt him, by the *Sicilian* Diſcords, being naturally of a fickle humour, he might readily turn to ſome other undertaking; and that as he had come into *Italy* ſlightly, and upon no occaſion, to make War againſt them, ſo he might eaſily be perſwaded by any adverſe Fortune to give over the Affairs of *Italy*, and fall upon ſomething elſe;

had he been ſo ſtrong in Men and Forces, as it ſeems men thought he was, he would not have ſent his Orator *Cineas* to ſeek friendſhip with the Senate and people of *Rome*, and to endeavour that by words which he might eaſily have obtained by force, which was, to grant peace to the *Tarentines* his Confederates.

Something like this we may believe was ſaid by that *Appius*, a Senator of experienced wiſdom, who was imployed in anſwering *Pyrrhus* his Ambaſſador, and in readily accepting the intimated War. And whoſoever ſhall duly conſider theſe ſo many and ſo ſprightly reaſons which they had to diſmiſs the Carthaginian aſſiſtance, muſt needs be perſwaded that it did agree with the Roman wiſdom and generoſity. Yet he who will ground his judgment aright, and juſtly weigh what the Carthaginians did, muſt reflect upon divers reſpects, by which ſuch actions are uſually governed. If then the advantage of the buſineſs be only conſidered, it will appear to conſiſt well with what the Carthaginians did then adviſe upon: For to hazard thoſe few Forces which they ſent to aſſiſt the Romans, tended towards the preſervation of their own State from *Pyrrhus* his incurſion; and it appeared rational enough, that the war made againſt him by the Roman forces, joined with thoſe of the Carthaginians, might draw on to a length of time: For it was believed by the reſolution which *Pyrrhus* took when he went from his Kingdom, that he ſhould not have ſo ſoon given over his attempt; and the Carthaginians being with a conſiderable ſtrength in the Roman Armies, might at their pleaſures, and in divers manners have ſo prolonged the War, and ſpun it out into ſuch a length, as they might have ſo weakened both their Forces, as they needed not for a long time to fear either *Pyrrhus* or the Romans. But in the Romans reſolutions to refuſe the Carthaginian ſuccor, the magnanimity of their minds is chiefly to be praiſed: For the War was not ſlighted by thoſe who refuſed to make Peace with their Enemies, and to accept of aſſiſtance from their Friends; but full of dangers, which if they ſhould be able to overcome, they thought it would be an action of great worth, but of greater difficulty. But this reſolution, out of the aforeſaid reaſons, made not ſo much for their advantage for the preſent, as for the future. And it was known, that *Fabritius* his generoſity in preſerving *Pyrrhus* his life (though his Enemy) from the Treachery of other men, made no leſs for the overcoming of *Pyrrhus*, then did the military diſcipline of *Valerius Corvinus*, and the Roman Armies which fought againſt him. Wherefore he ſent *Cineas* to *Rome* to grant liberty to ſuch priſoners as he had taken, and to deſire peace with the Romans, being moved thereunto rather by that noble act, then by any loſs he had received in the conflict. And it may be believed, that it was this which made him reſolve to forego *Italy* the ſooner, and leave the Roman affairs quiet.

Yet ſuch a Conſideration may appear to be very weak, being compared to the advantage which might thereby have been gotten: For it had regard to things of uncertainty, and to dangers far off; whereas the Carthaginians help might have made for the good of preſent affairs. Wherefore the Romans might be herein convinced; if it were not to be ſaid, that the deſire of Glory was ſo great in them, as aiming only and chiefly thereat, they put on their reſolutions with ſuch fervor, as they did not only exceed all others, but even themſelves. They thought they ſhould make their condition the worſe by accepting of Forein aſſiſtance, whatſoever ſhould befall them: For if they ſhould overcome *Pyrrhus*, aſſiſted with the Carthaginians, the military valor would be much leſſened, which otherwiſe did belong to ſo great an undertaking, and to the ſo great hazard which they ran; but if they ſhould be overcome, their ſhame would be increaſed; the Roman Forces, though aſſiſted by ſo great a ſtrength of Foreiners, not being able to reſiſt *Pyrrhus* his Army. They might likewiſe peradventure doubt, leſt by repoſing ſome part of their hopes upon Forein aid, they might make their own Senators leſs fervent and ſollicitous in

providing

providing things fitting for the War, and their Captains and Soldiers leſs diligent in their military imployments; as it often falls out in what is recommended to the care of many, that whilſt one to eaſe himſelf a little, ſeeks to lay load upon another, the burthen is more weakly ſuſtained by many, then it would have been by a few: But the truth of theſe things can but only be diſcuſs'd by probable Arguments, to delight our ſelves in the variety of affairs which preſent themſelves in the ballancing of ſeveral reaſons which may happen in theſe great actions: For to give a determinate ſentence therein, we want the groundwork of thoſe particulars, which we cannot take notice of now in things done ſo long ſince, and by which all our works, eſpecially ſuch as are ſubject to ſo many alterations as are all Civil and Military affairs, can be only beſt regulated. It is moſt certain, that the *Romans*, who were formerly full of high and glorious thoughts, got ſo much boldneſs and reputation after having driven *Pyrrhus* out of *Italy* with their own proper Forces, and overcome him in ſo many Battels, as they did the eaſilier undertake any War, and no Nation in *Italy* durſt ever after oppoſe their deſigns, whereby they ſoon opened the way to a large Empire.

The Fourth DISCOURSE,

Which of the two famous Roman Commanders, Quintus Fabius Maximus, *or* P. Scipio Africanus, *brought more of advantage to the Commonwealth of* Rome *in managing their War.*

Fabius Maximus, and *P. Scipio Africanus*, deſcended from noble Roman Families, and endued with excellent parts, did flouriſh in the ſame Age; which happening to be at the time when the Commonwealth of *Rome* was much moleſted by the Carthaginian Forces, they had occaſion to ſhew their valor in the behalf of their Country, and to purchaſe much glory to themſelves. They had alike zeal to the common good; their love to their Country, their ſtrength of mind, and knowledg of military affairs was alike; but they differed in opinion concerning the management of the War, and different was the occaſion which they had in exerciſing it. Great was the ſervice which the City of *Rome* received from theſe two; but they differed much in their ways and ends. *Fabius* led the Armies through *Italy* againſt *Hannibal*, for the ſafety of the City of *Rome*: *Scipio* fought in *Africa* againſt the ſame *Hannibal*, for the glory and grandezza of *Rome*, being already freed from ſo many dangers of the Carthaginian Forces. The former brought ſuccor and help in a very ſeaſonable time to the affairs of *Rome* when they were much diſtreſſed, and raiſed up the tottering fortune of the Commonwealth: The latter, by diſcomfiting many of the Carthaginian Commanders, and even *Hannibal* himſelf, did not only put his Romans in perpetual ſafety from the Carthaginian forces and ſtratagems wherewith they had been ſo long moleſted, but brought whole *Africa* under their obedience. *Fabius* preſerved *Italy* from the ſlavery of Forein Nations, into which ſhe had certainly fallen, had it not been for his actions and advices, *Hannibal* having already poſſeſt himſelf of all the chief Cities: But *Scipio* did much enlarge the Roman Confines, and made the Africans confeſs they were overcome by Italian valor, and ſubmit their necks to the yoke of the Roman Empire. Theſe excellent Commanders ſhewed great worth, and great experience in military affairs by theſe their actions, each of them uſing therein their proper qualities and endowments: *Fabius* loved

conſtancie,

conſtancy, gravity, followed late taken reſolutions, but ſuch as were ſecure. *Scipio*, meaſuring all things according to the greatneſs of his conception, did willingly imbrace new Enterpriſes, nothing that was glorious ſeemed hard to him. *Fabius* feared *Hannibal* out of wiſdom, not out of any cowardly mind; *Scipio* deſpiſed him, confiding in himſelf and in the valor of his Army. Wherefore *Fabius* thought he had ended the buſineſs, if *Hannibal* being reduced to much hardſhip, ſhould be forced to forgo *Italy*: But *Scipio* as if he had been ſure of Victory, refuſing all offers of Agreement how advantageous ſoever, made by the *Carthaginians*, would hazard the day in that famous place of *Zama*, where the height of Empire was to be decided between two powerful Nations. And truly it ſeems, that it was *Romes* good Fortune, which made theſe two ſo excellent men be at this time Coetaneans, though with different thoughts applied to the Safety and Glory of that Commonwealth: For the one, with much patience overcoming the bitterneſs of Fortune, and the Inſolency of the Enemy, freed her from ſo many dangers into which ſhe was faln: the other, finding the Commonwealth already reſtored, and knowing how to make better uſe of his good fortune then *Hannibal*, did by his noble daring add greater ſplendor, and glory to her.

But here it may be worthy conſideration, which of theſe two may be thought to have done things which were better, and of more uſe for the Commonwealth. *Fabius* his actions tended to the ſafety of his Country, when ſhe was reduced into great danger, and put a period to her troubles more by good Counſel, then by many Forces: But the *African* propoſed unto himſelf the increaſe of Glory, and of Empire of the City of *Rome*. Wherefore not ſatisfied with what he had ſucceſsfully done in *Spain*, he reſolved to paſs into *Affrica*, where refuſing all conditions of Peace, he would needs joyn battel with *Hannibal*, wherein his proſperity continuing, he won a great and glorious Victory. On the one ſide then, *Fabius* deſerts appear to be very great, he having preſerved the City when it was in a deſperate condition, ſo by ſaving it from the utmoſt of dangers, he made himſelf a ſharer of that praiſe which is given to the firſt Founders of Cities: And certainly ſuch was *Hannibals* fortune at that time, the worth and reputation of his Army ſuch, as all Force indeavoured againſt him, would have proved not onely vain but prejudicial; and his being judged by the Senate and People of *Rome* to be a Commander fit to cope with *Hannibal*, and onely fit to ſuppreſs his Forces, even then when *Scipio* that valiant and famous Captain, did live and flouriſh, ſhews that *Fabius* worth was ſo highly eſteemed, as it was not to be exceeded. And this is afterwards confirmed by the grave teſtimony of *Paulus Æmilius*, famous among the moſt celebrated *Romans*; who being, as Conſul, to go into the Camp againſt *Hannibal*, highly extolling things formerly done by *Fabius*, whilſt he was Dictator, ſaid that he would rather be praiſed in matters of War by him alone, then do things which might differ from his actions, though they pleaſed all the people of *Rome* therein. *Fabius* was indeed excellently well adviſed in all he did; for he was no leſs valiant in withſtanding the Enemy in Battle, and in correcting the error and raſhneſs of *Minutius*, Maſter of the Cavalry, who had importunely, and contrary to his opinion begun the Skirmiſh, then he was formerly wiſe in foreſeeing the danger, and in endeavouring to keep it off. His conſtancy of mind in adverſity witneſſed his no want of Courage, but out of abundance of Wiſdom he ſhunned the hazard of giving Battel. Wherefore after the diſcomfeiture at *Canna*, no man was more conſtant, and ready then he to take a reſolution. It is therefore ſaid, that in the dejection of ſoul, and confuſion of all things, the Citizens had recourſe to his Counſel, as to an Oracle: And the comparing the actions of others, in what concerned the adminiſtration of War againſt *Hannibal*, made *Fabius* his worth appear the more; for before he took upon him the Dictatorſhip, the Conſul

ſul *Flaminius* was routed at the Lake *Thraſymenus*, and when he laid down the Dictatorſhip; *Terentius* taking other courſes then did *Fabius*, gave occaſion for that famous and grievous overthrow which the *Romans* received at the Battel of *Cannæ*; whereby it may be known, that wiſe Commanders (juſt like underſtanding Phyſitians when they meet with weak bodies, do oftentimes make uſe rather to preſcribe quiet and good government, free from all diſorder, then Phyſick) when they know the Forces of the Commonwealth to be but weak, as were thoſe of the *Romans* at that time, ought alſo to free the State from great and eminent dangers, by temporizing, and by proceeding leaſurely with all advantage, then by uſing Force of Arms and hazarding a Battel. Which made *Hannibal* ſay, That he feared *Fabius* his fearfulneſs more, then the daring of the other *Roman* Captains: And finding all his Deſigns at other times fruſtrated by *Fabius*, he affirmed that the *Romans* had alſo their *Hannibal*. Nor could his cunning be indeed overcome otherwiſe then by cunning, and by knowing how to make uſe of fitting occaſions, and how to bereave the Enemy of the like, which indeed was peculiar to *Fabius*.

It may moreover be ſaid for *Fabius*, and in praiſe of his advice, that as no humane Action is more ſubject to divers unexpected Accidents, then in Battle, wherein great Effects are often produced from very ſmall Accidents, ſo cannot a Commander attribute at any time ſo much praiſe unto himſelf in Victories, but that good Fortune will challenge a great ſhare therein: Wherefore it is numbered amongſt the chief qualities which are to be deſired in him who would prove a good Commander, that he be fortunate. Beſides, no Victory is ever won by meer fighting, without much blood, and much loſs of ones own men; ſo as to overcome an enemy by ſuch means as *Fabius* knew how to do, and without expoſing himſelf to the danger of a ſet Battle, to overthrow an Enemies Army by reducing it to great hardſhips, is a thing of more rare vertue, and which makes the Commander more praiſe-worthy. By theſe cunnings were *Hannibals* cunnings deluded, by theſe was his fierceneſs tamed, and the reputation won from him, and from his Army, which he had won in Battel, by having ſo often worſted and overthrown the *Romans*. So as it may be ſaid, that *Fabius* conquered *Hannibal* a Conqueror; but that *Scipio* overcame him when he was already conquered. For *Fabius* had to do with him, when he was in *Italy* with a puiſſant Army, and in the height of his greateſt proſperity; But *Scipio* made not trial of his Forces againſt thoſe of *Hannibal*, till he was returned to *Africa*, with his Army beaten and waſted by ſufferings, and when by the uſual change of humane Affairs the ſtate of things between the *Carthaginians* and *Romans* was ſufficiently altered. Wherefore *Hannibal*, who had formerly endeavoured nothing more then to fight his Enemies in a pitch'd field, when he was returned to *Africa*, perſwaded the *Carthaginians* to Peace, and propoſed all conditions of Agreement to *Scipio*, ſo to ſhun joyning Battel with him; in which, as if he had foretold his own misfortunes, he loſt the remnant of his Army which he had brought from *Italy*.

Wherefore ſhould it not then be thought, that it was harder for *Fabius* to ſtop the courſe of *Hannibals* Victories, then it was for *Scipio* to overcome him in Battel, when the *Carthaginians* were at their greateſt loſs, and calamity? Nay, it was objected to *Scipio*, when he endeavoured to lead his Army into *Africa*, that he did it to ſhun encountring with *Hannibal* in *Italy*. It is a very common, but a very true ſaying,

Non minor eſt virtus quàm quærere, parta tueri.

Fabius preſerved the Glory, Reputation and ſtate of the Commonwealth, which his Anceſtors had won; *Scipio* increaſed them. So as had it not been for *Fabius*, the Name, at leaſt the Fame of *Rome* had been almoſt loſt: But ſhe had onely been leſs glorious without *Scipio*.

Of

On the contrary, who will consider *Scipio's* great actions, how can he judge him to come short of any other Roman Commander whatsoever, either for glory or desert; since he may be said to have been the first who opened the way unto the Romans of conquering the whole World, as they did in a short time? For by his means *Africa* was conquered, and a curb put to the greatest and most powerful Enemies that ever the Romans had; so as none ever after durst withstand the Roman greatness by force, or did disdain to humble and submit themselves to their worth and fortune, whom the most powerful and fortunate of all other Nations did already obey? *Scipio* brought all *Spain* under the Roman obedience, driving away the Carthaginians from thence, whom he overcame in four several battels: Nor did he make the way easie to greater acquisitions, less by his excellent gifts of mind, then by force of Arms; making those people affectionate, and faithful to the Romans. And yet as not much valuing these his great deeds, being returned to *Rome* full of glory, he endeavoured to return again with his Army into *Africa*, knowing that the Carthaginians could not keep quiet at home, but must be troubling and endangering the the Romans: Nor had he less difficulty to overcome *Fabius* his obstinate opinion in the Senate, who blamed this advice, then in routing the Enemies in the Field.

But if *Fabius* be to be esteemed, because he in a short time freed the Romans from the danger of the Carthaginians; what must we say of *Scipio*, who did for ever secure them from these their Enemies, bereaving them of their Land-Forces by taking the Flower of their men away from them in Battel; and the like of their Maritime strength, having by agreement forced them to burn all their Ships? Which won him so great respect from all persons, as at his return from *Africa* people ran from all parts, only that they might see him. To say truth, what can be said of *Fabius*, save that he did not lose? But in *Scipio's* Victories, what can be desired to make them greater or more glorious? In the space of forty five days he raised a powerful Army; and followed by more Voluntiers for the fame of his worth, then he carried Soldiers with him by Decree of Senate, he marched into *Africa*: He conquered People and Cities, that were enemies to the name of *Roman*; he overcame *Asdrubal* and *Hanno*, two famous Carthaginian Commanders; he discomfited *Hannibals* Army, and ending the War with the overthrow of the Enemy, he returned time enough to *Rome* to lay down his Magistracie. *Hannibal* being withdrawn from the walls of *Rome*, and kept at gaze by *Fabius* his cunning, stayed in *Italy*, expecting succor from *Africa*, to renew the War with greater Force. *Scipio's* advice and actions were only able to draw him out of *Italy*; so as carrying the War elswhere, at the same time he freed his own home from the troubles and danger thereof. He who should have asked *Fabius*, what the signs were, what the fruits of his Victories; what could he have shewn? No Enemies taken, no Cities won, no Gold nor Silver brought into the Comon-Exchequer. But many things prove the glory and deserts of *Scipio*: So many Prisoners taken, amongst which *Syphax*, the great and famous King of *Numidia*; so many Cities subjugated in *Africa*, and in *Spain*; the annual Tribute imposed upon the Carthaginians; the rich Pillage brought home from the Enemy.

What is there then of like, not to name equal, between these two, which may make them contend for military glory? But certainly it may be affirmed for truth, that the one and the other of them are come to the height of glory, though they took several ways to arrive at it: For each of them shewed wisdom and valor in their actions, becoming advised Statesmen, and great Commanders. Divers accidents concurred in their several actions, which perswaded them to proceed after a differing manner: For *Fabius* being to withstand *Hannibals* violence, who being already advanced into the very bowels of *Italy*, and being drawn veryneer to *Rome* herself,

herſelf, had filled all things with fear, did not think it fitting in this confuſion of affairs to hazard all the fortune of the Commonwealth in a day of battel: For the neerneſs and power of the Enemy did not allow time to recruit and ſtop the courſe of *Hannibals* Victories, in caſe that Army wherein the chief hopes of *Romes* welfare did conſiſt, ſhould have been beaten.

But *Scipio* having to do with the ſame *Hannibal*, when he and his Army were in *Africa*, and neer the City of *Carthage*, knew that if any thing of ill ſhould befall him, he ſhould only loſe thoſe men that were with him; which loſs might eaſily be recovered, the condition being conſidered wherein the Commonwealth then was: And it being his fortune to overcome *Hannibal*, he reduced the affairs of the *Carthaginians* (whom he had worſted in divers other battels) to the utmoſt of dangers: Wherefore by the victory he got great rewards for himſelf, great glory, and increaſed the Empire of his Commonwealth. *Scipio* had alſo other reaſons which perſwaded him to fight; his being in a forein Country, his keeping of the Enemy from recruiting after their late loſſes, and he being ſhortly to lay down his command; ſo as to ſpin out the War in length, was to deprive him of his conceived hopes of victory, and to leſſen what he had already done. *Scipio* therefore had as much reaſon to engage in battel, as *Fabius* formerly had to refuſe fighting.

This is confirmed by the ſeveral ways of proceeding of the ſame *Hannibal*, an excellent Commander; who at firſt, when he was in *Italy*, deſired nothing more then to come to a pitch'd battel, out of the aforeſaid reaſons; ſo afterwards being withdrawn with his Army into *Africa*, ſhunn'd encountring *Scipio* as much as he might, the different condition of affairs adviſing him differently. And it is a general rule, That thoſe things ought to be avoided which pleaſe the Enemy; for the reſpects being different, that which makes for the one, muſt needs be bad for the other. It muſt afterwards be conſidered, that if *Fabius* had pleaſed, when he was made Dictator, after the unfortunate Fight at the *Traſſemine* Lake, to lead that Army into *Africa* which was deſtined for the ſafety of the very City of *Rome*, it muſt have been expoſed to apparent dangers of the Enemies victorious Forces, with uncertain hope of ſucceſs in *Africa*; nor would this diverſion have been then peradventure a ſufficient means to have freed it from danger, as it did afterwards when *Scipio's* counſel was followed in an opportune time, when after divers bad ſucceſſes both in *Spain* and *Africa*, *Hannibal* was ſent for back to aſſiſt the much weakned affairs of his Commonwealth.

He therefore who will go about to imitate the actions of theſe two Captains, if he will reap good thereby, muſt firſt very well conſider every particular of thoſe things which he goes about, and therein accommodate himſelf, either by hazarding battel, and haſting on to the end of the enterpriſe with ſudden and reſolute Parties, or elſe muſt haraſs and overcome the Enemy by drawing things out to a length, and by reducing him to many inconveniencies. He alſo who will adviſe wiſely touching the aſſaulting of another mans Country, to keep his own from danger, or who will elſe make good his own affairs only by way of defence, muſt have divers reſpects in conſideration, which lead to the knowledg what in his caſe is fitteſt to be done; and by ſo doing he may hope for the good ſucceſs which theſe two famous Roman Commanders had. But howſoever, though their affairs fall out leſs proſperouſly, he will win the praiſe of being either a wiſe and circumſpect, or elſe a valiant and bold Commander; as befell *Scipio* and *Fabius*, becauſe each of them knew how to manage the War ſo, as the condition of Times, the quality of their own and of their Enemies Forces, the diverſity of the Place, and other reſpects and accidents, which in ſuch caſes ought to regulate our actions, did adviſe them to do.

The Fifth DISCOURSE.

Whether War being to be made againſt the Romans, Hannibals *Counſel was good to carry it into* Italy.

Hannibal, a cried up *Carthaginian* Captain, intending to wage War with the *Romans,* reſolved to lead the Army which he had already raiſed in *Spain* into *Italy* by land, paſſing firſt over the *Pyrenean* Mountains, and then over the Alps, that he might approach as near as he could to the City of *Rome,* the Seat of the Empire. This is thought by all men to be a bold and generous advice, but it is much doubted whether it were advantagious for the *Carthaginians,* and for *Hannibals* own deſigns. He thought, that being to quell the *Roman* Power, he muſt ſhake it in thoſe parts where it had taken deepeſt root: That the *Romans* would be furniſhed with Soldiers, Victuals, Moneys, and all things elſe from *Italy,* wherewith they were wont to maintain War againſt ſeveral Nations, and to encreaſe their own Glory and Empire: that whilſt they were Maſters of this, they could not be much prejudiced by any thing that could be attempted againſt them in other parts: That uſually his advantage was very great who aſſaulted another at his own door, becauſe he keeps the perils, and greateſt loſſes of War far from him: He increaſeth courage in his own men, and takes in from the Enemy, and makes the way more eaſie to Victory, not onely by Forces but by Reputation, and alſo by the fear which he infuſeth into the Enemy: but the farther off the War is carried, and the nearer the Enemy is aſſaulted in the Centre and very heart of his State, the more are ſuch advantages got. If the *Romans,* who were alwaies wont to moleſt other mens Affairs, ſhould be forced to fight within their own Confines, and were to wage War, not to inlarge their Dominions, but to defend themſelves and what they held deereſt, they would prove leſs then themſelves, becauſe their courage would fail them, and the ſplendor of the *Roman* name would be obſcured, which did ſo much help to the atchieving of their Enterpriſes. Therefore the *Romans* knowing by experience the diſadvantage of making War at home, and open enmity being profeſſed between them and *Phillip* King of *Macedon,* fearing leaſt the *Carthaginian* War being ended, he would aſſault *Italy,* as *Hannibal* had done but a little before, would be the firſt who ſhould paſs with their Army into *Greece,* and carry the greateſt trouble and danger of War into the States of others. But the longer and more difficult the way was for *Hannibal* to conduct his *Carthaginians* into *Italy,* ſo much greater Honor would he win when he ſhould have overcome theſe difficulties: That without great conſtancy and worth in the Commander and Soldiers, ſo hard an Enterpriſe could not have been undertaken, ſuch craggy mountainous ſeats paſſed over, and their way be made by the Sword amidſt an Enemies Country.

To this was added, that there were many in *Italy,* who were not pleaſed with the *Romans* Empire, by whoſe Colonies ſent by them into other peoples Countries, they were robbed not onely of their Goods but of their Liberty: That the fame given out that *Hannibal* would free theſe from the *Roman* ſlavery, and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power, might alienate the minds of ſuch as were Neighbors to the *Romans,* and reconcile them ſo much the more to him. *Hannibal* did likewiſe conſider, as he whoſe intention it was not to make Inrodes into the *Roman* Territories, to make a ſore and long War with them,

that

that there were many in the *Carthaginian* Senate who were not well pleaſed with this enterpriſe, ſome being moved by reſpect of the contrary Faction, others by envy to his glory, and others by zeal they bore to their Countries quiet. That if he ſhould be with his Army in ſome neighboring Country, and that the *Romans* ſhould be but weakly invaded, and not ſoundly ſet upon, it might in likelihood fall out he ſhould be ſent for home, and Peace be concluded. He feared likewiſe leſt his Army, which was compoſed of divers Nations, when his Soldiers ſhould find themſelves near their own houſes, they might the more eaſily disband. Being therefore onely intent to come with his Forces into *Italy*, he would ſhun all occaſions of trying his men againſt the *Romans* in a pitch'd Field, when *Publius Scipio* went to encounter him at the Banks of *Rhodanus*. Moreover it would not ſatisfie the high and magnanimous end which he had prefixt unto himſelf, of freeing *Carthage*, his Country, from the Tribute to the which ſhe was made liable by the *Romans*, to moleſt them in any part further from the State, but he muſt march againſt the very City of *Rome*, the Seat of the Empire, to allay, or at leaſt to weaken much their power. Other ſmaller things might have given ſome trouble to the *Romans*, and have retarded their greatneſs; but in the ſame danger and uncertainty of War, whereby ſhe had provoked ſo powerful an enemy againſt her, the reward, and the benefit were not equal in both the caſes. Very great and difficult undoubtedly was ſuch an enterpriſe, but befitting *Hannibal*, who, as it was ſaid, had through the magnanimity of his ſpirit, propoſed unto himſelf to imitate the deeds of *Hercules*, and had taken up arms againſt the *Romans*, not out of any hatred he bore them, but for the dignity of Empire. So as what would have infuſed fear into another, did ſet his mind the more on fire. He thought likewiſe by force of neceſſity to infuſe into his Soldiers that ſtrength and conſtancy of mind, which was as an excellent vertue in himſelf, whilſt fighting ſhould be enforced, all occaſion of flight being taken away, to put all their hopes of ſafety in their Swords. This moſt expert Commander knew likewiſe wherein his Forces did exceed, and therewithal he would make trial of their worth. Wherefore paſſing with his Army ſafe over the Mountains, he foreſaw he ſhould find large Plains in *Italy*, wherein he might fight the *Romans* upon great advantage, his Army abounding in Horſe, and the Infantry being the *Romans* chiefeſt ſtrength.

Then as this counſel was taken by *Hannibal* with reaſon, ſo if this action be particularly conſidered, it may be ſaid, that he was very ſucceſsful therein: for the firſt time that he had to do with the Roman Armies in *Italy*, though the Armies of two Conſuls were joyned together againſt him, that which was firſt ſent againſt him into *France*, and that which was deſtined to encounter him when he ſhould have deſcended the Mountains, he came off with ſuch victory as he put *Rome* into great terror, both for that the City was not wont before to hear ſuch bad news from their Captains, as alſo for having ſo powerful, and ſo victorious an enemy ſo nigh at hand. But what can be added to the victories gotten at the Lake of *Thraſymenus* and at *Canna*; (places made famous for the calamities which the Romans ſuffered there) to make his glory greater? and the good thereof was anſwerable to the greatneſs; for thoſe of the Empire rebelling every where, and flying from the Romans diſtreſſed fortune, to *Hannibals* favor and obedience, he ſoon made himſelf Maſter of almoſt all *Italy*, and put the very City of *Rome* to great danger and confuſions. So as it was either his noble daring which begot ſuch proſperous effects, or elſe it was thereby accompanied.

Yet there wanted not other reaſons, and reſpects, which may make *Hannibals* advice of leading his Army into *Italy* appear leſs uſeful, and leſs praiſe-worthy; and it may be ſaid, that if he had paſſed into *Italy* with almoſt all the whole Carthaginian

ginian Forces, bringing along with him Veteran Soldiers, and the greateſt ſtrength of the Carthaginian Empire, he ought to have conſidered, that undertaking to make War againſt the *Romans*, a warlike, powerful, and fortunate Nation, the Carthaginian State was not likely to keep unmoleſted by their Forces; Reaſon not permitting it to be believed, that they who formerly, not provoked by any injuries, but rather excited by a deſire of Government, had happily waged war with the Commonwealth of *Carthage*, would now ſtand only ſpectators of their own miſery, and repulſers of offence, but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kindled in their own houſes, either into *Africa* or *Spain*, to keep the Carthaginian Forces from ſuccouring that part where their own danger was increaſed. And ſo did the effect enſue; for the *Romans* having firſt aſſaulted *Spain*, and after *Africa*, and finding them both but badly provided of Garriſons fitting to withſtand ſo potent an Enemy, they reduced the firſt under the obedience of their Commonweal'th, driving all the *Carthaginians* from thence, and did put the other into ſo great confuſion, as little more then the bare name of a Republick remained to the very City of *Carthage*. But how could *Hannibal* hope to tarry long in *Italy*, and to be able to receive ſuch ſuccors and ſupplies as he muſt of neceſſity ſtand in need of? The way was ſhut up by Land by the craggy mountains, and by the Enemy; and the Sea was leſs open to them, the *Romans* not being only maſters of the Sea, but of Navigation; for their Fleet was greater then that of the *Carthaginians*: whence it was, that the ſuccor came neither time enough to *Hannibal* for him to proſecute his Victories; neither when it was ſent, could it come ſafe to him, his brother *Aſdrubal*, who conducted it, being cut in pieces, together with all his men by the Conſul *Claudius*.

Out of theſe reſpects it may be thought, that it had been better and ſafer for *Hannibal* to have commenced the War againſt the Romans in *Sicily* or *Sardinia*. The pretence of taking up Arms againſt the Romans, for the recovery of ſuch things as were granted out of great neceſſity to them by his Commonwealth, was more juſt. Wherefore he might have bethought himſelf of not provoking the diſfavor both of God and man againſt him; as it appeared on the contrary, that his breach of Articles, and his too bold deſign of driving the Romans out of *Italy*, their own proper ſeat and dominion, made all things prove croſs unto him. The buſineſs would likewiſe have proved more opportune and eaſie, by reaſon of the ill ſatisfaction which the people of thoſe Iſlands received from the *Romans* power, which occaſioned in them a great mind to rebel, as was afterwards found. The Carthaginian Commonwealth was ſtrong enough by Sea; and though Fortune had not been propitious to them in their Naval conflict with the *Romans*, yet was their experience in Maritime affairs greater; and the City was then ſo well provided of Shipping, as we read that they were above five hundred Ships which they were forced to burn by command from *Scipio*, after *Hannibals* Rout in *Africa*. If *Hannibal* would then have put his Army into theſe Bottoms, and have turned with powerful Forces upon *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and being alſo aſſiſted with the Peoples inclination, he could not almoſt have doubted to have reduced them in a ſmall time under the Carthaginian power. And having won theſe Iſlands, what way would he have made for the enterpriſe of *Italy*? He might have made uſe of this ſituation, and of his Fleet, to have kept the Sea open to himſelf, and block'd up to the *Romans*: whereas doing the contrary, it happened otherwiſe; for the Carthaginian Fleet being very weak, the greater part whereof were imployed in other places, it was overcome by the *Romans*, their Navigation and Succor was hindred, and finally all *Hannibals* deſigns were fruſtrated. But the advantage which *Hannibal* might have reaped by ſuch an enterpriſe, and by the getting of *Sicily*, may eaſily be known by what *Scipio* got, who being to paſs with his Army into *Africa*, putting

in

in at *Sicily*, he thereby got great assistance and accommodation. And the *Carthaginians* themselves were aware, that the War ought to have been handled thus: For after the death of *Hiero*, Lord of *Syracusa*, they sent their Fleet to regain *Sicily*; but the counsel was too late and unopportunely taken; for Fortune beginning now again to smile upon the *Romans*, and the enterprise being undertaken with but weak Forces, they did little else but raise Tumults, with more of loss to those that had rebelled against the *Romans*, then any advantage to the *Carthaginians*. It seems likewise that *Hannibal*, when he first endeavoured to joyn in league with *Philip* King of *Macedon*, whose strength by Sea was very great, and his jealousies of the *Romans* likewise very great, as also his desire to secure himself therefrom, had laid a better foundation for his designs, and might have had better success in his endeavours against the *Romans*; which because out of vainglorious ambition he would accelerate, he overthrew them.

Let us then bound *Hannibals* praises within straiter precincts, though his fame sound very gloriously in the memory of all Ages, for the greatness of his attempts, and his success therein at first; since that advantage ceaseth which might first have counselled him to the affairs of *Italy*: And let us only see whether he may have purchased any true glory by his so great daring, and by the readiness wherewith he buckled to battel. He who will weigh things with reason and experience, will find that Wisdom ought to be of greater consideration in a worthy Commander, then force of Arms. Which may be seen in *Hannibal*; for the wisdom of *Quintus Fabius* did that against him with safety, which the War waged with much loss, and more danger, by *Flaminius* and by *Sempronius*, and afterwards by *Gaius Terentius*, all of them Consuls, and Commanders of the *Romans* Armies, could not do; who rashly hazarding the doubtful events of Battel, were overcome by *Hannibal*, and brought the affairs of *Rome* to almost utter despair. The praise then which is given to *Hannibal*, is great eagerness of mind against dangers: which though of it self it may make him worthy some admiration, yet such a vertue fals easily into vice, and in stead of Boldness, may be termed Rashness. But if we will consider *Hannibals* Actions yet a little more narrowly, we shall the better discover, that *Hannibal* having undertaken this War unjustly, and violated the Articles made between the *Carthaginians* and the *Romans*, he cannot deserve to be truly named valiant, the vertue of Valor not consisting in the maintaining of an unjust Cause. And if *Hannibal* ought to glory of his having routed the *Romans*, his glory will prove the less, since the Captains whom he overcame were not so much cryed up, and were of lesser experience and worth then many other *Romans*, who never had to do in any great enterprise; and that it was not his own worth, and the worth of his Soldiers which made way to his Victories, more then did the ignorance, rashness, and chiefly the discord of the Roman Commanders; to whom, through some unlucky Star, it was the misfortune of the Commonwealth at that time to commit the guidance and command of her Forces. But when he met with *Fabius*, *Marcellus*, or *Scipio*, the face of affairs altered. And yet *Hannibal* ought to have believed he should have met with these, or at least such as these, then with the others, or such as them: For the *Carthaginians* had experienced much to their loss, in the preceding War, what the worth of the Roman Commanders was. *Hannibal* might likewise have considered, how hard it would be for him to vanquish so many Cities, so many Roman Colonies, defended by Citizens who did partake of the Roman name and valor. But this was seen afterwards by experience; when he first began to undertake the taking in of Cities, and when entring into *Umbria*, and being incamped about *Spoletum*, he spent much time there to little purpose; and finding how strong defence was made by a little Roman Colony, he saw how vain his designs would be of storming the City of *Rome*.

And

And though many of the chief Cities of *Italy* fell into his hands, this happened through the renown of Victories which he had won; which working upon many people who did accommodate themselves to the Victors fortune, they gave themselves willingly over to the *Carthaginians*, and rebelled against the vanquished *Romans*. But to besiege Cities required time, and time afforded means to the *Romans*, who were at their own homes, to recruit their Forces, and reduced *Hannibal*, who was a stranger, into many inconveniencies and necessities. Insomuch as it is affirmed by Writers, that when *Hannibal* had the means of fighting afforded him (which he so much desired, but had little reason to hope for) by *Terentius* the Consuls rashness, who was afterwards routed and overcome; his affairs were reduced to so great and desperate straits, as manifest signs of revolting over to the enemies Camp were discovered, and in himself a mind to save himself by flying away into *Africa* by Sea.

But let us take the end of War into consideration, which we will be better able to judge by, then by its beginning: And though it is usually said, that Event is the fools Schoolmaster, yet it often falls out, that things are known by the event, which would never have been formerly thought upon; and the best instruction is that which is learnt by experience. *Hannibal*, after having with various and uncertain success, but with very great and certain dangers, oftentimes tried the event of sundry Battels with the Romans, was constrained, not so much out of obedience to the Carthaginian Senate, as out of necessity to forgo *Italy*, and to lead the remainder of his Army, which was already very much lessened, back into *Africa*, to relieve the City of *Carthage*, which was by *Scipio* reduced into great danger; and with his like former boldness, though not with the like prosperous success, come to a day of Battel with his enemy: Wherein his Army being overthrown, and with that Army, which was the strength of the Empire, all hopes lost of ever being able to make head against the *Romans*, the War was finally ended upon new conditions, and by the agreement, but in effect by the ultimate ruine of the Carthaginian Commonwealth: And together with the loss of her Liberty, she was bereft of all her maritime Forces; for amongst other grievous conditions, she was injoyned to burn all her Ships, whereof she had great store; so desirous were the *Romans* to keep her from attempting any novelty.

But how can we pass over these great actions, without reflecting upon the wonderful variation of humane affairs, and without marvelling at the several fortunes of these two powerful Nations? For the *Carthaginians* having as Conquerors overrun all *Italy*, and bereft the *Romans* of almost all their Forces, when it seemed as if their Commonwealth, following this her miraculous prosperity, was in a short time to mount to a supreme greatness of Monarchy, they fell from these high hopes into the extreme of misery, being bereft not only of the gallantry of Command, but of Liberty. And on the other side, the *Romans*, who having not many years before her Armies so notably defeated by *Hannibal*, as they were glad to imploy all their care about the safety of the very City of *Rome*, did on such a sudden rise to such a height of reputation, and power, as driving the *Carthaginians* out of *Spain* and having put the affairs of *Africa* into great confusion, they forced them to recieve their Laws from the *Romans*. This victory of the *Romans* was that which opened them the way to that Monarchy, at which they afterwards did in a few years arrive; for having quell'd the *Carthaginians*, and increased their own Power by the ruine of the Forces and Dominion of others, there was not any other Potentate who could long resist them. Other people seemed not to be ashamed to yeeld to them who had conquered the *Carthaginians*, and made themselves Masters of their Commonwealth. No truer, nor better reason can be given for this indeed so miraculous diversity of condition and fortune which befel these two great and

powerful

powerful Commonwealths, then the excellency of Military Diſcipline, which was better ordered . and underſtood by the *Romans*, then by the *Carthaginians*. For hence it roſe, that every Citizen being amongſt the *Romans* imployed in the Militia, they had greater ſtore of Commanders and Soldiers, So as though they were oftentimes worſted by *Hannibal*, they could notwithſtanding ſoon muſter other Armies, and get new Forces: Which the *Carthaginians* could not do; who having had a notable rout at *Zama*, were totally oppreſt, not being ever able to rally again, becauſe they had no other Soldiers nor Commanders under whoſe conduct they might hope for better events. But when the *Romans* were overcome, they wanted not *Fabius Maximus*, *Marcellus*, *Claudius*, *Scipio*, and many others, who behaved themſelves more fortunately in that War, and did better ſervice the Commonwealth; and they could eaſily ſend Recruits unto their Armies, and ſupply the places of ſuch as were ſlain in Battel, out of their own Citizens of *Rome*. Which was cauſed by the committing of the Government of the War to their Conſuls. which place of Magiſtracy enduring but a year, occaſion was offered to many other Citizens, to get experience in military affairs, and all others were ſo obliged to the Militia, as after the Carthaginian War was ended, they who had not ſerved in the Wars for the ſpace of four years at the leaſt, were by the Cenſors noted of Infamy, and blotted out of the publick Muſter-books. But the *Carthaginians* having through the power of the Barchinian Faction, transferred the Supreme Authority of adminiſtration of Arms, upon ſome few Citizens, as it was formerly upon *Hannibal*, the Father to this man, and after him upon this *Hannibal*, and his brother *Aſdrubal*; when *Aſdrubal* was ſlain in *Italy*, in the conflict which he had with *Claudius*, and when *Hannibal* the Son was abandoned by his former good Fortune, and by the reputation he had formerly gotten; and the Commonwealth being alſo wonted to make uſe of mercinary Souldiers, the Army of antient Soldiers being loſt in the Battel of *Zama*, they could not recruit it with their own Citizens, nor withſtand the blow of ſo dire a miſchance. Theſe, and ſuch like things may be argued, concerning this great action of *Hannibals*, and theſe important ſucceſſes of War; but rather out of probabilities, then any certain demonſtration. Yet theſe very conſiderations, may ſerve for uſeful inſtructions in hard and difficult reſolutions, to foreſee what end is likely to befall the undertaking of great Princes.

The Sixth DISCOURSE.

Whether it was well done by the Romans, *to carry the War againſt the* Carthaginians, *into* Sicily *and* Spain, *and into* Macedonia *and* Greece, *againſt King* Philip; *whilſt* Hannibal *waged War with them in* Italy.

AS amongſt all the Wars made by the *Romans*, none was more long or troubleſom, then that which they made with the *Carthaginians*, eſpecially when their Commander *Hannibal* did flouriſh, ſo from hence chiefly may noble matter of diſcourſe, and uſeful Inſtructions for matters of State be gathered. Whilſt *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, which was for the ſpace of about Fourteen years, the *Romans* made War notwithſtanding in other Countries; as in *Sicily*, *Spain* and *Africa* againſt the ſame *Carthaginians*; and againſt *Philip* King of *Macedon* in *Greece*. But as War was made againſt them

in

in *Italy*, ſo were they the firſt Authors of theſe other Wars; which affords occaſion of no ſmall wonder to him who conſiders, and doth well weigh this their proceeding. One would think, that the *Romans* being ſet upon at home by ſo powerful Enemies, as it was apparent that their whole Forces were not able to reſiſt, ſhould not have reſolved by dividing the ſame Forces to make their defence weaker; ſince the main of all their affairs depended upon the ſucceſs of their Armies againſt *Hannibal*, how can it be thought a good advice, to hazard with part of their Forces the whole Fortune of their Commonwealth? A thing which when forced by neceſſity, is thought a great misfortune to the State wherein it happens. And when *Italy* ſhould be loſt, as it was in great danger to be whilſt *Hannibal* was there with a puiſſant Army, to what purpoſe could any acquiſition ſerve which ſhould be made in *Spain* or elſwhere, which muſt of neceſſity fall of it ſelf? And with what courage could the *Romans* fight in Forein parts, when their own Country was waſted with War, their houſes, wealth, and all that they had expoſed to utmoſt danger? So as whilſt fighting againſt *Hannibal*, and all their minds being inflamed, not only out of a military obligation, and out of charity to their Country, but out of the natural and powerful love which every man bears to his own affairs, one man ſtood for many: So when abroad, the unquietneſs and doubt of mind keeping them afflicted and in jealouſie, by reaſon of the dubious caſe wherein they left whatſoever was moſt dear unto them, would not permit many to ſtand in fight for one. Who can praiſe the ſuffering of danger to increaſe at home, out of hopes of purchaſing abroad? Had the *Romans* Armies been in another Country, and imployed about other affairs, reaſon would have adviſed them to have ſent for them back into *Italy*, when they ſaw ſo powerful an Enemy upon their backs. For, *Vis unita fortior*; Force when united is ſtronger, and better able to keep what is harmful afar off. Thus we ſee it falls out by vertue of mother *Nature*, in our bodies; when the Heart is ill at eaſe, all the ſpirits of the body flock thither to defend it, as the moſt noble part, and whereupon life it ſelf depends.

Hannibal was a powerful Enemy, formidable for his excellent worth and military diſcipline, and for the many Forces which he brought with him; and moreover *Italy* was as it were unarmed at this time, and wanted her valianteſt Commanders, and beſt Soldiers. What could the Carthaginians have more deſired for *Hannibals* proſperity, then to ſee the two *Scipio's*, *Gneus* and *Publius*, on whom only the welfare of the Commonwealth, now ſo much in danger, did reſt, ſent into parts afar off, ſo as they could not, in her very greateſt extremity, return to ſuccor her? If *Hannibal* had had a mind to have left *Italy*, was not this parting of the Roman Forces, and the want of their beſt Commanders, a powerful reaſon to make him ſtay? And what advice was it to provoke other Princes and People to enmity, as muſt needs be done by ſending Forces to moleſt *Spain*, whilſt the Commonwealth was in ſuch trouble and danger, as ſhe ought to have made friends on all ſides? By which they incenſed that Nation, and drew other African Princes upon their backs, who were Friends and Confederates with the Carthaginians. And the increaſing power of the Romans being formerly apprehended by other People and Princes, the condition of thoſe times ſhould have rather adviſed them to have cloaked ſuch thoughts, and not to draw hatred and envy upon them: For every one muſt needs hold, that if the Romans, being in ſuch calamity and danger, would vex other Countries with war, no Province would have been free from their Forces when they ſhould have been rid of *Hannibal*. Which made the Romans cauſe worſe, and *Hannibals* better, with thoſe in *Italy*, who did not much affect the ſo much greatneſs of the Commonwealth; and much more with forein Nations. Wherefore the *French*, who firſt oppoſed *Hannibal* when he went into *Italy*, did for theſe reſpects favor his brother *Aſdrubal* afterwards, when he paſt with ſuccor

through

through their Country; nay, many of them joined with his Camp, and followed the Carthaginian Colors in *Italy*, to maintain the War with them. If the Romans did not know themſelves to be ſufficiently able to withſtand *Hannibal* in *Italy*, where they had all conveniences, and he being a ſtranger wanted all, and could only come by them by force; what reaſon could perſwade them to maintain War in *Spain* at the ſame time? which War muſt be as incommodious to them, as it was advantageous and convenient for their Enemies; both for that that Province was at their devotion, for the neerneſs of the City of *Carthage*, and for the accommodation the Sea afforded them, in furniſhing them with all things neceſſary to make War; which certainly may be done better and more commodiouſly at home. Thus the Cimbrians, after having given many defeats to the Romans in *Gallia*, were by them overcome in *Italy*. War is likewiſe made at home with leſs danger, out of the eaſineſs of recruiting an Army, when Battels prove unfortunate. Thus the Romans being oft-times worſted by *Hannibal*, did maintain and raiſe up their abject fortune: And the Venetians being aſſaulted at their own homes by thoſe of *Genoa*, by reaſon of the commodity they had of aſſembling all their Forces together, did not only withſtand, but did overthrow the Aſſailants, who were gotten even into their Waſhes, and were ſetled in the City of *Chioggia*.

But if we will then conſider the particular condition wherein the Romans were at that time, we ſhall find all their affairs in great diſorder, and ſuch as did adviſe them rather to leſſen then to increaſe new Expences, by undertaking new Wars. The publick Treaſury was ſufficiently decreaſed by loſs of the uſual Rents of ſo many places which *Hannibal* was poſſeſt of in *Italy*; for that what they were maſters of in *Sardinia*, was to ceaſe paying uſual and great contributions; for that the people who were ſubject to the Romans, were ſo much wearied with continual Wars, as they were hardly able to maintain thoſe few Soldiers which they had need of for their own defence, not in a caſe to furniſh other Armies with monies, as Writers affirm. Others add, that the affairs of the Romans were grown to ſo great a ſtrait, by maintaining ſo many Armies ſo long a time in ſeveral Countries, as that the *Scipio's* writing to the Senate, that they could no longer maintain their Soldiers who were grown needful of all things, the Commonwealth was fain to beg aid from thoſe who had gained much in former times by publick Impoſitions, ſo to provide out of private purſes for the paying and victualling of the Army: An example of much charity to their Country, which was brought to ſo great a neceſſity; but withall of ill advice, and but little wiſdom in thoſe who had brought it to that paſs. The Romans affairs were ſo weakned in *Spain*, as *Gneus Scipio*, contrary to the cuſtom of the Romans, was forced to make uſe of many Soldiers of that Nation to recruit his Army: which through the deceit of thoſe Barbarians, was the cauſe why he received a notable Defeat, wherein he himſelf likewiſe loſt his life.

It might at firſt peradventure be thought an uſeful advice to aſſault the Carthaginian States, ſo to remove *Hannibal* by diverſion from *Italy*. But ſince experience proved the contrary, how can the increaſing of danger at home, to carry it abroad, be praiſed? 'Twas already eight years that *Gneus Scipio* had made War in *Spain*, and *Marcellus* had labored long with various ſucceſſes in *Sicily*, when *Hannibal* was notwithſtanding ſtill ſo powerful in *Italy*, as marching with his whole Army from *Capua*, he went to aſſault the very City of *Rome*, where all things were full of tumult and confuſion: And had not the Romans had good fortune by the great ſtore of rain and water, which falling from the skies, retarded the firſt aſſault of *Hannibal*, all the hopes of ſo flouriſhing a Commonwealth had been diſparch'd. Who then in ſuch extremity of danger, in which with great uncertainty of ſucceſs the Walls and Gates of *Rome* herſelf were guarded, did not wiſh that *Marcellus*,

the two *Scipio's*, and the reſt that were at war in *Sicily*, and in *Spain*, had been there preſent, who if the City of *Rome* ſhould be loſt, muſt be made a prey unto the enemy? The very fame and honor of ſuch a Victory being ſufficient to make all that the Romans in ſo long proceſs of time had taken from the Carthaginians, return to their former obedience.

On the other ſide, if ſo many Commanders and Roman Soldiers, waſted in wars ſo far off, had been all joyned together in *Italy*, how could *Hannibal* have ſo long withſtood ſo great a power? The firſt onſet of the Carthaginian Army was great, when it advanced ſo far, as the fortune of the *Romans* began to give back, and the Romans to confeſs themſelves overcome, having had many great routs. But when Fortune began to face about, and the worth of the Carthaginian Soldiers began to flag, who were deboiſhed with the delights of *Capua*, (which was the cauſe why *Hannibal* tarried long in *Italy* without doing any thing of note) reaſon tells us that if he had been aſſailed by ſo many Roman Commanders and Soldiers, he muſt have been forced to have left *Italy*. And he being gone, and the danger removed to a further diſtance from home, the *Romans* having a valiant, and an expert Militia, and having won great reputation by this Victory, the other enterpriſes which they ſhould have afterwards have undertaken either againſt others, or againſt the *Carthaginians* themſelves at their own homes, would have proved more eaſie, and more certain: And experience proves clearly, that the Affairs of *Italy* would have given the Law to all other proceedings; and that upon the ſucceſs thereof the whole War did depend; for the Romans could never drive the Carthaginians totally out of *Spain*, till the rout given to *Aſdrubal*, Brother to *Hannibal*, by the Conſul *Claudius*, by which the power and fortune of the Carthaginians growing leſs in *Italy*, they fared alike in *Spain*.

But the War undertaken by the *Romans*, againſt *Philip* King of *Macedon*, at the ſame time when *Italy* was all on fire with the Carthaginian War, may peradventure be thought a buſineſs of greater importance. For *Philip* was a great Prince; and might eaſily have troubled the Romans affairs, by reaſon of the neighborhood of *Greece*, whoſe people were his friends and confederates. And though *Philip* had ſhewed himſelf not to be very well affected to the Commonwealth of *Rome*, ſince he had firſt ſent his Ambaſſadors to *Hannibal*, to treat of joyning with him in confederacy againſt the Romans, and had afterwards ſet upon, and taken the Cities of *Apolonia*, and *Orico*, that he might have, (as it was ſuſpected) the better opportunity to offend the Romans; yet the preſent condition of Affairs ſeemed rather to adviſe them, to diſſemble their injuries and ſuſpitions, then by unimportunely revenging the one and aſſertaining the other, put their affairs in greater danger, and make him a certain and open Enemy, who was as yet concealed and doubtful. And time might have opened the way unto them to have made him their friend, and to have brought him into their parts; which it was formerly known he had mind enough unto of himſelf; but being put in fear and jealouſie of his own affairs by *Hannibals* ſo great proſperity, he was diverted from it. And counſels which bring certain miſchiefs with them, ought not to be undertaken out of hope of evading another evil which is further off, and uncertain, when he who uſeth it is in ſo weak and dangerous a condition, as the addition of any new inconvenience how little ſoever, is ſufficient to ruine him: and this was the condition of the affairs of *Rome* at that time. Yet it may be ſaid that the very Authority of the Romans name was a thing of great moment, and ſo much the greater as the event approved of their counſel. For *Hannibal* could not have been drawn out of *Italy*, but by troubling the affairs of *Africa*, and by putting the Carthaginians into the ſame hazard and dangers, as they had endeavored to put the Romans into. They conſidered then, that *Hannibal* having ſhewed ſuch conſtancy, and worth in leading ſo numerous

merous an Army, consisting of divers Nations into *Italy*, and having found that Fortune (according as is usually said) favoured his boldness, their chief hopes of overcoming him lay in making him be his own ruine, and suffering his Army to moulder away through hard ships. And this manner of warfaring, used by *Fabius Maximus* had saved and restored the Commonwealth, which the different opinion of other Commanders, by hazarding themselves upon the fortune of a Battel, had almost quite undone. Now to compass this, it was necessary to keep the Carthaginian Forces so imployed abroad by diversion, as they could not relieve *Hannibal* in *Italy*: For if so, many of the Carthaginian Armies might have passed safely into *Italy*, as the *Scipio's* did defeat in *Spain*, they would have so overflown *Italy*, as there could have been no escape for the affairs of *Rome*. This very advice was followed by the Venetians, when they had their Enemies at their own homes, and were in the same danger and disorder by reason of the rout given them by the *Genoeses*, as the City of *Rome* was in, after the defeat at *Canna*. For they joyned in confederacy with *Barnaby Vis Conte*, Duke of *Millan*, and making a great Effort, sent many Soldiers against the City of *Genoa*, and did so molest their affairs by Land, as they kept off those succours, which otherwise would have been sent to their men who had taken the City of *Chioggia*, who missing of supplies, and being fought withal, and besieged by the Venetian Forces, of Conquerors became conquered, and fell into the hands of the Venetians.

Moreover the Romans considered, that in the Wars which they made in *Sicily* and in *Spain*, they had this great advantage, that they fought not with *Hannibal*, a Captain of singular and unparalleld valor. It was likewise held, that the Roman Commanders and Armies, might more securely make trial of their worth and fortune, in Wars made out of *Italy*, as they had oftentimes done; for when they had any loss abroad, they lost nothing but those men which the fortune of War bereft them of; but if they should overcome, they got the Enemies Country; just as it befel them in *Spain*. Wherefore it being disadvantagious for them to fight in *Italy*, it proved the better advice to temporize with *Hannibal* in *Italy*, and at the same time to fight with *Mago*, *Asdrubal*, and other Carthaginian Commanders in *Sicily*, and in *Spain*. So as the losses in *Italy* were recompensed by acquisitions made in *Spain*, the which of all other Countries, was the first that was reduced into a Province, and did much inlarge the Confines of the Roman Empire. But if the Sea had been open for the Carthaginians, as it would have been if the Romans neglecting their Fleet had not provided for the affairs of *Sicily*, *Hannibal* might easily have been furnished with things necessary from the Carthaginians, wherewith to reinforce his Army, So as no part of *Italy* should have been free from his forces, who unassisted or succored, could notwithstanding keep his Army so long together, and attempt so many enterprises; they therefore thought they had done enough, in entertaining *Asdrubal*, a Captain of great authority and valor, so as he could not (as they knew his design was) pass with a new Army into *Italy*, to joyn with *Hannibal*, as he did after the *Scipio's* death, and after the rebellion of many of the Spanish Cities, the Carthaginians being moved to do their utmost, since they had lost *Syracusa* and *Capua* which were both of them fain into the Romans power. So as no assistance being given unto *Hannibal*, all the labor was lost which he had so many years undergone in *Italy*. On the contrary, the Romans persevering in their first opinion, when the two *Scipio's* were dead, sent *Publius Scipio* into *Spain* to keep *Asdrubal* from making his passage, diverting the Forces which were to pass over with him into *Italy*, by keeping the Carthaginians molested at home: It follows not therefore by a general rule, that what was good for one of the enemies, must be hurtful for the other; so as it were good for the Carthaginians to wage War in *Italy*, far from their own homes, this very

same

ſame thing muſt be harmful for the Romans. But ſince they could not be the firſt Aſſailant, *Hannibal* having faln upon them with ſuch violence, it was reaſon, that the Romans taking the ſame courſe, ſhould aſſault the Carthaginians Territories. We read alſo, that the ſame *Hannibal*, being ſtill of the ſame opinion which once he was, being with *Antiochus* in the time of his Exile, whilſt he was treating of making War againſt the Romans, he perſwaded him to paſs over as ſoon as he could, and with as great a ſtrength as he could put together, into *Italy*; affirming that all other enterpriſes would be to no purpoſe, whilſt *Italy* was at peace and quiet, and that the Romans had means to maintain War abroad.

This very ſame thing, for the ſame reſpects diverſly conſidered, ought to have inſtructed the Roman Commanders and Senators in the Carthaginian war; to wit, that they were not to ſuffer their Enemies to reſt quiet at home, ſo as free from all thoughts of defending themſelves, they might the better turn all their Forces upon *Italy*, and the very City of *Rome*. And if they had taken that reſolution at firſt, which they did afterwards by the advice of *Publius Scipio*, (who from the conquering of *Africa*, took the name of *African*) to wage War with the Carthaginians neerer their own home, they might peradventure have freed *Italy* ſooner from the ſo many troubles and dangers which ſhe underwent by *Hannibals* long abode. But it may be moreover ſaid, that many other things did force, or at leaſt perſwade the Romans to undertake theſe Wars. *Sardinia* was firſt aſſaulted by the Carthaginians with thoſe very Forces which were deſtined for *Italy* to relieve *Hannibal*; ſo as it behoved the Romans to march with their Armies thither, not only to maintain and defend that Iſland, which was of ſuch importance to the Commonwealth, but for that they therein defended the welfare of *Italy*, by keeping ſo many Warriers afar off, who if they were free, were ready to aſſault her. And this advice proved very fortunate; for *Quintus Fabius* gave ſo notable a Rout to the Carthaginians in *Sardinia*, as they loſt about Forty thouſand of their Soldiers. The death of *Hiero* the Tyrant of *Syracuſa*, occaſioned the War made in *Sicily*, and the great commotions of that Iſland, by which it was comprehended, that if theſe their deſigns had not been hindred by the Romans, that great and famous City would have faln into the power of the Carthaginians, to the great prejudice of the Romans, who for the ſame reaſon (being aſſiſted by the *Mamertines*) undertook the firſt Carthaginian War; judging that if the Carthaginians ſhould be abſolute Maſters of *Sicily*, it would be a ſtep to paſs into *Italy*. But this would have been the more incommodious at this time, for that by reaſon of the ſo many places which *Hannibal* had taken in *Italy*, they might have had a more eaſie and ſecure receptacle there. Moreover, the Romans were invited to make War with the Carthaginians in *Spain*, and to divert their Forces, by reaſon that they underſtood how that Province was but ill ſatisfied with the Carthaginian government, and that it was well inclined to the Romans; which did much facilitate thoſe enterpriſes which were boldly undertaken, and fortunately atchieved. The City of *Saguntum* was alſo the firſt riſe of theſe Wars in *Spain*; which they thought it did not become the generoſity of *Rome* to leave in the power of the Carthaginians; ſo as upon any other good ſucceſs, they might ſeem to have loſt the chief cauſe in this conteſt: Neither did they notwithſtanding take *Saguntum* till after eight years War in *Spain*, when the other affairs of *Rome* began to proſper very much; as if the City which was the beginning of ſo many Wars, had been reſerved to be the end thereof.

Theſe and other ſuch like reaſons may be alleadged for the War undertaken againſt the Carthaginians; but that which they made againſt *Philip* may be ſaid to be cauſed rather by neceſſity then choice: For *Philip*, for his part, being already reſolved to follow *Hannibals* fortune, and expecting large recompence, had ſent his Ambaſſadors ſeveral times formerly to him, to conclude a confederacie with him:

where-

wherefore the Romans thinking it better to prevent the Enemy, then to be by them prevented, fell ſuddenly upon him with their whole Fleet and Army, hoping to ſuppreſs him, though they did not wholly effect their deſign. But they continued their War againſt him afterwards in *Greece*, incited by the commotions already raiſed in that Province by the Italians; knowing that unleſs they ſhould interpoſe themſelves, *Greece* muſt either fall into *Philips* hands, whereby the power of a People that were Enemies to the Romans, and already very formidable of themſelves, would be greatly increaſed; or elſe they muſt have recourſe to the aſſiſtance of King *Attalus*, as the Grecians had already proteſted to the Romans, and ſo they muſt ſuffer the neighborhood of another King, who was already powerful in *Aſia*, and might at another time trouble the affairs of *Rome*. And the wiſdom of the Romans was always ſuch, as not being caſt down by any adverſity, they never ſeemed ſo much to apprehend preſent dangers, but that they had an eye to thoſe which might enſue, and in time grow greater. And this peradventure was that which did prove the Romans power and worth more then any thing elſe; ſince, when as they were as yet but maſters of a ſmall State, and that their affairs were reduced into great difficulties, both by their ſo many bad ſucceſſes in battel againſt *Hannibal*, and by the riſings of their Friends and Confederates, yet they reſolved to maintain War at one and the ſame time in four ſeveral Countries, to wit, in *Italy*, *Sicily*, *Spain*, and *Greece*; and they were able to manage them all. And certainly ſuch advice was no leſs uſeful then generous: For he who ſhould overcome the Romans in any one place, could not hope quite to ſubdue them, ſince they had other Armies and valiant Commanders who might make good their fortune, and raiſe it up again.

So as things formerly alleadged for arguments to aſperſe this their reſolution, may peradventure be allowed of in ſuch States, and amongſt ſuch Princes, where there is not that worth, diſcipline, or power as was amongſt the Romans; but in them, or ſuch as they, they are of no force; and very Experience, by the iſſue of theſe Wars, ſeems to confirm and approve of the Counſels by which they were undertaken.

The Seventh DISCOURSE,

Whether the deſtruction of Carthage *was the riſe of the ruine of the* Roman *Republick.*

Carthage, a glorious and famous City, both for the command ſhe had in *Africa* and *Spain*, and for being long Rival in glory with the Commonwealth of *Rome*, being at laſt to yield either to the great worth or happy genius of the Romans, was not notwithſtanding made tributary to *Rome*, but was burnt and deſtroyed even to the ground. The Carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the Romans, and had ſevere Laws impoſed upon them; yet were thoſe undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd, but beginning to heighten their hopes and augment their Forces, after the ſecond Carthaginian war, they moleſted thoſe that were friends to the Romans, and contrary to their Articles, began to ſail upon the Sea with Men of War. Theſe things being therefore treated of in the Senate of *Rome*, cauſed variety of opinions: Some were for the total ruining of the City of *Carthage*, ſince otherwiſe the Commonwealth of *Rome* could not be free from their injuries and moleſtations; and *Cato* was very ſtiff of this opinion, who bringing ſome freſh Figs which were gathered in *Carthage*, ſhewed

ſhewed what dangers they were always ſubject unto by reaſon of their Enemies neigborhood.

But others endeavoring the contrary, ſought to prove, that totally to extinguiſh the Carthaginians was no good advice; and *Scipio Naſica*, a man of great authority, was greatly averſe to this reſolution, being thereunto moved (as he ſaid) not through any pitty to the conquered enemy, but for the advantage of his own Citizens, who when they ſhould be free from the fear of the Carthaginian Forces would ſuffer many evils through Idleneſs. So as it was the common ſaying, and opinion, that the deſtruction of the Carthaginians would haſten on the ruine of *Rome*. And *Saluſt* in the beginning of his Hiſtory of *Catilines* Conſpiracy, deſcribing the abuſive cuſtoms of the City of *Rome* at that time, ſeems to be of opinion, that the overthrow of *Carthage* did more harm to the Commonwealth by introducing idleneſs and pleaſure, then the keeping of her flouriſhing and in arms, would have done. Yet there were other conſiderations which did thwart this opinion, ſhewing that it was not peace and idleneſs, but the continually being vers't in Arms and War, which was the true cauſe of the Civil diſcords, and change of Government in *Rome*. This it was which fomented ambition in the Citizens; this it was that did too immenſely increaſe their power. Finally, it was this that divided the City, and through diſcord brought it to utter ruine. And how can it be ſaid that the City of *Rome* was ruined by Peace, ſince ſhe never taſted thereof? Inſomuch as for the ſpace of Six hundred eighty five years, that famous Temple dedicated to *Janus* by *Numa Pompilius*, that it might ſtand open in time of War and ſhut in time of Peace, was onely twice ſeen to be ſhut; once in the Conſulſhip of *Titus Manlius*, after the end of the firſt Carthaginian War, and once more in *Auguſtus* his time, after the Naval Victory over *Mark Anthony*. Thus were the Romans, and chiefly the moſt valiant amongſt them, great enemies to Peace; not ſo much endeavoring to procure greater ſtrength to the Publick Empire, as to encreaſe their own glory and power. Therefore one War was made to beget another, no time being ever to be found wherein the City was to enjoy honeſt and civil leaſure. And Provinces, and the authority of adminiſtring War, was oft times confirmed to thoſe who commanded their Armies, who either deſired to continue in their command, or occaſion requiring it to be ſo, that they might put an end to the Wars begun: As it fell out in the ſecond Carthaginian War; where the time of tarrying in that Province, and the continuing of his command was prolonged to the Conſul *Scipio*, who waged War in *Spain*, to the end that he might finiſh what he had begun.

The like was done to *Fabius* in the Wars which he made againſt *Hannibal* in *Italy* and upon other occaſions; a thing which being done contrary to the rule of Law, though it made ſomewhat for the Publick advantage at the preſent, yet was the cauſe of great diſorders afterwards. Thus *Marius* whilſt he was abroad in the Jugurthan War, was created Conſul, and made chief Commander againſt the *Cimbrians*, though he ought not in his abſence, and in time of contumacy, to have been choſen to that Magiſtracy. *Cæſar*, after having commanded the Roman Armies five years, when he was ſent to wage War in *France*, had his place of command continued unto him for five years longer; and not herewithal content, but being accuſtomed to rule, he asked leave of the Senate to keep abroad, and to continue in the Army; which when the Senate would not give way unto, they too late oppoſed his deſire, he being grown ſo powerful, by reaſon of his continuation in military command, as he valued not the Senates Authority, nor the being declared an enemy to the Commonwealth. But if we will conſider the beginning of Civil Diſcords, how, and where the ſiding began, which infected the minds of the Citizens with peſtiferous corruption, we ſhall find that this happened not in time

of Peace in Cities, or by reason of Civil Affairs; but in the Camp amongst Weapons, and when the Commonwealth was busied in weighty Wars. For *Marius* being drunk with the desire of military glory, and not being able to endure that it should be taken from him, or diminished by *Sylla*, as he imagined it might happen by reason of *Sylla's* happy success in the Jugurthan War, wherein having taken *Jugurtha* alive, he had the glory to have put an end to that War; He began to think of establishing yet more greatness in himself, by making many of the Order of Cavaliers, and of the people partial to him, and impudently corrupting the Citizens, first with moneys, and afterwards with open force of Arms; making the Magistracy and command of the war be conferred and resolved upon in him, as he did in the Consulship, and Proconsulship against *Mithridates*. The Nobility being affrighted at this mans greatness, by reason of his authority and reputation with the Soldiers, they mightily encreased *Sylla's* power, who was an enemy to *Marius*, till at last they came to taking up Arms and shedding of civil blood. But who knows not that *Cæsar*, moved thereunto more out of a desire of his own greatness, then out of his alliance with *Marius*, raised and maintained his Faction in *Rome*; and that his power encreased not in Peace, and in the Market-place, but in War, and in the Camp? So for the same reason for which *Sylla* was advanced a little before, it behoved the Senate to confer more greatness upon *Pompey* then became the condition of civil Government; so as the whole City was divided; and with those arms, by which, though taken up, and made use of against enemies, the first occasion of contention among private Citizens was given, the very Commonwealth must be wounded, which stood in the midst between them; so as her vital spirit of liberty being taken away, her throat was cut by those whom she had most favoured. But whence did the so many other corruptions of those times arise, save from the so many prosperous successes of war, by which the Citizens being much enriched and made proud, could not betake themselves to live parcimoniously, and with civil equality? And it is said of *Cæsar*, that he corrupted the people of *Rome* by moneys which he had got in the War, so to make them confer places of Magistracy as he listed, upon such as were his friends, and partial to him. Out of these respects the wise Legislator, *Lycurgus*, intending to lay the foundation of a long lasting Government in *Sparta*, though he introduced Military exercises, to the end that the Citizens might be able to defend their Country; yet he ordered the City so, as it could not much increase its power by any Forgein War. But the Commonwealth of *Rome* not being ordered for peace, could never find out, nor enjoy a peaceful condition.

How is it then given out, that peace and idleness was the ruine of that City? How should she beleeve that her Arms should remain idle, if she would have the whole world for her enemy, as *Marius* said to *Mithridates*; that who would not receive Law from the Romans, must make themselves more powerful then they? So as the counsel which *Scipio* gave to his Romans of not utterly destroying *Carthage*, might be good in another respect, for the preservation thereof might encrease that glory to their Commonwealth, which many of her valiant Citizens seemed greatly desirous of, to wit, to have easily pardoned their enemies, when they should have humbled themselves; as the *Carthaginians* had then done, having not onely with great humility begged peace of the Senate by their Ambassadors, but given many of their chief Citizens for hostages to *Scipio*, and great store of Arms, to secure the Romans that they would keep their Articles. And truly the destruction of that noble City, did differ from the usual generosity of the Romans, who had wont, after Victory, to grant the Cities and Kingdoms to those very enemies with whom they had fought, making both King and People in all parts or Tributory, or Confederate to the Senate and People of *Rome*. But I

see

ſee no reaſon at all why they ſhould forbear the rooting out of theſe the Romans antient enemies, for fear leſt they ſhould be undone with idleneſs, and that civil diſcords ſhould thereupon enſue. How many years were there between the ſecond and third Carthaginian war? and yet when was the Commonwealth of *Rome* free from Foreign war, though theſe her Enemies did not appear to be ſo? The laſt Carthaginian war being hardly ended, did not they wage war in *Spain* with the *Numantines* for the ſpace of fourteen years? And yet in theſe times the bounds of the Roman Empire may be ſaid to have been very narrow, in reſpect of what they were afterwards. *France*, which then was Miſtreſs of more Provinces then now ſhe is, was not as yet ſubdued; nay, the difficulty and length of that War bringing along with it the prorogation of Command, ſince *Cæſar* commanded the Armies for ten years together, did much increaſe thoſe diſorders which did at laſt prove the ruine of the Commonwealth. But how much did *Pompey* enlarge the bounds of the Roman Empire in *Aſia*? over how many conquered Kings and Provinces did he triumph? *Armenia*, *Cappadocia*, *Media*, *Iberia*, *Syria*, *Arabia*, *Phœnicia*, and other Nations were reduced under the Romans power by this ſole Commander. It will ſeem ſtrange, and yet it is related by authentical Writers, that nine hundred Cities were made ſubject and tributary to the Roman Empire by *Pompey*, and almoſt as many more by *Cæſar*: And he who will conſider it well, ſhall find that the Roman Commanders did flouriſh moſt, and were moſt cryed up, after the deſtruction of *Carthage*. *Rome* wanted then neither means nor will to exerciſe her Arms: not to mention ſo many Wars, which were all of them famous, if not for the greatneſs of acquiſition, at leaſt for other weighty accidents; and if not for their ſtrength, yet for the wiſdom of the Enemy: That of *Tigranes*, *Mithridates*, *Jugurth*, and ſo many others, where the then almoſt loſt name of the *Carthaginians* did not concur.

But if it had proved true, that the Commonwealth of *Rome*, when *Carthage* ſhould be deſtroyed, ſhould have remained in idleneſs, ſo harmful to her liberty, if *Scipio's* counſel had proved ſucceſsful, and thoſe evils had been taken away which he feared would befall the Commonwealth, *Carthage* was not only not to have been undone, but her power ſhould have been ſuffered to increaſe; for it is ſeen by what hath been ſaid, that War of it ſelf was not able to keep the Citizens united, but was rather that which did divide them. But this peradventure might have been done by War wherein their own defence had been only concerned, and the keeping of themſelves from danger: And yet it is an abſurd thing to ſay, that an Enemy muſt be preſerved, and men muſt be continually in trouble and danger of War, for the conſervation of a City. But ſay, I beſeech you, was there not forty three years between the firſt and ſecond Carthaginian war? And yet though *Rome* was free from dangers, and from being troubled by the Carthaginians, nay, for ſome years every where more quiet then ſhe ever was at any other time, yet fell ſhe not upon thoſe great miſchiefs of civil contentions, which ſhe afterwards incurr'd in the greateſt heat of her foreſt Wars. This was occaſioned, becauſe the City was not as yet corrupted, as it was afterwards, becauſe it grew old, and becauſe there was not any that knew by correcting her diſorders to return her to her firſt principles. What danger can enſue unto, or can harm the common liberty or authority of Citizens either in War or in Peace, whilſt the Laws are obſerved? And when the Laws are trampled under foot, what State can be free from the ſnares of the Enemy? The Spartan Kings had not ſupreme authority in War; but War being governed by good Laws, could never injure them. Power intruſted in Citizens with due meaſure and temper, was never prejudicial: And behold an example thereof. On the one ſide, *Ageſilaus* King of *Sparta*, being Commander in chief of the Army againſt *Farnabaſſus*, and being entred *Aſia* with great hopes of ſignal victories; when he was called home by the Magiſtracie of the *Ephori*, readily obeyed. On the other ſide,

Cæſar,

Caſar, being already returned into *Italy* from the French enterpriſe, will, contrary to the will of the Senate, keep the Army together, and deſpiſeth the authority thereof. *Cato's* counſel of deſtroying *Carthage* might then have proved good, not of it ſelf, but when the Romans, being ſafe for theſe Enemies, and ſetled in a condition of not being to fear any Forein forces, could have ordered unto themſelves a firm and quiet Civil State.

It was known by experience, that the other agreement made with the Carthaginians had done but little good: For they keeping ſtill the ſame mind, though not the ſame fortune, did not let ſlip any occaſion of throwing off the yoke of ſlavery which the Romans had put upon them. So as the only means to reſt ſecure from their Forces, ſince their words were not to be truſted, was to put them out of their antient neſt, and to make them live far from the Sea, as they were commanded to do after that their Country was deſtroyed, ſo to bereave them of the opportunity of the Sea, by means whereof that Commonwealth was grown great and powerful. But wherein was the quiet of *Rome* bettered by the ruine of *Carthage*, if they would have to do with more barbarous Nations, and Nations further off, not moved thereunto through fear, nor provoked by any injury, thinking their Empire was only to be bounded by the Confines of the Earth? What had the *Parthians* of common with the Commonwealth of *Rome*? what injury had they then done her, to make the *Romans* take up arms againſt them? yet *Craſſus* had a mind to find them out in thoſe far diſtant parts, whereby to draw upon himſelf and the Roman Armies ſo many great loſſes and ruines as they were to undergo in that War. The overthrow of *Carthage* ſhould peradventure have taken from the Citizens of *Rome* their deſire of continual warfaring, as it took from them the occaſion of being in Arms; but it did not ſo; for the cauſe which produced and nouriſh'd theſe thoughts, was internal, not external. So as they were not provoked to Arms, but did rather provoke others; and when they fought not for the welfare, they fought for the glory of the Empire: For all the Orders of that City conſiſted only in the exerciſe of the Militia. But how could a City be long preſerved, which was wholly bent upon thoſe things which were the means to bring her to her end? how could ſhe enjoy true civil felicity, if ſhe knew not what it was, and did not value it, but did abhor that peace and quiet which begets civil felicity?

Therefore if that Commonwealth had been well inſtituted in civil Orders, and that when *Carthage* was deſtroyed, ſhe had known (which ſhe did not) how to lay down Arms, this had been the way to bring her to much good, nay, to the true and chief good of civil felicity, not to the ruine and perdition thereof. So as if *Scipio* doubted that the introducing of Idleneſs into *Rome* might bring with it ſuch notable diſadvantage, it was perhaps, becauſe knowing the imperfections of that Government, he feared not that Idleneſs which the laying down of Arms is wont to produce, but that which is born, and doth increaſe with the corrupt cuſtoms of Cities, by which contrary, but wholly peſtiferous effects are begotten; as the making of ſome Citizens love pleaſures, and hate labor and toil; and others ſtrangely proud, lovers of brawls and novelty. The *Athenians* endeavoring to baniſh this ſort of Idleneſs from out their City, committed the care thereof to the chief and moſt ſevere Magiſtrate, called *Areopagus*. But that true and vertuous Quiet which is oppoſed unto Toil, and which as a thing to be deſired ought to be ſought for in a City, doth not baniſh, but doth nouriſh true generoſity of mind, which makes men willingly enter, when need requires, into the dangers of War, for honeſty ſake, and for the defence of their Country, not out of ambition and deſire of ſelf-greatneſs: And to free the City from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies, the Carthaginians, was not contrary to this. So as I may conclude, That it was not the deſtruction of *Carthage*, but the ill Government of *Rome*, which wrought her ruine.

The Eighth DISCOURSE.

Why Rome *could not regain her Liberty after the death of* Julius Cæsar, *as she had formerly done, by driving the* Tarquins *first out, and then* Appius Claudius *and the other* Decemviri.

MAny do not without reason wonder, why the City of *Rome*, which after having droven the Tarquins out, who had reigned for above Two hundred and forty years: And which having afterwards made *Appius Claudius*, and the other *Decemviri* lay down their Magistracy, who usurpèd Tyranny, could put her self into a free condition; why I say she could not do the like when *Brutus*, and *Cassius* had slain *Julius Cæsar*: when it appears they ought rather to have done so now; the people being more numerous and powerful, and the City in such greatness, as the liberty, nay rather power which the people had in ordering that Commonwealth, ought to have been more esteemed and held dear. To this may be added, that in the time of Kings the very name of Liberty was not well known, much less was the good thereof injoyed; Wherefore a good which they had not known ought to have been of less power with them: And in the Government of Kings the City had been so successful, as it seemed she might run a hazard by chusing a new form of Government, which she had not formerly experienced. And in the time of the *Decemviri* the affairs of *Rome* were also in a very weak condition; nor ought the Liberty, or command of that City be reputed a thing of such moment as it became afterwards by the wonderful felicity by which she marched to the height of all Glory and Greatness. Besides, the Government of Ten, retained a certain shew of a Commonwealth; and many being therein interessed, she seemed to have thereby also a better ground for her subsistance; Whereas in *Cæsars* time, he having reduced the main of all affairs into himself, and begun to accept of the Title and Honors of a King, all Form of a Commonwealth and of Liberty was lost; and he having maintained himself in that degree onely by his own Greatness, and in a City so full of Nobility at that time, and of so many generously minded men, his Principality must of necessity be the weaker, and easilier to be eradicated; which when it should fall, it seemed that the former Government of Commonwealth must of it self rise up again. These and other such like reasons, afford occasion of seeking into the cause why contrary effects were seen to ensue.

We will herein consider first, what the customs of the City of *Rome* were in each of these times; and what effects were prevalent in the peoples minds, men not being accustomed to imbrace such things as are truly useful, but often such as by the predominate affection are held to be so. Whilst the City was in an humble condition, and that her Citizens were not begun to be corrupted by an immoderate ambition of Governing, there was no siding nor partaking studied amongst them, which crept on by little and little, and did so contaminate all orders, as it reduced the Commonwealth to such weakness, as wanting strength to rule her self, she must fall, and being once down could not rise up again. This corruption began amongst the Soldiers, in whom the Commanders did permit such unbridled licentiousness, to the end that they might dispose of them as they listed to oppress their particular enemies, and sometimes against the very Commonwealth: As *Sylla* did to lessen *Marius* his power, and *Marius* no less to counterpoize *Sylla* by

the

the ſame means, things growing into ſuch diſorder, as he made the ſervants of the Commonwealth to take up arms againſt his enemies the *Syllanians*; and this authority did ſo continue in great Citizens, and in the Commanders of Armies, as it ſeemed a wonder, that *Pompey* the Great, who had exceeded all others in Glory and Power, after his return into *Italy*, having proſperouſly ended his enterpriſe againſt *Mithridates*, ſhould be content to quit the Army, when every one feared that he would enter *Rome* therewithal, and do even then with *Rome* as *Cæſar* did not long after, aſſume unto himſelf the chief Government of all publick affairs: So great was the diſorder, and ſo little was the Authority either of Laws or Senate eſteemed. But his Deſign, who plotted tyranny in the ſucceeding time, proſpered the better, for that this corruption which was firſt entred into the Soldiers, was paſt into the Nobility, and ſpread every day abroad amongſt the people: For thoſe who had been Generals of the great Enterpriſes of War, being grown exceeding rich, did ſeveral waies purchaſe the popular votes, turning and winding them as they liked beſt, to the end that the places of Magiſtracy might be conferred on them, or upon their Friends and Adherents. Neither was the very Senate free from this contagion, but being long before accuſtomed not to be at their own command, but to depend upon the power of thoſe who were of ſupreme Authority in the Armies, they fell headlong into the ſame errors into which the people were faln, manifeſtly adhering by way of Faction, not by any civil favor, to particular Citizens who headed parties, and the authors of novelties; which was at firſt done with ſome appearance of honeſty, to maintain the Commonwealth, and to defend Liberty againſt thoſe who had been too immoderately exalted by the peoples favour, to the injury of other more deſerving Citizens, and to the prejudice of Liberty. But in the proceſs of time and affairs, thoſe who had taken up Arms in behalf of the Commonwealth, proved no leſs burthenſom, much power thereby encreaſing in one particular perſon, then thoſe themſelves againſt whom Arms were taken up. For an immoderate deſire of encreaſing in power and wealth, began to poſſeſs the ſouls of many who were already accuſtomed to rule longer, and with greater authority, then was fitting to be done in a Civil Government. So as all things were put into great confuſion; and now, not thoſe who were worthy and valiant, but thoſe who were moſt bold, & inſolent found places of greateſt honor in the Commonwealth Hence it was, that it being obſerved that thoſe who had adhered to *Sylla's* party (when his Adverſary being overcome, he was become almoſt the ſole Arbitrator of all things) had often gotten great riches, and preferments in reward of their wicked actions, the wealth of thoſe who were proſcribed by *Sylla* being given to theſe, and ſuch being eaſily proſcribed at his Favorites pleaſure, whom they would rob of their Palaces or of what they valued moſt: Many allured by hope of getting better things, and more eaſily then they could have done in a well-governed Commonwealth, loved confuſion, and favoured the Government of one alone, thinking that they might obtain Honors, and many other favors, which are uſually beſtowed freely upon ſuch as are partial to them, by thoſe, who will preſerve themſelves in height of Power.

Hence then it aroſe that *Brutus* and *Caſſius*, the murderers of *Cæſar*, were not ſo backed, nor met not with that general approbation from the City, to uphold their fact, and the common Liberty, as *Junius Brutus* and *Virginius* did, when they raiſed the people to free themſelves from the Tyranny of the *Tarquins*, and of the *Decemviri*: The latter had recourſe unto the Camp, and kindled a fervent deſire in the Soldiers to vindicate the injuries, and inſolencies uſed by the *Tarquins* and by *Appius*: But what favour could *Brutus* and *Caſſius* expect from the Soldiers, themſelves being contaminated, and more deſirous to preſerve the chief command in one onely perſon, that they might keep the power in themſelves, then

to remit the Commonwealth into Liberty, whereby their uncurb'd licentiouſneſs was to be corrected? Therefore as ſoon as *Octavius*, the adopted ſon of *Julius*, and who afterwards took upon him the name of *Octavius Cæſar*, and of *Auguſtus*, returned after *Cæſar's* death into *Italy*, he was freely accepted by the Army, he being well beloved by the Soldiery, out of memory to *Julius Cæſar*, and out of hopes that if he ſhould ſucceed him in power, they might ſhare in the ſame favors and priviledges. But *Brutus* and *Caſſius* were compell'd to gather together ſufficient Forces to defend themſelves, to have recourſe for help to Forein Princes, and with their Soldiers to fill thoſe Armies, which were to defend the Liberty of *Rome*. So much were the Cuſtoms of the City altered in thoſe times, and thoſe generous Roman ſpirits extinguiſhed, who for a long time had loved the name of Liberty more then any other thing, and then any other Nation. And though the fact committed by *Cæſars* Murtherers was approved of by the Senate, yet there were many chief men, and of great authority, who being *Cæſars* friends, and depending upon him, did much deteſt it; amongſt whom were *Marcus Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, *Cæſars* intimate friends, who did openly and powerfully maintain, that *Brutus* and *Caſſius* were to be purſued by the publick Arms, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, and that *Cæſars* death ſhould be revenged.

This diverſity of inclination in the People, and in the Senate towards the former and theſe latter Vindicators of the Liberty of *Rome*, to boot with the diverſity of Cuſtoms by which the City was ſwayed at theſe ſeveral times, were much furthered by the differing conditions of the perſons intereſſed: For the name of the *Tarquins* was become hateful to all the common people of *Rome*, not only becauſe they kept them always buſied in laboring their own grounds, but becauſe they were become hateful to all people by reaſon of their haughty carriage; ſo as they had no Fautors who did deſire or endeavour their return to *Rome*, but ſome few young Noblemen who were well pleaſed with that former Government, by reaſon of their intimacie with the Kings ſons, which ſecured their inſolencies. But theſe were not of themſelves of any authority to diſturb the peace and common liberty; and thoſe in whom the publick authority did reſide, were ſo well diſpoſed towards the good of their Country, and ſo uncontaminable by any other affection, as *Brutus* condemned two of his ſons to ſuffer death, becauſe they were of the number of thoſe who had conſpired in favor of the Kings ſons. And in the time of the *Decemviri*, *Appius* was not held to be proud, but cruel; and yet not ſo really, but in appearance, which by the common people is held to be as bad: For he had ordered many Lictors to walk always before him and his Colleagues, with many Faſces in their hands; and having afterwards taken away Appeals, he ſeemed in all his actions to aim at Tyranny, which is always injurious to the People. So as it is no wonder if they did not afterwards reſent that ſuch men ſhould be removed from Government wherein they had behaved themſelves ſo ill, and did deſire to return under the Government of Conſuls and other Magiſtracies.

To this may be added, that the People had then almoſt the ſame authority which ſome particular Citizens did afterwards uſurp, and did go about to obtain all unjuſt things from the Senate by ſedition, as theſe did in the enſuing times by force of arms. So as no ſuch way being opened in the firſt State of the City, the People knew that when the *Decemviri* ſhould be driven away, they might obtain many things of favor to themſelves, as indeed they did. For, Appeals were not only again allowed of, but much amplified, and the Tribunes of the People were declared to be *Sacroſancti*. But *Cæſar*, uſing therein either his natural endowments and worth, or ſome wonderful cunning, had wrought himſelf into much favor with the People, by his humanity, magnificence, liberality, by his familiarity with all men, by eaſily pardoning offences, making of noble and frequent Shews, by his

ſumptuous

ſumptuous and coſtly Feaſts, and by his rich Gifts; and by theſe means ſecured his Tyranny upon the ſound foundation of univerſal favor, and upon the favor of many partial Friends, whom he had made great, and by many ſingular favors bound them faſt unto him, and intereſſed them in his own greatneſs and power. So as he who will conſider theſe things duly, muſt confeſs, that in *Brutus* and *Caſſius* the intention was more to be commended then the act; for their danger could bring no true ſafety to the Commonwealth, as they themſelves were ſoon aware of, by flying from that City, which they ought to have ſummoned to Liberty, and making themſelves the Heads of thoſe who ſhould riſe up in their behalf. But the buſineſs being inopportunely undertaken, miſs'd of that ſucceſs which opportunity might have brought it: For *Cæſar* might eaſily have loſt the Peoples favor, either for that thinking himſelf ſufficiently ſetled in his Dominion, he might value it ſo much in the future; or for that they being naturally given to love change, might grow weary of his too great power, which was already begun to be much ſuſpected by his having accepted of the title of King, and of many other Honors which he had formerly refuſed: Things which made the People aware of their error, in being too conformable to the will of one ſole Citizen. If ſuch an occaſion had been waited for, he who ſhould have had a mind to have reſtored the Commonwealth to her Liberty, might have had ſome better foundations for the effecting of his deſire. And if it ſhall be objected, that the City could not throw off the yoke of ſervitude after the death of *Caligula* and *Nero*, though they were very vicious, and much deteſted by the People; it may be anſwered, That then the power of the Emperors, and authority of the Soldiers were too ſtrongly confirmed, who put *Caligula* and *Nero*, and other of their ſucceſſors to death, not out of any deſire of reſtoring the City to liberty, as *Brutus* and *Caſſius* had done, but for that they were weary of their Empire, and hoped to be better rewarded by thoſe who were by them cryed up for Emperors in place of thoſe that were ſlain.

The cauſe of ſuch diverſity of ſucceſſority likewiſe be known, if we will conſider ſome things more in general. While the City of *Rome* was in ſuch a condition by reaſon of her Laws and Cuſtoms, as ſhe was of herſelf well given to Politick Government, it was impoſſible to introduce Tyranny, ſo as it could be continued there: For the Body of the City not being organiſed ſo as became ſuch a Government, which is the Soul of the City, ſuch a Union could not be ſetled there, as might aſſume vital Form: And as it falls out in natural affairs, every thing is not made of every thing, but from this or that other aſſigned matter, ſuch, or ſuch a thing is particularly generated, anſwerable to the quality of the ſaid matter, and to the vertue of the generating cauſe; ſo in our civil actions, every State cannot be faſhioned out of every State, but theſe things are likewiſe determined by a certain order; ſo as from Ariſtocracie we paſs into the power of a few, from thence to a Popular condition, and at laſt to Tyranny.

Yet are theſe Tranſitions very hard to be obſerved in the City of *Rome*; for that her Government was always mixt with divers ſpecies of Regiment: yet it may be ſeen how divers Parties prevailed in divers Times, ſo as they came to conſtitute a different Form of Government. At the beginning Vertue was highly eſteemed, the greateſt Honors and chiefeſt Places were conferr'd upon ſome few that were the moſt famous, and moſt vertuous Citizens, though the People had always a ſhare therein. But Ambition, and the deſire of Rule and Riches, did afterwards mightily increaſe in the Nobility; who deceiving the Multitude by ſeveral artifices, they reduced ſo much of the publick Authority into themſelves, to maintain their private greatneſs, as the Laws having loſt their efficacie, and the choice of the Magiſtrates, and the reſolution in all weighty and important affairs, depending upon the will of ſome few powerful Citizens,

the

the City wholly loſt the reſemblance that ſhe had of an Ariſtocratical State; and took the form of being governed by a few: And thoſe very Citizens, that they might preſerve the power amongſt themſelves, were forced to favor the multitude, by promiſing and permitting unto them things that were both unworthy, and unlawful. So theſe men, that they might domineer over more noble perſonages, were forced to obey the baſe will of the Soldiers, and of abject and inſolent Popular men, which reduced the Commonwealth at laſt to a baſe and corrupt Popular State (though in former times the peoples Authority was always great, but better moderated notwithſtanding by the Laws and certain conſiderations) from whence it was more eaſie afterwards to paſs to Tyranny, the Plotters uſing thoſe very means, which it hath been obſerved *Cæſar* made uſe of, to uſurp unto himſelf the ſole Government of the Commonwealth.

Such changes have uſually been ſeen in other Cities, and at other times, where the condition of Government hath given the ſame occaſion. So *Athens* was alwaies ſubject to frequent alterations of Government, and particularly to Tyranny; Inſomuch as the wiſe Legiſlator *Solon*, who had the charge of reforming it, before his death ſaw it faln from the ſtate whereinto he had reduced it, and tyranny brought in by *Piſiſtratus*: for the corruption which was amongſt the Inhabitants, afforded matter and means to any one who had a mind to poſſeſs himſelf of the Liberty thereof. And it is likewiſe ſeen of Modern Commonwealths, that thoſe wherein the people have had much authority, or rather licentiouſneſs, they have not been able to keep in a conſtant Government, free from Civil Seditions, and have been but ſhort-lived. As happened in the City of *Florence*, wherein for the conſideration aboveſaid, it was eaſier for them who had a mind to ſuppreſs the liberty thereof, and hard for him who deſired to preſerve it. So as though the Houſe of *Medici* hath by various accidents been ſundry times driven from thence, and though *Alexander* the firſt Duke thereof loſt his life; the City, though otherwiſe noble and magnificent, being much infected with parties, and corrupted by popularity; all endeavors of preſerving it in the form of a Commonwealth, and in true liberty, proved vain: And on the contrary, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, by reaſon of her excellent Form of Government, which though it be mixt, hath little in it of Popular Government, and much of the *Optimati*, not having given way to ſuch corruptions as uſe to trouble the quiet of civil life, nor afforded means to any who ſhould goe about to plot againſt the publick Liberty, hath been able for a very long ſpace of time to maintain her ſelf in one and the ſame condition, and free from thoſe dangers, into which other Commonwealths have faln, for not having a Government of equal temper with that of hers.

The Ninth DISCOURSE,

Which is the ſafer way to be taken, to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth; that which was held by Cato, *or that which was purſued by* Cæſar.

Julius Cæſar, and *Marcus Cato*, who was afterwards called *Uticenſis*, both of them very famous, and greatly cried up perſons, both for their excellent indowments of mind, and for the great Authority which they held both with the Senate, and with the people, did both of them flouriſh at the ſame time in the Commonwealth of *Rome*: But they did ſo differ in Manners and Cuſtoms, as it may afford occaſion of wonder, if we will conſider how, ſtearing ſeveral courſes, they happened both of them to arrive almoſt at one and the ſame end: And of doubt in him who ſhall propound unto himſelf the example of theſe two great Perſonages, to purchaſe Fame and Power in a Commonwealth, whether of the two he ought moſt to imitate. *Cæſar* won much love by his great humanity, liberality and magnificence; but *Cato* was reverenced for the auſterity of his Comportment, by the integrity of his life, and for the zeal he ſhewed in the managing of all publick affairs. Thoſe who were oppreſt either by poverty, or by enemies had recourſe to *Cæſar* for protection; and thoſe who hated wicked men, and the inventers of novelties, truſted that *Cato* would chaſtiſe and ſuppreſs them. *Cæſar* never ſpared for any labour by which he might hope to purchaſe renown and glory; and *Cato* by deſpiſing glory became glorious: *Cæſar* deſired to ſhew generoſity, and greatneſs of ſpirit in all his actions; and *Cato* delighted in nothing more then in modeſty, and innocency of life: *Cæſar* was much given to all acts of Grace; and *Cato* conſtant in all acts of Juſtice: *Cæſar* ſeemed to take delight in Sports, Feaſts, and Banquets; and *Cato* profeſt openly to ſcorn all favor, ſave what the merit of his own worth brought with it. So as the greatneſs wherein the Commonwealth then was, was ſaid to be moſt reſplendent in *Cæſar*, ſo the preſervation of the antient Form of the Commonwealth, and of the cuſtoms of her firſt age was held to be preſerved in one onely *Cato*. Theſe two ſo excellent Perſonages took theſe two differing ways, yet each of them acquired great Renown, Fame, and Authority. Great was *Cæſars* glory by the many things he did in War, but *Cato* was no leſs celebrated for Civil Affairs. *Cæſar* by his great Authority could make *France* be firſt aſſigned unto him, and then confirmed upon him, where he kept in chief command with his Army for the ſpace of Ten years; He alſo made uſe of the peoples favour, not to aggrandiſe himſelf, but to make the greateſt honors be conferred on his Friends, and upon ſuch as depended on him, which was that which made his faction ſo potent. And truly, he who will conſider it well, will finde that as long as *Rome* retained any Form of a Commonwealth, *Cato's* power was no leſs then was *Cæſars*, for he oftentimes bore it even againſt *Cæſar*: As when the buſineſs of thoſe that were Complices with *Catiline* in his conſpiracy, was in hand in the Senate, they being accuſed by *Cato*, and defended by *Cæſar*, were condemned to be put to death. And alſo another time, when he oppoſed the publiſhing of the Law propoſed, and favoured by *Cæſar*, touching the diviſion of Lands in *Latium*, wherein *Cato's* authority appeared to be the greater, by making *Cæſars* ambitious deſigns fail of ſucceſs in ſo popular things as were the *Agrarian* Laws. The ſame ſucceſs had the things maintained by *Cæſar* againſt *Pompey*, though he was more powerful then any other Citizen; for having ſtoutly

oppoſed

opposed *Metellus*, who moved at the time of *Catalines* conspiracy, that *Pompey* should together with his Army be recalled back to *Rome*, he carried the business; which was the cause why these two prime Citizens endeavored the friendship and good will of *Cato*, for they doubted of compassing what they desired without his good will, so great was his Authority. *Cæsar*, when *Cato* appeared to be his bittereſt enemy, procured *Cato*'s releasement, when he was imprisoned by order from the Senate: And *Pompey*, that he might be fastened to him by the bond of Alliance, endeavored to have his Neece for Wife. Whence it is conceived, that *Cato*'s austere behaviour had purchased him more Authority, though unarmed, in the management of the Commonwealth, then the reputation of having commanded Armies, and their so much obsequiousness to the people, had done to *Pompey* and *Cæsar*.

A just occasion then offers it self here of consideration, whether was the better, and safer course taken to arrive at Glory, and Civil Greatness, or that which *Cæsar*, or that which *Cato* took? *Cæsars* comportments seem to have been more noble, and better befitting a Civil life, as also more easie to be imitated; and what indeed is of more importance for the happiness of a City, then quietness and concord amongst Citizens? What more proper to produce and preserve this, then Magnificence, Grace and Affability? all which vertues were proper to *Cæsar*, and which by a straight and speedy way guided him to the height of greatness and glory. He who desires to obtain this favour from Citizens, must abstain from doing any injury, must seek out all occasions of doing good, must attribute much to others, must speak moderately of himself, must do good things, and make them appear to be so, so as he may help not onely by his actions, but by his example. Rigor, Severity, the neglect of all other respects, where there is onely an upright mind to do well (things which are sufficiently commendable in *Cato*) may of themselves peradventure border nearer upon true vertue, but bear a less proportion with civil vertue, if respect be had to that which is found, not to that which is desired. Who does not value the love of his Citizens, or will not endeavor the acquisition thereof save by very upright ways, which are not always possible, meets with continual occasion of contention, from whence great and open enmities do often arise, which do at last put the City into confusion. So as such men do first ruine themselves, and then the Commonwealth. When laws are observed with such extremity of rigor, it seems to be done to oppress Citizens, not to preserve Justice; Wherefore such a Government is but little acceptable, and therefore easier to receive alteration upon any accident that shall happen: This was seen in *Cato*'s actions; for his way of proceeding got him many enemies, who that they might make themselves able to bulk with his Authority, made themselves strong by Alliances and Friendships, and became not onely formidable to him, but even to the Commonwealth. If *Cato* had not despised the Parentage offered him by *Pompey*, *Cæsar* had not joyned alliance with him by giving him his Daughter *Julia* for Wife, which was the occasion of both their too excessive greatness, by which they ruined the Commonwealth. The people were not pleased with *Cato*'s severe way of proceeding, which made them the more easily adhere to *Cæsar*, and his Associats, and so not perceiving it, became enemies to the Commonwealth. Therefore *Cæsar* might still continue in the peoples good opinion, and long preserve his Authority and Power: But *Cato*, though his counsels did sometimes prevail, yet was not his Dignity and Power grounded upon so sound foundations, as that he could alwaies keep himself in the same condition: Nay, sometimes things were born against him in the choyce of Consuls, when people much more unworthy then he were Corrivals with him. The little pleasingness of his proceedings was also cause, though under pretence of honor, and publick imploy-

imployment, why he was sent from the City, and in a manner banished, being sent by Sea to *Cyprus* for some concernments of that Kingdom; so as the Commonwealth suffered by his absence; and particularly *Cicero*, who was formerly upheld by *Cato's* authority, and held for a Defender of the publick Liberty, was banished. By these things the question seems clearly enough decided, that *Cæsars* way of proceeding is much more easie and certain to bring a man to dignity and greatness, then the way which *Cato* took.

Yet he who on the other side shall examine *Cato's* manners and actions, as he will find them more praise-worthy, so will he think that they may lead by a righter and more direct way to true Honor, and to that greatness which is to be desired by him that lives in a Commonwealth. For he takes a safer and a more noble way to arrive at Dignity, who walks by the way of true Vertue, of Justice, Modesty and Temperance, then he who endeavors the like by Popular Favor: For that Favor which is won by a good repute, and by vertuous actions, is easily preserved by herself, and of herself; nay, the cry'd-up Honor which ariseth from publick Imployments and Places, if it be not grounded upon true worth, soon vanisheth, and leaves that in obscurity which did before shine forth so bright. But he who deals uprightly, doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion, and confirms himself more and more in the habit of well-doing. So that Favor which hath so good a leaning-stock, is more firm and stable; whereas that which is purchased by extrinsecal appearances, as it is easilier gotten, so is it upon any slight occasion more easily lost. For those who are moved to favor for such reasons, are incited so to do rather out of their own humor, or for their own advantage, then out of any true affection that they bear to such persons: And therefore growing either glutted of the same things they did so like at first, or thinking that they may receive them in a larger proportion from others, they change their minds, and turn their liking elswhere.

Moreover, he who does that which of it self is good, can never want a reward: For though he do not purchase those exterior demonstrations which are usually gotten by worth, and which do more illustrate it, he notwithstanding feels that true content within himself which springs from well-doing, and which is held by wise men to be the best reward of good actions. For he who loves and favors Equity and Justice, makes the Laws be observed, prefers the publike good before private interest, thinks nothing an injury wherein the Commonwealth is not offended; this man may be truly said to be a great Citizen; for that publick dignity and greatness maintains his private credit and estimation: Nay, such men as these, if by any ill fortune or bad accident they fall from favor, they find always, as it were by some occult power of Vertue, some others to protect them. As was seen in *Cato*, who having drawn upon him the enmity of the greatest part of the Nobility, and being but little befriended by the People for impeding the *Agrarian* Law, though he were for a while held low, he was notwithstanding created Consul in rivalship with *Metellus*, who was favored by *Pompey*. And by a more notable example, *Murena* himself, who was accused in Judgment by *Cato*, was not only not his Enemy afterwards, but defended him against *Metellus*; and *Cato's* reverend authority prevailed over *Metellus* his fury, who being accompanied by a number of armed men, was come into the *Piazza* to promote the Law of making *Pompey* return with his Army to the City in the time of *Catalines* Conspiracie: And we read, that when he returned from *Cyprus*, the Magistrates, Priests, the whole Senate, and very many of the People went in such numbers to meet him, as the banks of *Tybur* were full of them on both sides, as if he had entred into the City in triumph. And another time being in the publick Assemblies put by the Pretorship, by the violence of the Consuls *Crassus* and *Pompey*, yet he, being but a private man, was accompanied home to his own house that very day with more men, then followed the Magistrates.

If then we will know in this diverſity of affairs, which of theſe two courſes it is beſt to follow, ſince by what you have heard, equal credit may almoſt be given unto both, we muſt weigh what his natural inclination is who will ſet theſe examples before him to follow them; what the true end is which he propoſeth unto himſelf, and after what Form of Gornment that Commonwealth is ordered in which he is born, and which he ſerves: for without ſuch conſiderations it is hard to know what courſe of life a man muſt take. He who ſeeks to win favor, muſt above all things ſhun affectation, as that which makes a man always ſuſpected to be ambitious, and his actions not acceptable. For he whoſe genius is naturally given to humanity, and to a ſweet and pleaſant manner of converſation, if leaving that, he will put on a Socratical ſeverity and gravity, he cannot hope to uſe it ſo, but that ſome other end being diſcovered to be in him, he will not onely not win credit, but will ſometimes become ridiculous. So on the contrary, when a man is known not to be wittily or facetiouſly given, but that his nature is rather given to be grave, if he will appear to be civil and very familiar, fauning and flattering with humble words, and in a baſe manner, he incurs the ſame miſchief; for ſuch forced behavior denotes affectation, and grows tedious. *Cato* was born with this ſeverity, as he had witneſſed all his life time, by all his actions. He was a Sloven in his feeding and in his apparel; he went on foot to his Country-houſe, and ſometimes when he was in place of Magiſtracy he would give Audience unſhod, and in Garments unfit for the Bench. In fine, all his actions were unpoliſhed, ſevere, deſpiſing ſuch things as others did moſt value. The clean contrary was ſeen in *Caſar*, who was given to quaint behaviour, humanity and grace. They therefore by their ſeveral ways proved both of them great men, and famous, becauſe they followed their natural genius and inclinations.

In the next place, the end which a man propounds unto himſelf, who endeavors to get Honors and Imployments in a Commonwealth, is to be conſidered: for if he aim onely at the publick Service, and at his Countries good, it is fitteſt for ſuch a one to lay aſide all particular intereſt, and not valuing any private favor, to attend onely a punctual obſervance of the Laws, and the depreſſion of ſuch Citizens, who to the prejudice of the publick Liberty, will become too powerful as did *Cato*. But if one who is meerly byaſſed by ambition, propounds unto himſelf the becoming great and powerful, by any whatſoever means; thoſe arts and applications which are pleaſing to moſt men, and which purchaſe applauſe, and univerſal liking, will certainly lead him more ſafely to that end, and conduce moſt to his purpoſe, as they did to *Caſar*; who abaſing himſelf that he might mount the higher, giving, that he might get the more; being ſubſervient unto others, to the end that he might command over them, knew ſo well how to cover his moſt affected and ambitious thoughts, as at laſt he did not onely attain to the greateſt Authority that is uſually granted to any one in any Commonwealth, but drew all Dignity and publick Authority upon himſelf.

Next it muſt be had in conſideration, what the Form of that Commonwealth muſt be, in the which a man who lives therein, propounds unto himſelf the acquiſition of place and honor. For if the Form be Optimatical, wherein vertue is eſteemed above all things, certainly *Cato's* Manners and Cuſtoms will better ſute with ſuch a Government; for in ſuch a Commonwealth, the Magiſtrates in their diſpenſation aim chiefly at thoſe things which were very eminent, and much commended in *Cato*: But if the peoples authority be great in the City, *Caſars* Manners and Artifices will be better beloved, and likelier to win approbation, and conſequently the peoples favor in their ſuffrages, which may carry them to the height of Civil preferment. Therefore in *Sparta*, which was an Optimatical Commonwealth, divers men did flouriſh, who in their lives and manners did reſemble *Cato*; as on

the

the contrary, thoſe Citizens were moſt eſteemed of in *Athens* which was a Popular Commonwealth, who knew how to win the Peoples good will, after *Cæſars* way: whence it was that ſhe fell eaſily afterwards into the power of many Tyrants; inſomuch as the liberty of the Commonwealth was poſſeſt at one and the ſame time by Thirty ſuch men. But in *Rome* where the Government was partly Popular, partly Optimatical, both *Cæſar* and *Cato* might win renown, for divers Citizens were diverſly minded, according to the diverſity of Government in the adminiſtration of publick affairs; but in that mixture, *Cæſar* might get firmer, and more ſetled authority then *Cato* in civil diſſentions, becauſe the Popular Faction was much the greater. So that *Cato* ſiding with the Senate to the very laſt, and being, according to his wont, and worth, unwilling, to be expoſed to the licentious will and pleaſure of the Conquerors, he was born down, together with the Senate, and reduced to the neceſſity of making himſelf away. And *Cæſar* being by the Soldiers ſuffrages, and by force, confirmed and ſetled in Power and Authority, which were already too immoderately granted him in the Commonwealth by the peoples favor; he poſſeſt himſelf of the common publick Liberty, and deſtroyed all Form of Civil Government.

The Tenth DISCOURSE.

To what Age of the City of Rome, *the greateſt praiſe and merit is to be given, for the proſperity and greatneſs, whereto ſhe arrived.*

SUch and ſo many are the Grandeurs and proſperities of the City of *Rome*, as the conſideration thereof affords always new matter of diſcovering divers myſteries therein very well worthy to be examined and obſerved: but if we ſhall conſider amongſt many other things, how her proſperity did ſtill from time to time increaſe both in ſtate and reputation, a particular deſire will ariſe in us, of knowing to what Age the chief praiſe and merit of that Cities arrival at ſuch a height of Greatneſs and Glory, is to be attributed. Three Ages may chiefly be numbred wherein that great City did ſtill more and more increaſe, and grow greater in Reputation. To wit, the firſt, which may be termed her Infancy; from the foundation of the City till the driving out of the *Tarquins*, and to the firſt Conſulſhip of *Junius Brutus*, and of *Tarquinius Collatinus* which was the ſpace of Two hundred twenty four years: The ſecond, which ſhall be her Adoleſcence, from that time till the beginning of the ſecond Carthaginian War; betwixt two which times, there paſſed the ſpace of Two hundred forty ſix years: The third, her Youth, which was the flowre of her years, and of her greateſt proſperity, may be termed the reſt of that time which paſt from the beginning of the ſaid War, which was in the Conſulſhip of *Appius Claudius*, ſirnamed the *Bold*, till *Cæſars* Dictatorſhip, the ſpace of Two hundred and twenty years, which makes up the full number of Seven hundred and ten years, which the Commonwealth of *Rome* laſted, which might be ſo termed for the temperate Government of the firſt Kings, and for the authority which the Senate held therein alſo, as long as their Dominion laſted. For what concerns the times of Emperors, no mention needs to be made thereof, for what concerns our purpoſe: For to boot with the corruption which inſued of the firſt Form of Civil Government, they enjoyed,

and for the moſt part but unworthily, the labors of other men; and though the City mainrained herſelf in great height for the ſpace of four hundred years, nay, though many gallant and magnifick things were by the Majeſty of the Empire, and by the Emperors power, yet theſe did not concur to the firſt foundation of the Empire, which is that which is now particularly enquired into; but the Empire did for the moſt part decline in divers parts, and in ſundry times, till at laſt it began to haſten more headlong to ruine.

The chief and greateſt praiſe then of this moſt noble and moſt artificial Fabrick may be attributed to the firſt that laid the firſt foundation: For thoſe that ſucceeded them, finding that they might thereupon ſafely erect the great ſtructure of the Roman Empire, their Counſels were excited, and their work chiefly helped by thoſe who did firſt think thereupon, and did ſo work, as the City being well ordered and diſpoſed of with good principles, might riſe to a greater degree of dignity and Empire. But thoſe of the third Age, having noble examples of worth before them, and ſeeing ſo good and gallant a work already ſo proſperouſly increaſed and raiſed up, went more courageouſly on to greater and more noble works, having framed a conceit unto themſelves out of the former proſperous ſucceſſes, that they might be able to make (as they did) their City the Miſtreſs and Monarch of all Nations. The firſt Age was governed by ſeven Kings, of differing natures and cuſtoms for the moſt part, but well fitted to what concerned the ſervice of the new City, and *Romes* riſing greatneſs. For *Romulus*, the Father and Founder thereof, was excellent at Arms; ſo as accompanied by other military men, he began the firſt habitation, and did ſo order things, as the new City might ſubſiſt of herſelf, without putting herſelf under the protection of any neighboring people. But *Numa*, who ſucceeded him, that he might give the form of a true City to the new Inhabitants, ordering them by certain Laws, and chiefly by Religious worſhip, did ſo behave himſelf, as in all ſucceeding times that City was always much given to Religious affairs; which though they were falſe of themſelves, yet did he thereout draw good advantage concerning Civil affairs. The third King, *Tullus Hoſtilius*, reaſſuming Arms, bridled the boldneſs of the neighboring people, who conſpired the ruine of the City; and getting many victories over them, began not only to think of ſuch things as concerned the ſafety of the City, but to enlarge her Confines by way of Arms in her neighbors Territories. *Anus Martius* did ſtudy Civil affairs more, and minded the multiplying of people in the City, and the making of diverſe Orders which might reduce it to the form of a great and well-governed City. *Tarquinius Priſcus* accuſtomed the People to know the majeſty and dignity of Empire; by which reverence he, to the great ſervice of publick affairs, increaſed obedience in thoſe who both then and afterwards were to command in the City, and in the Armies. But *Tarquinius Superbus*, the City being already got to her full growth, procuring his own ruine by his raſhneſs and unbridled licentiouſneſs, opened the way to the liberty of *Rome*, and to her greater greatneſs.

By which things it may be conceived, that the ſecond Age found the City already well inſtituted in Arms and Religion, much increaſed in People and Buildings, accuſtomed to know the dignity and majeſty of Empire, ſhe being eſteemed and feared by the neighboring people, an Enemy to Tyranny, and finally fit to receive a good Form of Civil Government, and able to govern herſelf by her own Orders and Forces. So as thoſe who followed in the enſuing Age, finding the way chalk'd out unto them to lead the City on to a greater degree not only of ſafety, but of glory, they found leſs of difficulty in all their undertakings: As it is uſual in all things, whereunto it is harder to give a beginning, then to augment them. Wherefore the praiſe is due to thoſe firſt Romans, which is given to the firſt Invertor of things, of knowing how to put on generous thoughts, and uſe good counſels, when

the

the City was so weak as she knew not how to nourish them, nor had any example of her own men. Therefore in the following Age, the height of praise which was given to any one that had deserved well of the Commonwealth, was to honor him with the name of *Pater Patriæ*, and to compare his actions to those of *Romulus*, and of those that followed next after him; from whom, as from the first Founders of the City of *Rome*, it was generally granted that the rest had received power and vertue to imitate them. The custom was therefore always observed in *Rome*, of honoring her Birth-day with solemn sacrifices, as that which by its happy Auspices had not only given excellent Auguries, but as it were a certain vigor to the so many other Felicities which did at all times accompany her. And it was particularly interpreted for an excellent Augury of the City of *Rome's* greatness, and of her increase in power and authority over all the Latines, that she was born and increased from the ruines of *Alba*, most of the Latines having been Colonies of the ruined City of *Alba*.

Now if we shall consider what may be alleadged on the behalf of the second Romans, we shall find such and so many things to be said for them, as the first Garland of the glory of *Rome's* greatness may seem to be due to them, without offence to any others. For he who shall weigh things well, shall find that this Age brought forth more noble and truer Examples of real worth, then any other; so as they did not only excell themselves, but even all Foreiners: For the military valor which flourished in the Citizens of *Rome* of this Age, was accompanied with other excellent vertues, and especially with vast charity towards their Country, not for their own glory, but out of love to her greatness and prosperity. Danger was so despised by some of them, as some famous men amongst them did even sacrifice themselves and their lives for their Countries welfare; as the examples of *Curtius*, and of the two *Decii* do even at this day, much to their glory, shew. The generous Commanders in that Age did contemn riches as well as danger; so as they overcame not only their Enemies, but even themselves; things which were praised and admired in *Quintus Cincinnatus*, in *Fabritius*, and in *Paulus Æmilius*. But how famous did they prove in matter of War, and worthy of that praise which is given to excellent Commanders? He who shall consider how Enterprises were managed by the two *Papyrii*, the Father and the Son, against the *Samnites*; what the Forces of the conquered Enemies were; of what advantage their victory was to the *Romans*; will confess that their merits came not short of any, neither in those, nor in the following times. This Age was often to withstand the *Galls*, who were powerful and bitter Enemies to the *Romans*, by whom the very City of *Rome* was assaulted and indangered; for the delivery whereof *Furius Camillus* grew so famous. But this was not the only occasion of trying the Roman Forces against the *French* in those times: *Quintus Servilius Ala*, and *Q. Fabius* withstood them; when the *French* returning more powerful then before neer to the City of *Rome*, by means of these illustrious Commanders, their whole endeavors proved vain. In this Age, divers People of *Italy* did sundry times jointly conspire against the City of *Rome*; which, the more formidable she grew to her neighbors, the more did a common apprehension make them arm against her: And notwithstanding, she did not only seem not daunted amidst those dangers, but having still the better of those by whom she was infested, she increased by the ruine of others. For these reasons Forein forces were called in by the very *Italians*, and *Pyrrhus* was received into *Italy*, that he might wage war with the *Romans*; whose renown was so great, as the chief honor in matters of war was given by *Hannibal* to *Pyrrhus*. And he who in a few words will conceive the worth of the Commanders in this Age, let him say that *Livy*, who was much versed in the Roman affairs, did attribute so much to the Commanders of this Age, as he esteemed them not only equal, but superior to *Alexander* the Great: holding for

certain,

certain, that if *Alexander* after he had conquered *Darius*, had turned into *Italy*, he would have left the glory that he won in *Persia*, when he should have met with the Roman Forces, commanded by *Fabius Maximus*, *Valerius Corvinus*, *Papyrius Cursor*, and *Titus Manlius*.

But above all things it is worth consideration, that in this Age, the City of *Rome*, was confirmed and established with more certain and useful orders, as well in Civil as in Military Affairs, whereby she long after was governed, and by vertue whereof, she chiefly arrived at such a height of greatness. Great were the rewards which were given in *Rome* to military worth, and those Citizens were much egg'd on by glory to great undertakings, and sharp sufferings. Triumph was a great ornament and glory to victorious Commanders; which was first used to honor the Consul *Postbumius*, for the Victory he wan over the *Sabins*. The first equestral Statues, were likewise an invention of this Age, which were granted to Consuls who overcame the *Latins* in Battel. In this Age the Mural and Civick Garlands were first used, to the end, that there might be rewards for every mans worth. The wintring of Soldiers in the Fields and under Tents, was begun to be used by the Romans in this Age: a thing which proved so useful and necessary afterwards in greater and farther distant enterprises. What did more advantage the City of *Rome* in her greatest dangers and weightiest occasions, then the authority of Dictator; a Magistracy of reverend majesty, and which proved so often the true and onely remedy to maintain the affairs of *Rome* in their less prosperous times. This was first created in *Rome*, to resist the forces of Forty *Populi Latini*, who were joyned in league together against the Romans, and against whom *Postbumius* was created the first Dictator. But how reverend and unviolable the observance of military orders were with the Commanders of this Age, may be demonstrated by the famous examples of the severity of *Postbumius*, and of *Manlius Torquatus* against their own Sons, who for not obeying the command of their Superiors, though it were accompanied with noble daring, and happy success, was punished by death.

And as this age was busied in perpetual Wars, new Wars being perpetually raised up by the same people of *Latium* and *Toscany*, whom they had often overcome, so to it that Fortitude, Vertue of mind, and Military Discipline is chiefly to be attributed, by which the people of *Rome* proved more excellent then all other Nations. For this so continual exercise of Arms for so many years together, did so accustom the City to Military Affairs, as it was not onely easie for those that followed after, to tread in the footsteps of these their Predecessors, but almost necessary for the preservation of the City; which being long accustomed to labor and warlike occupations, could not, nor would not without intestine disorder, live in idleness. And as for the orders in Civil Affairs, certainly no small praise is likewise due to this Age; for not to touch upon many particular Laws and Institutions; the most famous Laws amongst the Romans of the Twelve Tables, made in the Decemvirate of *Appius Claudius* and his Colleagues, by which the City of *Rome* was chiefly governed, were Institutions of this Age; industriously taking divers things from the Grecians, amongst whom more then in any other Nation, all learning, and all the most noble Arts did then chiefly flourish. Amongst other things, great was the wisdom of allowing the *Latins* to be free Denisons of *Rome*, for hereby the City was notably augmented, and her Empire established. For she did not onely for ever free her self from the vexation which she had had for the space of Four hundred years by the Forces of these people, whom they had often subdued, and who had often rebelled against the Romans, and could not by Force be kept within the bonds of obedience; but being hereby obliged so fast, and so interessed in the same Affairs with the Romans, she was much

assisted

assisted by them in the so many Wars which the Romans made afterwards. The use of Colonies was of great advantage likewise to the Roman Empire; for it served to ease the City when she was oppress with too many Citizens, and to keep others in obedience who were daily reduced under the Roman Empire. And this use of Colonies, though it had a certain weak beginning, when *Romulus* sent some to inhabit in the City of *Fidena*, yet was it oftener and more orderly introduced, and confirmed in this second Age; So as experience shewing the good of this institution to those that came after, this custom was ever after followed by the Romans. This Age is likewise a great argument of the civil wisdom of the Citizens: for though there were therein important Insurrections often made, and so great broils between the People and the Nobility; and though it were harder to keep those in obedience, who had continued to serve in the Commonwealth in her Wars for the space of a hundred years after the driving out of their Kings, without pay, yet were they able to appease all discords without the effusion of any civil blood, as it happend afterwards in the third Age, wherein great tumults arose from little ones; so as Civil Wars, or at least dissentions and partakings continued amongst the Citizens for about Fifty years, from *Sylla's* Dictatorship to that of *Cæsars*, thereupon the final ruine of the Commonwealth ensued. It also gives a great proof of the perfection of the orders observed in the City of *Rome* in these times, that she was twice able to shake off slavery; First, that of the Kings, and then that of the *Decemviri*; which the Third Age could not do, which being once faln under the command of *Sylla*, though he himself forewent the vast authority which was granted him, and left the City in Liberty, continued notwithstanding still in factions, which soon after brought her past all remedy under *Cæsar's* most expres Tyranny. And certainly great was the endeavor after Liberty in this second Age, in respect whereof all things else were set at nought; insomuch as *Brutus* did not pardon his own Sons life, it being suspected that he had had to do with *Tarquin* to the prejudice of Liberty; and the whole people of *Rome* condemned *Manlius Capitolinus* to death, he who had saved the Capitol and the City of *Rome*, for being suspected his actions tended towards Tyranny. Those who lived in the hardest times of this second Age shewed their constant generosity, when the City of *Rome* being burnt and destroyed by the French, they would not abandon her, and go to live at *Veij*, as their forlorn fortune, and the condition of these times seemed to advise them to do; but kept their hopes alive for better things, which if they had then abandoned, that name and fame of *Rome* had peradventure been for ever lost, which her happy genius promised her. So as he who shall consider the works and actions of those Citizens of *Rome* of this second Age, may with reason think them worthy of great praise; so as it may seem they had nothing to desire, whereby to have been made as illustrious in the sight of the world, and their actions equal to those of the Third Age, then to have had occasion of greater enterprises, as they had. But on the contrary, these mens actions are more to be commended for the integrity of their manners, for their love towards their Country, and for their other noble vertues; whereas in those of the last Age the splendor of their glorious actions in War, was oft-times obscured, and stained by other vices, by Ambition, Avarice, and immoderate Liberty; to which things the Third Age was so addicted, as they brought her in the height of her greatest prosperity, to utter ruine.

But before we pass this sentence, it will become us in justice to hear what those gallant Romans can say in their own behalfs, who by the cried up Fame of their stupendious actions, have filled the world with the glory, and wonder of the Roman greatness. And how much shorter the time was wherein the supreme Monarchy was founded and established, so much greater demonstration is thereof

the

the generosity and worth of these men, who had the boldness to undertake so many Enterprises, and could bring them to a good end. For, the first time that the *Romans* carried their Forces out of *Italy*, was by reason of the Carthaginian War; wherein amongst other things, it was not only a thing commendable, but much to be wondred at, that the *Romans*, being till then unexperienced in Maritime affairs, did so soon learn that manner of Discipline, as they overcame the *Carthaginians* in many Sea-fights, who for so long a time before had profess'd themselves to be Sea-men, and had the first place given them by all other Nations for their Naval preparations.

But whereby can the excellent Military Discipline of the *Romans* be better known, and their unvanquish'd worth, then by their deeds done in the second Carthaginian War; wherein at one and the same time they were able to maintain so many Armies in *Italy*, *Sicily*, *Spain*, and *Greece*? And yet one only City of *Rome* could furnish them all with Commanders and Soldiers out of her own Citizens, and Italian Colonies; and that in so great a number, as that there was above Eighty thousand fighting men of the Roman Army in the Fight at *Canna*. On the contrary, *Carthage*, though her Dominions were large and powerful, after she had been several times routed by the *Romans* in *Spain*, being willing to defend *Africa*, nay the very City of *Carthage*, the head of the Empire, was forc'd to recall that her Commander in chief, and those her Soldiers which she had in *Italy*. The *Romans* thrice overcome in battel by *Hannibal*, took still fresh courage, and assuming new Forces, did even face Fortune, whom they won at last to be their friend, and in a manner obedient to their deserts. But the *Carthaginians*, when once overcome by *Scipio* in Fight neer *Zama*, yielded, and humbled themselves to the *Romans*. But the last *Punick* War, as it ended in a shorter time, and with less trouble then the former two, so brought it more glory and security to the *Romans*; for the very name of the formidable Roman Forces, was sufficient to put an end to that War; and the final ruine of *Carthage* which ensued, did for ever secure the Commonwealth of *Rome* from the false faith of the *Carthaginians*.

But other great and noble feats of Arms, undertaken at the same time with great courage and happy augury, as the War against *Philip* in *Macedonia*, and in *Asia* against *Antiochus*, did sufficiently illustrate the Roman Forces, and did enlarge the Confines of their Empire in fartheſt distant Nations. In the three *Punick* Wars, which lasted forty three years, with variety of fortune, they fought sometimes more for safety then for glory: But herein the People of *Rome* shewed not only the power of their Forces, but the generosity of their minds; having undertaken the one War to revenge the injuries received from *Philip*, in his having supplied *Hannibal* with succors; and the other to preserve some Cities in *Asia*, antient Colonies of *Greece*, in their Liberty, and from being injuriously oppress'd by *Antiochus*. And if it be said, that these so many Enterprises were made by the Italian Forces; the first and chiefest difficulty consisting in the subjugating of *Italy*, the first and chiefest praise seems to be due to this Age: But take this for granted, it must be added, that a great share of this very praise is due to the last Age; for the *Insubri* and *Liguri* were not assubjected by the *Romans*, till after the end of the second Carthaginian war; the first being conquered by *Marcellus*, the second by *Quintus Fulvius*; who wan so much the more glory thereby, for that these are very noble parts of *Italy*, and that the Country of the *Insubri* was possess'd by the *Galls*, who were at that time very potent in those parts, and *Liguria* was inhabited by a very fierce and warlike people. These are not then things altogether so great and glorious, as that they surpass all other things done by other men at other times: But if we shall look further into this very Age of *Rome*, we shall meet with other actions so great, and as miraculous, as their splendor will obscure the glory of those very *Romans*,

who

who were so cryed up in comparison of other Nations. For when the City of *Carthage* was utterly ruin'd, with which the City of *Rome* had fought so long, and oft-times with variety of fortune, and those dangers being secured for ever, there not remaining any other Potentate who could of himself give a just counterpoise to the Roman power, they march'd so fast on to Monarchy, as in the space of one hundred years, between that time, and the time of *Cæsars* Dictatorship, they extended the Confines of the Roman Empire almost over the face of the whole Earth. Amongst the rest, great was that War which was taken against *Mithridates*, under pretence of defending *Nicomedes* and *Ariobarzanes*, who were Friends to the People of *Rome*, but in effect to oppose his vast designs, wherein aspiring at the dominion of all *Asia*, and of *Europe* also, he became formidable even to the very *Romans*; who though they had to do with this potent Enemy, who could put together in this War an Army of Two hundred thousand Foot, and Fifty thousand Horse, and a Fleet of Three hundred Ships, yet did they not only discomfit *Mithridates*, but took occasion to make other Victories in Nations far off; for they marched with their Armies into *Armenia* against *Tigranes*, because he had favored *Mithridates*, and received him into his Kingdom, when he was driven away by the *Romans*. And he who will observe the Roman History, will have occasion of wonder, that though the Roman Commanders and Armies were often overcome in battel, yet in all the Wars that ever they made they have at last proved Victors. But the things that were done in the last years of this Age, do exceed whatsoever could at first have fain into the thought of man, thereby to settle the Commonwealth in a flourishing and fortunate condition. To pass by so many other glorious Victories and Triumphs, who can choose but admire the great deeds of *Pompey* and of *Cæsar*? the speed which the first made in finishing so many Wars, his great good fortune chiefly in subjugating so many Eastern Provinces in a very short time; and the second's constancie and fortitude, demonstrated in so many battels, and in curbing so many Western Nations. Insomuch as it is said of both these, that each of them won above eight hundred Cities to the Roman Empire; which certainly hath dimmed and obscured the glory and memory of all Antiquity.

What resolution shall then be given in this so doubtful question, in which so many reasons may be alleaged on all sides? It is a great matter certainly to give a beginning to things, which being afterwards increased, are wont usually to proceed on more easily: And yet on the other side, according to the known saying, they are no less to be commended who add to things begun, and do preserve what is already gotten, then are the original Authors. But neither these, nor those may be said to have won the Gole; which they can only properly be said to do, who bring things already begun, and since much augmented, to the highest pitch of perfection which such a thing is capable of, or whereunto, being measured with due respect, it can arrive. And these degrees are found in almost all things that are effected by humane industry; that is, the beginning, the increase, and the perfection: After which two other things follow, declination, and final ruine, whereof we do now treat. But these several degrees may clearly enough be observed in Empires. In these then did the Citizens of *Rome* adoperate themselves in all the aforesaid Ages so worthily, and so much to the good of the City, as each of them may seem to lay claim to the chief Crown of the Roman glory. It may then be said, that though many things concur to the production of any thing, yet do they not all do it after the same manner, nor are they all of equal dignity in themselves, or of equal force for the constituting of that work. Thus in the foundation of *Romes* Monarchy, certainly the Founders of the City did concur from whom she received her first nutriment, which help'd so much to strengthen that body, and made it fit to sustain the weight of so great an Empire. Those also who did next succeed them, who did add to her Militia,

her Government, to her good orders both for War and Peace, and made her fitter for greater things, have their part therein; and finally, those who by so many, and so signal Victories, placed her, as it were, with her own hands on the top of her greatest power and dignity. But in this connumeration of things, what can be affirmed, but that the last Age, which by her particular Acts, and labors saw the Commonwealth seated, as it were, in the Throne of Majesty, may with reason challenge the greatest part of this merit and glory, because she concurred as the neerest cause to the founding, and establishing of the City in that state and condition, wherein she was in her greatest excellency and glory amongst all Nations. It is true, that he, who in another respect, will more consider the necessity then the dignity of the thing, may peradventure be of another mind; for it is most certain, that had not the City of *Rome* been first founded by *Romulus*, and maintained by other Kings in her beginning against her insulting enemies, if the Capitol had not been saved afterwards from the *Gauls*, if the so many conspiracies made by the people of *Italy* against her rising greatness had not been repulst, there could have been no such thing as the Victories and Triumphs of the *Scipio's*, *Marcellus*, *Fabritius*, *Metellus*, *Pompey*, and *Cæsar*, and of so many others; who atchieved those things by the strength of the City, already happily begun, and encreased with much industry and valor.

But as it usually falls out in natural things that their augmentation, changing as it were that first Form, proves the corruption thereof, so as that subject being reduced to another condition, little count is held of precedent affairs; so in these things which are formed by mans industry, as a more unpolished Form is succeeded by another, which renders that subject more excellent and perfect, no man values the former, or considers it with a thought of praise or imitation: So we see it falls out in the more noble Arts, as in Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, and the like, which daily grow to more perfection, those are most commended in them who therein prove the greatest Masters; so as their particular praise walks hand in hand with the perfection which by their industry they have brought to that Art, wherein they have with much industry and study spent their time.

Cincinnatus his poverty was praised, and the like of some others of those Commanders, who were called up from the Plough to be Consuls and Dictators, because they bore a certain proportion to the condition of those things, and of the City. But the magnificence of *Crassus*, and of *Lucullus*, had more coherence with the greatness to which the City of *Rome* did afterwards arrive. It seems then that neither can there be any comparison made between these ages, for as they were sufficiently different between themselves, so different thoughts, studies, and exercises did become them: which things, if they had any thing of conformity between them, it was rather by likeness, or figure, or rather some dispositions of those first weaker operations, to the other greater and more noble. And as it is seen in every individual man, the same things are not proportionate nor proper to all Ages, but divers things do accommodate themselves to divers Ages, though the one be subordinate to the other, so as the exercises may both be the same, and different, because they are accommodated to the same aim, and end, but are notwithstanding otherwise put in use, in Childhood, Youth, and Manhood; just so in the point we are now upon, things suit not with a City in the second Age, which were proper to her in the first, neither could the second do those things which were reserved to the third, and which would not be praised in the third, had it not done more then either the first or second. So to end this Discourse, it may be said, That the City of *Rome's* happy genius produced men well adapted to her three conditions, and very excellent for what each Age and condition brought forth. For

if

if the first would have made too much haſt in agrandiſing, and making the City famous, they might rather have diſordered themſelves, and by making many enemies, have encreaſed the difficulty of effecting thoſe things, which when riper, proved afterwards more ſafe and eaſie: And likewiſe if the ſecond ſhould have imbraced things diſproportionable for her ſtrength, and have carried her Forces out of *Italy*, before ſhe had therein ſetled the Roman power, it might have proved rather the corruption then the perfection of the Commonwealth. The firſt therefore, and the ſecond are very much to be praiſed, for ſuch things as became that Age and ſtate of the City wherein they were done. But by how much more the adoperating cauſe doth work upon a more noble & perfect ſubject, by ſo much doth the work prove more perfect and excellent. Therefore thoſe of the third Age having occaſion to act in greater matters, as finding the City already very ſpacious and powerful, the off ſpring of their induſtry and labour hath proved more noble, and they have won ſuch praiſe to the Commonwealth, as greater is not to be pretended unto.

The Eleventh DISCOURSE,

How the Roman Empire, though it fell oftentimes into the hands of baſe and wicked men, was notwithſtanding able to maintain it ſelf in the reign of many Emperors, and how it came to be finally deſtroyed.

AS amongſt all humane actions; thoſe Commands and Powers are nobleſt, and of greateſt worth, by which a man gets to be above other men, and doth govern them in a manner as God doth rule and govern the world, ſo of all Dominions and Commands that ever were, the Roman Empire was greatly remarkable, and held in great eſteem and reverence by all Nations; and did ſo far extend her ſelf, as it may almoſt be ſaid with the Poet, That her Confines were thoſe of the whole world which was known to antiquity. Which may be comprehended by this, that *Conſtantine* the Great having divided the Empire between his three Sons, the elder *Conſtantine*, to whoſe third part fell the Provinces of *Spain*, *France*, and the greateſt part of *Germany*, together with the Iſland of Great *Britain*. made War with his Brother *Conſtantine*, to whoſe ſhare many other Countries fell, to come to a better aggiuſtment of diviſion, wherein he thought his Father had dealt unequally with him. Bu now this ſo ſtupendious Fabrick erected in the concourſe of many years, by the worth and labor of ſo many gallant men, muſt finally run the fate of all humane things, muſt be diſſolved and fall to the ground, and by her ruine occaſion vaſt revolution of things. Hence it was that ſo many noble Cities were ruined, and the ground-work of ſome others laid, which proved afterwards very noble Structures. Hence it was that many intire Regions, had their antient Inhabitants driven away, and were poſſeſt by new Citizens, had new Cuſtoms, new Laws, new Tongues and new faſhions brought in; and hence it was that *Italy*, which had been the Seat of ſo great an Empire, was ſubject to greater alterations, and more heavy calamities then other Provinces. It will not then be an unacceptable labor (man being ſo naturally given to the deſire of knowledge) to ſeek out how, and for what cauſes chiefly theſe things happened. For that general rule, That whatſoever

hath had a beginning, muſt have an end; will not ſatisfie our inquiſitive underſtandings. Empires, as all other earthly things, have their beginning, increaſe, perfection, declination, and laſt ruine and deſtruction, all of them ordained and diſpoſed of by certain cauſes: And though they may be ſeen to vary according to the variety of Accidents, that is not notwithſtanding Chance which appears to us to be ſo, when we cannot penetrate into the true cauſes of things.

In the beginning, the Roman Empire was governed in the form of a Commonwealth, her firſt Founders having begun to enlarge her Dominion amongſt her neighbouring people. She continued in this her infancie, as I may call it, many years, till the times of thoſe famous *Scipio's*, who brought *Spain* and *Africa* under her dominion. But afterwards in the enſuing Age, wherein *Caſar*, *Pompey*, and ſo many other famous Commanders did flouriſh, ſhe mounted to the height of her greatneſs and glory: Neither did *Auguſtus Caſar* degenerate from the worth of them, though the Form of Government was changed; but he likewiſe did much increaſe the Empires Confines in the Eaſtern parts amongſt the *Indians*, and other exterior Nations, and eſtabliſh'd excellent Orders both Civil and Military in the Empire But this Monarchy may be ſaid to ſtand at a ſtay at this time, being conſtituted in a Throne of Majeſty, reverenced and obeyed by all Nations; and in this condition ſhe preſerved herſelf for well-nigh three hundred years, wherein though many and great Wars were made by the ſo many Emperors who governed in thoſe days, yet were they rather made for the preſervation, then for the enlarging of the Empires confines: For there was not almoſt any of the barbarous and far diſtant Nations, as well of the Eaſt, as of the Weſt, which thoſe Emperors were not forc'd to vanquiſh and overcome ſeveral times, and reduce them to the obedience of the Empire, from which they had rebelled. And if any one did enlarge the Empire in furtheſt remote parts, as did the Emperor *Trajan* in *Armenia*, *India*, and ſome others in other Regions and Provinces, it was notwithſtanding at the ſame time leſſened in other parts by new Rebellions. But in *Galienus* his time, who was the thirty fourth Emperor, the Empires ſupreme greatneſs began to decline: For though ſhe received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, which was above a hundred years after, yet in this intervening time, the Empire being in her decaying age, grew weak, yet ſuſtein'd herſelf, and like a Tree whoſe root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd, could not be eaſily eradicated; ſo as though ſhe were oftentimes ſhrewdly ſhaken by Armies of ſundry Nations, yet was ſhe able to reſume her ſtrength, and keep herſelf on foot.

Thus ſtood the Roman Empire then, wherein many miraculous things offer themſelves to our conſideration, and invite us to ſeek out the true occaſion thereof. For on one ſide it appears a ſtrange thing, that an Empire arrived at ſuch a height of greatneſs, when ſhe once began to decline, haſted ſo faſt to her ruine, there not being any other Potentate left in the World, which was able to counterpoiſe her power, yea, which did not obey her, as ſubjugated by her Armies; having alſo ſo many Soldiers to defend her, deſirous for their own advantage to preſerve the Empire. But on the other ſide, he who ſhall conſider, into the hands of how many baſe and wicked men this ſo great Empire fell, he may very well wonder how ſo violent a thing could endure for ſo many Ages, and how a Dominion governed by ſo many Tyrants could paſs from hand to hand through the ſeries of ſo many Emperors, whereof there were above five hundred between *Caſars* time, and that of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, in whoſe days the Roman Empire began viſibly to fall, by the taking of *Rome*, by the ruine of *Italy*, and of other Provinces belonging to the Empire: And yet 'tis known, that the Perſian Monarchy, which was of ſo great eſteem amongſt the antient Kingdoms, was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of Princes given to idleneſs and pleaſure, and was by *Alexander* carried

to

to another Nation; whereof there are many examples ſeen almoſt in every Age.

Let us then ſay, that another violence helped very much to ſuſtain this violence; of ſuch a force is the union of alike things. Thus did the corrupt Cuſtoms of the People and Militia of *Rome* help to maintain the State and Power of theſe Tyrannous Princes: For ſince People lived in *Rome* with much licentiouſneſs, and were entertained with many Paſtimes and publick Shews made by the Emperors, wherein thoſe appeared to be moſt ſplendid who were moſt overgrown with vice, as were *Caligula* and *Nero*, who did not only make the wonted ſports of Hunting and of Comedies be often repreſented with more then uſual magnificence, but introdceed new Shews, as Naval battels, Chariots drawn by Camels and Elephants, and permitted all licentiouſneſs to the Soldiery, no man deſired to change condition; and the Pretorian Soldiers enjoying all things of uſe and priviledg neer unto the City, did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men: And when ſuch Princes grew tedious to them, they put them to death, proclaiming a new Emperor, and receiving from the new Prince many gifts in reward of their wickedneſs: And the diſorder grew ſo great, as ſometimes the Empire of the World was by the Soldiers ſold by Outcry to who would give moſt for it, and at low rates, as it fell out in the time of *Didius Julianus*. Nor was the authority of the Senate able to correct this ſo great inconvenience; as well for that being trodden under foot by force, it was grown very weak, as alſo for that the antient Roman generoſity was wanting in them. So as the Senate having reſolved, after the death of *Caligula*, to free the City and Empire from the like Tyranny, and to reſtore her to her liberty, they could not be conſtant in their reſolution; but being abaſed by fear, ſubmitted ſoon to the obedience of *Claudius*, of *Cæſars* linage, and accepted of him for their Emperor, as ſoon as he was cry'd up by the Pretorian Soldiers. The like to which happened afterwards in many Emperors; thoſe being confirmed by the Senate, which were choſen by the Army.

This licence was diverſly uſed by the Soldiers themſelves: For the Pretorian Bands, and that Army wherein the Emperor was at the time of his death, pretended a particular priviledg in the choice of the new Emperor. Yet Emperors were ſo often cry'd up by other Armies alſo, which were in ſeveral Provinces of the Empire, as all of them deſirous in *Galienus* his time to uſurp this authority, there were thirty two, who at one and the ſame time made uſe of the name and title of Roman Emperor. So as it ſeems it may be truly ſaid, that the Roman Empire was preſerved, not in reſpect to unity, or to the ſame form of Government, but only in reſpect of that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors, whom by reaſon of the ſaid Armies all Provinces were to obey, there being no Militia like to that of the *Romans*, or which could reſiſt them, or withdraw themſelves from their yoke. But great was the diverſity in all things, almoſt in all Ages; for the height of Empire was arrived at by ſeveral ways: Some got it by Inheritance, as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*; and in the following, *Conſtantinus*, *Conſtantius*, and many others; ſome, though very few, were choſen by the Senate, many by the Emperors themſelves, who in their life-time choſe ſome one for their Companions and Succeſſor in the Empire, calling him *Cæſar*, to whom after the former Emperors death, the Title of Emperor, and of *Auguſtus* was given: But their number were moſt, who got the Empire through favor of the Soldiery; wherein one and the ſame reſpect did not always prevail, but many much different conſiderations; regard ſometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former Emperors, ſometimes to worth, and to ſome ſingular action of War, ſometimes to favor, which Commanders knew ſome way or other how to come by from their Armies, and ſometimes to ſome other ſuch like things:

whence

Whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition, but even of divers Nations, were made Emperors of *Rome*; *Trajan* and *Theodosius* were Spainards; *Probus*, *Giovinianus*, and *Valentinus*, Hungarians; *Diocleſian* a Dalmatian, *Cato* a Slavonian; and some others. But that which made the difference greater, was that this Empire as it was diverſly gotten, ſo was it diverſly administred: By some ſo tyrannically, as there is no ſo infamous and wicked vice, whereof you find not ſhameful examples in the lives of *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, *Caracalla*, *Heliogabolus*, and other of thoſe Emperors; whereas the Empire was governed by some others with ſuch Wiſdom and Juſtice, as no more perfect Regal Government can almoſt be imagined. And what excellent vertue (not to ſpeak of *Auguſtus*) was there to be deſired in *Veſpatian*, *Titus*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, *Antoninus*, *Marcus Aurelius*, *Alexander Severus*, and ſuch like? Whence it was, that there having been good and bad Emperors in divers Ages, as much of Dignity, Authority and Power as this Empire loſt through the bad Government of thoſe wicked Princes, it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of theſe good and vertuous Princes.

And this may be alledged for the firſt reaſon, why the Empire was able to preſerve it ſelf for ſo long a ſpace of years. For being for a while run into many diſorders, ſuch as were introduced by the baſeneſs and negligence of other their Predeceſſors, were by the worth of generous Princes amended, and returned to their firſt channel. The Romans antient and confirmed uſe of good military orders, did likewiſe help well towards this: Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy perſons, yet finding the uſual Armies already raiſed, and ready for any enterpriſe, they were able by means of their Commanders, to wage war ſucceſsfully, and to quiet ſuch riſing, and rebellions, as continually aroſe in ſo great an Empire. Thus *Tiberius* did not onely return *France*, which had rebelled to obedience, but ſubjugated *Comagena*, and *Cappadocia* and driving out their Kings, reduced them to Provinces. *Nero* drove the *Parthians* out of *Armenia*, and placed King *Tigranes* there, making that Kingdom Tributory to the Empire. *Claudius* did not onely reduce *Mauritania*, which by means of her Commanders made inſurrection againſt the Empire; but did himſelf in perſon paſs with his Army into *England*, to appeaſe the Riſings of that Iſland; and yet theſe Princes were not thought to have of themſelves any great worth in them. Theſe and ſome other ſuch like cauſes may perhaps be alleadged why this Empire could maintain it ſelf in that greatneſs to which it was arrived.

But to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after, as a thing very ſtrange of it ſelf, as alſo for many other notable conſequences; to wit, to the cauſes of its declining and ruine, Three may, in my opinion, be chiefly alleadged; The immeaſurable greatneſs of the Empire, the ſimplicity and wickedneſs of thoſe who governed it, and the corruption of cuſtoms, which were far different from thoſe with which it was firſt founded, and wherein it grew great. Humane imperfection is the cauſe why mans vertue, as it is not onely finite, and bounded, but weak and brittle; ſo hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded, but circumſcribed within no very large limits; which were it otherwiſe, it would looſe it ſelf in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to eſcape ſafe. And of this, to omit the examples of many other of our actions, we will onely conſider, for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand, That his worth muſt be exceeding great, who is to rule, and command over others. Phyloſophers have affirmed, That ſuch a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth, as he doth in Dignity and Power; nay that his worth and vertue ought to weigh againſt that of all thoſe that he will rule over. But let us paſs by theſe ſupreme Eminences, which are rather to be deſired, then ever hoped to be found. 'Tis very certain,

tain, that it is very hard to govern an Empire well, and the greater it is, the greater is the difficulty of governing it. Wherefore *Lycurgus*, a very wise Legislator, knowing that the quiet of a City, and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition, and with a certain Form of Government, ought to be the true cause of ordaining good Laws, would of his own election so dispose of his *Spartans*, and of the orders of that Commonwealth, as she should not be able much to enlarge her Confines. But on the contrary, *Rome*, as all the constitutions of the City, and the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the Commonwealth, so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace, not onely by reason of foreign Forces, but not by occasion of discord between the Citizens. The bounds of her Empire grew to be almost immense, and she marcht with her Forces to the utmost parts of the Earth, subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous Nations. But at last, not having almost any foreign Enemies to fight with, her Citizens begun to make use of their Armies which had conquered other Nations, in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves; till at last the worth and fortune of *Cæsar* prevailed, so as *Augustus* remained sole Lord of the World, and *Tiberius*, who succeeded him, entered peaceably into so great an Empire, wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers, train'd up in a perpetual Militia, and by reason of Civil Wars, accustomed to live very licentiously. The greatest acquisitions of the largest and fartheſt distant Provinces were very lately made, there having been above 1700 Cities taken by two onely Commanders, *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, and powerful Nations vanquished. So as it behoved to keep a great number of Soldiers in those Garisons, to keep the people in obedience, which were in parts farthest distant from the Senate of the Empire. But the very same thing which was introduced to provide against those dangers, was cause of others, by reason of the Authority which the Armies had already usurped, and out of hopes afforded to the Commanders of attaining this supreme dignity, by being by the Soldiers cried up Emperors. Wherefore one onely man, though of never so much worth, not being able to supply all places, and provide for so many things as so great an Empire stood in need of, and less able to correct the disorders, which in so many States, as civil humors in members farthest distant from the heart, did daily more and more encrease, the Empire must needs be continually vext both by foreign Nations, and by its own Soldiers; so as it was hardly ever free from such troubles; nor was War sooner ended in one place, but it broke forth in another; nay for the most part, divers Roman Armies fought in several places, at one and the same time, each of them endeavoring to sustain him whom they had chosen to be their Emperor. Therefore *Adrian* to remedy so many disorders in the Empire, which he thought did onely arise by reason of the Emperors being so far off, and the largeness of the Confines, resolved not to keep his certain abode in *Rome*, but spending his whole time in travelling to visit all the parts of his Dominions, to keep his Subjects in their duties; and knowing how hard a thing this would be to do, and almost impossible in so large Confines, he resolved to shorten them in the Eastern parts, making the River *Euphrates* the utmost bound-out of the Empire, and restoring all the people of the higher Provinces to their Liberty, even to *India*; who being by his successors reduced under the obedience of the Empire, and many rebellions ensuing thereupon, and much difficulty, not onely in the further distant parts, but even in those that were nearest at hand; *Constantine* the Great, knowing that these evils could not otherwise be helpt, but by carrying the seat of the Empire nearer those parts, chose the City of *Byzantium* to be the place, which being rebuilt by him, took from him the name of *Constantinople*. And hence it is that the Indian Gymnosophist, being desirous to shew *Alexander* the Great, that whilst being born away with a desire of Rule in far distant Regions, he was gone

so

ſo far from his own Kingdom, as he gave it occaſion of rebelling againſt him, made a hard and ſtiff Oxe-hide be laid upon the ground, and walking upon the utmoſt skirts thereof, ſhewed him, that when the part that was trod upon gave way to the foot, another part roſe up: And that ſo it befell many great Princes, who whilſt they ſeek to keep one part of their States low and quiet, the reſt, which they keep far from, riſe up in rebellion.

Hence it was, that many Emperors, not only ſuch as were unfit for Government, but even the wiſeſt and moſt valiant, knowing and confeſſing themſelves to be oppreſt by the weight of ſo great a maſs, choſe others who in their life-times were to be their Coadjutors in Government, and who ſhould ſucceed them after their deaths in the Empire, which was ſeldom quietly poſſeſt by one alone, the Armies of far diſtant Provinces refuſing oft-times to obey thoſe who were choſen to ſucceed in the Empire by other Armies, though they were with all ſolemnity allowed and accepted of by the Senate; as befell *Galba*, who being created Emperor by the Spaniſh Army, was not accepted of, nor obeyed by the German Army. The like befell many others; ſo as ſometimes it was not well known who was the true Emperor. And certainly, at all times of the greateſt height of this Empire it may be known, that no one man, though of never ſo great worth, was able to govern it in peace and quiet. And even *Auguſtus* himſelf made trial of many Inſurrections in *Spain*, *Germany*, and in the Eaſtern parts, amongſt the *Scythians* and *Parthians*; though at laſt, through his ſingular worth and great good fortune, the whole World being reduced to an univerſal Peace, he was able to ſhut up that famous Temple of *Janus*, which was kept always open afterward, his Succeſſors having always occaſion to moleſt themſelvs with War. So as the ſaying is made true, that *Suâ & ipſa Roma viribus ruit*. But this her ruine was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of thoſe into whoſe hands the Empire often fell: For through their fault, the internal cauſes of the States corruption were either occaſioned, or much increaſed; ſince by their ignorance, baſeneſs, avarice, cruelty, luſt, and other enormous vices, they drew on contempt and injury, the firſt and chief roots of all change of Government: For by contempt the Subjects take occaſion to rebel, and chiefly the richeſt and nobleſt; and from injury comes hatred, and deſire of change of Government. And it was the greater misfortune for this Empire, in all other reſpects more fortunate then all other Empires, that in thoſe very times wherein there was greateſt need of a continued ſucceſſion of wiſe and generous Princes to confirm the State, which by vertue of the great *Auguſtus* was reduced from War and paſt diſorders into Peace and good Government, ſhould after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and baſe Emperors, *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, and *Nero*; from whoſe enormous vices thoſe chief evils aroſe to the Provinces of that Empire, which we but now mentioned, the contempt of that ſupreme dignity, both amongſt Forein and her own Soldiers. The former, by rebelling, ſtrove to free themſelves from their obedience; the other, through inſolence, bereft them of Empire and life. Hatred, and deſire of change aroſe likewiſe in the Senate, which was deprived of its authority; and particularly in thoſe who were offended, or had any thing of generoſity in them. Hence it was, that ſoon after, to wit in *Nero's* time, *Caſars* linage ended; and that the Soldiers accuſtomed to much licentiouſneſs under ſuch Princes, uſurp'd the authority of making Emperors, as they did in *Galba* after *Nero's* death, in *Otho* after *Galba*, and ſo in many others. His worth who commanded in chief, and his good fortune who was to ſucceed in the Empire, was ſometimes able to make a Succeſſor, but not to take this authority totally from the Soldiery, through confidence of whoſe favor many aſpired, though by bad means, to uſurp the Empire; and amidſt theſe contentions the Empire muſt needs be divided, ſhatter'd, and weakened. From this root another diſorder aroſe, which was cauſe of many heinous miſchiefs,

to

to wit, the general corruption of Customs in all the Orders of the City of *Rome*: For Subjects following, as usually they do, their Princes inclinations and exercises, men began to give themselves over to an idle life; and Vertue being neither nouriſhed, nor at firſt maintained, ſtill languiſhed more and more; ſo as the Art of Commanding failing, good Obedience was alſo wanting; every body made his will his law; nor was there any ſort of wickedneſs, how infamous ſoever, from which the Commanders or Soldiers were reſtrained by any reſpect borne to the Majeſty of the Prince. All reaſon was reduced to the ſword, and every one dared to attempt as much as his power encouraged him to compaſs. Such and ſo great were the vices which crept daily into men of all degrees and qualities, as it would be too laborious a thing to number them up all. This one example may ſuffice to ſhew, to what diſſoluteneſs and licentiouſneſs the affairs of *Rome* were reduced, when *Galba* having choſen *Piſo Laſinianus*, a man very famous for his civil behaviour and military worth, his election was neither accepted of by the Army, nor by the Senate, becauſe it was thought that if he ſhould come to the Empire, he would correct the many miſdemeanors both of Citizens and Soldiers: But both of them being kill'd, and in ſtead of him *Otho* was made Emperor in *Rome*, and *Vitellius* at the ſame time cry'd up Emperor by the Army in *Germany*. The affairs of the Empire were then governed with ſuch confuſion, and grew ſo much worſe in the ſucceeding Age, the diſorders growing to be confirm'd by a bad habit, as when any Emperors ſhould go about to correct the immoderate licentiouſneſs of the Soldiers, by reducing them to their antient diſcipline, were they never ſo good and wiſe Princes, they were ſlain by the Armies; as was *Alexander Severus*, *Probus*, and ſome others. So as no certain Form could be given to ſuch a Government, wherein the Soldier had ſo great a ſtroke in Authority, making and unmaking Emperors at their pleaſure; ſo as it might ſeem to reſemble a Popular State; and yet the Emperors commanding with ſupreme authority in ſo ample a Dominion, Monarchy might appear to be there formed.

It is not much to be wondred at then, if this monſtrous body of the Roman Empire being compoſed of almoſt incompatible, ill-govern'd, and miſproportioned parts, ſhould be ſick of divers infirmities, and muſt at laſt ſuffer diſſolution, ſooner then otherwiſe her greatneſs and power promiſed. The negligence and puſillanimity of ſome Emperors were likewiſe cauſe why the City-Soldiers, who kept ſtill about the City, as it were the Life-guard of the Princes perſon, and who were the flower of all the reſt both for valor and diſcipline, being long kept idle, grew ſo effeminate, and ſo unaccuſtomed to labor and military exerciſe, as when ſome more valiant Prince would make trial of them, they found themſelves deceived in the hopes they had of their priſtine worth. Wherefore the Empire having already received great loſſes and damages in divers battels, things grew to that height, as (not to mention many almoſt innumerable particulars which in this caſe might be produced) when the States of the aſſaulted Empire would defend themſelvs againſt the Northern nations (as you ſhall ſhortly hear) they were forced to take others of the ſame Nations to oppoſe their violence: To ſo great a want both of Power, Soldiers, and Military diſcipline was the Empire reduced before it was ſo rent and ſo bereft of many Provinces, as it was afterwards. Then, as the Roman Empire was got to that height of power and greatneſs by the worth of thoſe firſt antient Romans, and by the excellencie of their military diſcipline, ſo her good Orders being afterwards corrupted, ſhe took ſo clean contrary a way to her firſt beginning, as it behoved her ſoon to fall to ruine; it being a certain and true rule, That States do increaſe and are preſerved by the ſame means by which they had their firſt beginnings, and are corrupted by the contrary.

And he who ſhall conſider the antient ways and works of thoſe who laid the firſt

foundations of this Empire, and ſhall compare them with thoſe which inſued in the time of Emperors, will find ſuch difference therein, as the neceſſity of coming to ſuch an end may ſoon be ſeen. The Roman Armies and their Leaders, were once excellent examples of worth and diſcipline. Who does not praiſe and wonder at what *Titus Manlius* did, who puniſht his victorious Son with death, becauſe he fought the enemy before the ſign of Battel was given? Very remarkable were the ſevere puniſhments which were oft-times impoſed upon the Soldiers diſobedience, even for ſlight cauſes, whoſe tumultuous proceedings were oft-time puniſhed with decimating the whole Army. But how different from theſe examples were thoſe which were afterwards in the following Age ſhewn by many of thoſe, who waged War, and commanded the Roman Armies? The Commanders indulgence towards the Armies, the Soldiers uncurb'd licentiouſneſs, the authority and boldneſs which they aſſumed unto themſelves, both over the people, and over the very Emperors, whom they were to obey, are not they monſtrous things in a well ordered State?

Thoſe antient Romans did ſo ſtudy Military Affairs, and ſo frequent were the exerciſes of the Militia with all Citizens, as when the City of *Rome* had not extended her bounds beyond *Italy*, ſhe had ſo numerous Armies, as ſhe was able to maintain at one and the ſame time, but in ſeveral parts above One hundred thouſand men in Arms; and yet when ſo many calamities and ruines befel her by the Barbarians, when ſhe commanded over ſo many Provinces and Kingdoms, her antient Diſcipline was ſo loſt, as for want of Soldiers ſhe was forc'd to make uſe of mercinary Barbarians, who getting at laſt to be very powerful, did joyntly turn their Arms againſt that Empire, for whoſe defence they were called in, and whoſe pay they took. Nor is the vanquiſhing and beating of the Roman Armies, which was for ſo many years unconquerable by other Nations, to be attributed to the Goths, or thoſe other Northern people; but rather to the corruption of their Cuſtoms, to the loſs of their good Diſcipline, and to the diſcord and baſeneſs of the Commanders, and Soldiers of thoſe times. For were not the French a valiant and ſtout Nation? to overcome whom, it behoved *Cæſar* to fight ſo many Battels, and to make ſo often trial of the Romans worth and fortune, and that not without much danger. Did not the Romans wage War in *Spain* for the ſpace of almoſt Two hundred years together, before they could well conquer that Nation, and get quiet poſſeſſion thereof? How often did the *Saxons*, *Bavarians* and other people of *Germany* take up Arms to moleſt the States of the Empire? Yet all their commotions were ſtill ſuppreſt. And had not the Roman Empire almoſt continual War by reaſon of their ſo many Inſurrections, with many other Eaſtern Nations, and chiefly with the Perſians? And though ſometimes they taſted of adverſe fortune, yet their loſs was always recovered, as alſo the prejudice of the reputation of the Romans Forces by their own Commanders and Soldiers, ſo as they were always forc'd to keep within their own Confines, and under the obedience of the Empire. But when they ſtood in greateſt need, when the Empire recieved ſo ſore and ſo irreparable blows from the *Barbarians*, it was brought to ſuch weakneſs in the Eaſtern parts by reaſon of the many great diſorders which were in the Head, and in all the Members, which were now become incureable, as it was not able to ſuſtain the force of the fierce and warlike Northern Nations. And beginning once to fall, when its worth was but little, it could not get up again, as it had done at other times.

Now if we will apply theſe more general conſiderations, to ſome particular chances of this Empire, the true cauſe of its declination will the more eaſily be known. The Affairs of the Empire were almoſt at all times greatly moleſted by divers of the Northern People, many of which were never reduced to the obedience of the

Empire,

Empire, ſome of which had not been known till they took up Arms, but of all the reſt the *Gothe* proved the moſt famous for the ruine of the Empire, and for the ſo many calamities of *Italy*, and of many other Nations; and he who ſhall conſider their beginnings and their progreſs, muſt needs wonder very much, and through confuſion loſe the diſcourſe of humane wiſdom; To think how this barbarous people, and ſo far remote from our Regions, and unknown by them, inſomuch, as at this day their original is not by Authors agreed upon, without or Kingdom, or Military Diſcipline, falling down tumultuouſly at firſt, to poſſeſs themſelves of other mens Countries, ſhould ſoon become ſo powerful, and formidable, as that they ſhould overcome the Romans, who had overcome the world. Who could have imagined that a new, and unknown people, were to come from forth the utmoſt Northern parts, to deſtroy ſo vaſt an Empire, by which ſo many powerful Kings, and famous warlike Nations were ſubjected? The moſt general opinion is, That theſe men who deſtroyed the Empire, came from *Scythia* into *Europe*, where they were poſſeſt of many large Regions, differing amongſt themſelves in name and habitation; thoſe who lived more towards the Eaſt being called *Eaſtern-Goths*, and others, more *Weſtern-Goths*. But they were thought to be but new Inhabitants of that Country, into which they were firſt come from certain Iſlands in the *Sarmatian* Ocean; and that being worſted by ſome of their neighboring people, after many conteſtations had with them, their Country being moreover of two ſmal a circuit for their abounding numbers, they betook themſelves to ſeek out new ſeats, and other habitations. And thus they paſſed over very many times in very great numbers into the Provinces belonging to the Empire, poſſeſſing and indamaging many Countries: The things a little before mentioned, being the cauſe why theſe evils, and the greater ruines which enſued were not remedied. For the Empire being of a very vaſt extent, was continually troubled with ſundry commotions in ſundry parts. The Princes who commanded were of little worth, and the former antient valor and diſcipline was no longer found in their Armies, which were given over to licentiouſneſs.

Hence it was, that when in the time of *Philip* the firſt of that name, but in order the Nine and twentieth Roman Emperor, the *Goths* fixt themſelves in *Myſia* and *Thrace*, ſuch forces were not ſent againſt theſe novelties, as might appeaſe them, and quell the then but ſmall ſtrength of theſe tumultuous people. For there being no loyalty in the Commanders, nor valor in the Soldiers, thoſe who were ſent by the Empeor againſt ſuch enemies, intended their own particular intereſt more then the ſervice of the Empire. Inſomuch as *Macrinus* and *Decius* being ſent the one after the other to be chief of the enterpriſe, made themſelves be cried up Emperors by the Army, having firſt permitted much licentiouſneſs in the Soldiers, that they might win their good will. And when the ſame *Decius* was truly poſſeſt of the Empire, after the death of *Macrinus*, and of *Philip* alſo, joyning battel with the *Goths*, he found the effects of nouriſhing ſedition in Armies, and in winking at their diſobedience, and at the non-performance of their military duties; for his Army was routed and put to flight by the *Goths*, and he ſeeking to ſave himſelf by running away, was drowned in a mariſh ground. And when after theſe loſſes, the Empire ought to have been reſtored, and the honor thereof vindicated by the Succeſſor with new Forces; *Gallus* who had obtained this ſupream dignity by the Souldiers raſhneſs, and who was a poorly ſpirited man, and had come by the Empire by indirect means; That he might enjoy his leaſure time in *Rome*, which he leudly ſpent, he was eaſily perſwaded to make a ſhameful peace with the *Goths*, not onely permitting them to tarry in the Provinces which they were poſſeſſed of, but obliging himſelf to pay them a certain ſum of money yearly.

Thus the City of *Rome*, which was Miſtreſs of the whole World, became tributary to a Barbarous people, who knew not till then what belong'd to Imperial dignity, to Wealth, nor to Military glory: This baſe Agreement gave a great blow to the reputation of the Roman Empire; ſo as in *Galienus* his time, who ſoon after ſucceeded in the Empire, ſo many mutinies and inſurrections aroſe, as *Italy* it ſelf was hardly kept in obedience; and the *Goths* grew ſo inſolent, as breaking the Peace which they had made with the *Gauls*, they took many Cities in *Bythinia*, in *Thrace*, and in *Macedonia*: By which proſperous ſucceſſes others of the *Goths* being encouraged, who had tarried all this while at home, where they lived in narrow precincts, they ſent to the Emperor *Valens* to demand abode in the Provinces of the Empire; with whom fear prevailing more then the antient honor of the Empire, and the Roman generoſity, gave way to their requeſt, allotting *Bulgaria* and *Servia* for theſe new Inhabitants to live in; ſuffering the Northern Nations thus to get footing, and to increaſe in ſtrength, which had always been the greateſt Enemies to the Empire, and from whom the Emperors had received ſuch injuries and ſhame. Theſe eaſie acquiſitions, and the hopes of greater matters, made *Alaricus* King of the *Goths* march not long after with a numerous Army from his own Kingdom towards *Italy*, demanding that a place of reſidence might be allowed him by the Emperor *Honorius* in *France*; and receiving a denial, did in his fury do greater miſchief.

But the ſame Emperor *Valens* ſoon felt the harm of this his ill-taken advice: For the ſame *Goths* increaſing through the baſeneſs and negligence of others, and the *Huns*, *Alani*, and other Northern people conſpiring together with them, they beſieged the City of *Conſtantinople*, and other noble Cities were endangered: which made *Gratianus* chooſe *Theodoſius* for his Companion in the Empire, for the great repute which was had of his valor, though he were a *Spaniard* by Nation. But though he behaved himſelf gallantly againſt theſe Enemies, and wan ſome brave victories; yet ſince they had already got great ſtrength, and were governed in obedience under their valiant Maſters and Commanders, and for that the Empire was ſtill buſied in other Wars, it was thought expedient to come to peace with *Alaricus* King of the *Goths*, leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay, to make uſe of them in other undertakings. For the *Goths* being kept in continual pay by ſome former Emperors, amongſt other Soldiers which ſerved the Empire, and being of themſelves converſant in many Wars, they were become a valiant People, and had learn'd the Roman diſcipline, though not the corruption which overthrew it, in the Roman Camp. Which, though it might be good for the preſent occaſions, it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards: For though by this Peace *Theodoſius* was ſafe from any fear of this Nation, whilſt he governed together with *Gratianus*, and alſo afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himſelf, he being a perſon of ſingular worth, and one who by his induſtry had ſomewhat renewed the antient diſcipline amongſt the Soldiers, yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag, and the Empire falling into the hands of his two ſons, *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, who ſucceeded their Father whilſt they were but young, and proved not to be of ſuch gallant parts as the condition of thoſe times required, many of thoſe who commanded under *Theodoſius* in ſeveral parts rebelled, who were all of them cryed up Emperors by thoſe Armies wherein they commanded; by which occaſions being invited, the *Goths* did not only return to riſe up in Arms againſt the Empire, but alſo other Northern Nations who did then inhabit *Germany*, as the *Alani*, *Franks* and *Vandals*, took up Arms, and did at one and the ſame time aſſault the States of the Empire in ſeveral parts; many of them marching more particularly towards *Italy*, and againſt the very City of *Rome*, which after divers paſſages remained in prey to theſe Barbarians; the

the antient Roman worth being so decayed, as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City, which was the Queen of the World. And the Emperor *Honorius* (a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel) whilst *Italy* and other Countries were wasted with War, and the very City of *Rome* was reduced to the utmost extremity, remained in *Ravenna* an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity, and of the ruine of his State, in so base and stupid a manner, as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces, which being miserably torn in pieces, were falling into the power of the Barbarians, answered, That he could live without them.

After the ruine of *Rome*, these victorious Barbarians past into *France*, and into *Spain*, where being recruited with other people of their own Nations, and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions, and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen, they had leisure to fix themselves there, and to take possession of those noble Provinces, the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished, they setled themselves there, and did long govern those Dominions; and others of them passing into *Africa*, and having won large Territories, did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms. But on the other part, other People called the *Huns* fell into *Pannonia*, called now by their names, *Hungaria*, and possessing themselves likewise thereof, fixt their abode and dominion there. So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War, the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them: Insomuch that when *Attila* marched with a furious Army to destroy *Italy*, the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage, the Romans were forced to take King *Theodoricus* with a good number of his *Goths* into their pay; by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off. But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred, and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline, the greater, and almost fatal ruines of *Italy* began; whereinto when these cruel Barbarians entred, they put all to fire and sword, bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities. Which (according to the natural order of all things mortal, wherein *Corruptio unius est generatio alterius*) gave occasion to the birth of the City of *Venice*, whereunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse, and saved themselves.

PAGINATION INCORRECT

The Twelfeth DISCOURSE,

Why the Commonwealth of Rome, *though ſhe ſuffered many Defeats in divers Battels, yet did ſtill prove Victorious at laſt.*

HE who ſhall narrowly conſider the great actions of the Romans, will ſtill diſcover new things therein not onely worthy of praiſe but of admiration. Their proſperity was certainly very great, but proceeding, as it is to be believed, from their worth, and from certain and ordinary cauſes. The People of *Rome* made more Wars, then ever any Potentate hath been known to do; but that which occaſioneth the greateſt wonder is, that their ſucceſs in all of them was proſperous: And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome, yet ſtill in the concluſion of every War the Victories ſided with them.

It will then be worth the while to ſeek out the trueſt, or at leaſt, the moſt truth-like cauſes thereof, by reaſoning thereupon. The City of *Rome* waged continual Wars from the firſt foundation thereof till *Auguſtus* his time, which was for above Seven hundred years. The gates of that famous Temple of *Janus*, which were never to be ſhut but in time of Peace, ſtood always open, unleſs it were once in the Conſulſhip of *Titus Manlius*; nor was there almoſt any Nation known in thoſe dayes, with whom the City of *Rome* hath not at ſome time made trial of her forces and worth. That Commonwealth in ſo many, and ſo long contentions of War, was likewiſe ſometimes favored, ſometimes frowned upon by fortune; ſo as ſometimes ſhe was brought into very great danger; yet ſtill ſhe prevailed at laſt, and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies. Long and heavy was the diſpute, which in her very beginning ſhe had with ſo many people of *Italy*, and chiefly with thoſe that were neareſt, who ſingly by themſelves, and joyntly with others, did conſpire againſt the Romans, and did by all their beſt endeavours ſeek how to keep the power of the Empire low, which was ordained, as was afterwards ſeen, to the height of all greatneſs. Nor was the Commonwealth of *Rome* ſecure from the efforts of foreign Nations; nay many times ſhe was to withſtand the fury of the French, who aſſailed her with great Forces, that they might totally ſubdue her, and poſſeſs themſelves of her Territories, as they had done of ſo many other parts of *Italy*. The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces, even in the beginning of her greatneſs with other Kings; till beginning with the firſt Carthaginian Wars, to wage War further from her Confines, ſhe proved at laſt a terror even to the moſt remote foreign Countries, which ſhe at laſt ſubjugated aſſuming always greater and better courage, as her Empire did encreaſe, and her Military Diſcipline bettering by exerciſe, as did alſo her worth by proſperous ſucceſs.

Who will not then admire theſe ſo great and unparellel'd things? Who can conſider them without endeavoring to know the reaſons thereof? *Polybius*, whilſt he recounts ſome of theſe wonderful things, terming the people of *Rome* invincible, adds (that he may in a manner give the reaſon thereof) that theſe people brought whatſoever enterpriſe, how hard and difficult ſoever, after many and various ſucceſſes, to a good and deſired end, becauſe they were modeſt in proſperous, and conſtant in adverſe fortune. Theſe two excellent vertues are certainly requiſite to whoſoever propounds true and perpetual Glory for his end, and does aſpire thereunto

thereunto: for the variety of humane affairs does not tolerate that man ſhould arrive at the height of power, and at ſupreme honors by a ſtreight and ſhort path of continued proſperity; therefore conſtancy, or let us rather term it Magnanimity or Fortitude is requiſite for him, to the end that he may perſevere in the ſame gallantry and grandeur of ſpirit, wherewith he did propound any great action to himſelf, without being weary or quiet till he hath effected it. And modeſty is likewiſe neceſſary for him, that is to ſay a temperate affection, ſo as he may not loſe himſelf in proſperous ſucceſſes, and being puft up with pride and vain glory, may not think he is come to his journeys end, when he is not gotten half way thither; which is the cauſe why many have loſt their good fortune, and not reaped the true fruits of many worthy and well begun labors. So as it may be numbred amongſt thoſe things which made great Kings amongſt them, and which brought them to ſo great an Eminency of power, and command, that they were endowed with theſe two excellent Vertues, whereby they knew how to make uſe of both fortunes.

But theſe may peradventure be but general rules, and not ſuch as may give ſatisfaction; for if we will look into the Commonwealth of *Greece*, we ſhall find many eminent examples of both theſe vertues, yet were they not able to carry them half the way ſo far towards the Goal, whereat the Romans arrived; therefore are not their actions worthy that high eſteem which is deſervedly put upon the Roman Affairs. There have likewiſe been many famous Princes in ſeveral ages, who neither wanted generoſity of mind, conſtantly to proſecute noble actions by them begun; nor modeſty and temperance in all other affections, meerly out of a deſire of glory; and yet their enterpriſes have not alwaies ſucceeded well, nor have they inlarged their Power and Dominions, as did the Romans. Let us paſs on then to other conſiderations which ſhall hereafter be looked upon, how the Romans governed themſelves and their counſels in their Militia, what their military orders and inſtitutions were, what ſtate they were at firſt poſſeſt of, which ſerved as it were for a ladder for them whereby to climb up to the height of ſuch greatneſs and command, and we ſhall find that theſe were ſuch amongſt the Romans as were not all of them together, or in ſuch excellency in other Principalities and Nations, ſo as they were with reaſon to produce ſuch effects as they did. All the Offices of War were adminſtred amongſt the Romans by their Citizens; varying ſometimes the condition of the perſons, together with the names and authority of thoſe who commanded the Armies; for they made ſometimes uſe of Noblemen, ſometimes of Plebeians. But they ſtill kept amongſt their own Romans, all the degrees of the Militia, and afforded occaſion to many to exerciſe themſelves therein, ſo as there was not any witty Citizen, or hopefull Young-man of noble extract, who was far from them. Nay, it is ſeen, that thoſe who were more given to the ſtudy of ſpeculative Learning, when the places, and Governments committed to their charge, did ſo require, betook themſelves, as others did, to the managing of Arms, and to warlike Affairs; in ſuch ſort as even *Cicero*, wholly given to Philoſophie, and the ſtudy of Eloquence, when he went Proconſul into *Cilicia*, waged War with the *Parthians*. Hence it was that they never wanted Commanders, and if at any time the Roman Armies ſuffered any thing by the imprudency or infelicity of one Commander, they knew quickly how to make amends by the worth and fortune of another, as it fell out at all times; For in that Commonwealth, by reaſon of her orders, and by her being ſtill imployed in War, the way was alwaies open to many Citizens to imploy themſelves in Arms, and in commands of the Armies. Nor was the obedience which is due by Soldiers to their Commanders the leſs for this. For a Conſul, or Dictator had the like authority in the Camp, as the perſon of an abſolute Prince could have had, who commanded his Army perſonally.

There-

Therefore by deſcending to more particulars, the benefit may be the more eaſily diſcerned which redounded to that Commonwealth, by means of theſe her good orders: For if any diſorder did at any time happen (as uſually there doth in any, how well ſoever ordered Government) through the fault of any particular Citizen, whereby the Commonwealth ſuffered prejudice in the adminiſtration of War, this might ſoon be amended, and the prejudice received from the enemy, might quickly be reſtored by the preſence and worth of ſome other Citizen. Thus it fell out, that when the Roman Armies, whilſt the bounds of the Commonwealth were but ſmal, were overcome by the *Sabins*, by the *Equi*, by the *Capenati*, by the *Faliſci*, and by others of their neighbors, with whom they waged War, they could eaſily ſtop the courſe of that their bad fortune, and ſhun running into greater dangers. The rout which was given by the *Equi*, and *Sabins*, and which was the greateſt given in thoſe times, was known to be occaſioned through the diſtaſte which the Army took at *Appius* the *Decemviri* and at the injuſtice, and cruelty which he uſed towards the Soldiery. Wherefore returning to the former Government of Conſuls, *Quintius* the new Conſul had the means given him of recovering the Militia's formerly loſt honor and credit; by giving a great overthrow to thoſe very enemies, who were grown ſo proud and inſolent for their victories had over the Roman Army.

Thus likewiſe, when the Roman Armies were ſhamefully put to flight another time by the *Equi*, *Fidenates* and *Faliſci*, firſt through the defeat of *Papyrius Mugelanus*; and then by the like of *Genutius*, and *Titinius* the military Tribunes, who were mean and unexpert *Plebeians*, and who without much authority had the care of the Army; When *Quintus Servilius* was created Conſul, and after him *Furius Camillus*, they won the moſt famous victories that the Romans had ever gotten till that time (which was Three hundred and fifty years after the building of the City) againſt the *Æqui*, and other of their Enemies. But this may be better conceived in greater affairs, when the Commonwealth was much increaſed. The Roman Armies received ſo notable defeats in the War which *Pyrrhus* made againſt them, as the whole affairs of the Commonwealth ſeemed to be in no little danger, having ſo potent and victorious an Enemy within their boſoms: yet at laſt not being diſmayed for any adverſe fortune, but treating freely with their Enemy, rather as vanquiſhers then vanquiſhed, they reduced their affairs to ſuch a condition, as *Pyrrhus* thought it his beſt courſe to quit *Italy*, and leave the Romans quiet. It is herein to be conſidered, that the Romans being ſo long accuſtomed to continual Wars with their neighbors the Italians, and particularly with the *Samnites* a little before this time, againſt whom the Romans marched with numerous Armies, and had good ſucceſs winning many famous victories; inſomuch as *Val. Corvinus* kill'd above thirty thouſand *Samnites* in one day, made much for their withſtanding ſo great an Enemy as *Pyrrhus*, and for their maintaining themſelves againſt Forein Forces, againſt the uſe of Elephants, and other new ways of warfaring, which *Italy* had not known before; whence it was that the City of *Rome* did at this time abound in valiant men, and who were expert in the Militia. So as *Cyneas* who was ſent by *Pyrrhus* to *Rome*, told him, that he had ſeen a City ſo very full of Inhabitants, as he feared if his Highneſs ſhould continue his war with the Romans, he ſhould go about to overcome an *Hydra*: And *Pyrrhus* himſelf hath more then once admired the worth of the Roman Commanders.

Who doth not even with wonder conſider, how many Commanders, and how many Armies the Commonwealth of *Rome* could ſet out in the War with the Carthaginians, and eſpecially in that with *Hannibal*, which did more endanger the affairs of *Rome* then all the reſt? ſince it maintained War in ſo many ſeveral parts at one and the ſame time, in *Italy*, *Spain*, *Africa*, and *Greece*. Which they were

able

able to do by reaſon of the infinite number of men wherewith *Italy* was then inhabited, who were all well diſciplined, by reaſon of their long exerciſe in War. We read, that when the Romans made War with *Hannibal*, they had ſometimes, what of their own proper Soldiers, and what of their Aſſociates, who did all neighbor neer upon them, twenty three Legions, which made about an hundred thouſand Soldiers, for defence of their Empire. Moreover, whilſt the Commonwealth kept her Forces divided in ſeveral parts, as ſhe did with wonderful judgment in the Carthaginian war, which was the ſoreſt of all the reſt, though the taſted of adverſe fortune ſometimes in ſome parts, yet were not all her Forces utterly deſtroyed; for that part of their Forces which was yet ſafe and entire, was able to make good the fortune of the whole Commonwealth. Thus after thoſe notable Routs which the Roman Armies had, the one by the *Tygurian Gauls*, when the Forces were commanded by *Lucius Caſſius*; the other by the *Cymbrians*, when they were led on by *Caius Servilius Cepio*, in which two Battels the Romans loſt above Eighty thouſand Soldiers, they were able notw thſtanding to recruit themſelves, and defend their affairs; becauſe they had another victorious Army at the ſame time, commanded by *Marius*, who had juſt at that time gloriouſly ended the War againſt *Jugurth*. Thus when the Commonwealth of *Rome* ſeemed to be utterly ruined by reaſon of the two diſcomfitures given them, the one at *Thraſymenes*, the other at *Canna*, ſhe was reſtored again by her proſperous ſucceſs in War with *Spain*. Thus when two of her Armies were worſted in *Spain*, the Commonwealth was preſerved in ſafety by fortunate ſucceſs of their Wars in *Sicily* and in *Italy*. When the Romans were in greater danger then ever, there being at the ſame time two great Carthaginian Armies in *Italy*, and two moſt valiant Generals, *Hannibal* and *Aſdrubal*; yet would not the Romans keep all their Warriors in *Italy*, but did at the ſame time maintain and reinforce their Armies in *Sardinia*, *Sicily*, *France*, and *Spain*. And though by reaſon of ſo many Wars which begot one another, the Commonwealth muſt needs oftentimes run great hazards, eſpecially ſince ſhe oftimes expoſed her Armies to the doubtful event of Battel; yet did they thereby receive this of good and ſafety, that by reaſon of their continual exerciſe of Arms, they were the more eaſily provided of valiant and experienced men, and were the better able to govern themſelves in adverſe fortune. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, not being able to make uſe of many good Commanders or Soldiers, (for they did not make uſe of their own peculiar Militia, as did the Romans, but did imploy ſome few of the chief of their City-Factions in commanding their Armies) could not ſo eaſily recruit and reinforce their Armies, when they were weakened by any adverſe fortune; nor had they whereout to pick better or more fortunate Commanders, when any of theirs were faulty. Inſomuch as when the Carthaginians were overcome by *Scipio* in *Africa*, they were forc'd to recal *Hannibal* from *Italy*, ſuffering the Romans to take breath in thoſe parts where they were moſt moleſted; and *Hannibal* himſelf not having means to recruit his Army, which he had brought with him from *Africa*, and which was waſted and weakened by long march, and adverſe fortune, was neceſſitated to give way to the valor and fortune of the Romans.

It made not a little likewiſe for the Government of the Roman Commonwealth, and for the maintaining of her in her weak beginnings, that the Militia was exerciſed for many years without any pay to the Soldiers. So as whilſt their means was yet but ſmall, and yet they muſt ſtill be in Arms, by reaſon of their being ſtill infeſted by many of the neighboring Nations, the want of monies was no cauſe of not maintaining their Armies, as it hath been the ruine of many States; but if they happened to receive a Rout, the Army might be recruited by other choſen and commanded men. But afterwards when the City was much better peopled, and much

ſtronger, ſo as ſhe was able to make greater undertakings, the publick Exchequer was ſo enriched, anſwerable to what became a well-ordered Government, and which aſpired to the heighth of Empire, as ſhe was not for this cauſe ſo incommodated, as that ſhe muſt yield under the weight of War, nor yet for any her greateſt misfortune. Whereas in ſome other Commonwealths, as in that of *Sparta*, the poorneſs of the Exchequer introduced by *Lycurgus* his Laws, hindred her from enlarging her Empire; and when ſhe aſpired thereunto, ſhe was forc'd for want of things requiſite to flie for help to the Kings of *Perſia*; ſo as in lieu of domineering over the reſt of the Grecians, ſhe became a ſervant to Barbarians, becauſe ſhe exceeded thoſe Terms and Rules wherewith her Government was founded and eſtabliſhed.

After theſe conſiderations, ſome things may be added which proved likewiſe very advantagious for the ſecuring of the Roman greatneſs: As the continuation of the Militia, out of a duty impoſed upon every Citizen, of ſpending almoſt all the beſt years of his life in the Camp, every one being bound to militate till he had advanced fifteen Pays at leaſt: So he who had fought in one or two Battels, was not permitted to ſit down and reſt, but continuing in the Militia, by reaſon of the experience he had gotten, became more uſeful and advantagious in the Wars. Amongſt others, we have a notable example of one *L. E. Siccius*, who was ſlain in the Camp in the time of *Appius* his Decemvirate, after he had followed the Wars for Forty years together: and after having been in above a hundred Battels. It is alſo a thing of great conſideration, that the nerve of the Roman Armies conſiſted in their Infantry, though they had ſome Horſe to ſtrengthen them; whence it was, that they were ſooner recruited, and reinforced after a rout, for that men are ſooner recruited then horſes: there being greater ſtore of them: And which the Romans could the better do, becauſe they made uſe of men of one onely Country for their Soldiers, that is to ſay, of their own men, and thoſe of their Aſſociates who were at hand and ready to be joyned together, and be imployed in any action; which doth not fall out ſo when Armies are to be raiſed and recruited out of many Nations, and from far diſtant places. But it was a great help to the Romans above all other things, for the maintaining of themſelves in all events of ſo many Wars, which they made with ſo many powerful Kings and Nations, that they were poſſeſt of *Italy*; a Province, which in thoſe times did more abound in men and arms, then any other Country; as may be known by many things, but chiefly by this, That the Commonwealth of *Rome* had labored very long ere ſhe could ſubjugate *Italy*, which was not wholly ſubdued, in all the parts thereof, till after the Commonwealth had extended her Precincts very far: when afterwards by the Forces of the ſame *Italy*, ſhe in a few years overcame all other Provinces, and Nations. Therefore the War which was made againſt the Romans by the neighboring People, the *Piceni*, *Peligni*, *Marſini*, *Lucani*, *Marci*, and others, which was called *Bellum Sociale*, becauſe they termed themſelves fellow-companions to the People of *Rome*; though there were but a ſmal part of the Italian Forces in it; yet that Country being excellently well inhabited with warlike men, it was thought to be one of the hardeſt, and moſt dangerous Wars, that ever the Commonwealth of *Rome* made; nor could it be ended but by allowing thoſe People, the Franchiſe and Liberty of Roman Citizens, which was as much as to grant them the thing they fought for; for the obtaining of that, was that for which they fought. And we read, that a muſter being made throughout all *Italy* of all the Soldiers which might be aſſembled to withſtand the danger which was threatned by the Barbarians, when the *Tranſalpine Gauls* which dwelt about the *Rhodoſius*, were ſummoned by the other *Gauls*, who were already poſſeſt of ſome parts of *Lombardy*, that they might prepare to aſſault *Italy*; the Muſter role of ſuch as were

able

ble to bear Arms, amounted to Seven hundred thouſand Foot, and Threeſcore thouſand Horſe, who were fit to ſerve upon ſuch an occaſion. And yet the greateſt part of *Lombardy*, which was poſſeſt by the ſaid *Gauls*, nor ſome other of thoſe Provinces which are now comprehended within the Confines of *Italy*, were not numbered in this Muſter-roll. Which is ſo much the more to be wondred at for that this happened after the Carthaginian War; to wit, when the Commonwealth of *Rome* was not yet gotten to that height of Power whereunto ſhe arrived afterwards; people multiplying through the greatneſs and felicity of the Empire, and many men having been conſumed in that long and ſore War.

To theſe things may be added the excellency of Military Diſcipline, which as it was in great perfection with the Romans, ſo was it of great advantage to the obtaining of ſo many Victories, and to the compleating of ſo many enterpriſes. For though the *Grecian*, *Macedonian*, and *Roman* Militia were of great eſteem at one and the ſame time, yet that of the *Romans* did ſo far exceed the others, as that it was not onely ſtronger, and more ſecure, but better fitted than the reſt for all places, and times. Amongſt other Orders of the *Grecian* and of the *Macedonian* Militia, wherewith the Armies of *Alexander* the Great did in particular ſo miraculous things, the *Phalanx* was muchcelebrated; but this, though it were in it ſelf of very great ſtrength, it oft-times proved not ſo ſerviceable, if upon any occaſion it became to be divided, or diſordered: But the Roman Orders were not onely firm and ſtable, as was the *Phalanx*, but were more adapted to every place, and every ſeaſon, and proved very congruous for all warlike actions; ſo as to their own great advantage, and to the prejudice of their enemies, making uſe of their own Soldiers, the Romans performed the Office of whatſoever military Diſcipline by their own men, fighting in all poſtures, either in whole bodies altogether, or Squadron to Squadron, or man to man, ſo as not any man was idle or uſeleſs in their Camps, or Battels. For whilſt they minded fighting and not flying, or free booting, the routs which their Armies did oft-times receive, were not ſuch, but that they did in ſome places make their party good againſt their enemy, and keep ſome part of their Army ſafe; which proceeded principally from the exquiſite orders of that Militia. Inſomuch as *Hannibal* when he came firſt into *Italy*, having after his firſt conflicts learned the excellency of this Militia, made his Soldiers uſe the Romans Arms; and *Pyrrhus* did not onely betake himſelf to uſe theſe Arms, but did mingle many *Italian* Soldiers, the better to accommodate his Militia to the Roman Ordinances; ſaying, that that Diſcipline of the Barbarians (a name given by the Grecians to all other Nations) was not at all barbarous. So when it happened that the Romans received any rout, as they did in the Battels made againſt the two aforeſaid Commanders *Hannibal* and *Pyrrhus*, very experience in other ſucceſſes made them know that it was not the goodneſs of any forein military Diſcipline which bereft the Romans of the Victories which they were wont to bear away, but for that the Romans wanted ſuch excellent Commanders as thoſe two were. Therefore when the worth of the Commanders came to be equal, the goodneſs and excellencie of the Roman Military Ordinances prevailed before thoſe of thoſe very Armies, which for ſome other reſpects had the better of the Romans.

But to proceed upon our late conſideration, we muſt ſay that the Arms uſed by the Romans were thought very convenient, and better then thoſe of other Nations, as Launces which were uſually given to Soldiers of the firſt Files; whereby they received much benefit, as well to withſtand the firſt fierceſt efforts of the Enemy, as to weary them in cutting thoſe arms in pecees, being to come to cloſer fight; and then whole bodies of freſh and well armed Soldiers ſucceeded in the Roman Armies. For their bodies were covered with their Bucklers, which were

very large ones, and the ſhort, but very ſharp ſwords and finely tempered, uſed by the Romans, were of great advantage to the Soldiers, who might wield them in a long fight, as well to defend themſelves from their Enemies blows, as to let flie upon them; which was not practiſed in other Militia's of thoſe times; particularly not amongſt the French, with whom the Romans had often and dangerous fights, for they uſed very little Bucklers, and long heavy ſwords, very ſharp at the point, ſo as they were eaſily wreſted, and made unuſeful. Therefore the routs which the Roman Armies received, were very few in compariſon of thoſe they gave their Enemies; and being but ſeldom worſted, and often victorious, the ſtate, ſtrength, and reputation of the Empire did ſtill increaſe; ſo as when ſome adverſe forune happened, it was not ſufficient to extinguiſh, no nor ſo much as long to weaken the greatneſs of that Commonwealth. Divers particular good rules obſerved in the adminiſtration of War, were likewiſe of great moment for the carrying on of the Roman affairs. Amongſt which the diligence which was uſed by publick conſtitutions in dividing of the prey, may be numbred for one; for they uſed to place the prey or booty firſt in publick, and did then ſo divide it amongſt the Soldiers, as thoſe who were upon the guard ſhared as well thereof, as thoſe that were forwardeſt in the action, and who had ſackt the Enemy. Whereby occaſion was not given for thoſe notable diſorders which have been obſerved to happen in theſe latter times, wherein upon ſuch an occaſion the loſs of the whole Army hath enſued.

The faith alſo which was ſo exactly obſerved, and the fair proceedings with ſuch Cities as were ſubject to that Dominion, won the Romans the good affection of the people; by whoſe favor Empires are uſually more upheld upon any adverſe accident, then by any other thing. Of theſe we read of many notable examples; it being as far from that good Military Diſcipline, to bear with the inſolency of Soldiers, as it is introduced in theſe our laſt Ages to the great prejudice of people, though friends and ſubjects. For ſuch faults as theſe were ſeverely puniſh'd; the which is obſervable amongſt ſo many other actions, for what the Romans did to thoſe people, to whom they did not only reſtore the goods and liberty which had been by the Soldiers wickedly taken away, and ſo their grievances were redreſt, but thoſe were ſeverely puniſh'd who had committed ſuch things. To this may be added, that the Romans, to the end that the power of the Commonwealth might ſtill prevail, and might upon any occaſion be made uſe of, endeavored as ſoon as they bent their minds to greater matters, to accompany their Land-forces with Maritime-aids, ſo as the one might help the other, and the one not only be made more powerful by the other, but more ſecure, as it fell out, and as it may be obſerved in many of their actions; but chiefly when ſeeing their affairs ſucceeded but ill with the Carthaginians, who prevailed by reaſon of their antient Maritime profeſſion, and had likewiſe great advantage in their Land-Militia by their uſe of Elephants, which the Romans had not as yet well learned how to reſiſt; they bent themſelves wholly to Naval preparations, wherein they did afterwards behave themſelves with ſuch valor and proſperity, as they overcame theſe their ſo fierce and cruel Enemies in a Naval fight, and raiſed their fortune.

Let us in the next place obſerve, that the greatneſs and generoſity of the Romans was ſuch, as not content to ſecure their neer neighboring dangers, and out of a deſire of quiet to leave the ſparkles of thoſe Wars unquench'd, from whence another fire might ſoon be kindled, they always endeavored to ſee the laſt ſparkle quite put out. The Roman Army was overcome, and much endamaged by the *Galli Geſſati* after the death of Conſul *Atilius*, where their liberty being expoſed to much danger upon this ſo ſad accident, the Romans would once more try the fortune of battel, wherein they had good ſucceſs, and cutting in pieces above Forty thouſand of that Nation,

Nation, they did vindicate their former injuries. Nor yet did they then lay down their Arms, though they were freed from that their greateſt danger; but knowing that there remained yet other powerful Armies of the ſame *Gauls* in other parts of *Italy*, they would continue war againſt them, and of aſſailed become aſſailors; which afforded them occaſion of thoſe *Marcellus* his notable victories, and of making themſelves maſters of the chiefeſt Cities of *Lombardy*, which were poſſeſt by the *Gauls*. The Commonwealth of *Rome* was never in greater danger, then when *Aſdrubal* paſſing over the Alps with a numerous Army, entred *Italy*, whilſt his brother *Hannibal* was there likewiſe with another powerful Army. They fought *Aſdrubal*, and to their great joy their Conſuls were victorious: which notwithſtanding, they forbare not to continue war in *Spain*, though they were free from their greater and neerer dangers; but with the Forces they had there, went to find out, and to fight other Enemy-Armies of the Carthaginians which were in that Province; for they knew if thoſe Armies ſhould remain entire, the War might eaſily be renewed, and other impediments being removed, *Hannibal* would be the more eaſily ſuccored with neceſſaries which he wanted, and ſo might ſtill moleſt the Romans in *Italy*. Thus not allowing of any Peace, then what might be purchaſed by either having totally quell'd, or at leaſt very much weakened the Enemy, the Romans never laid down Arms but when they were entire Victors: which other Princes not being able to do, have deferred their ruine for a ſhort time, but have not totally kept it off.

Many other things might likewiſe be thought of, by which it might be evidently proved, that the Romans did always prove victorious at laſt, and did perpetually increaſe their State and ſtrength. But what we have already ſaid, may ſuffice to teach ſuch Princes and Nations as ſhall aſpire to the higheſt degree of glory, whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts, and which are the beſt means to arrive thereat: And when all other neceſſary accidents ſhall correſpond, thoſe who ſhall imitate the excellent worth and diſcipline of the Romans, will not find themſelves any whit deceived.

The Thirteenth DISCOURSE.

Whether the City of Rome *could have maintain'd herſelf longer in the glory and majeſty of her Command, if ſhe had preſerved her Liberty and Form of Commonwealth, then ſhe did under the Government of Emperors.*

After that *Caſar* had robb'd his Country of her liberty, and changing the antient form of Government, reduced the Commonwealth of *Rome* into a Monarchical form, ſhe continued therein in a continued ſeries of many Emperors, ſafe and entire, or at leaſt without any remarkable alteration or declining, for the ſpace of about four hundred years, till the time of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, wherein *Italy* underwent many miſerable ruines, as did alſo the very City of *Rome*, which was the Metropolis of the Empire; ſo as ſhe could not reſume her antient greatneſs, as formerly ſhe had done after ſome adverſe events.

It appears to be, and truly is a thing worthy of deep diſcourſe and conſideration, how this ſo great and well-founded Empire, after it began to totter, did ſo ſoon precipitate

cipitate into final ruine. If the time of this its duration be measured in respect to the ordinary mutation of humane things, and more particularly of State-Governments, the time of its continuance may appear to have been long enough: but if the greatness and power of the Empire be taken into consideration, which was such as that there was no other Potentate that could weigh against it, or rather no Country which was not in some sort subject thereunto, it may very well invite us, so far as may be probably conjectur'd by so great success, and where so many various accidents concur, and have a share, to conjecture whether the Roman Empire would have been longer or shorter lived, if it had been still governed in the form of a Commonwealth, then it did when it fell into the power of one onely man, under the government of Emperors. Many things may perswade us to beleeve that in whatsoever condition or form of Government, this Empire must have run the same fortune, and walked on with some little variation of time to the same end it did. First the vicissitude of humane affairs, which by reason of their natural imperfections, will not suffer sublunary things to be still in the same state of being, but will have it so, as being carried about in continual motion, they must sometimes be raised higher, fall sometimes lower. Other People, and other Nations, besides the Romans, have flourish'd in other times, though not so much, nor so highly cried up. Other Ages have seen other great Empires, so as the rise of the one hath been the fall of the other; and it is a great truth, that Lordships and Empires, as do mens lives, nay as befals every thing that is born, in time wax old, and proceeding on by ordinary and natural gradations, have their beginning, increase, time of perfection, declination, and final ruine. Till *Honorius* his rule, at which time the Empire began palpably to wander from its grandeur and dignity, it had continued for so many years, as the longer duration thereof would have almost exceeded the common condition of other things; this may well be a general reason, but one that is so approved of by other reasons, and continual experience, as it may be reputed certain in particulars, though sometimes we ignore the proximate reason. But to proceed to more particular considerations, why should we beleeve that the Roman Empire should have been of longer duration if it had been governed by a Commonwealth, then under Emperors? Not onely reason, but experience shews, that the Government of one alone is fittest to keep up supream power in large Dominions, since all other great Powers and Lordships have been founded and governed by one onely King or Emperor.

The City of *Rome* is the onely example of a Commonwealth which hath purchased large Dominion; nay, we may therein also observe, that as soon as she grew to be Mistress of many Provinces, that Form of Government behoved to be altered, as not fit to sustain so great a weight. In the very times of the Commonwealth, when any thing was to be agitated or treated of, especially in Wars of great importance and difficulty, they ran to create a Dictator; because the supreme authority which by vertue of that Magistracie was granted to one man alone, was held requisite for the good administration of the most difficult businesses. The Magistracy of the Dictator did punctally represent the Majestie, and Dignitie which the Roman Emperors did after retain; Wherefore *Cæsar*, when he made himself the Master of the Commonwealth, made himself be declared perpetuall Dictator; And the name of Emperor was taken from the very name used by the Roman Commanders, and shewed the Authority which they had of Emperor, which is to command over Armies. And certainly the uniting the power of many in one alone, doth not onely not weaken, but doth much to the strength and power of a Government or State: For it encreaseth obedience, facilitates resolutions, and hastens the execution of weightiest affairs. So as had not the Roman Forces, when military Discipline flourished most amongst them,

them, been with-held oftentimes, as if oppreſt by internal ſeditions, ſprung from that ſort of Government whereof they did ſo much partake, and which did oft-times retard great enterpriſes, it may be argued that the City would have ſooner gotten to that height of greatneſs and Empire, which ſhe arrived at, born even even by main force againſt all theſe difficulties, by the great worth of her Citizens.

Let us obſerve in the next place, that though the Empire of *Rome* had changed the Form of Government, and reduced the ſupreme power into one alone, yet we finde not, that ſhe was bereft of thoſe arms, and helps wherewith ſhe had been preſerved whilſt ſhe was a Commonwealth; but did rather encreaſe them, and did very much eſtabliſh Forces; for the Emperors kept alwaies about their perſons a great number of Soldiers, for the defence of Imperial Majeſty, which were therefore called *Pretorian*-bands, and Armies in the Garriſons of Provinces, which might defend, and keep them from any commotion which might be raiſed, either by their own Subjects, or by foreign Nations. Nor were the Emperors themſelves wanting in taking order for Arms and all things belonging to War; nay, not only thoſe that were held valiant, but even who for all things elſe were eſteemed cowards, and given over to all manner of vice, did either by themſelves, or by their Commanders undertake and finiſh many Wars. So it ſeems likliеſt that the Roman Empire might govern her ſelf, and ſo long preſerve her greatneſs as ſhe did, chiefly for being ſuſtained by the chief Authority, and reverent Majeſty of one one'y Lord, which was of ſuch force, as it for a long time did overcome that weakneſs, which otherwiſe might have befaln the Empire, by the abject baſeneſs of many Emperors; where on the contrary, whilſt it was a Commonwealth, it was divided, rent, weak, and eaſie to have been oppreſt, if it had then met with the power of any great, and valiant Nation, which would have ſuppreſt it, as did ſo many Northern People do to the Empire. And if the corruption of antient cuſtoms may be judged to have been the readieſt and trueſt occaſion of the ruine of this Empire, the Commonwealth was never free from the like, but even as for this very cauſe, of having faln from her good Principles, that firſt Government was altered, and the City loſt her Liberty, ſo might ſhe have done, though ſhe ſtill kept the Form of a Commonwealth. Avarice, ambition, immoderate ſenſuality, were the maladies wherewith the City of *Rome* began to be infected, not when ſhe was governed by Emperors, but whilſt ſhe was ruled by her Citizens in Civil Government; And if it be objected that this did not hinder her from giving the greateſt teſtimony of her valor in War, ſince in the laſt Age of the Commonwealth, when theſe vices and corruptions were riſeſt among the Citizens, Military Diſcipline did flouriſh moſt, and greateſt actions were done: It cannot then be ſaid, that neither the corruption of manners in the times of Emperors, did deſtroy the Empire, nor that the integrity thereof could have longer preſerved the power of the Commonwealth. But ſo much the leſs for that the Empire did not fall to ruine (though it was ſufficiently agitated by home-diſorders) in ſuch ſort, as that either the Subjects did vindicate their Liberty, or the Commanders of Armies divide the Empire amongſt them, as did *Alexanders* Commanders after his death; but the Roman Commonwealth, though it was oft-times thruſt at by ſuch commotions, was ſtill notwithſtanding able to ſubſiſt, and to raiſe it ſelf up again when it began to fall. But barbarous and foreign Forces overthrew it at laſt; with whom the famous Commanders in the time of the Commonwealth, not having had any occaſion to try their worth, it cannot be ſaid what would have ſucceeded upon ſuch an occaſion, if the Government of the Commonwealth had continued till that time. It is likely, that the diſorders and factions increaſing much more, whereof ſo many peſtiferous ſeeds had been ſowed in all the Orders of the City, the City, and

Ter-

Territories belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker, and the more exposed to the injuries of Foreiners, would have been the easilier oppresst, if she had been to have withstood the terrible shock of these fierce and wild Northern Nations, which the Emperors Forces did notwithstanding long resist; insomuch as the Roman Empire maintained it self for the space of two hundred years after it was molested by these sorts of people; nay, it maintained it self in dignity and majesty for about sixty years after it was shrewdly shaken, till in the time of the Emperor *Leo* the First, *Rome* and *Italy* being totally abandoned, the name and power of the Western Empire did totally terminate.

It may therefore be thought a gallant and well-advised action, that the Emperors did so long temporise, and keep the Arms of these so powerful Nations from the more inward parts of their State, of *Italy*, and chiefly of *Rome* herself, like so much venom from their hearts; with which if they should have tryed the fortune of War, hazarding one Battel or more, as upon other occasions those antient Roman Commanders had done, they might peradventure have brought the Empire sooner to its ruine, since they had to do with a very warlike people, and whose condition was such, as they must either die, or overcome. And certainly they had done worse, if they had therein trusted and relied upon Fortune, since they could have gotten nothing by the victory when they should have won it, were it not the saving of themselves for the present against those Armies, who might have been succeeded by others of the same Nations, and so the War to have been renewed more hotly and direfully then before, out of a desire to revenge the death of their friends; whereas the loss of a Battel or two on the Romans side, might have drawn along with it the ruine of a most noble Empire. It was then fortunate for the Commonwealth of *Rome*, that she met not with these people in such necessity and danger; for if that had befaln her, which hapned in the time of Emperors, that Fame might peradventure have been obscured which she was happy in, of being glorious and victorious in all Wars; and the course of her so many prosperous successes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end.

Yet if we will look on the other side, we may peradventure meet with other no less prevalent reasons which peradventure perswade us to the contrary. Experience shews us how good the Orders were wherewith the Commonwealth was founded, to make great acquisitions: But it is a general rule, That States are preserved by walking in the same ways wherein they were founded; for every thing is preserved and maintained by alike things, and are corrupted by the contraries. If the Roman Arms, governed by her own Citizens with Civil authority, were sufficient to reduce so many States and Kingdoms under the power of the Commonwealth, what reason have we to believe that they should not still be as able to preserve what they had gotten; which is more easily done? The baseness and carelessness of many of those Emperors did doubtlesly open the way to the Empires ruine; for they oftentimes suffered those Northern people to settle themselves in divers Provinces of the Empire. *Alaricus* was permitted by *Honorius* to inhabit with his *Goths* in *France*; and soon after becoming his Colleagues, they likewise obtained some Cities in *Spain* from him. *Valentinianus* granted likewise *Servia* and *Bulgaria* to other *Goths*; and before these, *Gallus* had bought peace of the *Goths*; so as becoming more bold and insolent, they made themselves masters of *Thrace*, *Thessaly*, and of *Macedonia*. Thus the very Emperors themselves having through their pusillanimity suffered mischief to increase at home, and these their fierce Enemies to grow powerful, they could not afterwards drive them out of those places which they had possest themselves of, nor keep them long out of *Italy*. This would not have been suffered by the generosity of the Roman Commanders and Citizens, who when they were in a much worse condition, would by no means agree with King *Pyrrhus*,

Pyrrhus, who had assailed *Italy*, unless he would leave them, and return to his own Kingdom. And that they might draw *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, they betook themselves to molest the Carthaginians in *Spain* and in *Africa*, after they had for so many years generously withstood their Forces. And whilst that State continued in the form of a Commonwealth, as if Liberty had infused noble and generous thoughts into them, the City of *Rome* was an example to all the world of all sorts of vertue, chiefly of Magnanimity in undertaking great enterprises, and of Fortitude and Constancie in managing them, and in bringing them to a happy end. But when the Commonwealth was ruin'd, and a new sort of Government brought in, that antient Roman worth went astray by little and little, till at last it was quite lost. So as the ensuing Ages gave as many examples of ignorance and baseness in the very Emperors themselves, and in others who were of greatest degree and authority in that Empire. Hence then it was, that the good and antient Customs being corrupted, both in Civil government, and chiefly in the Militia, the State being reduced to great faintness, and growing old, had not strength enough to govern it self when it met with stout opposition. The Roman Empire was brought to so miserable a condition when it was set upon by the Northern Nations, which wanted all manner of order and military discipline, as well in their Commanders, as in the Soldiers of their own Nations, whereof the Roman Armies had been for a long time full; insomuch as for above twenty years together, before the *Goths* pass'd into *Italy*, they put themselves into the usual pay of some of the Roman Emperors: And when *Theodosius* the Second, who was to make head in *France* against a valiant and numerous Army led on by *Attila*, it was found that the Army which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a *Roman* Army, being totally composed of *Barbarians*, *Vizigots*, *Franks*, *Burgonians*, *Alani*, and others, who notwithstanding bore away the victory for the Roman Emperor. The like hapned in *Gratianus* his time, who being set upon by *Atalaricus* King of the *Goths*, was fain for the defence of *Italy* to make use of *Goths*, *Huns*, and other Soldiers of those Nations.

But the antient valor of the *Romans* was no less lost in their Soldiers then in their Commanders: For so great an Empire was grown to so great a scarcity of valiant men, and such as were fit to command the Armies, which were to withstand the raging violence of these fierce and barbarous Nations; as *Honorius* found none to whom he could commit such a charge, but one *Stilico*, who was himself a Barbarian, a *Hun* by Nation, and very perfidious; who moved by his own interest and designs, sought to maintain his authority, and to the end that he might place his Son in the Empire, whilst he commanded over those Forces which were raised to extinguish the Gothish Armies, he did not only not beat them when he might have done it, but sollicited other Northern people to assault divers Provinces of the Empire, and so procured them more Enemies. And *Theodosius* the Second, having placed all authority and hope of defending the Provinces of the Empire from the fury of *Attila*, in one *Etius*, when he had lost that Commander, he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge, but was forced to leave the passage into *Italy* free unto him. That which is reported of *Attila*, doth greatly witness the weakness of the Empire, and in what need it stood of valiant and faithful men; that being foretold by his Southsayers, that if he should come to a day of battel with the Roman Army in *France*, he should lose the day, but that his loss would cost the Empire dear, for they should lose one of their best Commanders; he did put so high an esteem thereupon, as notwithstanding such an Augury, he refused not to joyn battel.

The Wars made by the Empire many years before the times of this its greatest calalamity and ruine, were made against their own Roman Commanders, who com-

manded over their Armies in ſeveral places, and who being in far off Provinces, rebelled againſt the Emperors, hoping that they might uſurp the Empire, to the which every one of them did aſpire, ſince they ſaw that all ways, even the moſt indirect, lay open to a ſucceſſion therein, ſo as the Diſcipline and worth was alike in both the Armies, and ſtill the Romans got the victory, that is to ſay, thoſe who had the greateſt Power and Authority in the Roman Empire. But as ſoon as occaſion was offered of trying the worth of thoſe Soldiers who ſerved the Empire againſt foreign Forces, and that whatſoever the Roman Empire loſt, proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies, the weakneſs thereof was ſoon ſeen, and what a loſs it had ſuffered by the total corruption of Diſcipline, and good antient orders. Which could not have happened, if the Commonwealth had ſtill continued; for it is not likely that valiant Commanders would be found wanting in that City, where by the vertue of good military Inſtitutions, Soldiers did ſo much flouriſh; ſince thoſe who had betaken themſelves to other imployments, when once they took upon them the Government of Provinces, behaved themſelves ſo in the Militia, as they deſerved commendations, for there was a certain ſpirit of glory in them all, and a deſire of propagating the common good, as alſo an aptneſs for all things which did befit Roman ſpirits. But as ſoon as the Form of Government being changed, the ſame Romans began to degenerate from their antient worth, and that the chief imployments, nay the Empire it ſelf fell into the hands of foreigners, all things elſe muſt likewiſe ſuffer alteration; and in particular, diſorders in the Militia, and the licentiouſneſs of the Soldiers grew to be ſuch, as ſo great an Empire ſeemed ſometimes to be governed by chance, there not being any one therein who took care for the common good, nor for the obſervance of good Orders, neither at home nor abroad. And the making of the Militia mercinary, was cauſe of the going leſs in worth and diſcipline, as alſo of treachery; Inſomuch as thoſe very Soldiers, who ſerved the Emperors, favored the Enemy; as it happened in *Theodoſius* his time, when thoſe who were to guard the *Pirenean* Mountains, were bribed to let the *Vandals* and *Swedes* paſs into *Italy*, without making any oppoſition; which was the occaſion of other miſchiefs. And the treachery of his Commander *Gallus* hindred the Emperor *Decius* from purſuing a famous victory gotten of the *Goths*, when not being ſo well fleſht as they were afterwards, nor yet ſo powerful, they might have been the eaſilier kept back.

But in time of the Commonwealth, the Roman Commanders, and Soldiers, fought for their own Grandezza; the Nobility grew famous and powerful, and the people in whoſe name, and in that of the Senate all Wars were made, got honor and advantage by thoſe things which by their Arms they added to that Dominion: So as amongſt other actions of the Commonwealth, it is not without wonder to be conſidered, how ſhe could maintain ſo many and ſo numerous Armies as ſhe did, meerly out of Roman Soldiers. But when theſe reſpects began to fail, and that the Militia grew mercinary, and that the Soldier grew paſt all meaſure inſolent, by reaſon of their Commanders leudneſs, who permitted them to do all manner of foul things to the end that they might have their aſſiſtance in their uſurping the Empire: The Roman Empire which had formerly wont to be ſo formidable to their Enemies, ſo obedient to their Commanders; began to behave themſelves poorly againſt thier Enemies, and inſolently againſt their Lord and Maſter, troubleſome to their friends whom they were ſent to aſſiſt, and too unable to defend them againſt foreign Forces: which things, as they were begotten by the change of Government, ſo is it moſt apparent that they were the occaſion of bringing the Empire to a ſooner and more miſerable end. So many, and ſo heinous diſorders could not have riſen, if the City had continued in a Form of Commonwealth,

wealth, or of Civil Government; for though all the Citizens might not have peradventure proved good and valiant, yet amongſt ſo many there would ſtill have ſome one been found, of ſuch excellent worth and charity towards his Country, as would have been able, if not totally to cure ſuch diſorders, at leaſt ſo far to have bounded them, as they ſhould not have run into ſo great a precipice. And though amongſt the Emperors, there were ſome who were endowed with excellent vertues, yet could not the affairs of the Empire revert to its beginning, becauſe there paſt ſometimes a whole Age betwixt one and another of theſe good ones: And the Empire, for a continued ſeries of many Emperors was adminiſtred by baſe men, plunged in a multitude of vices; Inſomuch as it became almoſt impoſſible for thoſe who ſucceeded to reduce the affairs to any good condition, which had ſo long run to the worſe.

Moreover no one mans abilities, though never ſo excellent, were able to govern ſo great a body, as was the Roman Empire, much leſs thoſe of ſuch as were ſo unfit, even for Governments of leſs importance, as were many of the Roman Emperors. Whence it was that *Adrian*, a wiſe Emperor, thought it fit for the welfare of the Empire, to go in his own perſon, and conſolidate it with his preſence, and viſit in perpetual progreſſes, ſometimes one, ſometimes another Province; for the good Government whereof, they being ſo many, and ſo remote, the example of ſo many rebellous Commanders and Armies, ſhewed how falſe and unworthy the Miniſters had been who had been by the Emperors ſent thither. But in the Commonwealth there were a great many Citizens who were intereſſed in the Government and Greatneſs thereof, ſo as though ſome valiant man went to the Wars, the City remained not without Government or Obedience; nor did the appointing a Commander in chief over one Army, bereave them of others who might command more Armies, if they had need to wage War at one and the ſame time in ſeveral places, whereof the Commonwealth of *Rome* did in all Ages give notable examples.

Nor can it be affirmed, but that the Commanders, and Armies of the Commonwealth have made War with people as powerful in Arms, as were thoſe Northern Nations, whoſe fury the Roman Empire could not reſiſt. For, not to mention ſo many bitter Wars made by thoſe antient Romans, the enterpriſes done by *Julius Cæſar* in *France*, were they not undertaken againſt people, in whom all the reſpects met which were conſiderable in thoſe Northern Nations? very numerous Armies; for we read, that one onely Army, amongſt many ſundry people whereinto *France* was then divided, which was vanquiſh'd and wholly overcome by *Cæſar*, conſiſted of above Three hundred thouſand fighting men. But the *Helvetii*, *Foringi*, *Boij*, and others who were routed and overcome by *Cæſar*, had taken up Arms of meer choice, and that they might get new places to dwell in; juſt as did the *Goths*, *Hunnes*, *Vandals*, *Lombards*, and others; and this with ſuch reſolution as to put a neceſſity upon themſelves of doing their utmoſt to get a dwelling place, they burnt all their houſes in their own Country. But the *Almans* led on by their King *Arioviſtus*, were they not a fierce Nation, and long trained up in Arms? and yet theſe were alſo overcome by the ſame *Cæſar*, and by the Roman Arms. The ſame may peradventure be more properly aſſerted, of the *Cimbri*, *Ambroni*, and *Teutones*, who were not long before this overcome by *Marius*: For theſe were alſo a very barbarous people, and come from the Northern Countries, from whence *Romes* ſo many miſchiefs did afterwards proceed. There were of theſe above Three hundred thouſand fighting men, they had left their own homes for the ſame reaſon, that they might find out new habitations; and being already well advanced into *France*, they boaſted that they would be Maſters of *Italy*, and ruine *Rome*: But againſt theſe did the Roman Armies boldly march, and

went over the Mountains to encounter them; ſo as thoſe Barbarians began to be routed, and met with a rub to their greateſt Forces: And afterwards thoſe who had advanced by another way, being gotten ſafe into *Italy*, they ſent to deſire *Marius* the General of the Roman Armies, that he would aſſign them ſome Territories where they might live quietly, and they would therewithall reſt contented, without endeavoring to advance their Fortune any further by their Arms. But they did not then obtain it of the Roman General, as did the *Goths* and other Foreiners afterwards from ſome of the Emperors, who not truſting in themſelves, nor in their Armies, permitted thoſe Barbarous hoſtile Nations to live peacefully in thoſe Provinces of the Empire, whereof they had injuriouſly poſſeſſed themſelves. Nay, though there were not above Fifty thouſand Foot in the Roman Army, and that they were to fight with ſix times as many of the Enemy, the Roman Commanders did not refuſe to join battel with them, and did totally overthrow the Enemies Army, thereby ſecuring *Italy* for that time, and for many years after, from Tranſalpine incurſions. But 'tis ſeen, that neither the number of the Enemy, nor the deſperate-mindedneſs of them with whom they fought, nor the diſcipline nor induration in Armies and military duties, (all which things were in theſe barbarous Armies overcome by the Romans) were ſufficient to diſcourage the Roman Commanders and Soldiers, whilſt the Commonwealth did nouriſh generous thoughts in them, and in their Forces. And in *Auguſtus* his time alſo, becauſe Diſcipline in War was obſerved, *Druſus* and *Tiberius Nero* were able to drive away the *Vandals*, who were then called *Burgondi*, and to frighten other People of the furthermoſt Northern parts from coming to infeſt *Italy*, as they were preparing to do.

No good argument can then be inforced from what hath been ſaid, nor can there be any rational judgment given of what would have befaln the Roman Empire, if it had ſtill been kept under the antient government of a Commonwealth, till the great combuſtions made by theſe Northern people, by whom it was deſtroyed. Certainly the acquiſition, or preſervation of States, does not depend upon the Form of Government, whether it be of one alone, or of a few, or of many; for we have examples cleer enough of great Empires which have been won, and preſerved by a King, by the *Optimati*, by a People, and by a Commonwealth mixt of divers ſorts of Governments. But the ſtrength or weakneſs of every State depends upon particular Orders, chiefly in point of the Militia, wherewith it is inſtituted, and the force and vertue whereof uſeth to be ſuch, as even Tyrannical Governments, which carry with them ſo much of violence, have riſen to a great height of power, and have preſerved it long, as by woful example to others we may this day diſcern in the *Ottoman* Government. As then the City of *Rome* grew great and powerful, not for being either formed of an Optimatical, or Popular, or mixt Government, but for her good Orders and Inſtitutions in military affairs; whence it was, that when at any time the *Romans* had bad ſucceſs in their battels, yet all their enterpriſes did ſtill end in victory: So cannot it be alleaged for a true and immediate reaſon of the ruine of that Empire, that it fell under the government and obedience of one alone. For this Supreme Authority, were it either by ſucceſſion, or by election, if (as it hath been for a long courſe of time in ſo many other Countries) it had paſſed in a ſetled and uſual manner from one Prince to another, whereby the Soldier ſhould have had no occaſion to have uſurped a very undue and harmful licentiouſneſs in all things, and that the antient diſcipline, obedience, and military worth had been obſerved in the Roman Armies, as it might have been, under one only Lord and Maſter, it may be ſafely ſaid and believed, that that the Roman Empire would have ſuffered no more by the fury of theſe Northern inundations, then it would have done if the State had continued in a Commonwealth; but as the *Cimbri*,

Teutones,

Teutones, *Ambroni*, all of them people of the ſame Nations, were formerly withſtood by the Roman Arms, ſo the violence of *Goths*, *Huns*, *Vandals*, and all ſuch like might have been ſtopped. It is only ſo far true, that the change of Government afforded occaſion to the ruine of the Empire, foraſmuch as the good orders and Roman diſcipline were peradventure eaſilier corrupted, when recommended to the care and diligence of one only Prince, who was oft-times unfit for Government, then it would have done, had it been guarded by many Citizens at once, as it was in the Commonwealths time. But it is very hard to penetrate into the true cauſes of ſo great events, and ſo remote from our memory, which are reſerved to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and Supreme LORD, and who governs and doth diſpenſe States and Empires by ways and ends, which are unknown to humane reaſon.

The Fourteenth DISCOURSE.

Why the Grecians *did not much extend the Confines of their Dominion, as did the* Romans; *and how* Greece *came to loſe her Liberty.*

OF all other antient People, there are two that have been greatly famous; ſo as their names, and the glory of things by them done, hath been conveyed over to the memory of Poſterity with large acclamations; to wit, the *Romans* and *Grecians*; alike for notable examples of all worth and vertue, but ſufficiently unlike for the greatneſs and duration of Empire. For whereas the *Grecians* did not extend their Confines beyond the bounds of *Greece* herſelf, nor did ſhe long flouriſh in the ſame ſplendor of dignity, nor greatneſs of fame and dominion; the *Romans* did command over almoſt the whole World, and their Empire, although the Form of Government was changed, endured for many Ages; for there paſt above eleven hundred years between the building of *Rome*, and the time wherein ſhe was taken and ſackt by the *Goths*. They then who ſhall conſider theſe things, may with reaſon deſire to know why theſe two Nations did differ ſo much in fortune, ſince they were equally worthy. It was not in any one City alone, that choiſe men for both all civil and military worth did flouriſh in *Greece*, as in *Italy* they did in *Rome*; but many Cities did at the ſame time produce Citizens excellent in all manner of things. It would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant Actions of *Miltiades*, *Themiſtocles*, *Ariſtides*, *Phocion*, *Alcibiades*, *Ageſilaus*, *Cimon*, *Leonidas*, *Epaminondas*, and of ſo many others whoſe Fame rings loud amongſt us: And *Plutarch*, when he writes the lives of the moſt excellent *Romans*, finds as many *Grecians* almoſt to parallel to them, who are as highly cry'd up for the ſame vertues. Yet did never any of their Cities, nor *Greece* herſelf the Country common to them all, ever riſe by any of their actions to that high pitch of Fortune and Command, as did the City of *Rome*, and whole *Italy*, by the illuſtrious deeds of the *Romans*. This diverſity of ſucceſs ought not to be attributed to Fortune, but their certain and natural cauſes. If *Greece* ſhould have enlarged the bounds of her Empire into the farthеſt diſtant Regions, as did *Italy* through the power and gallantry of the *Romans*, ſhe muſt either have been reduced under the power of one only Potentate, or they muſt all of them have been joined in an uniform conſent in the proſecution of great deſigns. But ſo many difficulties diſcover themſelves in both theſe things, as when

they

they are conſidered the wonder ceaſeth, why ſhe could not encreaſe her Dominions, anſwerable to the Fame, Vertue, and Glory of things done by that Nation. *Greece* was divided into many ſeveral people, who were all of them totally, or for the moſt part governed by proper Laws, and Civill Inſtitutions in the Form of a Commonwealth, though they were of divers States. And though they had a general Councel, which was called the *Amphictyones*, wherein men met, who were ſent from all the chief Cities, to treat of the moſt important affairs, and ſuch as did concern the common intereſts of all *Greece*, yet did not this Councel give one onely and certain Government to all *Greece*; but it was ſuch an Aſſembly as are the Diets which are in theſe times ſometimes call'd in *Germany* upon ſome particular Occurrences; wherein many Princes, and free Cities of that Province meet, which do much differ in State, Dignity, and Form of Government, and who have free votes in counſelling and in reſolving upon ſuch matters as are therein treated. But amongſt other people of *Greece*, the *Spartans* and the *Athenians*, antient people of Greece, and who for a long time, had by their worth purchaſt much authority, were very numerous and eminent when Greece did flouriſh moſt, both for publick power, and for the admirable worth of particular Citizens. For though the *Corinthians*, the *Argives*, the *Achæans*, and ſome other people, were of greater conſideration, in reſpect of other leſſer Cities, yet they for the moſt part did rather follow the fortune of the *Lacedemonians*, and the *Athenians*, then their own. And the *Thebans*, who for a while were in better eſteem then the reſt, by reaſon of their Soldiers Diſcipline, whom they called by a particular name, of the Sacred Cohort, yet becauſe of all her Citizens, onely two arrived at any celebrated honor, to wit *Pelopides* and *Epaminondas*, and for that her Militia conſiſted but of Five hundred men, their City never arrived at that degree of Dominion and Glory, as did *Sparta* and *Athens*. But as much as theſe were greater then the others, ſo much did they the more emulate one another, both for private worth and glory, as for publick Dignity and Reputation. To theſe did the other people of *Greece* adhere, ſome being by them commanded, others by vertue of particular conſiderations. Theſe two Cities were highly eſteemed for the orders of the firſt Founders of ſuch Commonwealths, to wit *Lycurgus* in *Sparta*, and in *Athens*, *Theſeus*; ſo as theſe people who did long before inhabit the ſame Country, began to take name, and authority over the reſt: Thoſe who did inhabit the *Terra firma*, held for the moſt part with the *Spartans*; and thoſe of the Iſlands with the *Athenians*. But yet every City was free, and hugely intent not to let the power either of the *Spartans* or *Athenians* encreaſe too much, but to keep the ſtrength of theſe two chief Cities ſo equally ballanced, as when the one of them ſhould go about to oppreſs the other people of *Greece*, the oppreſſed might have recourſe to the other.

It is therefore to be obſerved in all the actions of the Grecians, that the reſt of the people were never firm in their friendſhips, either to the *Spartans* alone, or alone to the *Athenians*; but when the one of them began to exceed the other, they ſided with the weakeſt; not valuing any tie of friendſhip or confederacy, when they met with any ſuch reſpect: So as for a long time the affairs of *Sparta*, and of *Athens* marcht hand in hand, though each of them both gave and received many routs, and partook both of good and bad fortune in War. *Sparta* was ſtrongeſt by land, and *Athens* by Sea; ſo as they did counterpoiſe one another; and therefore, and for that (as it hath been ſaid) they had each of them many dependants, and confederates, they kept the forces of whole Greece divided, nor was there means afforded to either of them, much to exceed the other. Wherefore neither of them could buſie themſelvs in far off affairs, nor againſt ſtrangers, becauſe they were ſtill at conteſtation between themſelves. And if at any time they went about

bout to do it, they were either hindred or diverted, as were the *Athenians*, when they paſt with their Fleet above *Sicily* under pretence to aſſiſt the *Leontinians*, but in effect, to get the Iſland to themſelves; aſpiring, by advice of *Alcibiades* (who had higher conceptions, then any former Grecian had had) to paſs over into *Africa* againſt the *Carthaginians*; the *Spartans* having diſcovered the deſign, and not being able to endure, that the *Athenians* ſhould to their prejudice, grow more powerful, reſiſted their Forces, and ſuccor'd *Meſſina*, when the City was ready to be loſt, and alſo aſſailed the Athenians in their own Territories, to divert them from that enterpriſe. The ſame thing, for the ſame occaſion fell out, when the Athenians paſſing with their Fleet into *Egypt*, had induced the Egyptians to rebel againſt the Perſians; and very powerful Forces were already brought by Sea from Greece to *Cyprus*, to aſſault the King of *Perſia's* Territories; But the Lacedemonians growing jealous of their greatneſs, fruſtrated that deſign, oppoſing them ſo many waies, and by ſo many Forces, as if the buſineſs had been not to have abaſed, but to have exalted the power of the Perſians, the common, and continual enemies of *Greece*. But theſe things were done by the Spartans, as they gave out, onely to curb the immoderate ambition of the Athenians, and to maintain, and defend the liberty of whole *Greece*; upon which pretence they undertook, and for many years maintained that famous War, of the people of *Morea*, which did much moleſt whole *Greece*, and kept their Forces very low. Therefore in the time when theſe two greater and more famous Commonwealths did flouriſh, they made uſe of their Forces more againſt themſelves then againſt foreiners; and in domeſtick War, which was the cauſe why *Greece* grew weaker, not more powerful: For whatſoever of prejudice befel either of the parties, was prejudicial to *Greece* her ſelf, and the fame and glory of their victories was blemiſh'd and leſſened by the loſs of thoſe Grecians that were overcome.

Therefore ſhe never became formidable to other Nations, as did *Italy*, where when the fame and worth of the Romans began to prevail, and the other neighboring Potentates were extinguiſhed, her force and power being all of a peece, the Roman Arms were dreadful to all people, nay they were all finally overcome by them. But *Greece* never having been able to reduce her ſelf to a condition, that all her forces ſhould be under the power of one onely Potentate, and that War was adminiſtred under the Auſpice of one onely Commonwealth, ſhe was of neceſſity to be alwaies too weak and impotent to inlarge her Confines much. So as that which made the Grecians be much eſteemed, to wit, her having ſo many Commonwealths, did much diminiſh the glory and dignity of Empire, to which otherwiſe her many ſignal vertues might have carried her, if her Forces had been in the power of one onely or Prince, or Commonwealth; or at leaſt if there had been a greater union, and better intelligence amongſt the ſo many Commonwealths that were in her. But too great a deſire of Liberty, which made it harder for one People to be obedient to another People, was directly that which made them injoy it the leſſer while. For being weak, and divided amongſt themſelves, the way lay open to any who who would aſſault, and oppreſs them. But the better the Grecians were accommodated with all vertue and diſcipline, which made them eſteem all others beſides themſelves barbarous, ſo much the more were they born away with too much vivacity of ſpirit, to ſuch an elation of mind, as none of them could indure to ſee themſelves equall'd either in publick, or in private by another, nor any City to his, nor any of his Citizens to himſelf. So as every more valiant man, and every more generous action grew ſuſpitious to others, and were more envied, and diſturb'd then the reſt, all their ambition and emulation being turned upon themſelves.

It is reported that *Pauſanias*, who was Commander in chief in a Victory had againſt

againſt the *Perſians*, did in token thereof preſent the Temple of *Apollo* in *Delphos* with that famous golden Trevet; whereat the reſt of the *Grecians* being greatly ſcandalized, made *Pauſanias* his name be raced out, and placed in ſtead thereof the names of all the Confederate Cities, whoſe People were preſent at that Victory. And 'tis ſaid of *Alcibiades*, that full of vexation, he had wont to ſay, that he could not ſleep for thinking of the Triumphs of *Miltiades*. But there are a thouſand examples of ſuch like things, which ſhews how fervently they did contend one with another in point of glory. *Themiſtocles* and *Ariſtides* were profeſs'd Enemies; ſo were *Alcibiades* and *Nicias*, and many others of the moſt famous and valianteſt Citizens of *Athens*: Where there was ſuch contention amongſt themſelves, and ſo great care was had that no one man ſhould exceed another very much, notwithſtanding any action which might make him more glorious and potent, as Oſtraciſm was ordained, which was, the baniſhment of ſuch Citizens for ten years, who were very remarkable either for excellency of parts, or proſperous fortune, more then were the reſt; by which means they loſt their beſt Citizens, nay ſometime made them become their Enemies, as was ſeen in *Alcibiades*, *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, and ſome others, who were born for the aggrandiſing of that Commonwealth, and yet through the corruption of the Orders thereof proved prejudicial to it. Whereupon *Xerxes*, who favored, and gave entertainment to ſuch men, had wont to ſay, that he prayed God that his Enemies might ſtill baniſh ſuch Citizens.

The divers Forms of Government made likewiſe much againſt the union of the people of *Greece*. Some of their Cities were much for Democracie, as *Athens*; and ſome others lean'd more to Ariſtocracie, as *Sparta*. Such diverſity of Governments produced diverſity of Cuſtoms and cogitations; ſo as they could hardly be all of them pleaſed with one and the ſame thing, every one meaſuring their actions with peculiar reſpects divided from the reſt. So as when in the time of *Lyſander* King of the *Spartans*, the City of *Athens* was taken, to the end that they might maſter it the better, they changed the Form of Government, reducing it from a Popular condition, the form of its former Government, under the authority of a few, as that which did more reſemble the *Spartan* Government. And in the following times, when the *Spartans* ran the ſame fortune with all the other *Grecians*, and was compell'd to obey the King of *Macedon*, it was requiſite to alter the Laws and Inſtitutions of that City, which were at firſt ordained by *Lycurgus*. Theſe things did beget and maintain ſo great a diſunion in *Greece*, as ſhe could not only not unite her Forces together to carry them againſt other Nations, but hardly could ſhe defend herſelf with them: As was ſeen, when being mightily endangered by an Army of the *Perſians*, which came with a great power to aſſault her, the War was diverſly adminiſtred, they not agreeing what City ſhould nominate the Commander in chief; the *Spartans* would have reduced the defence to narrow paſſages by Land, and the *Athenians* would have put the whole fortune of *Greece* in their Fleet; the ſituations of their Cities, and the condition of their Forces, would not permit that one and the ſame thing ſhould be equally uſeful and commodious for them all. Nor was the eminent danger of the *Perſians* ſo potent Army able to unite the Forces of all *Greece*, but that ſome of the chief People, as the *Theſſalians*, *Argives*, and *Thebans* would be exempted from out the League; and the *Argives* being requeſted to adhere to the Confederacie of ſo many other Cities, anſwered, that they would rather obey the *Perſians*, then give way unto their antient Rivals and Enemies, the *Spartans*. Finally, the *Grecians* having obtained a great and unexpected Victory in the Sea-fight at *Salamine*, when they were to have purſued their Fortune, after having beaten the Fleet, and made the Enemy retire, they of themſelves gave over all further hopes, and came home to their own Havens; for that the *Spartans* envied the glory of the *Athenians*, and fearing by reaſon of their

being

being ſtronger at Sea, that if they ſhould have proceeded on in their ſucceſs, they would not have ſpared their own *Grecians*, but have domineered over them; and ſoon after being more moved by envy, and their antient home-contentions, then by any hatred to the Enemy, when they ſhould have driven the remainder of the Perſian Army out of *Greece*, the aſſociate Cities fel upon the *Thebans*, becauſe ſevering themſelves in theſe common dangers from the *Grecians*, they had recourſe for friendſhip to the *Perſians*. So as *Greece* reaped no good by this proſperous ſucceſs, becauſe the *Grecians* knew not how to value it, nor knew they how to uſe the Victory when they had got it. *Mardonius* was overthrown at the Battel of *Platea*, together with his whole Army, which after *Xerxes* his flight he commanded in chief: But what advantage got the *Grecians* by ſo great a victory, ſave their dividing of the prey? which made them return all of them the ſooner to their own houſes. Nay, there aroſe greater and more cruel civil wars between them afterwards, then had ever been before; and the buſineſs grew to that height, as the *Spartans* who had always profeſs'd themſelves more bitter Enemies to the *Barbarians* then all the reſt, joined in league with them, and conſpired with *Tiſſaphernes*, who was Governor of *Libia* for King *Darius*, to ruine *Greece*. Truces made between them were alſo often broken; and out of too great proneneſs to adhibit faith to the ſuſpitions which they had one of another, the publick faith was broken; no tye being ſtrong enough to keep thoſe minds faſt together, which were ſo divided by perpetual emulation. But of all the reſt, two things are very conſiderable as touching this preſent Diſcourſe, and the Judgment which is to be given thereupon; to wit, of what ſtrength the *Grecians* were in military affairs, and with what Princes they had to do, in the time when *Greece* did flouriſh moſt, and had moſt reaſon to aſpire to enlarge her Empire. Certainly he who ſhall well conſider it, will find that warlike Diſcipline was neither ſo highly eſteemed of, nor of that excellencie and perfection amongſt the *Grecians*, as it was amongſt the *Romans*; for the *Romans* valued nothing more then military valor and diſcipline; nay, for a long time they ſtudied no Sciences nor Liberal Arts, (wherein thoſe who took any delight, made uſe of *Grecians*) but did wholly give their minds to military exerciſes, and ſought for praiſe from nothing but from War. Whence it was, that more Soldiers excellently well train'd up in military affairs, were to be drawn out of the City of *Rome*, then out of other whole Provinces: whereas the *Grecians* did not give their minds to the ſtudy of War, but to Learning, and to the Liberal Sciences, which flouriſh'd a long time amongſt them, as either born with them, or very well cultivated by them. There were as many of them that frequented Univerſities to become Philoſophers, as of thoſe who ſtudied the Soldiers craft. How many Profeſſors were there amongſt them of Oratory and Poetry, wherein they proved ſo excellent, as all that ever deſired to prove good therein ſince, have obſerved their rules, and trodden in their ſteps. How many rare Artificers have there likewiſe been of *Grecians* in all the moſt noble Arts, particularly in Sculpture and Picture-drawing? The original, or at leaſt the perfection whereof, knows no other beginning then from *Greece*: In the memory of all Ages, the names of *Phidias*, *Polycletus*, *Alcamenes*, *Agliophon*, *Polygnotus*, *Parrhaſius*, *Zeuxis*, *Apelles*, and of ſo many others are celebrated. Wherefore *Greece* was more famous for the excellencie of Learning, and of the Liberal Arts, then for skill in the Militia. Yet was the City of *Sparta* better then the reſt at military affairs; and *Athens* was ſufficiently famous for her Fleets by Sea, and her skill in maritime affairs: yet the Spartan Militia was bounded within narrow precincts, and it was late ere the *Athenians* did much mind their maritime exerciſes, to wit, not before *Themiſtocles* his time. And certainly, neither of theſe Cities was compleatly well ordered for the acquirement of Empire: For *Sparta*, though her Inſtitutions tended to Arms, yet did they aim more at their own defence, and at the preſerva-

tion of Libertie, then at the acquisition of Empire; not onely private Citizens, but even the publick weal being constituted in great poverty, and restrained to a small number of Citizens; they were forbidden all commerce with foreiners, least they might corrupt the Laws and Customs of their Country, their lives were austeer, and they were contented with a little; Whence it was that those Citizens were a long time from desiring any further greatness, it being therefore propounded to *Cleomenes* King of *Sparta*, by one *Anaxagoras* of *Miletum*, who had caused many of the Cities of *Ionia* to rebel against the King of *Persia*; to make use of that occasion, and take up arms; shewing him that he might penetrate even to the Cities of *Susa*, and possess himself of the wealth of all those Kings; The *Spartan* laught at the proposition, and considering onely the length of the voyage, said, He would none of those riches, which were not worth so much labour. Yet because the Government of *Sparta* preserved it self for a long time without any great alteration or change, and grew therefore the stronger, it was able to get the Dominion of whole *Morea*, and had afterwards the prime place for dignitie, and Empire amongst the Grecians. On the contrary, *Athens*, which by the opportunitie of the Sea, and by divers of her institutions aiming at the increasing of the City, seemed as if she ought to have inlarged her Dominion beyond the Confines of *Greece*, could not make good use of her Forces, nor reap the fruit which became the worth of some of her most excellent Citizens, who were highly spirited, and were minded to raise their Country to further greatness, because she could never order her self so as to preserve herself long in one and the same Form of Government, but was busied in perpetual Civil disorders, precipitating herself sometimes into a corrupt Popular State, sometimes into the tyrannie of a few.

But the Grecians seemed as if all their thoughts were usually bounded within themselves; insomuch as it is said of some of their most famous Commanders, That they did more willingly exercise themselves in Wars made amongst the Grecians themselves, then in Wars against the Barbarians; since come what would, the advantage and honor of the Victory did remain in *Greece*. But as for what belongs to the Militia, some may peradventure think, that it may be proved by some famous Victories that the *Grecians* won from the *Medes* and *Persians*, that they did much study Military Affairs, and were very good at Military Discipline, insomuch as for that part, there was no more to be wished for in them. To this it may be answered, That it is not to be denied, but that the Grecian Militia might be thought to be good and laudable when compared to that of the Barbarians, with whom they had most to do; But that it is no waies to be held comparable to that of the Romans, who did excellently well understand whatsoever belonged to the true Militia, better then did any other Nation in any whatsoever time. Insomuch as by reason of their good orders, and of the so many Victories which they wan, they propounded unto themselves the conquest of the whole world; which out of the same reasons they effected. But it is observable in the Victories which the Grecians got against the King of *Persia's* Forces, that they were occasioned, not so much through the good ordering of their Militia, as by reason of a certain obstinate resolution which they had put on, to defend *Greece* from the eminent slavery of the Barbarians, the fear whereof made them bold to encounter whatsoever danger.

Many of their actions prove this, as amongst others, that of *Leonidas* was sufficiently famous, who being left with onely Five hundred of his *Lacedemonians* to guard the Strieght of *Thermopyla*, fell boldly with them one night into the Persian Camp, where were sundry Hundred thousands of men, not being perswaded thereunto out of any hopes of victory or safety, but onely out of a desire to revenge

venge the injuries done by *Xerxes* to *Greece*, by the ſlaying of ſo many enemies, and by his own voluntary death. Who knows not that in the Naval fight at *Salamina*, it was neceſſity that made the Grecians ſo couragious? Since the *Athenians*, who were of greateſt power in that Fleet, were already without any Country, their City being burnt by the Enemy; ſo that their ultimate hope of any good conſiſted in that daies good ſucceſs. And to make the neceſſity the greater, *Themiſtocles*, who was their Commander in chief, choſe wiſely to joyn Battel in a place which was far from any friends Territories, thereby to bereave every one of any other hopes of ſafety but by being victorious. And the great multitude of the Perſians Fleet, ſerved rather for confuſion to them then for any ſtrength, for of above a thouſand Veſſels which were therein, it is ſaid that hardly Two hundred entred the Battel. And the Victory which was obtained not long after by land againſt the Army led on by *Mardonius*, was rendred the leſs difficult by the reputation which the Grecians had won by their Naval Victory, and by King *Xerxes* his running away, whoſe Soldiers proved no more couragious then did their Maſter, for whoſe glory it was that they were to fight; whereas the Grecians fought for themſelves, for the ſafety of their Country, their Houſes, and of all that they had.

But to boot with all this, it may peradventure not without truth be affirmed, That the actions of the Grecians have been transferred over to the memory of poſterity, for greater then what indeed they were. For *Greece* had great ſtore of excellent Writers, who according to the cuſtom of the Nation, amplifying ſuch deeds as might purchaſe glory to them, have ſtudied very much to ſet them forth to the beſt, and to make them appear praiſe-worthy. Wherefore *Saluſt* in the beginning of his Hiſtory, rendring as it were a reaſon why he took the pains to write, ſaies, That the Actions of the Romans may appear to be the leſs, out of the little care they had of putting them into writing, every one being more intent to do praiſe-worthy actions, then to celebrate the actions of other men; whereas the Grecians actions were made to appear, not what they really were, but ſuch as the moſt excellent wits of good Writers could by their adornments ſet them ſtately forth.

Moreover there met many things in the Romans, much differing from what hath been ſaid of the *Greeks*; for their whole ſtudy was to make their City powerful by any whatſoever way, that they might, as they did, draw upon any occaſion great ſtore of Soldiers from thence. This was the original of the ſanctuarie, wherein wicked men driven out of other Countries were received, and afterwards People of many of the neighboring Cities, were allowed the priviledges of the City of *Rome*, the more to intereſs them in what belonged to the honor and greatneſs of *Rome*, as to that of their Common-countrie, yet was not the War adminiſtred under divers names or auſpices, as it was in *Greece*, by reaſon of the ſeveral Leagues had between ſeveral People, but by the ſole authoritie of the Roman Commanders, and ſtill in ſole reſpect to what made onely good for the Commonwealth of *Rome*. Now if we will conſider with what forein Potentates the Grecians had to make War, we ſhall find that this alſo made it the harder for them to acquire other mens Countries, for juſt when the Grecians, by reaſon of their having many gallant men amongſt them, might have aſpired at the aggrandizing of their Empire, the Perſian Monarchie was grown ſo powerful as it ruled over all the Eaſt; And was not onely got near to *Greece*, by the poſſeſſion of *Lydia*, but did alſo poſſeſs *Ionia*, an antient Colony of the Grecians. So as it was a very great and difficult undertaking, to go about to poſſeſs the Territories of ſo great a Prince, who though he ſhould receive a rout might eaſily recover his loſs, and put himſelf in a ſafe poſture of defence, by reaſon of the largeneſs of his Domi-

mion, and the multitude of Soldiers that were at his command. So as join this outward impediment to the inward, which lay in their home-discords, and we shall see that the Routs which the *Grecians* gave to the *Persians*, did no further incommodate the *Persians*, then the loss of those Armies; nor did the *Grecians* receive any further benefit thereby, then the defending of themselves, and their safety for no long time from further dangers. But the Kingdom of *Macedon*, though of much less strength for extent of Empire, became very formidable by reason of its good Discipline in War, and for the great worth of some of her Kings, amongst which *Philip* the Father of *Alexander*, who as he proved a great Prince, and of deep designs, so was he very pernicious to *Greece*: For divers People of *Greece* having recourse to him for help against some other *Grecians* that were their Enemies, they were willingly received, and their request graciously listned unto, that so he might nourish their discords, and weaken all their Forces by continual Wars; by which means he made himself Arbitrator of all *Greece*; insomuch as there were not any of them who did not sometimes apply themselves unto him, either for Peace to themselves, or for help by War against others.

Wherefore *Philip* discovering his intentions at last, that he was resolved to rule over all *Greece*, he entred thereinto with powerful Forces, and was no less grievous to those who first called him in, then to the rest against whom he declared his coming to be. So *Thebes*, which was the first City which made use of his Forces, and did it oftner then all the rest, was one of the first (though with prejudice to all the rest) that tasted the bitter fruits of her unadvised Councels, being ruin'd and destroyed by the fame *Philip*; who being much allured by the taking of that City, and by hopes of greater matters, resolved to make himself Master of other Cities of *Greece*: To which design whereas all *Greece* ought to have opposed themselves for the common interest, they went about, though by several and divided councels, to join themselves with him, and to place their own safety in his friendship and fidelity. Thus did all *Beotia*, *Thessaly*, and other Regions adhere unto him; and the *Athenians*, who, encouraged by *Demosthenes*, took up Arms themselves, and endeavored to raise whole *Greece* against *Philip*, being but in weak condition after the so many defeats received from the *Lacedemonians*, they also had recourse to him for safety by the way of favor and peace, not only for themselves, but for all *Greece*. So as the *Spartans* being left almost alone to oppose *Philips* Forces, they proved much too weak to withstand such a power; so as *Greece* being oppress by Forein forces, fell at last into the hands of the *Macedonians*. And when there was a likelihood, by the death of *Philip*, who had not as yet well confirm'd his government over them, that the Grecians might have shaken off their yoke of servitude, *Alexander* succeeded in the Kingdom, so valiant a Prince, as he was a terror not only to his neighbors, but to all the East; who by his supreme greatness, and excellent worth, made all his Soldiers so inamor'd of him, as some of the Grecian Commanders, who had followed him in the Wars in *Persia*, stuck not to affirm, that there was not any one in *Greece*, who ought not to desire as the greatest happiness that could befall them, that *Alexander* might sit in the Throne, as King of *Persia*.

But after *Alexanders* unexpected death, *Greece* seemed to have a better opportunity offered her to remit herself into her former liberty, being just at that time in Arms; for the *Athenians* with many other people were rebell'd against *Alexander*, and had an Army on foot of Thirty thousand men, besides a numerous Fleet, discontented because he would have received into their Country a great many of Citizens, who had been banish'd for diversity of Factions. And moreover, the divisions of Empire made by *Alexander* among so many of his Commanders, and the contentions which suddenly arose amongst them, were things which gave *Greece* great

oppor-

opportunities of not being any more ſubject to be commanded by a Foreiner. Yet could ſhe not lay hold thereon, either becauſe their former valor and generoſity began to fail in them, and their antient Cuſtoms to be corrupted, (for many who had received favors from *Philip* and from *Alexander*, loved better to be governed by one man alone, then to reſtore their Country to her liberty; and chiefly for that the People having for the moſt part had great authority in thoſe days, the beſt and moſt valiant Citizens were rewarded with baniſhment and other injuries for their ſervice:) Or elſe it may rather be ſaid, that the ſame reaſon of Civil diſcord which had at firſt made *Greece* weak, and not able to maintain herſelf in a free condition, did concur at this time likewiſe to make her relapſe into ſlavery. Thus the *Achæans*, and the *Argives*, who together with the *Athenians* had taken up Arms againſt the *Macedonians*, either out of fear of *Antipaters* Forces (to whoſe ſhare in the diviſion of the Empire after *Alexanders* death, *Macedonia* and *Greece* fell, of which Provinces he was formerly Governor) or elſe egg'd on by envy, they ſoon forewent the League which they had contracted, leſt the City of *Athens* might have returned to her former greatneſs, and ſo ſuffered the *Athenians* to be made a prey of by the *Macedonians*. And the *Spartans*, out of their ſame antient reſpects, ſtanding idle Spectators of other mens miſeries, and not thinking that the ſame afflictions might befall them, minded more to ſecure their own City with new Fortifications, then to oppoſe themſelves, as they ought to have done, to theſe Forces of the Enemy, and not have ſuffered them to increaſe by the Forces of *Greece* herſelf, and by thoſe whom they had ſubjugated.

After this, *Greece* enjoyed peace and quiet; ſome of them enduring patiently the Macedonian government, and others not fearing (as they ought to have don:) the like miſchief, becauſe it was not as yet come home unto them. So when by the various accidents which befell the *Macedonians* in their own Kingdom, *Greece* might have kept them low, or at leaſt have kept them from further domineering, permitting *Caſſander*, *Antigonus*, and *Demetrius* to live peaceably and quietly for all them, and ſometimes too much believing their flatteries, and allured by a certain appearing Liberty wherewith thoſe Princes thought good to keep the *Grecians* in obedience to them, they knew not how to make uſe of any of ſo many occaſions, till at laſt in *Philips* time (that *Philip* with whom the Romans had Wars ſo long, who proved ſo gallant a Prince, and poſſeſt himſelf of *Macedonia* together with other Provinces) ſhe returned to her antient revolts. And as *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* made himſelf Lord thereof, by the ſame means whereby he had got entrance thereinto; for King *Philip* entred *Greece*, being call'd in by the *Argives* and *Achæans*, who were made War upon by the *Ætolians*, with whom many of the Cities of *Greece* were ſo ill ſatisfied, as to ſhun being governed by them, they voluntarily put themſelves into the power of King *Philip*; who had the way at laſt opened unto him (to the end that no part of *Greece* might be ſafe from the Macedonian Forces) to fall upon *Sparta*, with which City *Philip* was before upon good terms and in peace: For the *Lacedemonians* not being able to endure that the *Achæans*, by *Philips* favor, ſhould grow too great in *Morea*, the Principality whereof they had for a long time held, breaking their former agreement and confederacie made with *Philip*, were joined with the *Ætolians*, aſſiſting them againſt the *Achæans*, who were Friends and Confederates of the ſame *Philip*. And after many revolutions, the buſineſs came at laſt to that paſs, as the *Grecians* being too late aware that they had ſuffered the authority of the *Macedonians* to grow too great over them, by which ſome of them had been formerly tyrannically dealt withall, and others apprehending the like imminent danger, not able to endure theſe yet greater miſchiefs, they fled to the *Romans*, craving help and ſuccor from them againſt *Philip*; as did the City of *Athens* chiefly, as having ſuffered greateſt

greateſt injuries, and being wont to be the head of the greateſt, and moſt important innovations in *Greece*. Nor was it hard for them to obtain it; for the Romans, making profeſſion, that they had made it their buſineſs that there ſhould be no unjuſt power upon the earth, but that Reaſon, Juſtice, and Law ſhould rule every where, did willingly imbrace the protection, and defence of the weakeſt, whom they found to be oppreſt by the more powerful: which thing under pretence of defending others, and of a noble peece of generoſity, made the way to divers acquiſitions the eaſier to them; covering by theſe means their ambition of Government.

But the Romans were very cunning herein, who in all their actions ſhewed as if they deſired nothing but glory, by which they did miraculouſly win the hearts of all *Greece*: For in the Expedition which they made againſt *Philip*, their Armies having, at the inſtance of the Grecians themſelves paſt over the Sea, run many hazzards, and endured much hardſhips; when they had conquered *Philip*, and drove him out of *Greece*, they reſtored all thoſe Cities which had been formerly under his Dominion, to their Liberty; ſuffering them to live under their own Laws; but yet ſo, as made advantagiouſly for them, placing ſome of their own Roman Soldiers in ſome of the bordering Towns; alleadging that they did this for the good of *Greece*, that being freed from the ſlavery of *Philip*, they might not fall into the like of *Antigonus*, a powerful King at that time in *Aſia*, who might be the better kept out of *Europe*, for fear of not offending the Roman greatneſs, then for fear of the weak forces of *Greece*, which were already very low. But the truth was, that theſe places opportunely held by the Romans, ſerved to ſecure them of the Grecians fidelitie, if at any time forgetting their obligation, and deſirous of novelty, as they had alwaies appeared to be, they ſhould have a mind, with prejudice to the Roman affairs, to joyn with any other ſtranger Prince; for they deſired that they might depend on the Authority of the Commonwealth of *Rome*.

So as that *Greece* which had ſo many valiant Soldiers and Commanders, and was ſo famous amongſt other Nations, not having known how to make uſe of time, whilſt the name of the Romans was but obſcure, and that their Forces were buſied elſe-where, to make way for their further greatneſs; was forc'd afterwards to follow the fortune of the Romans, and to confeſs themſelves to be overcome by their more excellent worth; and to acknowledge all that remained of good or ſafety to them, from their favor.

But to rerurn from whence we have digreſt; and to proceed with the ſucceſſes of *Greece* in divers Ages, let us ſay; that it being the fate of *Greece* to fall upon two ſo potent neighboring Princes, as were the Kings of *Perſia*, and *Macedonia*, it did not onely foment their Civil diſcords, but did haſten their final ruine, for if the Grecians had had leſs powerful neighbors, they would either not have had recourſe unto them, or elſe the uſe of their Forces and aſſiſtance in their own *Greece* would not have proved ſo prejudicial to them: It being a true & general rule in State Affairs, that no foeign Forces are to be made uſe of, for a mans own ſafety, which are much greater then his own; for by ſo doing, a man muſt depend upon another mans will; which where rule is in queſtion, is uſually more ready to endeavor its own conveniency and greatneſs, then to keep word, and to conſider another mans good, though he be a friend and confederate: Yet it may be affirmed, that *Greece* having for neighbors not onely one but two great Potentates, it was a thing which as it hindred her from making acquiſitions abroad, ſo it might have been of great help unto her for the preſervation of her ſelf, and Liberty, if ſhe could have made good uſe thereof. For if at any time ſhe ſhould be oppreſt by one of them, ſhe had means to have recourſe to the other, from whom ſhe might ſafely build for help,

help, ſince ſelf-intereſt concurr'd therein, for it would be dangerous for either of them to ſuffer the others power encreaſe too much, by the ruine of *Greece*. So as if the Grecians, when they were threatned ruine by *Philip*, had known how to make uſe of the help which was offered them by the King of *Perſia*, they might peradventure have eſcaped that bad fortune; but being exceedingly jealous one of another, they had all of them recourſe to the ſame Prince, becauſe none of the reſt might make uſe of his friendſhip and favor. Thus *Philip* the firſt had greateſt opportunity offered him, of making himſelf by degrees, Firſt, chief Captain, next, Arbitrator, and laſtly, Lord of all *Greece*, by keeping ſome of her people quiet, and in peace, which he eaſily granted them for his own ends; and by making War at the ſame time upon ſome others of them, and he who ſhall compare theſe antient ſucceſſes of the Grecians affairs, with others of the enſuing age, and nearer unto us, ſhall and will find very like effects which have ſprung from the ſame occaſions. For *Greece* being once humbled, and aſsubjected by the Roman greatneſs, was afterwards returned to great honor and dignity in the time of *Conſtantine* who placed the ſeat of the Empire in the antient City of *Bizantium*; but ſhe knew not how to keep therein by reaſon of her diſcords. For after that the *French* and the *Venetian*, had taken *Conſtantinople*, though the Empire returned to the aforeſaid Grecians, yet through many and various chances which happened afterwards, whole *Greece* was divided; ſome of them following the Princes of the Grecian extract, and ſome of them the Latins, the people for the moſt part holding with the former, and the Nobility with the latter. So as recourſe being had to Arms, for the deciding of ſo many controverſies, they applied themſelves for help unto the Turks, and cauſing a great number of them to paſs over into *Natolia* in *Greece*, *Greeces* ultimate ruine did enſue thereupon. For theſe Barbarians, who were accuſtomed to live among craggy Mountains, inamored of the beauty and pleaſantneſs of this Country, and moved, as ſome ſay, by a certain good augurie, whereby they were adviſed to tarry there, promiſing them much happineſs in that Region, whereinto they were come, and called, they poſſeſt themſelves of divers parts and Cities of the Empire, ſparing nor friends, nor enemies; and placing their Regal Seat amongſt them, they grew ſoon much more powerful, being favored therein by the great diſſentions which ſtill continued amongſt the Grecian Nobility, and other neighboring Lords, as thoſe of *Servia*, *Bulgaria*, and *Albania*, intereſſing themſelves therein, they, together with their own intereſts, drew along with them the deſtruction of many other States, and gave juſt occaſion to poſterity, for ever to blame their ill taken counſels. For if the Grecians had been at unity within themſelves, and as ſolicitous to keep the Turks from advancing their power, as they were to abaſe that of the Latin Princes, they might certainly have hoped to have kept that fire a far off, which hath burnt and conſumed ſo many noble parts of Chriſtendom. Since it is ſeen that the Grecian Forces, whilſt their Lords, after being driven from the City of *Conſtantinople* by the Latins, kept in the parts about *Natolia* (which was for above fifty years) although they had already begun to be governed by one alone Prince, under a juſt form of Empire, were yet able to keep them bounded within the mountains of *Natolia*, in barren places, not ſuffering them to make any acquiſitions of moment, nor to enter into *Europe*, as they did afterwards. But it was the particular imperfection of this Province, and of that in all other reſpects, moſt noble Nation, that ſhe underſtood not, or knew not how to make uſe of her many and valiant Forces; Since if we will look back upon antient ſtories, when *Philip* had reduced *Greece* into his power, he put ſo high an eſteem upon the value of thoſe Soldiers, as he undertook by them chiefly to effect his antient deſire of making the enterprize of *Perſia*, which not being able (as hindred by death) to effect, was after ſo glorioufly ended by his Son *Alexander*,

and

And it is related, that being thus minded, *Philip* had already muſtered Two hundred thouſand Foot, and Fifteen thouſand Horſe in *Greece*; and that *Alexander* deſirous to proſecute his Fathers intentions, but by different advice, building his chiefeſt hopes in the body of an Army of but Thirty thouſand valiant Soldiers, many of which he raiſed in *Greece*, did by their valor chiefly end ſo many glorious Enterpriſes.

The Fifteenth DISCOURSE.

Whether Oſtraciſm, *uſed by the* Athenians, *be a juſt thing, or no; and whether it be uſeful for the preſervation of a Commonwealth.*

IT was inſtituted by the Laws in ſome antient Commonwealths, that ſuch as were very eminent above the reſt either for Riches, Glory, Friends, or for any other Civil power, or who did exceed the other Citizens for any particular worth, ſhould be baniſhed the City; not out of puniſhment or penalty, but for the common good, to the end that Equality being the better maintained, and as it were a certain Conſonancie amongſt the ſeveral ranks of Citizens obſerved, the Government might be the ſafer, and more durable. Which cuſtom was for a long time obſerved by the *Athenians*, and chiefly then when their Commonwealth did flouriſh moſt; and ten years was the limited time for this exilement. This Law was commonly called Oſtraciſm, whereof *Ariſtotle* toucheth a little in his Third Book of the *Politicks*. But whether ſuch a Law be juſt, or no, and whether it may make for the preſervation of a Commonwealth or State, for which end it was inſtituted, is a Conſideration of no ſmall moment in point of Polic'e; there being much to be ſaid on both ſides, both in praiſe and diſpraiſe of ſo ſtrange a Law and Cuſtom.

In the behalf thereof, theſe things may be had into conſideration: That nothing is more requiſite for the long preſervation of a City, eſpecially of ſuch a one as is governed in form of a Commonwealth, where the Government is in the hands of many, then Equality amongſt Citizens; whereof the more excellent the temper is, and the more it is tied faſt by ſtrict Laws, ſo as it cannot be exceeded on any ſide, the life of that City or Commonwealth will be ſo much the longer, more quiet, and more ſecure. A City may be reſembled to a humane Body, compounded of divers Elements, and conſiſting of many Members: and that as that humane Body is more healthful and more handſom, wherein every elementary quality is better diſtributed, and every member better proportioned; ſo that City or Commonwealth wherein every degree of Citizens hath a moderate authority, ſtate and fortune, and well proportioned to the whole, doth preſerve it ſelf the longer, and keep freer from the contagion of civil ſeditions: Though the Head be the nobleſt part of the Body, and the Eyes the like of the Head, yet would they not be of ornament, when either that or theſe were bigger then their ordinary and natural form; they would rather take away all Decorum and beauty, which is nothing but a due proportion in all things. Then, though it may ſeem a gallant thing to ſhew the greatneſs and nobleneſs of a City or Commonwealth, that there be many very wealthy men therein, and of excellent civil gifts, and that the ſupreme Degrees and Negotiations of the Commonwealth be beſtowed upon theſe; yet another reaſon may perſwade the contrary; for this eminencie ſpoils the proportion of the whole, and doth not repreſent a City

of Free-men, and partakers of the ſame Government, but the form of a Tyrannical Government, conſiſting of Lords and Servants, hateful names in good Governments. Therefore all the beſt Legiſlators have chiefly aimed at the reducing of all things, as much as may be, to an Equality, in that City where they would introduce a Politick Government, and a peaceful and durable condition. Inſomuch as *Plato*, to take away all occaſion of civil diſcord, would have all goods to be common, in that his Commonwealth which he propounded to himſelf for the moſt exact form of Government: So as there ſhould be no ſuch name as Rich, or Poor, but only that of Citizens of the ſame Country, and who live under the ſame Law. So as no man could out-doe another, by altering this ſo neceſſary and uſeful Civil Equality: which not being to be had where there is a Propriety of Goods, the *Athenians* would provide againſt thoſe inconveniences which the unequal condition of Citizens produced, by driving at a certain time out of the City ſuch as had cauſed the diſorder, and who were ſuſpected to be the Authors of Novelties, and of trouble to peaceful living.

And truly, he who ſhall conſider what the beginnings of thoſe evils have been, which have inwardly vex'd and troubled both Commonwealths and other States as well in antient, as in theſe more modern times, ſhall find, that all the confuſions and civil diſorders which have after a long time brought many States to their ultimate ruine, have ſprung from this root. How was partiality, and the corruption of good and antient Orders introduced in the Commonwealth of *Rome*, whence all great things may take example, if not from having ſuffered avarice, and the power of ſome Citizens to increaſe too much? Who having made themſelves ſo great by the continuation of military Commands, and for having many ways whereby to purchaſe popular favor, as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds, nor could the Laws curb them, did totally ſubvert that Government: inſomuch as it was ſaid of *Caſar*, that he would not have any Superior to him in the City; and of *Pompey*, that he would have no Equal. And *Cato* had wont to ſay, that *Ceſars* immoderate greatneſs had enforc'd *Pompey* likewiſe to exalt himſelf above what otherwiſe became the publick ſervice, to the end that the one might counterpoiſe the other. So grant one inconvenience, others will eaſily follow: And as too great eminencie in any Citizen, although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick, ought to be ſuſpected; ſo it is hard to rid ones ſelf thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated, where thoſe uſual means and inſtitutions are wanting which the *Carthaginians* had, without falling upon violent courſes, which in ſtead of Phyſick proves poiſon to that Seate. The Houſe of *Medici* began to lay ſound foundations for its greatneſs in *Florence*, by means of old *Coſmo's* great wealth; it afterwards increaſed very much by the vertue and wiſdom of *Lorenzo*; and ſo by little and little getting to a great height of power, which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State, it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country, but would aſſume unto it ſelf the ſuperiority of that Government: So as when the *Florentines* were too late aware thereof, they could not moderate that too immenſe greatneſs; for the continued power of that Family, wherein there had been excellent men for worth, and eminent degrees and dignities, purchaſed by them both in their own Country, and elſwhere, had got them ſo many to ſide partially with them, as their own Faction was able upon any occaſion to ſuſtain them.

The like happens alſo in ſome States wherein there is not ſo expreſs a form of a Commonwealth, but a ſupreme Prince, yet alſo many particular Lords of great authority. In ſuch States, the too much greatneſs of Barons hath oft-times proved too pernicious: For there being in all men naturally a deſire of growing greater, and they having means to do ſo, where their power is not limited by the Laws and Cuſtoms of the State, they are eaſily induced to mount higher then ſtands with their

degree, to equal their authority to that of the King himself, and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State. Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof, in the present troubles of *France*, which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power, whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom, and the better to foment and sustain their parties, and to perfect their designs, they had recourse to forein forces, and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet. It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some Princes, to have an eye upon such, whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected, and to allay this their greatness, by not admitting them into chief imployments, by taking away or lessening their Priviledges, and Immunities, and by lessening their authority, and universal favor by other means, according as occasions have counselled. *Consalvo* a great and famous Commander in the former age, had done excellent service to King *Ferdinando*; and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards, as having by his own worth gotten, and preserved the Kingdom of *Naples*, he was taken off from all imployment, and brought back into *Spain* to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition: That prudent Prince was moved thereunto, as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up, and who was so followed and applauded both by the common people and the Nobility, could not but be to be suspected: So as he knew it was requisite for his own security, and the like of his Dominions, not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice, and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment.

The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way, first by *Periander* to *Thrasybalus*, and after by *Tarquin* the proud to his Son *Sextus* are very observable, to wit, to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies, or ears of corn; whereby they would infer, that he who will rule in safety, must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others, for what concerns any Civil Power; which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical States, yet when it is used with discretion and wisdom, hath another aspect, for all particular interests ought to give way, where the publick good, and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State (which is of a much greater concernment) is in question. But when this may be done by any ordinary way, as by Law and Custom (as it was among the *Athenians* and other antient people) then this remedie proved the more just and secure. There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law, then Ambition, for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man, as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force, but rather the maladie increasing by length of time, it makes men as it were frantick, so as the ambitious man covets all things, and is not satisfied with any thing, having neither mean nor bridle. Honors, Dignities, Preferments how great soever they be, serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher, then for water to quench it, insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world, when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one. Now to this almost natural, and ordinary defect of humanity, and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States, as it is of it self incorrigible, *Ostracisme* will prove a wholesome cure; and which the *Athenians* in particular knew their Commonwealth stood in need of. For as *Greece* did in that Age abound in men, who were really valiant, so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them.

Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times. But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly contaminated by an immoderate desire of glory, and haughtiness. The Laws of canvassing, and all other

provisions

proviſions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitleſs, for every little ſparkle that remains of this fire, though it be covered over with aſhes, may cauſe great Combuſtions. It ſeems therefore that no other remedy is ſufficient for thoſe evils which proceed from pride and ambition, then totally to rid the City or State of ſuch men as are deſirous to exceed all others.

Plato ſaid, that men who were truly wiſe would be as contented with not ruling over others, as moſt men do what in them lies to get precedencie, and command over others. Therefore where ſuch a deſire is diſcerned, and where there is matter to occaſion it, as are great riches, high places, and vain glory, a man may with reaſon ſuppoſe that there is there an unſound ſoul, which ought to be taken away leſt it infect the whole Commonwealth. To take all Nobility, all riches, all civil preeminencie, totally away from a City or Commonwealth, as is now done in Turky, and as formerly it hath been done by divers Princes, that they might rule the more ſecurely, reliſheth too much of Barbariſm, and Tyranny, though it hath not proved an ill taken advice to them that have known how to uſe it, reputing it juſt, though not in ſelf, yet as it hath ſuited well with ſuch a Form of Government; but to rid a City of ſuch things, and of ſuch men for a certain prefixt time, is ſuch a proviſion as tends to the preſervation of ſplendor and reputation, without either prejudice or danger. This is a means whereby vertue and other civil preheminences may be rewarded; but not ſo, as the greater part be ſcorned, and oppreſt, for the haughtineſs of ſome few. And he who ſhall well conſider it, ſhall find that baniſhment from a mans Country is not a thing ſimply, and of it ſelf evil, or at leaſt not ſo great an evil, but that it may be eaſily and willingly born with all, by him who values the common good ſo well as he ought. But that which makes baniſhment be thought a miſchief, is the bad quality which is thereunto annexed, when it is inflicted for puniſhment; there being thereby imprinted as it were in indeleble characters, that ſuch a one is leudly given, and hath committed ſome fault, which is a thing naturally abhorred even by the wickedeſt ſort of men. But ſet this reſpect aſide, to live out of a mans Countrie, hath no reſemblance of evil, but is willingly imbraced by many as an advantage, and ſome endeavor it as a badg of honor, that they may have occaſion to ſerve their Prince, and to deſerve well abroad. He then, who to obey the Laws and Ordinations of the Commonwealth or State ſhall live for a certain time from his own home, is ſo far from ſuffering thereby in his honor, as he merits thereby; for he may ſay that by this his obedience he is ſerviceable to his Prince and Country; though he do not act any thing. So then he receives no injury, and may, and ought to paſs by any particular inconveniency, for the publick good. Nay it may ſo happen, that that very power and greatneſs, by which a man becomes liable to the Laws, is the longer and with leſs danger preſerved unto him, though he cannot enjoy it without ſome parentheſis of time. For we ſee by experience, that theſe greatneſſes and continued proſperities do eaſily precipitate a man, either through the envy of others, or by being too immoderately uſed, and ſometimes draw along with them the total ruine of the whole Family.

It may in the laſt place be alleadged, that this exemption from publick imployments, and Court ſervice, may make him retire to his private ſtudies, and enjoy himſelf, which ought to be eſteemed one of the chiefeſt bleſſings which man can attain unto in this life. Inſomuch as the Philoſopher ſaid, that to be kept from preferments is a pleaſant breath of wind which ſweetly conveys the wiſe man to the Haven of peace of mind, and of his lawful ſtudies; which many forbear to do of themſelves, leaſt they may be thought by the world to be vile, and abject men, and of no abilities. By theſe things it is concluded that Oſtraciſm is a good thing, and to be praiſed; and that this cuſtom of the *Athenians* is fit to be followed and imitated by others.

But now let us face about. What is more neceſſary for the preſervation of a City or State then Juſtice, without which no ſort of Government can laſt long, nor merit the name of a Commonwealth or State: For, take away Juſtice, and you take away the very being thereof, and leave nothing but a miſ-ſhapen matter, made up of corruption and diſorders. But in diſtributive Juſtice, which imports ſo much towards good and quiet living, Reaſon doth adviſe it, and all good Cuſtoms do approve of it, that a Geometrical proportion, not an Arithmetical ought to be obſerved; inſomuch as it is not all men who ought equally and indifferently to ſhare of Honors and Preheminencies in a City, but thoſe who for ſome good qualities and endowments do deſerve them. Therefore that Government where the Law of Oſtraciſm is obſerved, muſt needs be ſubject to all change and revolts: For it cannot but be diſpleaſing to the chiefeſt and beſt of the City, who ſeeing themſelves whilſt they are preſent, threatned with exile, and the overthrow of their grandezza, and having recourſe when they are abſent to the favors of other Princes to revenge themſelves for the injury they have received, may eaſily diſturb the Peace of the City, and put the whole Government into a hazardous condition. Thoſe who have been driven out of their Country by reaſon of any Civil faction, as it fell out long ago in divers Cities of *Italy*, have always been inſtrumental to the keeping of thoſe Cities in perpetual troubles, and of reducing ſome of them to ſlavery, which had wont to enjoy liberty. And yet what was this baniſhment but a kind of Oſtraciſm? For in theſe civil ſeditions, none but ſuch as were of greateſt power and authority, and of whom the reſt were moſt jealous, were driven out: Nor was this done by the will of one only, but by their Decree in whoſe hands the reformed Government was. So as it may be ſaid, that theſe Cities uſed the Law of Oſtraciſm; which hath notwithſtanding always proved prejudicial, and at long running mortal. And to ſay truth, to what purpoſe could ſuch a Law or Cuſtom ſerve, unleſs it were the more to exaſperate Civil diſſention? Which the ſame *Athenians* having learn'd by experience, they did annull this their Law; for the buſineſs was come to ſuch a height, as they drove out Citizens out of particular ſpleen, not out of any publick reſpect; as was done by *Hyparbalus*, a man of a mean condition, and no ways liable to Oſtraciſm, who for being an Enemy to *Alcibiades* and *Nicias*, was by their means baniſhed by vertue of that Law.

But ſay the Law were kept within its due bounds, and uſed only againſt ſuch as bore greateſt ſway and were moſt eminent; to reduce all things to an Equality, is not only an unjuſt, but a violent action, and which doth even contradict Nature herſelf, which did not only make ſo many different ſpecies of things created in the world, but gave various inſtincts and hidden qualities to thoſe of the ſame ſpecies, ſo as ſome might prove more generous and of greater worth, as is ſeen not only amongſt Men, but amongſt bruit Beaſts, yea even amongſt Vegetables. Then ſince this Equality is not to be found amongſt Men, it is great injuſtice to diſtribute things equally in a Government to thoſe whoſe parts and deſerts are unequal: For in conferring of honors or preferments in a City or State, a Geometrical, not an Arithmetical proportion muſt be obſerved: It is the vertue and merit of every one that muſt be weighed. He who is richer then another, may be ſerviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick. He who hath many Clients and Friends, may by his power and authority diſpoſe the Peoples minds to believe well, and act well in the Cities occaſions and affairs. He who is advanced above others in glory, muſt have deſerved it well of the Commonwealth by ſome noble action, and may confirm himſelf therein by ſome other like action. And he who is more generally given to any Vertue, be it or Warlike or Civil, is always fitter then others to ſerve his Country and Prince upon all occaſions. So as to drive ſuch men as theſe out of the City, is no better then to cut that member from the

body

body which is loveliest, and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto. Such an Institution then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments: And the examples alleadged of *Thrasybalus* and *Tarquin*, are examples of Tyrants, who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominions, were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men, and endeavor to be quit of them for their greater security. But a just Prince must not imitate such examples; nay, even in a Politick Government, these Proceedings would be pernicious. For he who will thereby preserve himself, must change the Form of the whole Government, and reduce it to a Despotical and servile condition: with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity, they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie; as it hath done to the *Turks* in these later times, and formerly in some other Nations, wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount, without any respect to the good of the Subject, and more according to will then to Law. Nor is it true, that the power of Citizens, or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom, proves alwas harmful; it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State. But this may be ill used, as many other things are; the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City, would ruine it, not bring it to perfection. Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things, not the things themselves, when they are not simply and in themselves evil. And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated, and their continuing in their military Commands moderated by a shorter time, *Cæsar* could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth, he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army, and in the same Province. Nor had they needed to have raised *Pompey* to such a height, to oppose *Cæsars* greatness: But when when they had let it run on too long, to declare him an Enemy to his Country, and drive him out of *Italy*, proved a violent remedy, and mortal to the Commonwealth.

Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended, (by the banishment of so many Citizens, who being become too great, are for suspition driven out of their Country) of securing themselves from their power: rather Injury added to Ambition, serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City, and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State, to raise some revolt in it, for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes: So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd, is rather increased then diminished. We have infinite examples in all Ages of those, who being driven by banishment out of a City or State, have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto: For though it cannot be denied, but that the too great power of Citizens in a City, or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom, begets suspition, and is dangerous, and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State; yet some other remedy then Ostracism may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do commonly beget. For that is only to suffer a sore to grow old and to gangrene, that they may be afterwards forced to use fire or sword to heal it. In a well-govern'd State, an eye must be had, and care taken both by the Law it self, and by the Prince who rules in chief there in, not to suffer any one to grow to too excessive a greatness: And if any one do arrive at such a condition, as he begins too far to overtop the rest, the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away, and of his plotting thoughts, so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties, or disturb the publick peace: Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief.

The

the ſame men ought not to be ſuffered to continue long in the ſame imployments, and eſpecially not to exerciſe them too long in the ſame place; ſuch things ought not to be left in their power, which may ſerve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughts to the prejudice of the publick good, which may be done under a pretence of honor, ſo as the Princes may not be noted for injuſtice, nor can the particular perſonages account it as an injury done them.

If any one do abound in riches, let him have expenſive imployments, that he may leſſen that wealth, which made him appear more eminent then others. If he be of too great authority in the Court, or amongſt the People, as having had the management of important affairs along time, ſend him to ſome place of Magiſtracie, or other imployment a far off, and change him often from place to place. If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him, give him hard and difficult imployments, wherein if he ſucceed not well, his reputation will ſoon grow leſs with the people, who judge by the events. But if ſuch a one appear too much ambitious, and be ſo, as many men are ſeen to be, out of a certain vain-glory, but without any malice of heart, he may be contented and kept quiet, by conferring honors upon him of glorious appearance, but little profit. But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in thoſe who boaſt themſelves to be more nobly deſcended, and of better blood then others, for many ſeveral reſpects meet often times in them, to make them great and powerful; yet even againſt theſe remedies may be found, without paſſing by a violent and illegal way to the driving them out of the City or State; their friends or kindred, may be kept low and humble, whereby their power is leſſened; if they commit any exceſs in caſe of Juſtice, as ſuch men out of arrogancie often do, be ſevere unto them, take their priviledges from them, declare them to be for a certain time uncapable of any Publick imployment, and do ſome other ſuch like things; which being done, upon ſome juſt occaſion, although the parties concerned be therewithall diſpleaſed, yet not being diſliked by the generality, their hatching of miſchievous plots againſt the preſent Government and Weal publick, will have leſs fewel to feed upon.

But what ſhall be ſaid of him, whoſe worth and vertue doth exceed that of all others? by what pretence can a juſt Prince, or a well-governed Commonwealth humble ſuch a man, or keep him low, or aloof from partaking of their Councels? To this it may be anſwered, that if this ſuppoſed perſonage be endowed with true vertue, he will not be ſubject to any ſuſpition, nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which may be prejudicial to his Prince or Countrie; but that all his endeavors ſhall aim at the common good, and it is juſt and convenient that ſuch a man ſhould alwaies bear ſway in every well-ordered Commonwealth. But if the vertues which render him ſo great and eminent, tend to policie, that is, when a man does that which is good and honeſt, having his mind bent upon ſome other object then meer worth and honeſty, as moſt men uſe to do, out of hopes of glory, or of bettering themſelves; which things notwithſtanding are ſo far vertues as they are helpful to the State, and have a certain reſemblance of true worth; it will not be amiſs that ſuch a one who may be ſuſpected to miſimploy his good endowments, be proceeded againſt in manner aforeſaid. We may then conclude that the cuſtom of the *Athenians* concerning Oſtraciſm ought neither to be praiſed nor practiſed in relation to the act it ſelf; but may admit of commendation and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth, *viz.* to provide that the ambition or malice of a few, rob not many of their quiet, nor do perturb or confound the whole State.

The end of the Firſt BOOK.

THE SECOND BOOK.

The First DISCOURSE,

Why the Commonwealth of Venice *hath not ſo far inlarged her Precincts as did the* Roman *Commonwealth.*

MEN may be allowed to wonder not a little, if they take it into their conſideration, why the Commonwealth of *Venice*, having ſo excellent Laws and Inſtitutions, and having ſo long preſerved her ſelf in power and authority, hath not notwithſtanding much inlarged the precincts of her Empire, as did the Commonwealth of *Rome*, in a leſſer ſpace of time and in a form of Government which was not void of many imperfections: The thought thereof hath made me oftentimes deſire to ſearch into the true cauſes of it.

I find this hath been taken into conſideration by ſome other modern Writers; but to boot that his diſcourſes are already buried in oblivion, it may be the things by him alleadged have not been ſuch, as may give full ſatisfaction to one who ſhall look narrowly into the carriage of our civil actions. He was of opinion that the greatneſs of the Roman Empire was ſoly to be attributed to the vertue of her Ordinations, and Form of Government; from which ſince the Venetian Commonwealth doth differ, he thinks that the cauſe why ſhe hath not been able to make ſo great acquiſitions. And he is ſo reſolute in this opinion, as without diſtinguiſhing between things & things, between times and times, he doth ſo equally extol all the orders and actions of the Roman Commonwealth, as he doth propound ſome things for example to all other Princes and Commonwealths, as are rather to be blamed then to be imitated, and which were the reaſons of the ruine of that Commonwealth, as the diſſentions which was between the Nobility and the Common People, and other ſuch things which are rather

diſorders

disorders then orders, and more apt to confound, then to establish States. Insomuch as his opinion is, That if there were a City at this day in *Italy* which had the same Form of Government as *Rome* had of old, that City might, as the other did, make herself Mistress of the World. As if the condition of times, and the so many various accidents upon which humane actions, and especially the augmenting and change of States do depend, were to be held for nothing; and that it be in the power of a wise Legislator to give the Empire of the World to that City, which he knows how to govern by good Laws. But experience teacheth us much otherwise; since we have known many antient Commonwealths founded by very wise men, and confirm'd with excellent Orders, equally for what concerns Peace as War, yet not any one amongst so many hath been able, I will not say to acquire so much Dominion as did the Commonwealth of *Rome*, but nor hardly able any ways to extend their Precincts amongst their Neighbors. The intrinsecal Orders of the State are not simply of themselves sufficient to make so great Atchievements, (though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto:) Nor ought the State of *Venice* her not being Mistress of larger Territories, be attributed to any defect in this behalf; but many other things are to be taken into consideration, whereby the truest causes of such effects, which amidst the uncertainty of such like affairs can be found out, may be discovered by looking into.

To know then whence such a diversity proceeds, we must take the business a little higher, and examine, First, what was the original beginning of these two Cities, *Rome* and *Venice*; what their Founders were; and then what their situation, what the inclinations, studies, and vertues of their Citizens; and lastly the condition of times, and qualities of their neighboring Princes must be examined: All which things appertain to this Consideration, as well as the Orders of the Commonwealth, and their Form of Government. He then who shall look upon the first Founders of these two Cities, will find them, even in these their first beginnings, not a little differing: which occasioned differing intentions, and differing ends; and therefore peradventure a differing state, and differing condition. The first Erectors of *Venice*, where men who were peacefully given, as those who having been wearied by the so many calamities of *Italy*, occasioned by the inundation of the *Barbarians*, had withdrawn themselves, that they might shun the danger of War, into that piece of marish ground in the *Adriatick* Sea, which was then greater then now it is, and the chiefest of many small Islands, which by a common name were called *Venetia*. So as they lived for a while without any Orders either Military or Civil; those first Inhabitants contenting themselves to live in peace and quiet, without dreaming of any greater matter: For it neither stood with the end which they propounded unto themselves in this their new abode so to do, nor did the condition of those times permit it: And they were so fenced from the Arm sof Enemies as then, both by the natural condition of their situation, as also by the salt waters, as they needed not to arm themselves for their own defence. Therefore their Citizens being by long custom inured to these thoughts, they had no thought of taking up Arms, though the City were already much increased both in Forces and Authority, unless when they were provoked, and more to keep themselves from being injured by others, or to assist their Friends and Confederates, then out of ambition of Rule, and of enlarging their bounds. And he who shall consider what their greatest and and most difficult enterprises were in those first times, will see they aimed all at this end. The *Venetians* fought first with the *French*, and afterwards against the *Huns*, in defence of their Country, and of their Liberties; and long after with the *Genoeses*, enforced thereunto by necessity, and provoked by many grievous injuries: For this very valiant and generous Nation would not rest quiet, out of an emulation of glory in Sea-affairs, wherein though they were oftentimes worsted by the *Veneti-*

ans,

ans, yet they ſtill found occaſion of new Conteſts. The Commonwealth of *Venice* hath oft-times taken up Arms likewiſe, in times neerer this our Age, with greater preparation for War, and with more courage to defend their State in *Terra firma*, which they had already gotten with much ado, and whereof they were juſtly poſſeſſed; inſomuch as they have ſometimes valian ly repulſed the fury of moſt powerful Leagues of Princes, who were reſolved upon their ruine.

But it becomes not the mouth of a *Venetian* to ſay how oft they have taken up Arms in defence of their Friends and Confederates, leſt he may ſeem to upbraid others with the ſervices his Countrymen have done them. But divers People and Cities aſſiſted and preſerved by their Forces, do witneſs this. And to ſpeak only of things of more recent memory, how great a deſire hath this Commonwealth ſhewn to the common good? and to this purpoſe how careful hath ſhe been of the liberty and glory of *Italy*, in ſuſtaining long and heavy War, to preſerve the noble *Neapolitan* Territories in the *Italian* Princes, and the like of *Milan*? But he who will look further back, and ſee what they have done, will find that the *Venetians* have undertaken and finiſhed famous enterpriſes out of zeal to Religion; as they did in the Wars of the Holy Land againſt the *Saracens*, and divers other times againſt other Princes, to preſerve and increaſe the glory of the holy Church, and the Papal dignity: which amongſt many other actions, is clearly and nobly witneſſed by the famous Naval victory won from the Emperor *Frederick Barboroſſa*; for the which *Venice* doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges, in witneſs of her great worth and ſingular merit. But it is needleſs now to particularize in thoſe things whereof all Hiſtories are full: It will ſuffice to touch upon ſome things, whereby it may be conceived what the firſt beginnings of the City were, and what were the intentions and end of her Citizens.

Romes ends were far different from theſe, who from her very beginning aimed only at Empire and greatneſs; being built by *Romulus*, a fierce and ambitious man, who not content to have recovered his Kingdom to his Grandfather *Numitor*, and opened the way to the Lordſhip of *Alba longa*, reſolved by the aſſiſtance of a great many young men who followed him, to purchaſe a better fortune and condition for himſelf, and to build a new City, which muſt have a warlike inſtitution to keep the minds of thoſe ſtirring youth buſied in military exerciſes, and to defend himſelf from his neighbors; who finding that the new City aimed at greater deſigns, thought to keep it low. *Romulus* might with reaſon promiſe himſelf to purchaſe more Dominion, and to enlarge his Confines; for he built his City in a Country which was poſſeſt by many people, who were weak, and at odds within themſelves, ſo as he needed not fear any potent Prince who might oppoſe his deſigns, or ſuppreſs his Forces before they were ſomewhat better eſtabliſhed. This was the firſt foundation of *Romes* greatneſs; for the City beginning ſoon to habituate herſelf to military diſcipline, and to turn her thoughts upon War, and aggrandiſing her State, ſhe grew ſo confirm'd therein with time, and with continual military orders, as the Militia and all things thereunto tending did continually flouriſh in her. For thoſe that came after, following (as it falls out for the moſt part) the example of their Predeceſſors, her Citizens were always deſirous of warlike glory, and of Empire; proving to be like *Romulus*, and thoſe other valiant men from whom they had their beginning and increaſe. Thus they always made one War beget another, not being able to endure the ſuſpected power of their Neighbors, nor yet the injuries done unto them by their Friends and Confederates; under which two pretences they made firſt many notable acquiſitions in *Italy*, and afterwards (paſſing over the Sea) in *Africa*, in *Spain*, and in many other Provinces.

But to paſs on now to another Conſideration, let us affirm that the ſituation is

of great moment for the Rule and Dominion which one City is to have over another, as that which affords ſecurity for ſelf defence, and opportunity to ſubjugate others; this helps likewiſe to make a City plentiful and wealthy, without which States are hardly acquired. For where there is ſcarcity of livelihood, povertie is more to be fought withall then Enemies, and want of wealth renders a City alwaies weak, and eaſie to be waſted and oppreſt. Hence it was that *Sparta*, though ſhe had excellent Laws and Inſtitutions, yet whilſt ſhe obſerved them, ſhe could not much inlarge her Dominions; for by them the City was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition, to be kept poor, and far from any commerce with others; and in our time the Cantons of the *Switzers*, though they be a very valiant Generation, yet being poor, and ſeated amongſt Mountains, and for the moſt part in barren places, their Soldiers being fighting under the pay of other Princes, they have not been able to do any thing for themſelves, or to make any acquiſitions, but have onely preſerved their Liberties.

If we ſhall then conſider the ſituation of *Venice*, we ſhall certainly find it very opportune for moſt things, and miraculouſly well for ſome things. For if we have reſpect to ſafety, what City can be compared to this, which without any Bulwarks of Walls, or Garriſons of Soldiers, defended by her natural ſcituation, is of her ſelf ſafe from all injuries, and inexpugnable? So as ſhe is the onely example after ſo many Ages of being untoucht by the Barbarians violence. If we reſpect abundance of plenty and wealth, the accommodation that the Sea affords her, and the ſo many Rivers which diſgorge themſelves, either into the neighboring Sea, or into her own Gulf, are ſuch and ſo many, both for the conveyance of victuals, and of merchandize, as it is no wonder that ſo great a multitude of people can live in her with ſuch abundance of all things, and not onely her own Citizens, but even foreiners who inhabit there, grow rich therein. But as for Empire and command, as ſhe is miraculouſly accommodated for the imployment of Forces in Sea enterprizes, ſo for what belongs to the like on land, ſhe hath not thoſe conveniencies which peradventure are requiſite. Therefore it was long ere ſhe bethought her ſelf of purchaſing any Territories in *Terra firma*, minding onely Dominion at Sea, whereunto ſhe was invited by her ſcituation, and by the inſtitution of her Anceſtors; touching which it is worthy conſideration, that the Sea Militia and Diſcipline, upon wh ch the Commonwealth was for a long time bent, are not ſuch as can naturally give occaſion of great command, becauſe their Fleets cannot of themſelves penetrate further then the Rivers which fall into the Sea; wherefore all her acquiſitions were onely Iſlands, or places on the Sea ſhore, becauſe ſhe had not then numerous and well diſciplined Armies to dive into the hearts of Dominions, and to purſue victories.

All Cities which have placed the pitch of their power in their Fleets, have had the like ſucceſs. For though they may have purchaſed ſome reputation, and ſome precedencie by Sea, yet have they not been able much to inlarge the Confines of their command. Thus the *Athenians* and other people of *Greece*, though they were very ſtrong in theſe kind of Forces, proper to that Nation from whence the art of building of Ships, and of Navigation is thought to have its original, yet have they alwaies been eſteemed weak, and but little valued by ſuch Nations, which they could not by their Forces make ſubject to their Dominions. But the City of *Rome*, which ſtudied more the Militia by Land, then by Sea, and built her greatneſs more by Armies then by Fleets, having more field-room wherein to exerciſe her Citizens valor, made much greater enterprizes, and made many Provinces ſubject to her Dominion. Nor did the Romans make uſe of Fleets by Sea before they were neceſſitated, that they might ſail into *Sicily* and *Africa*, to oppoſe the power of the *Carthaginians*, which they had reaſon

to be jealous of, by reaſon of their too great power, and vicinity.

But when they had occaſion to make uſe of their Soldiers by Sea, they ſhewed no leſs forwardneſs and daring therein, then they had done by land: Inſomuch as the skill and experience of the *Carthaginians*, who had long been Maſters at Sea, was oft-times overcome and deluded by the valor and military Diſcipline of the Romans; till at laſt that Nation which was held to be ſo powerful at Sea, was deſtroyed and beaten by the Romans, who had a long time been unexperienced in Maritime Affairs, but very expert in Land-Armies, and Military Diſcipline. So as the Empire of the World being conteſted for by theſe two Comonwealths, it was ſeen that it more availed the *Romans* to be a little ſuperior to the *Carthaginians* by Land, then it did the *Carthaginians* to exceed the *Romans* much by Sea. For the good Orders of their Armies, the valor and diſcipline of their Soldiers, got them the victorie over the *Carthaginians*, and opened the way to the Monarchie of the World; which had ſundry times before been done by the ſame means, by the *Aſſyrians*, *Perſians* and *Macedonians*; Land-Forces having alwaies in great acquirements prevailed over thoſe of the Sea, and the Diſcipline of Armies over the experience of Maritime Affairs. This is likewiſe more clearly ſeen by reaſon of the new Monarchie founded in a ſhort time by the Turks in *Aſia*, and in *Greece*, which was not done by Sea-Forces, wherein they were not any waies conſiderable, till of later times, but by the multitude of their Cavalrie, and more by the firm ranks of their *Janizaries*. And to ſay truth, the very Forces by Sea are increaſed and maintained by thoſe of Land, for larger Territories do eaſily furniſh men, moneys, victuals, and other neceſſaries for the well ordering of Fleets at Sea. The which is likewiſe known by experience of the very Commonwealth of *Venice*, which before ſhe had got any State in *Terra firma*, could never make ſo numerous Fleets, though ſhe did very much ſtudy Maritime Affairs; nor could ſhe prevail in the important Wars againſt the *Genoeſes*, as ſhe did afterwards, when her power was much increaſed and confirmed by her Land Territories. Thus in this laſt Age, ſhe hath been able to ſet forth at firſt above a Hundred nimble Galleys, and afterward more Galleys, and greater veſſels of all ſorts as hath been ſeen by experience in the two laſt Wars againſt the Turks, wherein nothing more gallant and glorious could be deſired on the Commonwealths behalf; whereupon alſo, as the worthy and becoming fruit of ſuch induſtry did the Victorie of *Lepanto* enſue, which will be memorable in all Ages. And it may ſuffice to know what the Maritime Forces of the Commonwealth are, and how they are abundantly ſupplied from Land with all things to make them powerful at Sea, yea, even then when the Sea was blocked up for what concerned them; that they were able to maintain ſo great a Fleet in all ſeaſons, for three years together. Wherefore *Franciſco Foſcari*, Duke of *Venice*, a Prince of ſingular wiſdom, by whoſe advice, and under whoſe happy auſpices, great acquiſitions were made on firm land, was wont to ſay, that the Commonwealth could not have increaſed much in power, if ſhe had not imployed her Forces on land enterprizes; which becauſe ſhe had not formerly done, was the cauſe why that greatneſs was much retarded and hindred, whereunto ſhe might eaſily have arrived if ſuch counſel had been ſooner taken; and by ſetting before her the example of the worth and glory of the *Romans*, ſhe might have aſpired to greater Empire. But thoſe who governed the Commonwealth were a long time far from any ſuch thoughts; being more intent upon peace and quiet, or upon ſuch Wars as might inlarge and ſecure her Dominion by Sea; which may be clearly witneſſed by what paſt with *Ezzelino da Romano*, with the *Scalligers*, the *Carrareſi*, and with others who ruled in the next neighboring Cities; whereby it is ſeen that the *Venetians* being contented with defending their friends, and vindicating their own injuries, dreamed not on their Domi-

nions, of which they might eaſily have bereſt them; till when overcome by neceſſity, and by the inſolencie of the *Carrareſi*, and by other accidents of thoſe times, they were compell'd to apply their minds and Forces thereunto, and to fix their Dominion there.

Let us conſider on the contrary, how opportunely *Rome* was ſeated to foment her Citizens diſpoſitions much to augment her Dominions; almoſt in the midſt of *Italy*, juſt fitting for a principal City, being placed (as may be ſaid) in the Center, to the end that ſhe may equally extend her Power and Forces on all ſides. The City of *Rome* ſtands on firm land, or *Terra firma*; but ſo neer the Sea, as ſhe may reap the commodity thereof, without being thereby endangered: ſhe is apt to breed up Armies, and to nouriſh men in the exerciſe of the Militia; nor is ſhe inconveniently ſeated for the tranſportation of her Forces by Sea into other far off Provinces. This diverſity of ſituation hath begot diverſity of inclinations in the Inhabitants. Thus doth Nature always adapt mens minds to thoſe Arts which they are to exerciſe themſelves in, or elſe Cuſtom doth inform the Habit, and turns it into Nature. For as the *Romans* following exerciſes conformable to the ſituation of their City, were more inclined to Land-war, and in Peace to husbandry: So the *Venetians* invited to other things according to the diverſity of place, applied their ſtudies otherwiſe to defend their Liberty, and to increaſe their wealth, uſing the Sea-Militia for the one, and Traffick and Merchandiſing for the other. Which whoſoever ſhall upbraid our Citizens withall, ſeems not to know, that without theſe a City could neither have long preſerved it ſelf, nor increaſe in ſtate and wealth, as it hath done: For not having any particular Territories whereout to extract their livelihood, ſhe would have been always poor and weak, and wanting other imployments, ſhe would have been deſtroyed, if not by forein Forces, by her own Idleneſs, as many other Cities have been, the Citizens wanting wherein to imploy their thoughts, and to exerciſe themſelves in quiet times. But if the Citizens of *Rome* were much commended for their husbandry, inſomuch as at this day many famous men of that Commonwealth are as much celebrated for having been good Husbandmen, as good Commanders; as were *Curtius Dentatus*, *Quintius Cincinatus*, *Attalius Collatinus*, *Marcus Regulus*, *Scipio Africanus*, and others; wherefore ſhould the *Venetians* be upbraided with their Merchandiſing, this being an exerciſe as fitting and requiſite for the ſituation of *Venice*, as was that of Tillage and Husbandry to the like of *Rome*? If the care of cultivating the Earth did not abaſe the minds of thoſe antient and reverend *Romans*, who have left ſo evident examples of worth to all other Cities and Nations, why ſhould the induſtry of Merchandiſing redound to the opprobry of the *Venetians*, ſeeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for ſo long a ſeries of years govern'd the Commonwealth?

The ſtudies and actions of the *Romans* and *Venetians* have then been different, but notwithſtanding alike in this, that they aimed at the ſame end, though they took ſeveral ways thereunto; to wit, at Glory, at the Grandeur and Liberty of their Commonwealth. Many famous examples of Fortitude, of love to their Country, and of all other ſorts of worthineſs have been ſeen in each of them; ſo as in our men nothing was more to be deſired, unleſs greater and more frequent occaſions wherein to have imployed themſelves, that the greatneſs of their actions might have correſponded to the magnanimity of their minds. Yet do not we *Venetians* want examples of many men who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth; and he who ſhall examine the life and actions of many Princes of the Commonwealth, will find them to be ſuch as deſerve praiſe and celebration. Such have *Ordelaſo Faliero*, *Vidale*, *Dominico Michell*, and *Henrico Dandalo*, *Sebaſtiano Ziano*, *Andrea Cantareno*, *Pietro Mocenico*, *Andrea Gritti*, *Sebaſtiano Veniero*,

Veniero, and divers others been; whose worths might be paralleſ'd to that of the *Fabritii*, *Marcelli*, *Fabii*, *Scipio's*, and others of their ſo much cry'd up men, if they had had a larger field to exerciſe themſelves in, or had the greatneſs of their Common-wealth afforded them fame equal to the merit and valor of thoſe renowned *Romans*.

But let us now come to conſider thoſe moſt important reaſons of the condition of Times, and their Neighbors qualities. The City of *Venice* had her beginning, when *Italy* was poſſeſt by the wild Northern Nations, and when being perplex'd with all other ſort of miſeries, ſhe fell finally into the ſlavery of *Barbarians*, wherein ſhe lived for the ſpace of many years: How then could a new City aſpire to Empire, while the Forces of the *Barbarians* were ſo powerful in that Province, as the moſt powerful Roman Empire was not able to withſtand them, which was ſhook and deſtroyed by their fury? It rather ſeems a wonder, that a City in her firſt and weak beginnings was able to manage ſo great a War, and withſtand (as ſhe did afterwards) the violence of two fierce and potent Nations, to wit, the *French*, and *Huns*: The *French*, when their King *Pipin* being entred *Italy* with puiſſant Forces to drive out the *Lombards*, and being ſcandalized that the City of *Venice* had leagued to the friendſhip of *Nicephorus* Emperor of *Conſtantinople*, turn'd his Forces upon her to ſubjugate and deſtroy her: And the *Huns*, when parting from *Pannonia*, (which took from them the name of *Hungary*) having overcome a very powerful Army of the *Germans*, and kill'd their King *Ludovicus*, they fell to overrun *Italy* again, their fury was withſtood by the *Venetians*, which *Berengarius*, a powerful Prince, was forced to give way unto. But afterwards, the Forces of theſe Weſtern *Barbarians* being in time weakned by *Charls* the Great, the State of *Italy* fell again in to the Weſtern Emperors; who being then very powerful, and maſters both of *Germany* and *France*, the Forces of a weak Commonwealth were not likely to conteſt with ſo great Princes, with any hope of acquiring Territories. Theſe difficulties being added unto by the Cities ſituation, withheld the *Venetians* a long while from thinking how to enlarge their Dominions in *Terra firma*; in which opinion being for a long time confirmed, and having very ſucceſsfully imployed their ſtudies and Forces in Sea-enterpriſes, (though the alteration of times did counſel them to the contrary, giving them hopes of noble acquiſitions on Land) they either deſpiſed, or knew not how to make uſe of the occaſions which afterwards were offered. Thus when the German Emperors, troubled with the domeſtick troubles of that Province, did forgo their poſſeſſions in *Italy*, the *Venetians* not minding then that opportunity, left the advantage to others, which they might eaſily have reaped: whereupon other Cities of *Italy* purchaſing their Liberties from the Emperors at low rates, framed a peculiar Government unto themſelves, as did *Florence*; and others were poſſeſt by other powerful men, as *Milan*, *Mantua*, *Ferrara*, and other Cities of *Lombardy*: when if the Commonwealth of *Venice*, whoſe power was already much increaſed, had been minded to have poſſeſt themſelves of any of the Imperial Territories, it is not to be doubted but they might in a ſhort time have made notable acquiſitions. But when they began very late, and more provoked by injuries then by ambition of dominion, to think upon Territories by Land, they found divers other Princes become very powerful both in Forces and Authority, and confirm'd in the States which they poſſeſt under ſomewhat a more lawful title. Wherefore they met with many difficulties; and amongſt the reſt, the Wars proved very heavy unto them, which they were forc'd to make with *Philip Maria Viſconte* Duke of *Milan*, who being Maſter of a great and rich State, became quickly very formidable. Nay, not long after, theſe new Potentates being already much increaſed and confirmed, and all of them growing jealous of the Venetian greatneſs, they joined all together with powerful Forces to oppoſe their deſigns. Thus in the War which they made againſt *Hercules de Eſte*, there was not any Italian Prince which

did

did not joyn againſt them, becauſe they ſaw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth, the way would be laid open to her for much greater matters in *Italy*; whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almoſt gotten, was impeded.

Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averſe to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land, partly by reaſon of her ſelf, and partly through other variousaccidents; which though they were ſomewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea, yet met ſhe not with ſmall interruptions therein to her enterpriſes. For the Eaſtern Emperors being Maſters of *Greece*, and of other States and Countries, wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea, ſhe could not make any great acquiſitions whilſt they preſerved themſelves in ſuch reputation and ſtrength, as became their State. But afterwards, when that Empire began to decline, ſhe began to increaſe and flouriſh glorioufly, and her worth was waited upon by much proſperitie; as was ſeen when the *Venetians* went in companie of the *French* to the buſineſs of the *Levant*, and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of *Conſtantinople*; of which acquiſition the Commonwealth had ſo great a ſhare, as that their Dukes did then aſſume the title of *Signori della quarta parte, è Mezza, di tutto L' Imperio della Romania.* And ſoon after with the like proſperous ſucceſs, they did by ſundry means reduce many Iſlands, and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience; and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command. But this courſe of glorie and victorie by War was much ſlackened by the original Cuſtoms and Orders of the City (as has been ſaid) which related more to Peace, and Merchant affairs, then to War.

Inſomuch as the *Venetians* ſeemed for a while to make uſe of theſe new acquiſitions, rather for the better accomodation of their Navigation, and Traffick, then for any occaſion of other enterpriſes. Their buſineſs did therefore infinitely increaſe at this time; inſomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the *Levant*, whither the *Venetian* Ships and Merchants did not flock. Nay, a great number of men of that Nation did uſually remain in thoſe Cities, through whoſe hands the moſt precious Merchandiſe of thoſe Countries paſt, to the great advantage of the City, and of her private Citizens. So as the *Genoeſes* plying the ſame places, at firſt a certain rivalſhip and emulation aroſe amongſt them, as well for the profit of merchandizing, as for the expertneſs, and glory of Sea affairs, till at laſt they came to open and cruel War: which kept the Commonwealth ſo buſied, and perplexed by diſturbing Navigation, and even private affairs, as for a long while they had no leaſure to undertake other enterpriſes, though they had met with opportunity for it, and that they had been thereunto diſpoſed. For the *Venetians* having ſundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel, they taſted both proſperous and adverſe fortune; inſomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf, not more for Empire, then for the ſafety of the City.

Thus whilſt the Commonwealth ſpent her beſt years, partly in theſe private affairs, and merchandizing buſineſs, partly in the ſo long and troubleſome Wars againſt the *Genoeſes*, another Power aroſe in the *Levant*, much greater, and more formidable then was the Grecian Empire. For the *Ottaman* Lords, beginning by divers accidents, but chiefly by reaſon of the diſcords among Chriſtians, to make notable and ſucceſsful progreſs in their riſing Empire, grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land, but alſo by Sea, having reduced the City of *Conſtantinople* into their hands, a very fit place for Sea enterpriſes, whereby the Commonwealth of *Venice* was not onely bereſt of all hopes of further in-

creaſing

creasing their Dominion by Sea, having so great and powerful an Enemy so near at hand, but even what they had already got, was exposed to hazard; so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War, and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie, she had more reason to think upon her own defence, then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others.

Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the neareſt neighboring people amongſt which she was to inlarge her Confines, whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with; for at the very first she was to overcome the *Dalmatians*, a Nation not onely very valiant, but of a quick wit, given to sedition, and desirous of novelties. Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these, may be conceived by this, that the Commonwealth of *Rome* having so many, and so far distant Nations, yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon *Dalmatia*, which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of *Octavius Augustus*, but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies. It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less, which had to contend with such Enemies; and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth, that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her State and fortune?

Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Commonwealth of *Rome* had her happy beginnings, and made the first progress to her Empire. Which we shall find to differ much, and to be free of the so many difficulties, which the *Venetians* met with. *Rome* had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince; for the *Assyrians* had then the Monarchie, whose confines did not extend beyond *Asia*; and after the concourse of many years it was carried by *Cyrus* amongst the *Persians*, with whom it remained for about Two hundred years, till it was destroyed by *Alexander* of *Macedon*, who though he made greater conquests, and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off, yet dying young in the height of his Victories, he could not get into *Europe*, nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince. And by his death (he having left no issue, either legitimate or illegitimate behind him) that Monarchie was soon destroyed, and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders; so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed, with which severally the *Romans* did afterwards much to their advantage make War. So as *Asia* having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire, the Provinces of *Europe* were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof; and those that were further from thence, as was *Italy*, less then the rest. But *Greece* which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius, for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues, was divided into many several Peopledoms, who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraignitie of that very Province, it so fell out that aspiring either wholly or chiefly therein, they minded not the annoying of other Nations by their Forces. In *Africa* the *Carthaginians* were very strong, the power of *Carthage* being almost at the same times as much increased, as was the like of *Rome* in *Italy*: So as she had the Dominion of many provinces of *Europe*, and did possess the greatest part of *Spain*: But this power did not any waies molest the *Romans* first designs, nor did it hinder them from making acquisitions in *Italy*, nor from confirming therein those Forces with which she afterwards did subdue the World. For the *Carthaginians* came not near the *Romans* for little less then Five hundred years, till such time as both the Commonwealths inlarging their Confines, they grew to be neighbors; Whereupon at last they commenced War, out of the envy and jealousie that each had of other. This was the condition and state of times wherein the Commonwealth of *Rome* had her rise and encrease.

Whence it may be observed, that though there might be some great Potentates then,

PAGINATION INCORRECT

then, yet was there none which might compare with the Roman Emperors, who had a greater Monarchy then all the reſt; beſides they were ſo far off, as their greatneſs could not impede *Romes* increaſing, though ſhe were as yet but a new-begun City. But ſhe met with the like proſperous condition both of affairs and times, in relation to her neereſt neighbors: For *Rome* had not only not any great conteſtation with any powerlike Prince in her firſt and weakeſt beginning; but for the ſpace of three hundred and ſixty years, till the firſt French war, ſhe had no occaſion of making trial of her Forces againſt any powerful people; for then *Italy* was not only not ſubject to any one Prince alone, who might be greater by other Forces and other States, as it happened afterwards in the *Venetians* times, but being divided into many parts, as well in reſpect of dominion, as of other ſeparations, each Country contained many people of differing government and power: So as *Latium* alone of herſelf, which is now called *Campagna di Roma*, contained four Nations, or rather Communalties, the *Hernici*, *Latini*, *Volſci*, and *Equi*; with whom the People of *Rome* did for a long time make war. I mention not the *Cecinenſi*, the *Cruſtumeni*, *Antinati*, *Sabini*, *Albani*, and other Nations of leſs eſteem, againſt which in her beginning ſhe exerciſed her Forces, whilſt ſhe learned (as a man may ſay) the firſt rudiments of her Militia. *Tuſcany*, though being taken all together ſhe were very powerful, and whoſe Confines were then much larger, yet was ſhe divided into ſo many Signories or Lordſhips, as the Forces of every People apart by themſelves muſt needs be weak and of ſmall moment: which may eaſily be known by this, that bare Three hundred men of the Family of the *Fabii* were able to wage War with the *Veienti*, who were the chief of that Region, with whom they oft times fought with diſplay'd Banners, and with dubious event, and were at laſt ſuppreſt more by the fraud, then force of their Enemies. So likewiſe the other parts of *Italy* which were neerer *Rome* were ſo weakly inhabited, as it is not much, that a new City, but yet well inſtructed in weapons, might get unto herſelf State and Dominion: Nay, he who ſhall conſider what the increaſe of that Commonwealth was from time to time, will wonder how that People, who got afterwards the dominion of the whole World, was ſo late in enlarging the Confines of her Territories upon her Neighbors, when they were to contend in War with thoſe that were weaker then they, and that the bounds of their Empire did extend to beyond *Italy*. For, for above the ſpace of four hundred years, when the City was ſo much increaſed in Citizens, as ſhe raiſed Armies of Forty thouſand Foot, beſides Horſe, the affairs of *Rome* were notwithſtanding in ſuch condition as they made War even under the Walls of *Rome* with the *Equi*, *Volſci*, and *Veientes*, her firſt Enemies. And this wonder is not a little increaſed, when you ſhall conſider that Military diſcipline did flouriſh even from the very firſt in *Rome*, and was ever afterwards held in great eſteem by her Citizens, who were bent with all their might to augment the power of their City, not being content, as were the *Venetians*, to enjoy peace and ſecurity. Wherefore the *Romans* gave eaſily way for friendſhip to all Foreiners, that they might by the multitude of their Citizens render their City more powerful, and fitter to worſt Adverſaries: And their firſt King *Romulus* ſet up a Sanctuary, where all ſorts of men, whether free or ſlaves, good or guilty, might have receptacle. But that Commonwealth had alſo her imperfections, whereby, being troubled with perpetual civil diſcords, ſhe found many impediments, and much difficulty in effecting her Citizens generous deſigns. But being gotten to a great height of power, the Counterpoiſe of forein Forces ceaſing by her own greatneſs, ſhe was able for a time to bear with her ſo many diſorders, till at laſt ſhe was brought to her final ruine.

We muſt now be permitted to take ſome other things into conſideration which appertain to particular order of this Commonwealth. A City which aſpires unto Empire, muſt above all things elſe be well provided of Arms, ſo as ſhe want not

any

any thing that is requisite for War: but she stands no less in need of good Laws, which are for many respects of great importance in all Governments; as also for that when the licentiousness of Arms, intrusted in the hands of Citizens, is not corrected by the authority of Law, that which was destin'd for the good and preservation thereof, it turns at last to her ruine. Therefore it is requisite that a City be constituted with such Laws as may result both to safety from foreign Enemies, and to union between her own Citizens; by which civil agreement the strength and reputation of a Commonwealth is much increased. Of these two conditions which ought to make a City powerful, and so as that power may continue long, the Commonwealth of *Rome* had the first in perfection, but was very faulty in the second: On the contrary, excellent provision was made by the Founders of *Venice* for the second, but much remains to be wish'd for in the former. Thus then had *Rome* a naturally warlike people, which she kept continually exercised in Arms, observing exactly Military discipline and orders: But she was much disorderly and confused in Civil affairs, nor knew she how to keep any setled form of Government, leaving too much authority in the People, and wanting usual means to suppress the immoderate power of Citizens. Whereas in *Venice*, the form and order of Civil Government is in every particular well disposed of, and excellently well understood; so as she is the only example which in so many Ages, and so many accidents both of good and bad fortune, hath never been troubled with any important domestick discords. But then, as for Military orders, they are not altogether such as are requisite for the acquiring of a large Command; for at her beginning, she applied herself (as hath been said) to maritime affairs, not with any intent of subjugating other Cities and Nations, but rather (as the condition of those times and businesses did require) for what concerned Traffick and Merchandising, to which the preservation of Peace did much conduce, and the keeping of open and free Commerce with all men; but having since had some such thoughts too late, they were not very fervently pursued neither, but only as necessity or some occasion did dictate: For the City was not disposed and established with certain and perpetual Orders, nor with any very ambitious ends for what concerned War; and for Land-Militia, it hath already been said, that for a long time the Commonwealth was totally a stranger unto it. And therefore when at last she made it her business, for want of any fitting preparation for it in her own people and Citizens, she had recourse for help to Foreiners; and this custom growing stronger by time, she hath always made use for the most part of Forein Commanders and Soldiers, brought under her Pay from elsewhere: which, as experience shews, hath turn'd much to her damage and disorder; for her Forces being under the command and power of other men, she hath not been able upon many fitting occasions to make good use of the Victories, which she with great danger and expence hath won. And not to mention many other things, it is a thing very well known, that had not the no great fidelity of the Commanders cousened the Commonwealth of her just hopes, in the Wars which she made with *Philippo Maria Visconte*, there had not been any inch of that State which she had not been Mistress of. But sometimes the Marquis of *Mantua*, sometimes *Il Carmignuola*, and sometimes *Sforza*, invited thereunto either by greater rewards offered them by the Enemy, or by some other peculiar, though very irrational respects of their own, forsook the Commonwealths cause, and bereft her of the fruit of certain Victory. Which disorders, together with so many others sprung from the like occasion, and which did sufficiently interrupt her further proceedings, would not peradventure have ensued, if the Commonwealth had been accustomed to give the command of her Armies by Land to her own Citizens, as she was always accustomed to do in her Fleets, in affairs of no less difficulty and importance.

The *Romans* did not thus, who being to rig out Fleets against the *Carthaginians*, did not seek out *Sicilians*, or *Grecians*, or people of other Nations, to command over them, but made use of their own Citizens as well by Sea as by Land. *Cincinnatus* was taken from the Plough, and made Dictator against the *Sabins*; *Cicero* being taken from pleading at the Bar, was sent to the government of *Cilicia*, and to make War against the *Parthians*; *Scipio*, who passed a fresh Soldier from *Rome* is said to have gotten the knowledge of the militarie Art, by the way, before he arrived at the Enemy; *Sylla*, being sent Questor into *Africa*, with the Consul *Marius*, being till then a Puney in the Militia, became in a few dales so well instructed therein, and raised so great an opinion of valor and military Discipline of himself, as the Commonwealth did very soon put their chiefest hopes in him, in all their weighiest affairs. In brief, people that are of a ready wit, and noble spirit, do easily accustom themselves by exercise to all things, and prove excellent therein; the experience whereof hath been seen amongst our selves, for those few who have betaken themselves to Land-service, have given such proof of their valor (which is witnessed by particular Histories) as it may very well be known, that the Commonwealth might have promised unto her self all gallantries from her Citizens, if she had known how to make use of them. But she was run into this error, because she would (as the conjuncture of times did almost require) follow the example of the other Princes of *Italy*, who long before, and chiefly at that time when the Commonwealth did most apply her self to Land-affairs, made use of mercinary Militia's, which was then heightned to a great esteem by two famous Commanders of that Age, *Braccio* and *Sforza*, who were afterwards imitated by others in this sort of Militia; Wherefore the Captains whose Troops did ordinarily consist of horse, led them along to the service sometimes of one, sometimes of another Prince. So the Venetians who were but learners in this sort of Militia, saw that the Popes, the Kings of *Naples*, the Dukes of *Milan*, the *Florentines*, who bore great sway and authority in *Italy*, made use of this sort of Forces, they began to follow the foosteps which were traced out unto them by others. Another respect may be added hereunto, which hath already been touched upon, that the Commonwealth having then put her self in a certain course, which she had for a long time observed, of making use of her people and her Citizens in Sea-affairs, it seemed dangerous to some to make such an innovation in a City ordained for civil Government, and which was greatly fixt therein by long custom. But it is not to be denied, but that when the aggrandizing of a State or Empire is in question, this which hath been spoken of as a great fault in a City, which doth aspire thereunto,

And it is to be observed in the Roman Monarchy that the happy success of their famous victories is chiefly attributed, to the discipline of their Militia, because it was excellent, and because it was exercised by their own Soldiers; and particularly in the *Carthaginian* Wars, which were sorer then all the rest which the *Romans* did ever make; it is observable, that the *Carthaginians* being equal to the *Romans* both for the reputation and worth of their Commanders, and superior to them in the numbers of their Soldiers, to boot with the strength of their Elephants, which they made use of in their Battels, yet their Armies were overcome, which consisted of mercinarie people, and assembled out of many Nations, and yet not by the greater worth, but by the greater fidelity, constancy, and love of the Roman Soldiers towards their Countrie.

But for such abuses as these it may be alledged in behalf of the Commonwealth of *Venice*, that she did it to shun those mischiefs into which the Commonwealth of *Rome* ran by giving these military commands to her Citizens; yet he who will truly examine the state of affairs, will find that the authority which is granted,

limited and corrected by the Laws, cannot be prejudicial to the publick good; and the experience of the very City of *Venice* confirms this, where ſo great authoritie being ſo often granted in commands at Sea to her own Citizens, yet it was never known that the Commonwealth ſuffered any miſcheif thereby, and certainly a great miſtery lies in the well diſpoſed orders of a City, by which Citizens are eaſily kept within their duties, wherein if any one chance to fail, he is ſoon chaſtiſed without any diſturbance to the peace of the City. Which if by nothing elſe, is ſufficiently proved in the City of *Venice*, by the long duration of that Commonwealth. So as theſe things were very well underſtood and ordained by her; and ſhe might the more eaſily do it, by reaſon of the conditions of thoſe her firſt inhabitants, as hath been ſaid. But ſuch freedom and licentiouſneſs was given in *Rome* to that warlike people, together with the government of their Forces, as the Laws were not ſo reverenced as they ought to have been; and the orders of the Militia being inſtituted by *Romulus*, before thoſe of Religion and civility by *Numa Pompilius*, military diſcipline was alwaies in greater eſteem then the ſtudy of civil affairs.

By all which conſiderations it is manifeſt, That the diverſity of ſucceſs in theſe two Commonwealths, hath ſprung from this diverſity of inſtitutions, and from ſo many accidents, and not from any one reaſon, as was ſaid at the beginning; but in this diverſity both of them have their praiſes, and all thoſe perfections and felicity, which is grantable to humane affairs. *Rome* was Miſtreſs of the World, but could not long enjoy this greatneſs and proſperity, nor yet with the quiet of her Citizens. But *Venice*, though of much meaner Precincts, and condition, hath preſerved her ſelf (as an onely example) in her liberty for ſo many Ages, free from all domeſtick troubles, and with the miraculous union and concord of her Citizens.

The Second DISCOURSE.

Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice *be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of* Piſa, *when it was oppugned by the* Florentines.

I Have often, not without ſome, to me appearing reaſon, wondred, that ſome Hiſtorians ſhould ſo much blame the Commonwealth of *Venice* for having taken upon her the defence of the City of *Piſa* againſt the *Florentines*, whereby they may ſeem to reproach the counſels of thoſe wiſe and ſtout Senators, who had then the managing of publick affairs in their hands, for thoſe very things, for which other Princes and States, have been by other Writers much celebrated. He who will know the truth of ſuch judgements, muſt take unto himſelf more particular, and inward conſiderations, for it often-times falls out, that looking into the very pith and marrow of buſineſs, the clean contrary is found to what did firſt appear, and the face of things do ſeem to alter. Such actions may then be meaſured, either by the ordinary reaſons of juſtice and equity, or elſe by the reaſons of State, which are the more proper. If you conſider this action of the Commonwealth according to the firſt meaſure, what is it that doth offend the nice conſciences of theſe ſo ſcruplous men? to take upon ones ſelf the defence of the weakeſt, and thoſe who ſuffer under the malignity of fortune, hath alwaies been thought a pious action, and befitting great and generous Princes; and how miſerable was

the condition of the poor *Piſans*, how much it did deſerve to be imbraced and favored both out of compaſſion and juſtice, is demonſtrated (to omit for the preſent other particulars) by what was done at the ſame time by *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, whilſt he was in *Italy*, and by the ſo many favors afforded to the cauſe of *Piſa* by all the chief of his Court. *Charls* had promiſed the *Florentines* to keep the City of *Piſa* under their Dominion, being obliged unto them for their readineſs in receiving them into his State, and for having afforded them all aſſiſtance and accommodation; yet did the afflictions of the *Piſans* appear to be ſo grievous, as he was moved more by compaſſion then by his own intereſt, or by his promiſe made to the *Florentines*.

A forein Prince uſed this charity to the *Piſans*, with whom he nor his Kingdom had never held any friendſhip or confederacie, his intereſts being not only ſeparate from, but contrary to their welfare: And ſhall it be thought a ſtrange and irrational thing, that the Commonwealth of *Venice*, which had had the *Piſans* for their friends and aſſociates in divers enterpriſes, and who kept ſtill friendſhip and commerce with that City, from whence alſo ſome of the nobleſt Families of the Commonwealth draw their original, and whoſe cauſe for the ſame reſpects was ſtraitly annex'd unto their own, ſhould intereſt herſelf in behalf of the *Piſans*, to comfort them in their great affliction? Nor ought the Commonwealth of *Venice* to uſe greater reſpect to the *Florentines*, then they had uſed towards her, againſt whoſe deſigns they had ſo oppoſed themſelves in the Wars formerly made againſt the Dukes of *Milan* and *Ferrara*, aſſiſting their Enemies both with men and monies, as they were thought to be the chief hinderance, why the buſineſs undertaken by the Commonwealth with great hopes of good ſucceſs, had no better an end. The *Venetians* were thereunto likewiſe moved by the example of others: For if the Duke of *Milan*, the *Genoeſes*, the *Lucheſes*, and thoſe of *Sienna* had aſſiſted the *Piſans* as much as they were able, how could the *Venetians*, whoſe Forces in *Italy* were much ſuperior to theirs, ſtand idly looking upon the *Piſans* miſeries, and upon the proſperity and greatneſs of the *Florentines*, whereby the common troubles of *Italy* were augmented, ſince they alone adhered to the French faction.

But let us conſider a little more particularly the cauſe which was undertaken to be defended by protecting the *Piſans*, and what it was that they did endeavour. Certainly nothing but the recovery of their antient liberty, whereof they were bereaved either by their ſeveral miſfortunes, and by the violence of others, or at leaſt (as they ſaid) to reduce themſelves to a leſs ſevere government then that of the *Florentines*; under whoſe dominion being faln but a little before, and the City of *Piſa* being ſold at a low rate by the *Viſconti*, the *Piſans* pretended firſt by the favor of *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, and afterwards by the like of *Maximilian* the Emperor, to be returned to their former liberty: The former having uſed his power, and the other his anti nt pretences of the Empire, to put them into that condition. And grant that reſpect were to be had to the poſſeſſion which the *Florentines* had of that City, which notwithſtanding was but of later times, the *Florentines* were likewiſe to have releaſed the Haven of *Ligorn* to the *Genoeſes*, from whom they had taken it by violence. The *Venetians* did not perſwade the *Piſans* to forgo their obedience to the *Florentines*, as *Ladovick Sforza* had formerly done; for they minded more the appeaſing of the commotions of *Italy*, then the raiſing of more; they did not free them from the bond of obedience to the *Florentines*, as did the Emperor and the King of *France*, becauſe they knew ſuch an action did not belong unto them; they were not the firſt that did foment the alienation of that City, as the *Genoeſes* and thoſe of *Sienna* had done, becauſe they had no intention to advantage themſelves by the diſcord and ruine of others: But the City having

having already totally rejected the obedience of the *Florentines*, being thereof freed by the authority of other puiſſant Princes, and aſſiſted by other more petty Princes to maintain their liberties; the *Venetians* being requeſted and conjur'd by the *Piſans*, when they ſaw them ready to fall into the depth of miſery, if not aſſiſted by them, and that their ruine would draw along with it great prejudice to the peace and liberty of all *Italy*, they at laſt took upon them their protection and defence. And I herein ſay nothing but what is moſt true, and confirm'd by the teſtimony of thoſe who have written upon the paſſages of thoſe times.

But let us conſider other more particular accidents, and more weighty reſpects. *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, was at that time paſs'd into *Italy*, to get the Kingdom of *Naples*; an undertaking wherein he had proſperous ſucceſs, which was an ill omen to *Italy*: All the other Princes of *Italy* oppoſed him afterwards in his deſigns, (inſtructed by the fall of the King of *Arragon*, to have an eye to their own danger) except only the *Florentines*, who ſtill continued in adhering to the *French*, the counſel of the moſt potent Citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wiſe. So as the *French* preparing to return with mighty Forces into *Italy*, they had friendſhip with none, nor had they any other receptacle, ſave with the *Florentines*, with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them aſſiſted with men and monies. *Piſa* was at the ſame time ſtraitly beleaguer'd by the *Florentines*; and had ſhe not been ſuccor'd by the *Venetians*, all her other aids were ſo weak, as ſhe muſt ſpeedily have fain into the *Florentines* hands; who being freed of the expence and trouble of that Siege, would be more powerful, and more ready to aſſiſt the *French*, and to facilitate the enterpriſes which they were to attempt in *Italy*. Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be juſt, honeſt and laudable to take upon them the defence of the ſafety and liberty of *Italy* againſt the *French*, how can thoſe actions be blamed, which did tend (as it is ſeen) neceſſarily thereunto, by keeping foreign Forces afar off, and by bereaving them of their friends aſſiſtance? The affairs of the King of *France* did at this time ebb and flow, but for the moſt part ebb in the Kingdom of *Naples*: Great were the King of *Arragons* hopes of recovering the State, being therein aſſiſted powerfully by the ſame *Venetians*: The King of *France*, though his Forces were in a readineſs, was doubtful whether he ſhould come into *Italy*, or no. So as at ſuch a conjuncture of time, every leaſt thing which tended either to the augmenting or leſſening of his hopes, was of great moment. Pope *Alexander* moved by theſe reſpects, did much preſs the Venetian Senate to be reſolute in aſſiſting the *Piſans*, whilſt he himſelf was ſomewhat doubtful and irreſolute. The Venetian Senate had the *Florentines* in good eſteem, and laying aſide the memory of what was paſt, would have had them for their friends, if they would have ſeparated themſelves from the *French* (who were then the common Enemy) and have entred into that Confederacie whereinto all the reſt of the Princes of *Italy* were entred, and by whom they had many fair offers made them, particularly to procure the redintegration of their State, if they would put on a generous reſolution to regain thoſe Forts, which as cautionary Towns for their fidelity were held by French garriſons, and do this by Force of Arms, not by Treaty or Agreement. But if theſe things could not be liſtned unto out of a pertinacious will, infected by the practiſe of ſome of their Citizens, what was to be done? Should the general ſafety have been neglected, to ſerve the will of ſome few, who peradventure did not well underſtand their own proper and true intereſts? To whom then was the injury done herein? Not to the *Piſans*, who with humble and earneſt intreaties had very often preſt the Venetian Senate to be received into the protection of their Commonwealth, nay, into their Dominions: Not to the *Florentines*, becauſe they to keep themſelves from parting with the *French*, did enforce a neceſſity upon the *Venetians* to take and maintain

ſuch

ſuch a reſolution, that they might keep the *Florentines* buſied about *Piſa*, and the French from thoſe ſuccors, whereby the troubles and dangers of *Italy* were increaſed.

But I find that theſe tranſactions have been diverſly interpreted, and the Senate blamed, who did not aim at ſuccouring the oppreſſed *Piſans*, not at the common ſafety of *Italy*, but at their own thirſt of bringing the City of *Piſa* under their Dominion. To this it is anſwered, that where the actions are evident, no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto; nor ought the ſecrets of hearts to be ſearched, which is reſerved to a more excellent power then what humane diſcourſe can arrive unto; it is certain that the defence of *Piſa*, which was oft-times denied them, was at laſt undertaken by the *Venetians*, when they being forſaken by all others, they were neceſſitated for the aforeſaid reaſons ſo to do. The *Piſans* offered to put themſelves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth, and to ſet up her colours in their City, the *Venetians* would not yeeld hereunto, nor accept of this large offer; but the *Piſan* Ambaſſadors were ſent back with many thanks for their affection, and were heard in what they deſired, though in a differing manner; for the Commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth, which ſhe did for many years, with ſuch fervencie and general conſent, ſparing neither expence, labor, nor danger, as ſhe could hardly have done more in her own defence; they ſent both Foot and Horſe ſeveral times to the *Piſans* under their beſt Commanders, as alſo moneys and victuals, and ſhipping to accommodate the City with all things neceſſary, and to free them from the ſiege of the *Florentines* by Sea. Yet to give a greater teſtimony of what their minds and intentions were in this, when it was propounded to put the City of *Piſa* into *Caſars* hands, and to remit the right of their cauſe to him, the *Venetians* did not onely not oppoſe it, but counſeled them ſo to do, deſirous that this controverſie might be ended, whilſt their faith, and the common intereſts were preſerved ſafe; and when there was yet ſome opinion, that the *Florentines* allured by this advantage, and hope, might have adhered unto the league; but on the one ſide, in progreſs of time, the *Florentines* obdurate reſolution was diſcovered of governing themſelves by Counſels, apart from the reſt of the *Italians*; and on the other, the deep deceits of *Lodowick Sforza*, who under the ſhadow of procureing peace and quiet, growing jealous of the greatneſs which the *Venetians* might arrive at by the acquiſition of *Piſa*, and calculating other mens by his own, did in reality endeavor to ſecure himſelf from this his imaginary fear, by hindring the *Venetians* from purſuing that enterpriſe, to the which not long before he had exhorted them

The *Venetian* Senate was inforced to maintain the cauſe which they had undertaken, to keep from breaking their faith unto the *Piſans*, and to free themſelves from the infamy and repute of weak advice, to which they ſhould be ſubject, as if they had condeſcended for fear of *Lodowicks* Forces, or elſe as not knowing his cunning; when it was already known to all men, that the endeavor of agreement with the *Piſans*, which was agitated under the name of the Collegues, was managed onely by him, and according to his will and intereſts. But ſay I pray, is this the onely enterpriſe wherein the ſincerity, and candidneſs of the Commonwealth is to be known in juſt things, and ſuch as do concern the common good of *Italy*? How often hath ſhe maintained Wars, to the end that there might be a right, and an Italian Governor in the Dukedom of *Milan*? which cannot be denied ſince the effects thereof be ſo apparent, as ſhe would not lay down Arms before ſhe had compaſt this her intent, as ſhe did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of *Bologna* the year 1529. in which year, by means of the *Venetian* Senate *Maximilian Sforza* was reſtored unto his State, to whom the Dukedom

dom of *Milan* did of right belong: and their ends in the buſineſs concerning *Piſa* may likewiſe be diſcovered, ſince when the agreement was come unto, the *Venetians* had no reſpect to their own advantage, but onely to the benefit of the *Piſans*, to the preſervation of their liberty as much as might be, and to the right of what belonged to their Territories, which they were poſſeſt of when they put themſelves into the Commonwealths protection; wherein the *Venetians* were alwaies very conſtant, though the imminent War with the Turks might have made them forget the dangers and intereſts of other mens, for their own concernments. And at laſt, as they would yeeld to nothing which might be prejudicial to the *Piſans*, ſo to witneſs to the World that in reality they had no thought in maintaining this controverſie, to any peculiar deſign of their own, in making themſelves Maſters of that City, they put the determination of theſe differences, into the arbitrement of *Hercules* Duke of *Ferrara*; which though it had not any effect afterwards, the *Piſans* not conſenting thereunto, yet it might be diſcerned, that the *Piſans* averſeneſs thereunto, or the conſtancy wherein they perſevered, was not fomented by the *Venetians*, but roſe either out of the meer election or neceſſity of the *Piſans* themſelves.

But let us come to another conſideration, more proper for this buſineſs, that is, to the reaſons of State, wherein tho many of the ſame things do concur, yet they are clothed with other reſpects, wherewith Princes building either onely or chiefly upon what may moſt redound to their own advantage, do not adviſe with counſel or equity, or do not attribute thereunto what is requiſite. It is moſt certain, being already reduced to the greateſt extremity, if they ſhould have been abandoned by the *Venetians*, they muſt have put themſelves either into the power of the Duke of *Milan*, or of the *Florentines*; but reaſon of State would not permit, that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this City ſhould be joyned to the Dominion of either of theſe. As for *Sforza* his vaſt and diſordinate drifts were already known, and how he would be the ſole Arbitrator of *Italy*; ſo as if he ſhould become more haughty, and puft up by this important acquiſition, no part of *Italy* could remain quiet or ſecure either from his force or craft. And as for the *Florentines* you have heard how reſolute they were not to part from the friendſhip of the King of *France*, by how much greater the danger of whoſe Army was in recent memory, ſo much the more were his friends and aſſociats to be kept weak and under, to the end that they might not increaſe to the prejudice and apprehenſion of the reſt. It was ſeen in what danger *Italy* was put by forein Forces, how ſoon the Kings of *Arragon* were driven out of their Dominion, how little reſolute the other Princes of *Italy* were to withſtand forein Forces, which having once found an open and eaſie way into *Italy*, it was to be imagined that they would be cauſe of greater dangers and moleſtations to her. So as the Commonwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to reſiſt the Forces of greater Princes, and of not being expoſed to their wills, ſhe was neceſſitated to think upon increaſing her power and reputation, that ſhe might depend upon her own Baſis, and be well eſteemed of by others. She knew particularly that *Toſcany* was a State which might accommodate of dis-accommodate the French deſigns, accordingly as it was well or ill affected towards them. And the keeping of the City of *Piſa* dependant upon the *Venetians*, might ſeveral waies be helpful unto them in their intentions, in keeping the French from ſuccoring the Kingdom of *Naples*, and in ſecuring themſelves afterwards from the *Florentines*, as alſo in winning ſuch ſtrength and reputation to the Commonwealth with friends and adherents, as ſhe might provide for her own preſervation, and for the like of thoſe other *Italians*, who had the like intentions with her to maintain peace in *Italy*, and to keep her ſafe from foreign Forces. It was not then onely uſeful, but neceſſary

for

for the *Venetians*, in this conjuncture of affairs, to have footing in *Italy*, and to have the City of *Pisa*, if not subject to their dominion, at leaſt dependent upon the authority of the Commonwealth. Now take it for granted, that that ſuſpition might be true which they have ſo much divulged, who have endeavored to caſt a blur upon the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth, to wit, that the *Venetians* intended to make themſelves abſolute maſters of that City, only out of a deſign of increaſing their dominion. Certainly the actions of a Philoſopher, and thoſe of a Prince, ought not to be meaſured by one and the ſame Rule; nor muſt we fancy the condition of men, and of affairs, to be what peradventure they ought to be, but what they are for the moſt part. Magnanimity is the proper vertue of Princes, which makes them always buſie themſelves about great matters, and whereby they make themſelves be dreaded and reverenced by others. Therefore the deſire of Glory and Empire is highly praiſed in ſuch Princes as have been greateſt and moſt celebrated, as *Alexander*, *Cyrus*, *Caeſar*, *Charls*, and all the reſt of the moſt famous men, in whom a ſpirit of Grandure and Generoſity, which did ſtill egg them on to new and glorious enterpriſes, is not only commended, but even admired. If the *Romans*, whoſe actions are praiſed and celebrated by the general conſent of all men, had been content to contain themſelves within the precincts of *Latium*, their worth would have been hidden and obſcured, nor would their names have been ſo highly cry'd up to the memory of poſterity: And had not the *Venetians* had larger thoughts then to keep within their private merchandiſing affairs (as it became them to do in their weak begining) diſpiſing or neglecting ſuch occaſions as they ſundry times met with of enlarging the bounds of their Dominions, the Commonwealth would not only not have gotten ſuch eſteem and reputation as it hath got, but could not have kept herſelf ſo long in liberty, amidſt ſo many revolutions of affairs, and ſuch movings of Forein Armies.

It remains now only to ſee whether the opportunity of the Times, and condition of Affairs did counſel them to purchaſe new glory and greater Empire to their Commonwealth. Which though it may be known by what hath been formerly ſaid, yet it will more clearly appear by adding ſome other particular Conſiderations. The Commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition then any Prince in *Italy*, being much ſtronger then them all both in Land and Sea-Forces; the *Piſans* cauſe was generally well wiſh'd unto; the *Florentines* were but little acceptable to the reſt of the Princes of *Italy*, by reaſon of their friendſhip with the *French*, and for this and other reſpects were particularly much hated by their neighbors, the *Genoeſes*, *Seneſes*, and *Lucheſes*; and all the actions of the Commonwealth ſeemed to be favored by a certain Genius. She had lately gotten the Kingdom of *Cyprus*; ſhe had enlarged her Confines in *Friuli*, by the acquiſition of many Towns in the Country of *Goritia*; and ſhe proſpered greatly in all that ſhe took in hand, and won much honor. So as in this happy conjunction, the *Venetians* ought not to abandon their good Fortune, leſt they might too late repent for not having known how to make good uſe of their proſperity. They were to be ruled by the example of things paſt: For having oftentimes let ſlip many opportune occaſions of increaſing their Dominion by Land, whilſt their Enemies were but weak and not well ſetled in their States, the like enterpriſes being by them undertaken afterwards in a leſs convenient time, proved more difficult unto them. Others thought, that for the like reaſons the *Venetians* ſhould have forborne to meddle with the affairs of *Piſa*; for (ſaid they) the City was ſo ſituated, as it could not be defended by them without much expence and inconvenience, they being to take a long compaſs about the Sea before they could furniſh it with things neceſſary; and then the City it ſelf was not ſo great a purchaſe, as deſerved ſo much labor to purchaſe it. They added moreover, that at the ſame time, the friends of the other Princes did much envy

the

the Commonwealth for her great prosperity; so as it had better become the wisdom of that Senate to endeavour by concealing their thoughts of aspiring to greater things, to allay this envy, then further to increase it, as they did by attempting so great a novelty.

No doubt but those wise Senators who sate then at the helm of Government did reflect upon these doubts and suspicions; but it is to be believed that they were easily free of them, considering that the Commonwealth, when she was not yet so powerful nor strong, had undertaken many difficult, but glorious enterprises in parts far off, and had gotten honable victories against the *Saracens*, who were then very strong both by Sea and Land, and had placed Trophies of singular worth, and great zeal to Religion, in the Holy Land; that she had many times taken up Arms in the behalf of the Emperors of *Constantinople*, against divers other Potentates, and upon occasions, had reduced many Cities into her power, which had formerly belonged to that Empire; and that likewise she had for many years maintained sharp Wars against the *Genoeses*, and had put a period to many other gallant affairs by apparent victories: So as they thought that the Commonwealth had reason to promise herself good success in this her noble design of taking upon her the defence of *Pisa*, and of the affairs of *Tuscany*. Wherefore then ought they to distrust that the Commonwealth might keep the City of *Pisa* at her devotion, in times when her power and authority was much increased, and being accommodated with so many Ships and Gallies which were usually upon the Sea, and having the Island of *Corfu* in the Gulfs mouth, to receive the Ships in the mid-way which sailed from the one Sea to the other? But on the contrary, who does not know how very opportune this situation was for many other things, and of what use for the Commonwealth? Their having got footing in *Tuscany*, might, according as occasions should be offered, open them the way to greater acquisitions; and the Haven of *Ligorn* was extreamly commodious for the Navigation and Traffick which the City of *Venice* holds with the Western Provinces: which may the better be known now, for that since the affairs which had wont to be transacted in the East, being now turn'd to the West, Ships which come from thence laden with sundry sorts of Merchandise, putting into the Haven of *Ligorn*, to shun further Navigation, do there unload themselves, from whence their Loading is afterwards brought by Land to *Venice*. So as it seems, those wise Senators did even then foresee what high esteem was to be put upon that situation. But their desires have at least prevailed thus far, as that this Country is possest by very wise Princes, who are great friends to the Commonwealth; with whom an excellent intelligence being held, as hath been of late, and as it is to be hoped it will be for time to come, Commerce will always be open, safe, and free in those Countries. So as no reason can perswade, that the fear of being envied by other Princes, should keep the *Venetians* from attempting so beneficial a thing: For if these thoughts (which ought not to be admitted of by any generous Prince) should have been sufficient to have stopped the course of the Commonwealths good fortune, she must not only have abstained from this, but from other enterprises; and so her Dominion and Fame would have been shut up within her own Washes, if that peradventure might have been permitted them.

It was therefore necessary for the preservation of themselves, and of their liberty, to provide themselves of sufficient Forces (which cannot be had without Territories) to resist such as would offend them; for the keeping of others well-affected, is not sufficient to keep off injuries. But War is not alwaies made out of fear of another Princes power, and with a mind to secure ones self therefrom, but most commonly out of contempt, and out of a beleef of being able easily to effect what you undertake against them; and envy is oftentimes more suppress in the

very height of good fortune, when a mans condition is raiſed much above that of others, then when it is kept within common and uſual precincts. But what Princes envy ought the Commonwealth to have feared? If you will ſay any Tranſalpin Princes, they had not as then any ſuch firm footing in *Italy*, nor ſo ready Forces, nor peradventure had they their thoughts ſo intereſſed, as that they were to make War upon that account with the *Venetians*; if you mean *Italian* Princes, every one of them were weaker then the Commonwealth, and the diverſity of their ends and intereſts would be ſure to keep them from joyning together. Nor was it likely that they would conſpire with greater Princes againſt the *Venetians*, ſince it became all of them to apprehend forein Forces, leſt they might all ſuffer in a common ruine. And if it be ſaid, that notwithſtanding it fell out ſo afterwards, as was ſeen by the league of *Cambray* which proved ſo pernicious to the Commonwealth, it may be anſwered, That things are not done (eſpecially among Princes) as reaſon would perſwade; and no certain judgment can be given of Actions wherein Fancy reigns. But let it be ſaid, that the condition of things, times and reſpects, were altered by reaſon of many much differing accidents and actions, when theſe more heavy Wars began; but chiefly, becauſe the French being become more powerful in *Italy*, by their acquiſition of the State of *Milan*, and more deſirous of ſubduing her, they reſolved to leave nothing unattempted, which might bring this their deſign to effect; ſo as it was from hence that all the troubles and dangers came upon the Commonwealth, whereas ſhe ought rather to have expected thanks, and good offices from the Crown of *France*, ſo as peradventure there may be more reaſon to blame the Commonwealth for having called the King of *France* into *Italy*, had ſhe been thereunto moved out of a deſire of inlarging her Dominions, and had not been thereunto compelled by the fraud and inſufferable inſolencies of *Ludovico Sforza*, to ſuppreſs the which ſhe was inforced to have recourſe to forein Forces, which afterwards turned themſelves upon herſelf. But in the defence of *Piſa* things were otherwiſe; the end was very honeſt, for the buſineſs was to comfort the oppreſſed, not to oppreſs others; an enterpriſe which was to be approved of for the common welfare of all the *Italians*, whereby they onely were weakened, who favored the affairs of forein Princes. The reward, if the War ſucceeded well, was very great, for it made much for the advantage and reputation, eſpecially at that time, of having the City of *Piſa* either her Subject, Friend, Dependant, or Confederate.

The Third DISCOURSE.

That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate ſucceſſes of War, after the routing of the Venetian *Army in the action of* Giaradada.

HE who hath ſought out an occaſion to blame the Commonwealth of *Venice*, out of envy to her glory, and particularly to the excellency of her Government, falling upon the times of her greateſt misfortunes, ſays, That when by her unfortunate ſucceſs at the rout of *Giaradada* ſhe loſt her State by Land, ſhe witneſſed that there was neither worth, nor ſtrength, nor power in her orders to govern an Empire; and that ſhe had had her increaſe, and had to this day maintained her greatneſs, more out of a certain appearance, and opinion, then by any excellency of power or counſel. I find theſe things written in ſome Authors, but chiefly amplified and affirmed by *Nicholas Machiavel*, a name which hath formerly been very famous for the curioſity of the matter which he took upon him to write on in his diſcourſes; but it is now ſo condemned to perpetual oblivion by the holy Apoſtolick Sea, as it is not lawful to name him.

The misfortunes which the Commonwealth underwent in thoſe days were certainly very great, but ſuch notwithſtanding as ought rather to move compaſſion in all mens minds, and ſhew the inſtability of humane affairs, then to afford matter of blame, and further oppreſſion. It is ſaid that the imperfection of the Commonwealth was diſcoverd by theſe publick adverſities; and (that I may give the very words of ſome men) that there was no true worth or excellency in her orders; yet prove they not this by any other reaſon then what is taken from the action it ſelf, to wit, becauſe ſhe loſt the day to the French, and that by the loſs ther of the publick affairs were brought into exceeding great danger. But he who ſhall penetrate more inwardly into the truth of theſe things, will not reſt ſatiſfied with this judgement, framed rather from the event then out of any reaſon, and will ſpeak much otherwiſe, and will take many other things into conſideration, before he give his judgement. And if we will by this our Diſcourſe penetrate into the more inward conſiderations, we ſhall find that the Form of Government is as it were the ſoul which gives a true being to a City. For a multitude of men aſſembled together could not have whereof to live, nor would their place of habitation deſerve the name of a City, were it not for certain Orders and Laws. But as the ſenſitive ſoul, which informs the animated body, cannot always make equal uſe of all her ſundry powers and faculties; for though ſhe preſerve her ſelf in her own purity, and perfection, yet needing the parts of the body, and ex rinſecal objects for her operations, ſhe muſt oft times ceaſe operating, and ſometimes produceth imperfect operations; ſo will it happen in a City, that though the form of government, which is as it were the ſoul thereof, be of it ſelf very vigorous and perfect, yet can it not always, nor in all things ſhew its force and excellency, by reaſon of the need it ſtands in of inſtruments, and by its encountring with many extrinſecal accidents, ſo as it muſt ſometimes reſt wholly idle, and other ſometimes do but little good by its operating; Whence I infer, that though a City be exceedingly well ordered for Civil and Military Affairs, yet cannot ſhe promiſe her ſelf to enjoy peace long, nor long to keep herſelf in one and the ſame condition,

ſave onely as long as ſhe ſhal be permitted ſo to do by the condition of other things, which are out of the Legiſlators power. So likewiſe the adverſe fortune of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, which may depend upon ſo many other occaſions, is not ſufficient to infer, that ſuch States are ill ordered: But rather as he may deſerve the name of a good Orator, who handles his cauſe ſo as he does perſwade handſomly, though he he do not always attain his end; ſo ought not the Legiſlator to be accounted leſs wiſe, nor thoſe Laws leſs good, by which the Government is well regulated as touching Peace, and the preſervation of the City or State, though various accidents may produce the contrary effects.

Theſe reaſons and examples do cleerly ſhew, how ill-grounded thoſe oppoſitions are, by which, without any conſideration of ſo many other circumſtances, men will conclude that the Orders of the Commonwealth of *Venice* were weak, and of no worth, becauſe her Army was worſted in the Battel of *Giradada*; and becauſe after that Rout, the loſs of the State, and ſo many other great loſſes did enſue. It is not the Event, but the Counſel by which things are done, which ought to give the true praiſe or blame to our actions. Let us then ſee in this Caſe which we are now upon, what the counſels were, what the hopes, what the condition of times were, and of Princes, and let us look into other ſuch circumſtances, and then we ſhall be able to give a better judgment. The times are three; and the affairs which upon this occaſion may fall under our conſideration, are of three ſorts; to wit, ſuch as did precede the action, thoſe wherewith it was accompanied, and thoſe which followed after. The Commonwealth, before this unfortunate accident fell out, was not only in a very proſperous condition, by reaſon of her happy ſucceſs in the laſt War againſt the Emperor *Maximilian*, but alſo (as it was thought) in a condition of much ſafety, being joined in league and amity with the powerful King of *France*, when unexpectedly ſhe underſtood that almoſt all the Princes of Chriſtendom had conſpired againſt her; and almoſt at the ſame time ſhe heard that the King of *France* had denounced War againſt her. Where will you find a mind ſo conſtant, as will not be much diſturbed at ſuch an advertiſement as this? The affection muſt needs be moved at the novelty of the action, and Reaſon troubled by the greatneſs thereof. What had the Venetian Senate reaſon to fear at this time leſs then this? The King of *France*, in league, friendſhip and confederacie with the Commonwealth for many years, out of obſervancie whereunto the *Venetians* had not only refuſed friendſhip with *Caſar*, which was offer'd them with ſo much advantage to themſelvs, but had taken up Arms to defend and preſerve for that King, their Friend and Confederate, the State of *Milan*; little mindful of ſuch a ſervice, (as the uſual affections of other men are ſeldom found amongſt Princes) conſpires her ruine, and turns thoſe Arms againſt her, which through their friendſhip were grown ſo powerful in *Italy*. What ſhould move him thereunto? Not deſire of revenge; for there appeared no injury: Not any fear of his own affairs; for he had found them already very conſtant unto them: No ſelf-intereſt; for he ought to have been jealous of *Caſars* greatneſs, who had been his perpetual Enemy, and to have wiſhed well unto the *Venetians*, who had been his antient Friends. But what ſhall I ſay of the reſt? Had not *Caſar* the like obligations to the *Venetians*, as the King of *France* had, which ſhould have kept him from ſuch a confederacie? Nay, had he not peculiar reſpects which counſell'd him to the contrary? The injuries which the *French* had done to the Empire; the King of *France* his particular hatred to him; the high aſpiring thoughts of that King, pernicious to the dignity of the Empire, and to the German liberty. Wherefore as he could never promiſe himſelf ſafe and firm friendſhip from the *French*, ſo he ought rather to have obviated their power, then have help'd to advance it. But who could have expected that ſuch an action ſhould have proceeded from the admired wiſdom of *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, ſo unuſual, and

ſo

MUTILATED PAGES

ſo harmful to himſelf, by reaſon of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive, in not preſerving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of *Naples* in peace and quiet? For which cauſe, the greatneſs of the *French*, their fidelity, and natural deſire of novelty ought to have been ſuſpected by him; yet he aſſented to the increaſe of their power, and of his own danger. But how did thoſe generous thoughts which Pope *Julius* the Second ſeemed to bear to the greatneſs and liberty of *Italy*, correſpond with his joining in confederacie with the Tranſalpine Princes who went about to oppreſs her by the ruine of that Commonwealth, which was confeſt by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of *Italy*, and the hope that ſhe might again riſe to her antient greatneſs and reputation? What ſafety could the Apoſtolick Sea expect, by increaſing the power of thoſe Princes in *Italy*, who were great of themſelves, whom he feared, and upon whoſe authority he foreſaw the Popes of *Rome* muſt depend?

Theſe certainly were ſuch things as did tranſcend whatſoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators, or of any other men how wiſe ſoever: Nor was the immenſity of the danger leſs, nor leſs able to moleſt and confound the minds of thoſe who were to prepare for reſiſtance againſt ſo great a War. The King of *France* his Forces were of themſelves very powerful, that Kingdom being then more flouriſhing then it had been for many years before, and become more formidable by the poſſeſſion which the *French* had got of the Dukedom of *Milan*, which afforded them mighty conveniencies to aſſault the Confines of the Commonwealth. And though *Cæſars* Forces were not of themſelves greatly conſiderable, yet were they increaſed by the fame he gave out, that he led his Army into *Italy* to make a certain and noble prey thereof, and with a mind to reſtore the Empire to its almoſt loſt greatneſs, whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people, and got them to joyn their Forces with his. Moreover, the King of *Spains* Naval preparation was in particular to be feared; to prevent the which, thoſe Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed, which ſhould all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from ſo fierce an aſſault. The Pope added no ſmall reputation to the League by his authority; and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces, became the more dreadful. And though the other petty Princes forces were but ſmall, yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great; and the Kings of *England*, *Poland*, and *Hungary* were ſought unto and ſollicited by all theſe together to join with them, and to declare enmity to the *Venetians*.

If then the *Venetians* had yielded to this ſo new and great preparation for War, which like Thunder made both its noiſe and harm be heard and felt at once, what could have been ſaid unto them? Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuſe, and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good? For as an object of immenſurable force does not move, but corrupt the ſenſe; ſo the encountring with ſo weighty a conſpiracie, was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to ſhew her vertue, but rather to diſorder and to confound her. Yet it is ſeen how ſhe behaved herſelf upon ſuch an occaſion; and whether it may be inferred from theſe her firſt counſels, as from a thing that was in her own power, that ſhe was not worth much, or that ſhe did any thing unworthy of herſelf, of her fame, or of the reputation which ſhe held amongſt other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear, or rather what greater ſign could be deſired in her of generous confidence and moſt noble daring? What did ſhe reſolve to yield up of free-will? What noiſe, what complaints were heard, which ſhewed that ſhe would terminate that controverſie with vain words, which could not be ended but with Arms? The Anſwer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them, that the King was upon his

march

MUTILATED PAGES

march in Arms againſt the Commonwealth, was onely, that that War was intimated them from the King, when they had more reaſon to expect Amity and Peace from him; but that they would not be wanting to their own defence, being confident that they ſhould be able to defend themſelves by their own Forces, and through the right of their cauſe. The effects were anſwerable to their words; for they betook themſelves forthwith to provide for ſo great a War. The moſt expert Commanders were ſent for from all parts, veteran Soldiers muſtered in all places, in ſo great numbers, and ſo qualified, as it was agreed upon by the common conſent of all, that neither that Age, nor any other, for many years before had ſeen ſuch an Army of meer *Italians* in *Italy*. Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City, wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to aſſiſt their Country at ſo great a need. There appeared ſo great a zeal in every one to the common good, ſuch reſolution to maintain the ſtate and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the laſt gaſp, as thoſe who have appeared to be no very good friends to the *Venetians* in other things, do praiſe theſe proceedings, being forced ſo to do by the power of truth.

But let us come to thoſe other things which accompany the action it ſelf; The Senate upon mature advice, reſolved wiſely how that War was to be managed; they knew the enemy was very ſtrong, the danger great, and that the welfare of the Commonwealth depended upon the preſervation of that Army which they had now got together. But as it would be a great raſhneſs to hazard it upon a Battel, ſo to keep it onely to be a ſafeguard to the City, ſhewed timorouſneſs in them, would diſcourage their men, and increaſe the courage and reputation of the enemy. Whilſt they bethought themſelves what to do in this great exigencie to evade both theſe inconveniencies, the Senate ordered their Commanders to march with their Army to thoſe Confines of the State of *Milan* where the Enemy ſhould appear to be likely to make their firſt aſſaults; to the end that following their Army in near, but ſafe quarters, and that keeping them ſtill incommodated, and in jealouſie and fear of being aſſaulted, they might keep them from advancing further, and from falling upon any enterpriſe. The Commonwealths Army was very ſtrong in Horſe, amounting to the number of Ten thouſand; and in Foot, to boot with a great number of Soldiers of their own Country, commanded by their own Orders, they had Twelve thouſand veteran Soldiers, under experienced famous Commanders, together with a great train of Artillery, and all other inſtruments for War; ſo as the Senate had reaſon to beleeve, that they might effect their ends of maintaining the War, and of keeping the field; and ſo ſpinning out time (as it becomes thoſe who are upon the defenſive part, and find themſelves to be the weaker) ſecure their own Affairs, and keep further dangers from them.

For it oftentimes falls out through various accidents, that the greater Armies be, they do ſo much the more eaſily moulder away of themſelves; and the Forces of many ſeveral Princes, though they be at firſt great and formidable, prove leſs fit for great enterpriſes, by reaſon of the Colleagues different ends and intereſts. And as learned Phyſitians uſe no ſtrong and violent remedies when the ſick party hath but ſome grudgings of an Ague, and when the diſeaſe is not yet well known; So theſe wiſe Senators were of opinion, that the Commonwealth being ſet upon and almoſt oppreſt by the ſudden violence of ſo many Enemies, it made not for their welfare and ſafety, to come to the violent remedy of a pitcht field, with enemies whoſe ſtrength was not yet very well known. Together with theſe reaſons, the *Venetian* Senate had for their example the ſucceſs of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, which finding her ſelf aſſailed by powerful *Carthaginian* Forces, and her Affairs being reduced to a great ſtreight, preſerved themſelves from greater danger, by drawing

out

out the War at length, and by keeping the Enemy incommodated; but the *Venetians* had not a *Fabius Maximus* for their Commander in chief, as the French had an *Hannibal*, for there were many of those vertues in *Lodowick* King of *France*, which were praised in *Hannibal*; chiefly a mighty thirst after glory, to purchase which he valued neither labor nor danger. But *Alviano* a famous and cried up Commander, not more for his own worth, then for this misfortune of the *Venetians*, was of a nature much contrary to that of *Fabius*, in knowing how to make advantage of time; and though he had many other noble qualities, as greatness of spirit in undertakings, undaunted courage in executing what he undertook, and great experience in matter of War; yet were these vertues little advantagious for the present occasion; better befitting a Commander who was to assist a puissant Prince, desirous of glory, and in his most prosperous times, then a Commonwealth, which not making use so much of force, as of occasion, was slowly, but safely arrived at that greatness, and which was now, more then formerly to proceed by the like counsels.

But it may peradventure be said, that the Venetian Army wanted not a *Fabius*, having *Nicolo Orsino*, Count of *Pitigliano*, who in his other actions may be truly said to resemble *Fabius* very much, for he alwaies proceeded with the slowest and safest advices; but in this he appeared much different, and inferior to him since he would not succour *Alviano*, who contrary to his order had given Battel, as did *Fabius Maximus*, who readily succoured *Quintus Minutius*, chief Commander of the Cavalry, though contrary to his opinion he had rashly exposed himself, and part of the Army to the danger of Battel. But on the contrary, *Lodowick*, King of *France*, was not onely like *Hannibal*, but did much exceed him; for *Hannibal* knew onely how to overcome, but knew not how to make use of Victory, having spent much time to little purpose, after the rout given to the *Romans* at *Canna*; but *Lodowick* pursuing the Victory, stopt not till he had regained all that he pretended unto from the State of *Venice*. But the Forces of the Commonwealth did either prove less valiant, and less fortunate then formerly they had done, or else they were hurried by some occult cause upon this calamity. Yet can it not be said that the Senates advice was less good, who in their Orders to their Commanders, did alwaies lay before them the importance of the business with express and particular command to shun the necessity of joyning Battel with the Enemy. Those prudent Senators knew very well that that Army was not to be hazarded upon the dubious event of Battel, wherein consisted all the hopes of preserving her State by Land, and that the condition of affairs were such on their side, that if they came to the trial of a Battel, it must be upon too much disadvantage. The War was made at their own doors, so as if the Enemy should prove victorious, the conquer'd party could not have time to rally or recruit themselves, for preservation of their own affairs; but if the French Army had been overcome, the War would not notwithstanding be at an end, the Forces of the other Colleagues remaining still intire: which were likelier to be ruined by their own disorders, and by the discords which use to happen in Leagues, then by force of Arms, which could not be made use of without danger. The bad advice of some Commanders, or else some fatal adversity of the Commonwealth would not permit that this advantage of time should be waited for; whereupon they came to the conflict, not onely contrary to the so many aforementioned respects, but upon such disadvantage, as with but half their Forces they hazarded the whole Fortune of the Commonwealth. How valiantly they fought is witnessed by the general consent of all men, nor do the victorious Enemies deny but that the victory was a good while doubtful; but a few not being able longer to resist a much greater number, that notable rout ensued which drew after it so many losses and ruines; For the French Forces did not more secure the way to their Army in all

places,

places, and facilitate their undertakings, then did the reputation of their victory.

Amidst so great amazement and astonishment, nothing was left unattempted by *Luigi Gritti*, and *Christofero Moro*, who were the *Provedatori del Campo*, to uphold the Commonwealths fading fortune: They betook themselves to rally the remainder of the Army, they comforted the Captains and Soldiers with hope of better success, they intreated the Nobility and people of *Brescia*, and of other Cities, that being mindful of their Loyalties, and of other things done in service to the Commonwealth, in former Wars had with *Philip Maria Visconte*, they would be like themselves, and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the *Venetians*, and abhorring the severe *Transalpine* Dominion, they would with one onely inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs. But they were all so possest with a Panick fear, as no entreaties nor reason could be listned unto; those who had escaped the Battel, were unfit either for strength or valor, to attempt any thing against the Enemy. no disposition to defence was found in the City, no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder, there were but few Forts at that time in the State, and those few of no condition of holding out long. What was then to be done? to whom was any recourse to be had? If all Princes and Countries were become Enemies, who were to be trusted? If all memory of former benefits were laid aside, so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged, how could new men be raised, and provisions made for a new War? The armed Enemy was already at the gates, nay even within their houses, threatning assured ruine. What was to be done in such a general dispair, but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass, which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand? And as sometimes it falls out in greatest Tempests, that the skill and labor of the Mariners being overcome by the malignity of the weather, they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the Sea carries it, So in cases of greatest danger, into which States do sometimes fall, he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad, till the fury of those tempests being past over, the Commonwealth, though born down, yet not quite sunk, may rise again, and make way for her pristine greatness.

The Army being then to retreat, and the loss of the City drawing other losses after it, as one stone that gives against another, it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes, so to preserve them from sacking and plunder, which they must have undergone, if they should maintain their loyalties, and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion, if they should submit to the Enemy. Such a resolution might appear willing, and therefore less generous, but it was really necessary, prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things, but which might prove useful in the future: At first sight, it appeared to proceed from rashness and fear, and yet it proceeded from wisdom, from charity, and in respect to the good of the State, and of the Subjects. The piety nor prudence of the Senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times, to be used for withstanding so many enemies, wherefore the *Venetians* did magnanimously refuse those helps, and assistances, which were offered them by the Turks; though but little before (as some writers affirm) they had been very much sought unto by other Christian Princes, as by *Frederick* of *Aragon*, and *Ludovicus Sforza*, for the defence of their Dominions, and not long after by the Emperor *Maximilian*, to be made use of against the *Venetians*, but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring Princes, nor the desire of recovering what was lost, prevail with those most wise and religious men, but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion, and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the Infidels, immaculate,

neither

neither would the reaſon of State, if well underſtood, conſidered in the example of others, ſuffer them ſo to do; and eſpecially in the unfortunate ſucceſs of the Emperors of *Conſtantinople*, who having unadviſedly call'd in to their aſſiſtance the *Otteman* Princes, who were much more powerful then they, had drawn a greater ruine upon themſelves, which proved the occaſion of the fall of that Empire. But being unwilling notwithſtanding to give over all hopes of accommodating the afflicted condition of affairs with ſome eaſe, the Senate reſolved to have recourſe to the Pope, and to *Caſar*, (though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies) to treat of ſome Agreement. They were moved much hereunto by the reſpect and reverence due to that holy See, and the pious and religious apprehenſion they had of Eccleſiaſtical cenſures, to which they were ſubject; and they truſted more in prevailing with *Caſar*, then with the King of *France*: For what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him, who being firſt bound to the Commonwealth by obligation and confederacie, had ſpurn'd at all thoſe reſpects out of meer deſire of novelties? To theſe then they granted all that they pretended unto; for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of *France* his greatneſs, they knew ſome way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune.

But how is it poſſible to paſs over here in ſilence another thing, not at all differing from this, by which ſuch baſe aſperſions have been endeavored to be caſt upon the *Venetians*; ſince by this our preſent diſcourſe we go about to vindicate them, by ſearching into the truth? We read in *Guicchiardine*, a Modern, and to give him his due, in many things an excellent Hiſtorian, an Oration publiſhed by him in the name of *Antonio Juſtiniano*, ſent by the Commonwealth to *Caſar*: wherein it is ſaid, that the *Venetians* begging pardon at *Caſars* hands, with much ſubjection and ſervility of mind, did offer to ſubmit the Commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the Empire, and to acknowledg to hold their liberty, lives and livelihood from him: with ſome other baſe unworthy expreſſions, not only not true, but not likely to be ſo. For firſt, it is very certain, that *Juſtinian* being ſent Ambaſſador to *Maximilian*, and finding him at *Trent*, was never admitted to have audience, peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates, and making of them jealous. Then, it is moſt certain that the Senate gave no ſuch Commiſſion: And let him who will not believe it, liſten but to reaſon, and then he will be perſwaded to the contrary. The Commonwealth had then loſt all her Territories by Land; but at the ſame time ſhe enjoyed all her State by Sea, wherein were not only one or two Cities, but divers Provinces and noble Kingdoms; their Naval accoutrements were very great, and equal, if not ſuperior to thoſe of whatſoever Potentate at that time; all entire and whole, not having ſuffered any thing by this thunder of War, which had only overrun their *Terra firma*: their Treaſure but little diminiſhed from what it was at the begining of this War, which continued afterwards, and was maintained for the ſpace of many years: The City of *Venice*, placed by her miraculous ſituation in compleat ſafety, all attempts which could be made againſt it being to prove raſh and vain, as the effects proved afterwards: A great Train of Artillery, and of all things requiſite for War; a quiet People, and obedient at the beck of their Nobility; and a conſtant and reſolute mind in all the Nobles to demonſtrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their Country. But that which followed afterwards in their defence of the City of *Padua* againſt the Forces of all the Princes of the League, will ſuffice to prove, that the Commonwealth was not ſo weak either in Counſel or in Power, as to have recourſe to that laſt extremity of making that City tributary, which had maintained her firſt freedom for above the ſpace of a thouſand years. Say, I beſeech you, was not the Commonwealth powerful by Sea, and ſufficiently valued by all other Potentates, before ſhe had any State in *Terra*

firma? Nay, ſhe was oft-times ſeen to neglect occaſions which were offered of making acquiſitions in *Terra firma*, thinking her ſelf ſafe and powerful enough without them

What was it then which could move them to make themſelves Servants and Subjects, who had no reaſon to doubt not onely their liberty, but nor their chiefeſt, moſt antient, and moſt proper Dominion, which was that of the Sea, for the preſervation whereof, as affairs ſtood then, they had no reaſon to make ſuch haſte to *Caſar* for friendſhip? Who can with reaſon blame the advice, as the condition of things went then, of giving and yeelding that up to *Maximilian* which could not as then be kept from him; to wit, ſome of thoſe Cities in *Terra firma* which he pretended right unto; ſince ſome agreement enſuing with him by ſuch conceſſions, and injuries ceaſing on that part, the way might be opened to ſtraiter, and more particular and advantagious conventions with the ſame *Caſar*, who was naturally deſirous of novelties, whereby the Fortune of the Commonwealth was again to be raiſed up. And this counſel tried afterwards with others had good ſucceſs, when they joyned in a new confederacy with the ſame French againſt *Maximilian*, who ſcorning their friendſhip, would not liſten to their propoſitions. Theſe were the counſels, theſe the actions of the *Venetians*, from whence, ſome would take occaſion to detract from the praiſe and dignity of their Commonwealth, and particularly from the excellency of their Government.

But we may better know how injuriouſly this blemiſh is laid upon them, if we will examine how other Princes and States did behave themſelves, when they were in like adverſity; which I do not alleage as taxing any one, but to ſhew the uſual courſe of affairs, by the example of others. Obſerve what art the King of *Aragon* uſed to preſerve his State, when *Charls* the Eighth, King of *France* came againſt them in hoſtile manner. *Alphonſo* who poſſeſt the Kingdom, having tried the extremity of fear before the danger grew near, out of the meer report of the French Forces, departed from *Naples*, leaving all things at ſix and ſevens, whilſt their Army was yet in *Rome*; and *Alphonſo* the Son, who had boaſted that he would defend himſelf, and to that purpoſe had muſtered a great many Soldiers, retired with them into the narrow paſſes of the Kingdom, without making any triall either of his fortune or of his valor, and yeelding rather to the Fame, then to the Forces of the Enemy, ſuffered them to take free and quiet poſſeſſion of that moſt noble Kingdom. But *Frederick* of *Aragon*, who was reinveſted in his State, by the favor of the people, and by the aſſiſtance of other Princes, with which the *Venetians* did readily joyn, what uſe did he make of other mens labors, and of his own fortune? Soon after the Kingdom of *Naples* was aſſaulted, by *Lodowick* King of *France*, and by *Ferdinando* King of *Spain*, at which aſſault being much diſcouraged, he would not liſten to the advice of his Commanders, who adviſed him to keep the field, but made ſome ſlender proviſions for the Towns, and ſoon after, thinking more how to eſcape, then how to defend himſelf, he fled into *Iſchia*, and went from thence into *France*, and put himſelf into the power of the ſame King his Enemy, contenting himſelf rather to live a private man in peace and ſafety, then to reign in trouble and danger.

But what ſhall we ſay of the *French*, who boaſt ſo much of their valor, and glory in War? How eaſily when they met with the firſt misfortune, did they ſuffer themſelves to be bereft of all they had before ſo happily acquired in the Kingdom of *Naples*? And that ſo haſtily, as it ſeemed that they had freely yeeled up the poſſeſſion of ſo many, and ſo noble Cities to the victors, the *Spaniards*, by agreement, and as it were in reward for the day which they had won. Nor is this the onely example, ſince we have ſeen the ſame *French*, who were faln with ſuch fervency with their Forces into *Italy*, and had with miraculous proſperity recovered the

State

State of *Milan* but a little before, reſolve ſuddenly to forgo all that they had won, and to retreat to beyond the Mountains, after the rout which they had received from the *Switzers* at *Novara*; the ſuccour which they met withal by the way as they fled, not being able to make them halt. Who was more famous then for dexterity of wit for the managing of weighty affairs, then *Ludovick Sforza* Duke of *Milan*: yet when a great deluge of War came upon him, what uſe could he make of all his Artifices? Could he ſhew that conſtancy and generoſity which he had many times before publickly boaſted of? The onely news of the league made againſt him, by *Ludowick* King of *France*, and by the *Venetians*, did ſo aſtoniſh him, as loſing all underſtanding, and leaving his Affairs unprovided for, he reſolved at very firſt, upon what ought to have been his laſt and moſt deſperate advice, to fly into *Germany*, foregoing the defence of that State, which being once loſt, he did afterwards in vain ſeek to recover.

But in this point I may help my ſelf in looking a little more backward, and trying whether the gallantry of the antients, ſo much commended, did produce other effects then thoſe that I have ſpoken of. The *Romans*, who conquered the whole world, met ſometimes with adverſe fortune, wherein let us ſee how they behaved themſelves; for he is very timerous who is not bold and generous in proſperous affairs. In what peril and hazard did *Brennus* Prince, and Commander of the *Galls Senones* put the City of *Rome* after the defeat given to the *Roman* Army, under the unfortunate conduct of the *Fabii*? no man thought of making any defence, but ſought how to ſave himſelf and the beſt things he had, in the Capitol; their houſes, and walls were abandoned, and the very gates left open to the Enemy by the Roman Soldiers, who fled into the City to ſave themſelves; and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth, which was preſerved for greater things ſent *Curius Camillus* to ſuccour it, the riſing glory of the *Romans* had even then been extinct.

But what ſhall we ſay of things that happened afterwards, when their Fame grew greater? Did not the *Romans* loſe poſſeſſion of all *Italy*, after the rout given them by *Hannibal* at *Canne*? Did not the Cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where? And did not they themſelves give over all hopes of defending them? the reſolutions taken by the Souldiers, ſhewed what the flight, what the fear of the conquered was. For ſome, whilſt they were yet in their own houſes, rendred themſelves priſoners to the Conquerors; others withdrew to the Sea ſide, intending if they could have the benefit of ſhipping, to go to ſome other Prince, and ſeek out a new Country: But with what deſpair the Citizens of *Rome* were poſſeſt, when they heard the news of this misfortune, in how great confuſion all their Orders were, may be conceived by what *Livy* relates, who undertook not onely to write the Hiſtory of the Commonwealth, but to celebrate with perpetual praiſe the fame and merit of her Citizens. And it was credibly believed (for as much as we hear) that thoſe valiant men, unaccuſtomed to know what fear was, were ſtrucken with ſuch amazement, as if *Hannibal* had known as well how to make uſe of victory, as he did to overcome, the ſo great, and ſo long continued fortune of *Rome*, had not onely been hereby interrupted, but totally ſuppreſt. And theſe very ſelf ſame *Carthaginians*, who had ſo long, and ſo ſtoutly conteſted for glory, with their rival, the Commonwealth of *Rome*, when they taſted of adverſe fortune, went aſtray from their former generoſity, and ſuffered themſelves to be born down by extremity of deſpair, for after the defeat which they had received by Sea by the *Romans*, they inclined to yeeld up unto them the Iſlands of *Sicily*, and *Sardinia*, and to make themſelves tributary for ever to the Senate and people of *Rome*; and afterward being overcome in Battel by *Scipio Africanus*, they fell to final ruin. But why do I inſtance in ſo many examples? Are not

these sufficient to prove, that the valianteſt and wiſeſt men are ſtrangely terrified at great and unexpected misfortunes; and that when Armies are loſt, which are the inſtruments whereby States preſerve themſelves from the evils of War, good Counſels muſt ceaſe, as not able to keep off other greater evils which do uſually follow after that a Battel is loſt.

Therefore out of the above-mentioned reaſons, and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents, every one may be cleerly ſatisfied, that the misfortune which the State of *Venice* underwent by reaſon of the ill-fought Battel of *Giaradada*, ought not to detract any thing from her other praiſes: For her ſubſequent actions, by which with ſingular conſtancie and generoſity ſhe recovered what ſhe had loſt, render her by the joint conſent of all men truly glorious.

The Fourth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Princes of Italy *did well, or no, to aſſault the Army of* Charls *the Eight, King of* France, *when after having gotten the Kingdom of* Naples, *he haſted to paſs over the Mountains.*

AMongſt thoſe things of ſad remembrance to *Italy*, the paſſage of *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, to the Conqueſt of the Kingdom of *Naples*, may be numbred amongſt the ſaddeſt, and moſt recent: For ever ſince that time, the Tranſalpine Nations have had a power in *Italy*; and the greatneſs of the Italian name, which began at that time to be raiſed up again with hopes of greater glory, all the parts of *Italy* being under the command of our Italian Princes, return'd to ſuch a declination by this blow, as it could never ſince recover its priſtine majeſty. But that which moſt afflicts the minds of thoſe who are any ways generous, is to think, that this moſt noble Country fell into ſuch misfortunes through the fault of her own men; and that the Italian Princes, to ſatisfie their own diſordinate deſires and immoderate ambition, did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of *Italy*; and little valuing the truer and greater dangers, they ſtood baſely looking on, and ſuffer'd this their common Country to be rent in peeces by Foreiners. The French Forces did at this time paſs into *Italy*, by which ſhe had not for a long time been moleſted, being called in by *Ludovick Sforza*, and maintained by other Italians: But ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counſel, being touched by the danger more at hand, by reaſon of the French-mens great felicity; which as it might have been foreſeen further off, ſo was it not now ſo eaſily to be remedied. They therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the ſafety of *Italy*, and to oppoſe King *Charls* his deſigns: So as after the acquiſition of *Naples*, as he would return into *France* by the ſame way which he had come in, with his Army, which was notwithſtanding much leſs numerous in men, he was oppoſed by the Army of the confederate Princes, as he came to the banks of *Tarus*, who meant to hinder his paſſage, and to fight his Army. For a little before, the Pope, the King of the *Romans*, the King of *Spain*, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, and the Duke of *Milan* had joined in confederacie to this purpoſe; the *Venetians* having been the firſt movers thereof, and expreſs Ambaſſadors from all the aforeſaid Princes had met in *Venice*, where the League was concluded and publiſhed. This reſolution

was

was at those times generally commended, as being generous, and suiting with the honor of *Italy*: But notwithstanding, there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate; nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business, so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done, and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation, or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein: For they appear to be attended with that wisdom, without which no action, though perchance it may have good success, deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men. The taking up of Arms to drive the *French* out of *Italy*, was doubtless a resolution as much to be commenped in the Italian Princes, as some of them were blamed for calling of them in, and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice. But how these Arms were to be made use of against them, and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away, and to stop their passage, and force both the *French* and themselves to come to a Battel, is somwhat a difficult case, and which may admit of divers considerations.

It is an antient and approved proverb, That a Bridg of Gold ought to be made for an Enemy that flies. And this is grounded upon solid reasons; for no Battel can be fought without much hazard and uncertainty of success, since there may happen many unthought of accidents, wherein the use of wisdom is excluded. Therefore where to join battel is to be thought a good advice, the condition of affairs must be such, as that a man be not necessitated thereunto, but makes it his choice, and comes to it with greater hopes of overcoming, then fear of being worsted; and likewise the advantage must be more that is to be expected from the Victory, then the prejudice which depends upon the loss thereof. By thus measuring the carriage of these affairs by these rules, we may the better know what judgment to give thereof. If we consider the state of affairs before the Armies drew near, there appears no necessity of fighting at that time: For the King of *France* led his men back over the Mountains to their own homes, without prejudice or injury to any one; so as the meeting him to stop his passage, and give him battel, proceeded from election, and from the determinate counsel of the Princes that were Confederates against him: But what the end of the combat was like to be, and how the business was ballanced, might be guess'd at by many particulars, before a stroke was struck. The King of *France* led along with him an Army consisting of *French* and *Switzers*; the former excellent for the Horse-Militia, and the latter excellently well disciplin'd in Foot-service: So as the Italian Militia was confess'd by all men to be far inferior to both these; for they had wholly lost all their antient excellent institutions, and had wanted true discipline for many years, being by Foreiners bereft of their antient military glory. But the much different impressions which were in the Soldiers themselves, was of great importance upon this occasion. The *French* were haughty, and puffed up by their success at *Naples*; they slighted the Enemy, their very name seeming to have infused so much terror into all the *Italians*, as that neither Princes nor People had dared to oppose them, but afforded them free and safe passage every where. On the contrary, the *Italians* accustomed only to such Wars as were made in *Italy*, wherein little valor was shewn, and less discipline, without almost any loss of blood, as if it were for meer shew and sport, were to fear the unusual encounter with the *French*, and to boot with their valor to apprehend their prosperity, which had made the way so easie to them to so great and so noble an acquisition. The Kings party was likewise favored by the Kings own presence, and the danger which his own person was in; which occasioned no small daring in the French Soldiery, some being thereunto stirr'd up by their natural love to their King, others by hopes of reward, and others for fear of punishment. But of all things else,

the

the diverſity of the cauſe ought to be of greateſt moment. For the *French* had no hopes of ſafety, ſave what lay in their Arms, being in an Enemies Country, the way in their return home very difficult, by reaſon of the craggy Mountains though they ſhould meet with no impediment by the Enemy; the Army of the Colleagues ſuffered not under the like neceſſity, for being at its own home, it might be ſure upon any adverſe fortune to have ſafe receptacle in every City. Moreover, the *Italians* were incited to fight, onely out of a deſire of honor, or of revenge, and this was much more in the Princes and Commanders, then in the common Soldier; which things being well conſidered, might by reaſon of what is the uſual iſſue of ſuch actions, cauſe rather doubt, then hope of victory, if they ſhould come to a day of Battel; or at leaſt might make it appear, that buſineſſes were ſo equally balanced, and ſo doubtful, as where there was no inforcing neceſſity, to purſue a buſineſs ſo full of danger, was not worth the while. We muſt now conſider the advantage, as alſo the diſadvantage which might happen upon the good or bad ſucceſs of the battel; which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncertain, yet out of the aforeſaid reſpects it was now both thoſe in extremity. We will ſay that the then chief moving cauſe was, to drive the *French* Army out of *Italy*, and to reſtore thoſe of *Aragon* to their Kingdom, out of which they were driven by K. *Charls*. The confederate Princes might in all liklihood have compaſt this their intention by other more ſafe, and more ſecure means. For what diſturbance might they meet withal, in the enterpriſe which they were to endeavor againſt the *French* in the very Kingdom of *Naples*, from that Army which haſted to paſs over the Mountains, and was to diſſolve of it ſelf? And ſay that thoſe people ſhould be routed and defeated, ſhould therefore the Kingdom of *Naples* be diſpoſed of according to the pleaſure of the Italian Victors? No certainly, for the King had already left ſtrong Gariſons there of his beſt Soldiers to ſecure it. The victory could not be ſo great, and favorable for the *Italians*, but that they muſt have loſt ſome of their men; ſo as if they had a mind to attempt any thing upon the affairs of *Naples*, it had been better for them to have gone with all their Forces upon that enterpriſe, then to give battel to thoſe, who did not any waies oppoſe their deſign, ſince when they ſhould have overcome them, they were to go with that Army, leſſened by the Battel, and wearied with marching, to the main buſineſs of taking the Kingdom of *Naples*, where the things offered at by *Ferdinand* would have had eaſier ſucceſs if he had entred the Kingdom with greater Forces, and as he was willingly received by the City of *Naples*, whither he might come at firſt with thoſe few men he had, ſo would the reſt of the Cities willingly have revolted from the *French*, and have put themſelves under the obedience of *Ferdinand*, if they had ſeen he had Forces ſufficient to defend himſelf, and to make good their rebellion. But ſay that the Colleagues would have ſecured themſelves yet better from the *French*, to the end, that their intentions upon the Kingdom of *Naples* might not be hindred or diverted; had it not been better for them to go with the Army of the league to find out Monſieur *d'Orleans*, who at the ſame time had poſſeſt himſelf of the City of *Novara*, to drive him out of *Italy*, together with thoſe of his party who had ſeiſed themſelves there, then to follow thoſe, who did of themſelves that which was moſt deſired by the league, to wit, haſten back over the mountains? Nay, it may be further ſaid, that unleſs the *French* ſhould be neceſſitated, as ſeeing their King in danger, as alſo that Army which was purſued by the *Italians*, they would not peradventure have ſent at that time more men into *Italy*, and Monſieur *d'Orleans* would not have had any occaſion to have poſſeſt himſelf of *Novara*, which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the Colleagues, and particularly to the buſineſs of *Naples*: For part of thoſe Forces which were promiſed and intended to aſſiſt *Ferdinand* in the recovery of the Kingdom, marched to the recovery of *Novara*, out of deſire whereof,

Ledowick

Lodowick Sforza did at last draw himself out of the league. Whence it appears, that it was rather revenge, or vain-glory, then any just reason which the Princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy, that moved them to resolve upon fighting the French Army.

But let us now consider more particularly, what of advantage, what of good the Colleagues might have got, if they had had the better of that Battel. The best which they could hope for, for all these their pains and dangers, could be nothing else but the routing of those Forces, which were not likely to make War any more in *Italy*; and the *Italians* had as then no reason to think of any Transalpine Affairs. It may be the person of the King, who was then in the Army, might peradventure be considerable, if he had faln into the power of the Colleagues; But both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger, and say he had been taken prisoner, he might have found many wales how to escape. And say all things had faln out according to the wish of the Colleagues, what would the *Italians* have gotten by having so great a Prisoner, but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of Foreiners, which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers? That warlike Nation, which was at this time more then at any other, devoted to their King, would not have sat down by such an indignity, such an injury without revenging it with their own Forces, and by drawing other Transalpine Nations who wished not well to the glory of *Italy*, especially in Military Affairs to joyn with them.

Let us see an example of this in what followed the next Age after; where we shall find that the imprisonment of King *Francis*, though taken by so great a Prince as was *Charls* the Fifth, to whom none of the Princes of the League, no not the whole League it self was to be compared, produced nothing, but longer, and more heavy Wars, which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered. But on the contrary, let us imagine into what ruine *Italy* would have faln, if the Army of the League had been routed and defeated, the Enemy being in the State of *Milan* wherein are so many and so noble Cities, for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot, then those which were to hazard themselves in that Battel; and to raise another Army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies, and so victorious, would be a business of some time, and very hard to do if not impossible. And if the very name of the *French*, and the fame of their Forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them, and so easie the conquest of so noble a Kingdom, what mischief had they not reason to expect, if by the discomfeiture of that Army, the Forces, not onely as formerly, of the Kings of *Aragon*, should have been beaten of whole *Italy*, and also such forein Forces as could be ready to afford any succor, for in that Army were all the Soldiers, that the King of *Spain* had in *Italy*? So as there was not any State which upon such an accident could promise it self security. Affairs then standing upon this foor, who can praise the advice taken by the confederates, of fighting the *French*? But on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor, wisdom, and maturity of the *Italians* in this action, to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them, it is very likely that the flourishing condition, and prosperity of *Charls* King of *France* began at that time to make him be hated and suspected not onely by all the Italian Princes, but also not very acceptable to the King of *Spain*; insomuch as he who had called him into *Italy* did already repent his rash advice, and he who did not withstand him, blamed himself for his slackness, and irresolution: so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that King, and to curb his prosperity, and his thoughts of further achievements. If then the King had been suffered to return without any let, safe and triumphant into his Kingdom, was it not to be feared, that the *French* not content

with

with their having got the Kingdom of *Naples*, would pass over the Mountains the next year again with greater Forces? to what danger would the Dukedom of *Milan* and *Tuscany* have been exposed? upon which States it was known that the *French* had set their minds, neither would they have spared the rest, if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further.

And if the *Italians* should have seemed but to doubt their beating those Soldiers, who were but the remainder of an Army which had first past the Mountains, and had left a good part of their Forces in several Garrisons in the Kingdom of *Naples*, many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents; what hopes had they to withstand their entire, and much greater Forces, with which they were to return the next year on this side the Mountains to new enterprises? Nor had they any reason to despair of victory, since the Colleagues had an Army for number of men much greater then the Enemy, commanded by experienced and valiant Officers, well provided both of Curasiers and Light-horse, well disposed to all actions, and which were to fight with people oppress with fear, and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves; especially the advantage considered which the assailants for the most part have. It was further considered, that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded, or to cool the courage of other men; since the *French* had not onely not met with any occasion of fighting, but had not so much as seen the face of an Enemy; since the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter, for that it was unexpected, they being accustomed to find all passages open, not needing to make their way by the sword. Nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves, by beating a victorious Army, and a warlike Nation, the person of so great a King being also in that Army; wherefore in such a case, the French-mens courage was rather to fail, then to avial them. And it was to be beleeved that the Enemies to that Crown wou'd the sooner appear against them, as the Emperor *Maximilian*, *Henry* King of *England*, and that *Ferdinand* King of *Spain* would continue the more firm to the *Italian* confederacie. Then what courage, or what hope of succour would those French-men have, who were left behind for the defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*? and the City of *Novara*, which though it were back'd with the Kings men, who to this purpose kept his Army a long time together after the Battel, was reduced to so great streights by the Colleagues, as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to *Sforza*; would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victory? Neither would this have been an occasion of dissention (as afterwards it was) amongst the Colleagues, and which bereft them of the chiefest advantage which that confederacie could hope for.

These are the Considerations which we may conceive did move those Princes to resolve upon following the French Army, and to join battel with it. But that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason, is, that the Battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice, but happened partly out of necessity, both Armies being already drawn very near, and partly upon a resolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place. But the Princes of the Leagues truest intention was to necessitate the King of *France*, when he should see so great a preparation for War to be made against him, to hasten his departure the more, and to enforce him to draw so many more of his men from the Kingdom of *Naples*, that so he might make his passage the surer. And that the Kingdom not having sufficient Garisons to defend it, might the more easily fall into the power of the *Aragoneses*, for whom the same Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by Sea to assault it. Nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past, that the States of *Italy* were free from the insolencies of the *French*, unless the Princes of *Italy* should either put themselves into a posture of War, or if they

should

ſhould keep their Forces far diſtant from the way whereby the King was to return for *France*, ſince in his former paſſage to the enterpriſe of *Naples*, though he was more neceſſitated to make haſt, and had greater need of making himſelf Friends more by favor then by force, he had notwithſtanding uſed ſtrange novelties in *Tuſcany*, which the *Florentines* did much reſent. And who could have aſcertained that he would not do the like in his return, in all other parts, where meeting with no obſtacle, he might meet with opportunity of pleaſing himſelf, or procuring any thing of advantage?

The Colleagues ſeeking to provide for theſe miſchiefs, & rather to ſhun new inconveniencies, then endeavor to repair their paſt loſſes, they thought it the beſt courſe that their Army ſhould follow that of the Kings, ſo to keep him in perpetual jealouſie and ſuſpition, and hinder him if he ſhould make any attempt; hoping likewiſe, as they had like to have done, that this was the way to make the King come to ſome good agreement with them, which had been often endeavored, and not without hopes of good ſucceſs, even when the Camps were very near together. But the Colleagues, incited either by the Armies being ſo near together, by the deſire of glory, or hope of victory; or perchance being inforc'd ſo to do, as it uſually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to ſtraight paſſages, they fought the *French*; the Commanders of the Leagues Army, were then to have conſidered, that they had more reaſon to hope for victorie, then to fear loſs in that daies fight, as the effect did in part prove, it being the common opinion, that had not their own men been put into great diſorder, by their own light-horſe, who fell too ſoon to pillage the Enemies Camp, they would have had a full and glorious victory. But though the buſineſs ſhould have ſucceeded otherwiſe, they knew the ſtate of affairs to be ſuch, as the victory on the Kings behalf could not occaſion them thoſe great miſchiefs, which upon ſuch an occaſion have been conſidered, the Kings Forces not being ſo great when moſt entire, much leſs being much weakened by the conflict, as could prove very formidable. Such like events may teach us not to attempt ſuch things in which it is hard to reſolve, and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful; nor to bring our ſelves to ſuch a condition, as the neceſſity of putting on another reſolve, bereaves us of choice. Nor will it be a leſs uſeful precept for Princes, to have a great care, and to be very well adviſed in chuſing their Commanders, which are to have the chief imployment in great enterpriſes; for if their nature and cuſtoms be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the Prince, it is in vain to give them any Inſtructions or Commiſſions; for oft-times a reſolution is to be put on upon the main concern, wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatſoever ſtrict command which the Commonwealth of *Venice* had experience of particularly in this daies fight, in the Marquis of *Mantua*, and ſome years after with much more danger and damage in *Bartholomio d' Alviano*, at the Battel of *Giaradada*; in both which perſonages, natural ardor and too vehement a deſire of glory, prevailed over the Senates wiſe and moderate counſels.

The Fifth DISCOURSE.

Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises.

AMongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty State Affairs, and of War enterprises, one, and a chief one, is that of Leagues, and Confederacies, in which divers Potentates do joyn, either out of some particular design of their own, or for their better securitie, or to abate the power of others. And the weakness of Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline, hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions, in these latter times, then we have heard of formerly. So as now adaies, as also in some later times past, when any great enterprise is debated upon, recourse is forthwith had to Leagues, by means and vertue whereof, it is usually thought, that greater ends may be compassed, then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State; and chiefly to curb and keep under those Forces which do threaten whole Christendom with most danger and damage. Those who speak in the behalf of these Leagues, and who heighten the hopes thereof, use these or the like reasons.

First, because reason, & natures self doth teach us, that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers, makes the motion the greater, and more powerful; and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone, is easily found amongst many. There is hardly any one so weak, or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune, who may not be some help to another, by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others. This is the cause why in humane actions, and especially in such as are of the nobler sort, the perfectest are those which are most compounded: The best harmonie is composed of differing Tones of Voytes. The perfectest State Governments (alwaies provided that they be essential and not meer Idea's) are those which being composed of the Three best, do comprehend the perfections of all the Three; and it is easie to observe the like in many other things. And *Aristotle*, when he would shew the perfection which proceeds in every thing from this concourse and union of many, doth instance in the example well known in those times of publick banquets and entertainments, where those wherein many were imployed, some in one thing, some in another, proved more noble and sumptuous, then those which were made by any one onely, though never so wealthy Citizen. Let us then gather by this, that such Forces likewise, wherein several Potentates do concur, for some noble and important action, where every one lends his assistance and advice, will be fitter to atchieve any great enterprise, then those of one onely, though never so great a Prince.

In War there are several Offices, and several imployments, whereunto we see that one Nation is not so proper (be it either by reason of the several influences of the Heavens, or through custom which is a second nature) as is another: So in this mistery of War, several people prove proper for several imployments. In pitcht Battels, the *Dutch* and *Switzers* have exceeded others, and have purchast most fame; The *Italians* have been alwaies esteemed for making assaults, and storming of Cities; and the *Spainards* are held better then others at defending a strong hold, by reason of their undergoing labor and disquiet, and for their dexteritie in military

actions.

actions. Others are better at Horſe-ſervice then on foot, as the *Frenchs*; others are good at Seafaring, and at Maritime Diſcipline, as the *Genoaſes*, *Portugeſes*, and *Venetians*; and others have been particularly addicted to other exercíſes. So as thoſe who are able to imploy ſeveral people, and ſeveral Forces, as Leagues may do, (eſpecially if they be made between puiſſant Princes) may have great deſigns; for they ſhall have wherewith to offend, and defend, both by Land and Sea, and numbers enough of Soldiers, fit to undertake and accompliſh whatſoever Enterpriſe. But beſides this, many things are requiſite for the maintaining a long War; Arms, Ammunition, Victuals, Money, and other things, the which no one State can ſufficiently furniſh, at leaſt not without much incommodity, for any long time: but where many joyn together, and every one furniſheth ſomewhat which they moſt abound in, the enterpriſe is ſure not to be impeded nor retarded, for want of any thing, nor for the difficulties which are occaſioned thereby. Moreover, for great enterpriſes, as they cannot be ſo ſoon effected, ſo are they ſubject to the hazard of ill ſucceſs, when they depend upon one onely Commander, who when he is loſt, there is never another of equal authority, valor and experience left to ſucceed him; for there are but few of thoſe that are fit for much pains-taking, and for management of great affairs. Inſomuch as that State is very happy, which in more then one Age meets with a generous and warlike Prince; and that Prince is very fortunate who when he will not follow the Wars in his own perſon, hath a Subject of his ſo qualified, as becomes him to be who is to command an Army, when the War is difficult, and of importance; which is the cauſe why we often-times ſee great enterpriſes which are well begun, precipitate into great diſorders and ruines.

The death of *Alexander* the Great, without any legitimate Heirs fit to undertake the Government of ſuch an Empire, and of ſo weighty affairs, kept the *Macedonians* and *Grecians* (of which two Nations his valiant and unconquered Army did conſiſt) from following his proſperous courſe, and from conquering the Weſt, as he had done the Eaſt, and which whilſt he was alive, he had propoſed to himſelf to do. The *Carthaginians* chiefeſt ruine aroſe from the want of Commanders; for having placed their hopes in one onely *Hannibal*, they were forced to ſend for him back out of *Italy*, to defend themſelves in *Africa* againſt *Scipio*; and his fortune forgoing him, when he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themſelves unto, to uphold their tottering Commonwealth. But in Leagues there is no ſuch hazard run; ſince the beſt Commanders that are in any of the Confederate Princes States may be imploied, and the Princes themſelves may ſerve upon an urgent occaſion; ſo as one Commander being loſt, another may be found to ſucceed him, of as great excellency and worth. For every State hath uſually in all Ages had ſome one man more eminent then the reſt, unto whom in greateſt extremities they have recourſe. So as a League, if we ſuppoſe it to be like a well Fabrickt humane body, may, ſince it hath the ſtrength of many Dominions united in it, be reſembled to *Briareus* for ſtrength; for as he had a hundred hands, to make uſe of as he pleaſed in ſeveral actions, ſo many do lend help to ſuch a League, and make it ſtronger and fitter for any undertaking. Moreover when we have to do with a very powerful Prince, as it falls out in great Enterpriſes, if we will weaken his ſtrength, we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided, and imploied in ſeveral parts, for ſo they are leſſened, and become leſs apt to make reſiſtance; but as this will be hard for a ſingle Prince to do, though a great one, for he who will drive another man from his own home muſt be much ſtronger then he; ſo is it more eaſily done when many are confedrates together, and this not onely becauſe ſeveral Forces joyned together, prove the greater (as hath been ſaid) and ſeveral Armies abounding with all things neceſſary may be thereout framed, but for

the commodiousness which several confederate States have, of assaulting the Enemies Country, at one and the same time, in several parts. Wherefore when any great and difficult enterprise was to be undertaken (not to speak of antient times) but of more modren ones, against the *Saracens*, and the *Turks*, two Nations, which have governed and domineered in these latter times with great fame and force, recourse was had to Leagues, to *Cruſadas*, and to the unions of Christian Princes, by means whereof notable things have been done against those cruel Barbarians.

How many Princes, how many several Nations join'd together in the time of Pope *Urban* the Second, for the recovery of the Holy Land? About Fifty thousand fighting men were raised, commanded in chief by *Godfrey* of *Bullen*, who gained so many and so famous Victories, and so worthy of eternal glory; this holy League having regained more then a hundred Cities in *Asia*, which were possest by the *Saracens*. And in the time of *Balawin* the Third, King of *Jeruſalem*, when the Emperor *Conradus* and *Lodowick* King of *France*, joining together with other lesser Princes, went themselves in person against the said *Saracens*, did not they do excellent exploits, though couzened and be rayed by some Lords of *Asia*, they could not continue on their enterprise with like success as at the first. And hath not this last Age seen one of the most signal and illustrious Naval victories that was ever heard of? which was the fight at *Lepanto*, which was won from the *Turks* by the League of the Christian Princes. But let us add somewhat more in pursuit of our former considerations. Greatest enterprises, though happily begun, are oftimes left imperfect, when they depend upon the Forces of one only Prince; for the rest of his neighboring Princes, either out of envy, or fear of his greater prosperity, take up Arms against him to make him give over the hopes of further acquisitions, and bethink himself of defending his home-affairs; and to keep the scales more equal between him and his neighbors, and to take away the jealousies of State, which are of all other things most dangerous, and whereof we have infinite examples. But when a weighty War is to be undertaken by the Forces of many Joint-Potentates, this suspition ceases; for Leagues are usually made with other Princes and neighboring States, or with such as are concern'd in common interest. And this Amity or Confederacie doth not only secure those States with whom the Confederacie is contracted, so as the one fears not the other; but it preserves each of them from the injuries that any may go about to do to any of the Confederates. For one State supporting another by reason of their convention, things are so well and stoutly govern'd, as People not being able to worst them, keep from molesting them, knowing that by offending any one Confederate, they shall draw upon them the Forces of all the rest, and hasten their own ruine. Every one of these Princes may then by reason of their strait conjunction and confederacie with others, more boldly and more resolutely undertake and accomplish any whatsoever enterprise, without danger of being diverted by any particular interest of his own. And all these Considerations are better confirm'd by many notable examples. *Greece* was assaulted by *Xerxes*, that powerful Prince of *Persia*, with an infinite number of men both by Sea and Land; almost all the several People of that Province, united and confeder.t'd together against this so great a warlike power: And such was the efficacie of this union, as that though one only *Greece* was to withstand the Forces of almost all the Eastern Nations who were flock'd together to that enterprise, but still under the Imperial command and conduct of one and the same King *Xerxes*, they did not only make their part good, but repulsed so puissant an Enemy, much to his own prejudice

The associate War which happened in the time of *Marius* and *Sylla*, wherein many Associates and Confederates of the *Romans* did conspire together against the Common-

Commonwealth of *Rome*, though the Confederates were all of them but weak people, as the *Marucini*, *Veſtini*, *Samnites*, *Lucans*, and other of their neighbors, yet was this War held one of the moſt dangerous that the people of *Rome* did ever ſuſtain: For theſe people had join'd themſelves together with much fervor, to revenge themſelves of the Roman Nobility, who had firſt promiſed them, and then denied them the liberty of being Citizens of *Rome*. And in theſe later Ages, whole *Germany* having confederated together againſt the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, was able to raiſe ſo numerous an Army, though all the German Princes did not concur therein, as did much perplex and endanger *Charls*. Which examples prove what many Forces, though weaker being taken apart, can do when join'd together, againſt one potent Prince. Theſe then may ſeem ſufficient reaſons and examples to ground a favorable concluſion in the behalf of Leagues, and to make them be held a ſtrong and powerful means to order great enterpriſes by, and to bring them to a good end.

Yet there be many good Conſiderations which may be alleadged on the contrary part; ſo as he who ſhall mind realities, and not what the magnificencie of name or preparations do promiſe, will doubt much whether theſe Leagues and Confederacies do really prove what they appear to be. It is moſt certain, that as the trueſt perfection conſiſts in union, and that whatſoever will partake of that, muſt be reduced to this; ſo may all our humane actions prove the more ſucceſsful and perfect, the more reducible they are to this unity; and if it happen to ſome ſometimes otherwiſe, it is becauſe thoſe ſome are not capable thereof either of themſelves, or becauſe their corrupted cuſtoms will not ſuffer them ſo to be: But it is not to be denied, but that in all humane actions, chiefly ſuch wherein great affairs are concern'd, and more chiefly in matters of War, after mature advice taken, ſudden execution is requiſite; and that it is neceſſary to reduce all things as much as may be to this unity: So as the ſoveraign authority conſiſt in one only, and not in many; for the multiplicity of thoſe that concur (eſpecially by way of parity) in the ſame action, doth not help, but rather diſorder and confound. Then look how much harder it is to reduce things to an unity in a League, the leſs gallant do they prove, and leſs fit for proſecution of great affairs: For they contain, and almoſt naturally, ſuch contrarieties, as muſt occaſion the ſudden corruption thereof. Several are the thoughts of ſeveral men, the cuſtoms of Nations different, and (which in this caſe is of moſt importance) the counſels and reſolutions by which confederate Princes govern themſelves, do not only differ, but are for the moſt part contrary, according as State-jealouſies are apt to breed occaſion of falling out. The powerful deſire after Rule never ſuffers right to be known, nor people to be therewith contented: It is therefore to be obſerved, that in all Ages the greateſt and moſt ſignal actions in War have been done and accompliſh'd by the worth and proſperity of one only Prince, or at leaſt of one ſole Potentate, with a ſeries of divers Princes and Captains who have commanded therein. *Alexander* the Great, the Commonwealth of *Rome*, *Charls* the Great, and in theſe latter times the Ottoman Empire, not to mention many others who have been great and potent, though not altogether ſo highly cry'd up, did all of them ariſe to that height of glory and power by the power and worth of one only Command, with the true and proper military diſcipline of each of them, and under the conduct of one and the ſame Principality. On the contrary, Leagues ſhew their weakneſs at the very firſt ſight: For company and multiplicity denotes always imperfection, and in this particular makes it be known, that thoſe things which a Prince or a Commonwealth cannot by reaſon of their weakneſs do of themſelves, and by their own Forces, they ſeek to effect it by the company and help of others. Wherefore (as it hath been ſaid) in this reſpect Leagues have been more frequently uſed in theſe latter Ages, then of old: for

many

many Princes and States are failing in military worth and courage, and not able of themselves to do any notable action, so as one Nation, or one Prince not being able to overcome another, and all of them wanting the excellencie of good Orders, he who hath at any time endeavored to advance himself by some deligh, hath been forced to have recourse to the advantage of Leagues; of which *Italy*, since by reason of the declination of the Western Empire, she hath been divided into so many members, and Seignories, hath in particular afforded many examples, which may serve to teach whatsoever belongs to these Leagues: whereof we do not read of any great good effect which hath ensued at last, or at least which have continued long in their first prosperity; for their Forces, though powerful enough of themselves, when met withal by contrary respects, and wearied in their first attempts, have soon gone but lamely off. And he who shall well consider such particulars as are most necessary in great undertakings, will easily see how badly they do correspond in Leagues. Deliberations would be wise and mature, but not slow, and unseasonable; execution would be speedy and bold; counsels are oft-times to be taken upon unexpected accidents; the end of all ought to be one and the same, though the Offices, Degrees, and Authorities be different; the respect and aim one and the same, whereunto all resolutions do tend; to wit, the safety, glory and the greatness of that Prince or State, for whom the War is made; the reward and honor one and the same, and alike the loss and shame, so as the possibility of having means to lay the fault on another, do not retard the doing of what is fitting.

These are things which have alwaies been hard, and rare to be found; yet they may the more easily be met withal in an enterprise which is undertaken by one onely wise Prince, or by one well governed Commonwealth; But in Leagues all things run counter byas to these important affairs. It is not alwaies generositie, but fear which makes a Prince take up Arms, which likewise makes others joyn with him, who other wise do much differ from him in desires, and interest: but that brunt being over, and every one being in their former particular, and more natural condition, he who dreads War bends to idleness, and willingly takes all occasions to change War for Peace; and he who was become a friend by reason of some contingencie, not out of any good will, discovering his real affection upon some other occasion, or by reason of some change, returns to be not onely as formerly, an Enemy, but more inveterate then before; so as these Ties of Common interests being soon loosened either by particular interest, or by some other affection, hatred, confusion, and disorder doth thereupon ensue.

The Moralists say, That friendship cannot long continue between those where one and the same thing is not interchangeably given and received; and that therefore true friendship is onely found, where the end is not that which is advantag ous or delightful (because equal correspondencie is not usually there) but what is honest, which alwaies is, and does still continue the same on all behalfs. In the Friendship or Leagues of Princes, every one hath his own convenencie, and particular benefit for his aimed at end, and then the like of others onely so far, as by accident it may square with his. But it commonly falls out, that what makes for one, makes against another; so as the same things cannot please all: wherefore a thousand accidents do easily cause diversity of opinions, contentions and breaches, so as hardly any League hath been able to preserve it self any long time. It is also usually seen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many; and therefore in Leagues, which are fastned together but with weak Ties, whilst one doth either trust upon anothers provisions, or is ill satisfied with others omissions, men neglect their own duties, and study more to pick a hole in anothers coat, then to mind his own business. The ignominy which may insue upon such defaults, and

the

the loſs of reputation, which uſe to be great incitements to a noble mind, are not ſo much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together, becauſe the way lies fair to excuſe ones ſelf, by laying the fault upon another, or at leaſt the fault is leſſened by others being ſharers therein.

Thus that common benefit, which is ſo magnified and cried up, and which ought to be their onely object, is found onely in a certain fancied Idea, and in a *potentia remota*, or in a vain and uſeleſs appearance, whilſt none endeavor to reduce it to its true, eſſential, and perfect being, by laying aſide their own proper and peculiar advantage, and by directing his actions to the common good of his Colleagues. So as he who ſhall duly conſider what the firſt intention is of making a League, and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards, and to what ends it is directed, will by many evident examples find it quickly ſo transformed, as though it meet not with any external forces, it eaſily diſſolves and moulders away of it ſelf. Leagues made by Chriſtians againſt the Turks have oft-times in particular met with theſe impediments and difficulties; the League between Pope *Alexander* the Sixt, and the three moſt powerful Kingdoms of *Europe*, the Kingdoms of *Spain*, *France*, and *Portugal*, and the Commonwealth of *Venice*, was ſtipulated with great hopes and noble intentions; the *Venetian* and *French* Fleet came into the *Archipelago*, where they had ſome proſperous ſucceſs; but the forces of the other Colleagues were in vain expected the firſt year, and it ended the ſecond year before it had fully effected any thing, by reaſon of the diſcords which aroſe between the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, which were occaſioned by the diviſion of *Naples*, ſo as theſe Princes turned their Arms each upon other, which were intended againſt the Infidels. The league made between Pope *Paul* the Thrid, the Emperor *Charls* the Fift, and the Commonwealth of *Venice*, againſt *Sultan Soliman*, likewiſe ended almoſt as ſoon as it was begun; and it is too well known, as being of reſcent memory, what occaſions of victories were thereby loſt, and out of what reſpects. But what greater thing could be expected from any League, then from that which God bleſt with the famous victory at the *Curzolari* Iſlands? Yet how ſlight a matter was able to retard the glorious atchievements which were with reaſon to be expected from thence, when a ſlight ſuſpition of the *Spainards*, that the States of *Flanders* might be moleſted by the *French*, by reaſon of the going of the Duke of *Alanſon*, the Kings Brother towards thoſe parts, was ſufficient to keep back the Fleet which was deſtined for ſo great affair in the *Levant*, and to make the beſt ſeaſon of the year paſs over without any advantage; whereupon all other things fell into great diſorders, and the League was quickly terminated. Neither can this natural motion of Leagues be ſo ſtopt by any means or endeavors, as that all the Colleagues may have the ſame intentions in preſerving it.

What greater reaſon can one Prince have to promiſe unto himſelf the continuance of friendſhip, and fidelity from another, then had the Commonwealth of *Venice* to expect, firſt, from *Lewis* the Twelfth, and then from *Francis* the Firſt, both of them Kings of *France*? Since to keep from any waies violating the friendſhip and conjunction, which ſhe held with the former; ſhe drew upon her the Forces of *Maximilian* the Emperor, and expoſed her State to ſo much labor, and danger; and did ſo long maintain a great part of the expence of a weighty War, firſt, to free the Seconds own perſon from Priſon, and then his Sons; yet (as uſually affection prevails more in the minds of Princes, then common reaſon, or juſtice by which private perſons govern themſelves) *Lewis*, breaking off his antient Capitulation, which he held with the Commonwealth, was a great means to make all the Princes of *Europe* conſpire againſt her; and *Francis*, as ſoon as he had made what advantage he could by the agreement, laying aſide all other reſpects, made peace for himſelf alone with the Emperor, leaving the Common-

wealth

wealth exposed to great toil and danger of War. So as when any stedfastness is found in any Colleague, all that is to be said, is, That as he that doth observe it deserves to be praised for his fidelitie, so he that doth rely too much thereupon, is not to be much commended for civil wisdom. But it may be moreover considered, that many times the Colleagues begin to squire but badly in the very beginning of their agreement, which tends much to the prejudice of the common interest. Whilst the last League against *Selinus* the Turkish Emperor was in treaty, and when it was so high time to relieve *Cyprus*, it was long and importunately argued in *Rome*, where they were first to imploy the Forces of the League; and some of the Spanish Ministers were so blinded with their particular interest, as they propounded and stifly maintain'd it to the very great prejudice and loss of time, that as soon as the League should be fully agreed upon, the Forces thereof should march to the Sea-coasts of *Africa*, to take in such places as they thought might make most for the advantage of *Spain*; not weighing that whilst they should leave their Enemies powerful, with the Fleet safe and entire in the *Levant*, it was very vainly done to think of getting such things, which though they should succeed well, must be to no purpose, and must quickly prove unfortunate, as experience shewed afterwards, and which reason could not perswade before.

But if these peculiar respects be at first concealed, they break forth in the process of time, and worke sometime worser effects in such of the Colleagues as are either weakest, or do confide most in the Confederacie. *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, though falling off from the other Colleagues, he joined with great offers and protestations with the Commonwealth of *Venice*; yet when the City of *Brescia* was recovered, he would keep it for himself, and appropriate the first fruit of victory to himself, which by the former, and by renewed capitulations was destin'd to others. Pope *Clement* the Seventh, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, and the Duke of *Milan* join'd together in League against *Cæsar*; but their ends were, if not apparently contrary, at least intrinsecally different. The King of *France* desired by all means to free the Crown of *France* from some prejudice which he had done it by the former agreement with *Cæsar*, and to set his Sons at liberty, who were left with him in nature of Hostages: But on the contrary, the other Confederates chief endeavour was, to take the Dukedom of *Milan* from *Cæsar*, and to secure *Italy* from his power. The enterprise was begun with prosperous success, the Italian Princes doing readily what became them; but the King of *France*, when he knew how to obtain his ends by another way, and began to suspect the Colleagues constancie, did neither make War on the other side the Mountains, nor did he send his Forces into *Italy*, as he was bound to do: Whereupon the League which was made with great preparation, with good beginning, and better hopes, ended in an agreement, which was voluntary and advantagious on the Kings behalf by the recovery of his Children, but inforced, and not over-secure on the behalf of the other Colleagues, who fell short of their conceived hopes, being abandoned by their Friend and Confederate, the King.

To know then the truth amidst this diversity of reasons and examples, we must distinguish and consider apart for what occasions, and with what respects every League is made, what the end therein proposed is, and upon what terms and conditions it is concluded; for by these particulars we may the better know what good or bad may be expected by joyning together in League, and whether the League be likely to be of short, or of long duration. Sometimes Leagues are made by Princes or Popularities out of necessary defence, and to provide opportunely for their own safeties; the Confederates obliging themselves by particular and stated obligations to defend each others State, when they shall be assaulted by any others from without: And such Leagues as these have proved profitable, as having respect to the preservation of Peace, and to a certain and honest end; and whilst nothing

thing but the common intereſt is treated of, ſo as they have all the ſame object, as well in maintaining, as in making the Confederacie. The Confederacie made between the Pope, the King of *Naples*, the Commonwealth of *Florence*, the Duke of *Milan*, and other leſſer Italian Princes, did long preſerve the Peace of *Italy*, and was for a while very advantagious for the Colleagues; for the only driſt thereof was to conſtitute ſome aſſured bounds to every of their powers, and to ſettle them in a juſt temperature, making the Confederates thereby the ſtronger and more able to withſtand any one that ſhould attempt any thing againſt them. Sometimes again Leagues are made for more neceſſary ſelf-defence, and which muſt ſuddenly be actuated; to wit, when a State is aſſaulted by one more powerful, and that the neighboring Princes, leſt themſelves might ſuffer if they ſhould permit a neighboring power to grow too great by the ruine of that State, do take up Arms jointly for the defence thereof, in whoſe defence they know their own ſafeties are concerned, ſince they might ſoon incur the like danger, if they ſhould not keep him at a further diſtance from the others home. And ſuch a League may alſo at firſt do gallant and memorable things, if it ſo fall out that the condition of affairs being altered in the ſame League, and the Colleagues intereſts becoming different, they will advance further with thoſe Forces, and with more full intentions to ruine that Foe-Potentate, and take occaſion by joining in League to increaſe in State and power. When theſe reſpects, and their contraries already handled are conſidered, theſe Leagues do uſually loſe all their efficacie, ſince they fail in their chiefeſt and ſureſt groundwork, when the trueſt conjunction fails, which is that of Princes minds, thoughts and deſigns, whence conformable actions, and ſuch as are of great efficacie and worth do ariſe.

Almoſt all the People of *Greece* join'd together to defend themſelves againſt *Xerxes* his Forces, a mighty King of *Perſia*, who came to aſſault them with an innumerable Army; and they got that famous Victory by Sea at *Salamis*, which furniſh'd them at the ſame time with proſperous ſucceſſes at Land, where they put the ſame King to flight: And *Greece* was preſerved at that time by vertue of that League from ſo great a danger, againſt which it appeared almoſt impoſſible that ſhe could defend herſelf. So likewiſe in theſe latter times, the Pope, and *Philip* King of *Spain* join'd with the Commonwealth of *Venice* in defence of the Kingdom of *Cyprus*, (to whom that Kingdom, as part of her Territories, did chiefly belong) when it was aſſaulted by powerful Turkiſh Forces; and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy, they bore away that famous and ſingular Victory, which will be celebrated in all Ages; the Turkiſh Forces were routed and ſhattered at Sea, and their honor and courage leſſened: But when all this was done, what other thing did the victorious *Grecians*, anſwerable to the hopes which were expected from that their ſo great Victory, the whole fruit whereof at their return home ended in the dividing of the booty? So alſo the Chriſtian League by Sea, did not only ſpend the reſt of that Autumn, a fit time for any enterpriſe which they could have undertaken, after the honor they had won in the aforeſaid Victory, in dividing the prey, and in other matters of ſmall moment, but alſo ſpent all the next enſuing Spring and Summer idly, without being able ſo much as to keep together, ſo to keep the Enemy from recruiting, to the great, notable, and woful example of what we are now in treaty of, and to ſhew that the Forces of Leagues are weak, though made between potent Princes. The purchaſe which is got, or which is hoped for, cannot be ſo equally divided and agreed upon, but that ſome of the Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater ſhare then the reſt; and every increaſe, be it ne'r ſo little, doth eaſily cauſe jealouſie, or at leaſt envy in the reſt. Almoſt all the Potentates of *Europe* convened together in the famous League of *Cambray* againſt the Commonwealth of *Venice*, allured by the hopes of being able to divide her

noble, rich, and flouriſhing State, which was ſo much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate Princes to make them endeavor by their joynt Forces to ſuppreſs the Commonwealth, and bereave her of all her riches. But as ſoon as the Colleagues firſt deſign began to diſcover themſelves, and begot jealouſies and ſuſpition amongſt them, inſomuch, as the very ſame Princes who had conſpired together to ruine the Commonwealth, did ſoon aſſiſt and ſuccor her, being become bitterer Enemies one to another, and amongſt themſelves (each others greatneſs becoming formidable and hateful to their companions) then they had been before out of the ſame reaſon to the *Venetians*, againſt whom they had joyntly taken up Arms.

It was not hard, though not very reaſonable, for *Lodowick* King of *France*, and *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, being blinded with the ſame deſire of enlarging their Territories, to joyn together in driving the *Aragonians* from out the Kingdom of *Naples*, but afterwards they did as eaſily diſagree, touching the dividing of what they had got; So as the League might help to bereave others of that Kingdom, but other Forces were requiſite for the appropriation of it to ones ſelf, and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the Militia, and of good counſel was likewiſe required. Leagues uſe likewiſe to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms againſt one new Prince, who is yet but weak, and not well ſetled in his State; as was ſeen by the example of the League made by the Princes of *Italy*, againſt the *Scalligers*, and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants; for Leagues being of ſome validity in their beginning, and not meeting with any ſtout reſiſtance, may at the very firſt effort have ruined the Enemy againſt whom ſuch Leagues were made, but when they have to do with a Potentate of eſteem, though he be inferior of himſelf, to the power of the Colleagues, they have not produced any great effects; as may be known by divers confederacies made by the Princes of *Italy*, againſt the Commonwealth of *Venice*; againſt which, as being become formidable to them all, though all *Italy* hath more then once taken up Arms, yet ſhe hath been able to defend herſelf againſt ſuch forces; for the firſt Efforts being withſtood, the reſt proved leſs difficult, by reaſon of the uſual weakneſs which Leagues are ſoon reduced unto. And it might have ſucceeded ſo with her likewiſe, in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of *Cambray*, had not *Alviano* with his unſeaſonable reſolution, of immaturely haſtning on the the Battel, drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth, which ſhe might eaſily have eſcaped by temporiſing, and the League have been diſſolved thereupon, as it was not long after.

Now by reaſſuming all theſe conſiderations, theſe general and true Concluſions may be thereout aſſerted; that Leagues may prove beneficial, either when they aim ſimply at defence, and at the maintaining of Peace, by the reputation of ſuch an union; or when one that is not able to defend himſelf by his own particular Forces, is actually aſſaulted by one that is more powerful then he, and whom he is not able to reſiſt of himſelf. For if no other good be got by ſuch unions, yet the buſineſs is ſpun out the longer, and there may be a way found out to deviate imminent ruine, by diverſion. But he who will confide too much upon ſuch Unions, or be leſs diligent in negotiating thoſe Affairs which of himſelf he is not able to do, will ſoon finde he is deceived; nay if he be not the more cautious, and circumſpect, he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend, as to his formally declared enemies. Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a meer and voluntary election of increaſing Territories, is very uncertain, and falacious, yet may prove good if many who be ſtrong and powerful joyn againſt one that is weak; but at laſt the fire is greater which breaks out amongſt the Colleagues themſelves, then that which they carried home to another mans houſe. But

that

that a State which is already grown great and powerful, may be oppreſt by the ſtrength of Leagues, unleſs it begin firſt to totter by reaſon of its internal diſorders, from what the experience of ſo many paſt paſſages teacheth, and from reaſon which is corroborated by cuſtom, is a thing which no man ought to promiſe to himſelf, unleſs he delight in flattering himſelf with vain and prejudicial hopes.

There remains yet ſome things to be ſtated which have formerly been alleadged in the behalf of Leagues, leſt they may get more credit amongſt men then they deſerve. To that then which was ſaid, That the multiplicity of the movers, make the greater motion, and things are better done by many, eſpecially things of the higheſt nature, then by reaſon of the imperfection and weakneſs of our humanity, can be effected by a few, it may be anſwered; That it is true, that the aſſiſtance of many is requiſite to the affecting of great things; but it is alſo as true, that for the right carrying on of affairs, it is requiſite that the ſecond cauſes (to ſpeak in terms of natural Philoſophie) ſhould be ſubordinate to the firſt, as is ſeen in the Order and Government of the world: So doubtleſly no great enterpriſes can be effected without Armies, Commanders, and a thouſand other neceſſaries; but by how much the more all theſe are conſtituted under the power of one alone, by which their order and union is the greater, the work they take in hand will prove ſo much the more excellent and perfect. A Prince, though ſingle in what he goes about, is not forbidden the making uſe of Soldiers of ſeveral Nations in his Militia, to the end that he may have an Army (as hath been ſaid) fitter for any military action, in buſineſſes which are at once undertaken againſt ſeveral States, ſo as all of them be to be underſtood as Enemies, though they be not confederates; but the trueſt and ſecureſt rule in this caſe would be, to be ſo careful and diligent in training up, and in diſciplining a Prince his own Militia, as that he may be able to provide for all actions of War, out of men of his own Dominions, as we ſee thoſe have done who have done the moſt glorious actions. The ſame may be ſaid of other things belonging to War, for which a wiſe Prince ought ſo to provide, as that he may rely upon himſelf, and not upon the friendſhip of others. As for the aſſertion, that Leagues do abound in Chieftains fit to command Armies; this proves not alwaies true by reaſon of the ſcarcity of excellent men which hath been found in all Ages; or ſay that ſuch be to be found amongſt confederate Princes, they uſe to cauſe more of diſcord and contention, by reaſon that every one pretends to have the ſupreme command, and chiefeſt honor in the Militia; and more of prejudice to the Leagues, then of profit or advantage. And if it be found that ſome Leagues have effected great matters, it hath happened (though but ſeldom) where the particular reſpects, which we have mentioned, have concurr'd. But in the fore-named unions made by Chriſtians againſt Infidels, no good reaſons can be given which do ſute well with the buſineſs now in hand, if we ſpeak of Leagues according to the ordinary acception of reaſon of State; for ſuch Princes or People as were ſigned with the *Crociata* had all of them but one onely reſpect and affection, which was more prevalent with them then any other, to wit, their zeal to religion; therefore their Forces not being onely kept together by that ſo powerful bond, but even their ſouls, more heavenly then humane rewards being propoſed to them, they might work miraculous effects: though they could not, even in this caſe, altogether ſhun thoſe diſorders which are cauſed by the aſſociation of ſo many, and by the multiplicity of ſovereign Lords, and of Nations. The ſame may be ſaid of other Unions, as of thoſe that did aſſociate the *Romans*, and of the Hans Towns of *Germany*; for amongſt theſe certain particular reſpects did concur, which were common to them all, no reſpects of States concerning differing intereſts, and other things, which have been conſidered in Unions which do truly and uſually bear

this name of Leagues: For when, though againſt Infidels, any enterpriſes have been attempted by Leagues, out of other reaſons, and other humane reſpects concurring more principally therein, what ſucceſs they have had, and how different, though uſual to Leagues, may plainly be known by other examples already ſpoken of.

The Sixth DISCOURSE.

Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to thoſe which were done by the Antients.

THere are ſome, who praiſing only the actions of antient times, do equally blame all modern deportments, and hold them in little or no account; as if the way were block'd up to thoſe who are born in our days, to keep them from arriving at any height of glory. Others on the contrary labor to heap our preſent Age with all manner of praiſe, and to compare it to the moſt celebrated and moſt cry'd up former times; affirming that the antient worth is ſprung up again in theſe our days, and in our now modern men, which come not ſhort of, nor differ from the former times or men, ſave in the veneration which is given to Antiquity. They celebrate the ingenuity of modern men, for the excellencie and perfection unto which they have brought many noble Arts and Sciences, which were obſcured and of no eſteem in former times; particularly that of the Militia. In which reſpect, by the ſo many new-found ways of Fortification, and expugning ſtrong Holds by their Engines, and by other very miraculous Inventions, it appears that the induſtry of Modern men hath not only equall'd, but in many things much exceeded that of the Antients; and that the glory of many excellent Profeſſors of the moſt eſteemed Arts ſhines cleerer in the preſent Age, for that they have not only ſufficiently improved that of the Militia, but alſo Architecture, Painting, Sculpture, and other noble Arts and Diſciplines, which are adornments to Civil life, and have drawn them out of obſcurity wherein they were hidden for a while.

I do not differ ſo much from the opinion of theſe men; nor do I think that other mens actions ought to be ſo much heightned, as that through a fooliſh modeſty or ignorance we ſhould undervalue our own, when they deſerve praiſe. But as for Military actions, which as they are the moſt perſpicuous to the eyes of all men, ſo are they moſt commended, or blamed by the univerſality of men; when I call to mind the warlike actions done by the Antients, and thoſe done by our Modern men, methinks that thoſe do ſo far exceed theſe, as they can hardly admit of any compariſon; though theſe latter Ages, as they have produced more excellent Wits in other Diſciplines, ſo alſo may they glory in the valor and generoſity of ſome Princes, no leſs great in worth then in Forces. But that which peradventure affords no leſs cauſe of wonder, and which affords particular matter for this diſcourſe, is to conſider whence it is that modern Princes, though ſome of them have been generouſly minded, and of much experience and worth in military affairs, of great poſſeſſions, and ſtrong in power, yet have they not been able to bring to paſs ſuch enterpriſes, as for their weighty conſideration, for the ſhortneſs of time, or for the eaſineſs wherewith they were done, can walk hand in hand with thoſe of the Antients; amongſt whom we ſee one only *Alexander*, one *Pompey*, one *Caſar* to have ſubjugated

gated many entire Provinces, and conquered many Nations. And not to go further in search of the like examples, since one Age alone, very neer this of ours, can easily furnish us with them: Were not the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, *Francis* the First King of *France*, and (if will pass by the errors of Religion) Sultan *Solyman* Emperor of the Turks, Princes great, and valiant in all acceptations? in whom so many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur, as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them, to make and constitute a potent Prince, and an excellent Commander, fit to undertake any action, how great or difficult soever. What was it that *Charls* with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake? Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor then *Francis*, never weary, nor satisfied with toiling in Arms, and in leading Armies? *Solyman* was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the Wars, as his age, though very great, was not able to asswage it; for he dyed in the Field amongst Soldiers, when he was eighty four years old. These great Princes were so puissant, and so remarkable for the number of Soldiers which they led to Battel, for military Discipline, and for all that belonged to War, as their Age had no cause to wonder at, nor to envy any preceding times, which were famousest for such affairs. Yet he who shall particularly examine their actions, will find they come far short of the famous acts of the Antients, and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such Princes, and of such Forces. For if we we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid, not to mention so many others, what, and how many were the things done by *Alexander* the Great, who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful Persian Empire, victoriously overran the whole East, and made the terror of his weapons known to People almost unknown till then, and yet died whilst he was very young? How many Cities and Provinces did *Pompey* and *Cæsar* bring under the Roman Empire? The first conquered and subjugated *Pontus*, *Armenia*, *Cappadocia*, *Media*, *Hiberia*, *Syria*, *Cylicia*, *Mesopotamia*, *Arabia*, and *Judæa*; things which though done, seem incredible: And the other, though he did not overrun so great a space of Land, did no less admired things, if we will regard the condition of the conquered; He quell'd the warlike *Switzers*, *French*, and *Dutch*, and made so many and so fortunate expeditions, as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Goverment of *Rome*.

What can be alleadged on the behalf of these modern Princes, which may compare with these for military glory? *Charls* the Emperor led sundry times puissant Armies upon several undertakings; but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous Expeditions? The greatest and most victorious Army which he ever put together, was that wherewith he withstood *Solyman*, when he came to assault *Austria*: yet he never departed with it from before the walls of *Vienna*; so as all the Trophy of Victory which he got there for so much expence and labor, was only not being overcome; for his Army never saw the Enemies face. The Wars of *Germany* were very difficult in this behalf; yet therein he contended not with any Prince, whose Forces were of themselves equal to his; nor were they made out of election, or hope of glory by new acquirements, but out of necessity, and for the defence as well of his own person, as of the Empire; and all the good he got thereby, was only the restoring the affairs of the Crown to the former condition, so as the Empires authority might not be lessened.

The Wars made so long between *Charls* the Emperor, and *Francis* King of *France*, with no less hatred then force, did oftentimes weary both their Armies; but though *Cæsar* had several times the better, yet at last the power of *France* was not diminished, nor the greatness of *Charls* his command made any whit the larger, so as he was master of so many, and so ample States rather by his right of inheritance, then by means of War; the enterprises of *Tunis* and *Algier* in *Africa*,

might

PAGINATION INCORRECT

PAGES PARTIALLY ILLEGIBILE

greater appearance of generosity, the business being very difficult, with great courage, and much danger, and wherein the glory appe then the advantage; yet the unhappy success of the one, did honor and praise won by the other; and these undertakings did duce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two Cities, and one of the chiefest of *Africa*: whereas one onely *Scipio* subdued *Carthage*, the Head of so great an Empire, and brought all those Regions under the *Roman* Eagles.

The Acts done by *Solyman* were somewhat greater then these, but not to be compared to those of old; nor perad venture will they appear to be very famous, if we shall consider his power, and the long time that he lived Emperor. He consumed much time, and many men in *Hungaria*, making many expeditions against it, and yet got but one part thereof, which was none of the greatest Provinces neither. He wan the Island of *Rhodes*; but what glory could redound to so mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights, who were weak of themselves, and who were not succoured by others? And yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force. He past with his Army into *Persia*, but though he might say with *Cæsar*, *veni*, *vidi*, yet could he not add *vici*; for as he with great celerity over-ran a great part of the *Persian* Empire, and came to the City of *Tauris*, so not being able to fix in any place, or establish any conquest, he retreated to within his own Confines, having left the greatest part and the best of his men in the Enemies Country, routed and defeated by divers accidents. These things then, and many other the like, give just occasion of wonder, and incite curious wits to search out the truest causes of such diversity of successes.

Amongst which, nay, in the primary place, the different means of warfaring in those times, and in these may come into consideration, wherein if we come to more particulars, we shall meet with the use of Forts and Strong Holds, which are become more frequent in these our Ages, then they were in former times, the art of building being doubtlesly in greater perfection with us then it was with them. There is hardly any State or Country now adaies, wherein there are not many Towns and Cities, either assisted by natural situation, or else by art reduced to much safety by many inventions found out by modern Professors of Fortification, so as almost every place is so fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men, against many; and he who will in these times enter into another mans Country with an Army intending to possess himself thereof, must first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers, for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them, since his victuals may be thereby hindred, and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed. Moreover to be master of the field, & leave the Cities and strong Holds unreduced, would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies, which being founded only upon the Forces of a field-Army, when that should be worsted, all things formerly won, must of necessity fall of themselves. Hence it is, that since much time must be spent in lying before a Fort or Citadel, and that many men are requisite to take it, and all this often-times in vain, the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficulty, are not so soon nor so sadly compast, as they were by the Antients who met not with such obstacles. And how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won, since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong Holds? whereof we see many clear examples in the actions, of the aforementioned Princes.

The Emperor *Charls* made War several times with numerous Armies against the King of *France*, propounding great matters unto himself, which proved all but vain at last, by his having met with strong Cities well munited, such as required much

much time and labor to take them; wherefore though his ſucceſs in War was ſometimes proſperous, yet it came ſo late, as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby; as was ſeen when after much time ſpent, and many men loſt before the Fort of St. *Deſir* which was ſeated in the midſt of *France*, whither he was fortunately advanced, though he reduced it to his own power, yet was he at laſt forced to come to agreement with the Enemy (as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquiſition) that he might fall upon another Enterpriſe. The ſame, and for the ſame cauſe, befell *Francis* King of *France*, who having ſent his Son the *Dolphin* with powerful Forces to the *Pyrenean* Mountains, to the end that he might break into *Spain*, promiſing himſelf eaſier ſucceſs therein, by an unexpected aſſault, and becauſe he had aſſaulted at the ſame time other parts of *Cæſars* Dominions with other Armies: The *Dolphin* being at the very firſt to take *Perpignano*, a Fort placed upon thoſe Frontiers, he there met with ſuch, and with ſo many difficulties, as this ſole encounter was ſufficient to keep thoſe Forces from penetrating any further.

Solyman being entred with a powerful Army into *Hungarie*, intending to paſs into *Auſtria*, waſted ſo much time in expugning the ſtrong Hold of *Buda*, as it proved the ſafety of that Country, and chiefly of *Vienna*; before the which he was in that reſpect the longer a coming, and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own ſecurity, ſo as the City being of it ſelf very tenable, it may be ſaid that ſhe did not onely ſave her ſelf, but by the preſervation thereof, all *Auſtria*, and other Provinces of *Germany*, were preſerved then, and ſeveral times ſince. So likewiſe in the War which was made by the ſame *Solyman*, againſt the *Venetians*, though he was come thither himſelf in perſon, with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land, yet his Forces being repulſt by the Fort of *Corfir*, which was forcibly, but in vain attempted by the Turks, he was forced to withdraw from before it; whereas without the help and advantage of ſuch a ſtrong Hold, both the Iſland of *Corfee*, and other places belonging to that State muſt have ſubmitted to ſo great and warlike a preparation. By reaſon then of theſe difficulties, and ſuch occaſions, the undertaking of later times have proved leſs glorious for matter of action, then thoſe of former daies. When *Alexander* had overcome in Battel *Darius* the powerful King of *Perſia*, he ſoon made himſelf Maſter of his whole Kingdom, and paſſing further into the Country, even to the ocean Sea, he found the way ſo open, as the onely difficulty he met withal, was the overcoming of thoſe Fortreſſes of Rivers and Seas which nature had furniſhed the Country with: Inſomuch as thoſe who writ his actions, ſpeak but of two ſtrong Holds of any importance, about which he was neceſſitated to ſpend ſome time amongſt the *Indians* in his victorious over-running ſo many Countries. But *Pompey* made ſuch way in following *Mithridates*, and in planting Trophies of victories, in all places whereby he paſt in ſo many Eaſtern Provinces, amongſt people that he had rather march'd over, then over-come, as it may be eaſily conceived that he met no where with any impediments by ſtrong Holds, which were able to ſtop the courſe of his victorious Forces. *Cæſar* found it ſomewhat a harder buſineſs to ſubjugate thoſe people of *Europe*, with whom he was to fight; but this was more out of the nature of the ſituations and the ſavageneſs of the people, then by reaſon of any ſtout reſiſtance made by any well fortified Cities; yet in the ſpace of Ten years he compleated ſo many victories, as he ſubjugated Three hundred ſeveral ſorts of People.

If theſe, though great Princes, and moſt valiant Commanders, had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort, certainly their atchievements would have been fewer, and their glory not ſo much cry'd up. This was manifeſtly known by the example of other Ages; For it may be obſerved, that

the

the ſo great progreſſes of War have been made chiefly in the Eaſtern parts, where at all times (peradventure by reaſon of the largeneſs of the Country) the uſe of ſtrong Holds hath been leaſt had; ſo as not only *Alexander* the Great, and *Pompey*, both of them more famous then all other Commanders, but ſome of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains ſubjugated ſpacious Countries in a ſhort time: And in later times, *Selymus* the Great Turk by the ſame reaſon was able totally to ſubjugate the Soldan of *Caire's* Empire; For having had the better in many Battels, and not meeting with any ſtrong Hold to withſtand him, the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the *Turks*, who were Victors and Maſters of the Field. But ſuch acquiſitions, as they are very eaſie to be made, ſo are they but ſeldom peacefully poſſeſt; which was the cauſe why the Roman Emperors could never ſo govern thoſe furtheſt Eaſtern parts, but that either by the Inhabitants themſelves, or by their neighboring Kings, tumults were continually raiſed: So as it behoved them to ſubjugate the ſame Provinces ſeveral times. But if theſe difficulties of winning Forts and ſtrong Holds did retard the courſe of Victories, certainly they ought not to leſſen the praiſe of modern Princes and Commanders; but when they deſerve it by their own military worth and induſtry, as great diſcipline, cunning, conſtancie, and ſufferance is diſcovered in this ſort of Militia, and as ſuch acquiſitions are more ſtable, and leſs ſubject to the various fortune of War; ſo the fewer actions of theſe men may for glory and praiſe be juſtly compared to the many of the others, wherein perhaps they would have equall'd them, had it not been for the concurrence of ſuch differing accidents and reſpects.

But if we ſhall continue to examine other parts appertaining to the Militia, we ſhall find that the diverſity of effects hath proceeded from the diverſity of other things. The invention of Guns is ſo new and ſo miraculous a thing, ſo out of the way of all War-Engines which were known and uſed by the Antients, as it may well be believed that this muſt needs have made a grert alteration in the managing of the Militia; and the uſe and invention of Gunpowder is ſo increaſed in theſe times, and ſo variouſly multiplied and perfected, as it may be ſaid that men make not War now adays with ſteel and iron, as they were wont, but with fire. Then this formidable Inſtrument of Artillery, which makes ſo great and irreparable havock, is the reaſon why Commanders proceed with more caution in giving Battel, and ſeek to ſpin out the War in length, to reduce the Enemy to ſome neceſſity; and that uſing more Art, and truſting leſs to Fortune, they ſpend more time in bringing their enterpriſes to an end, but do it with more ſecurity. Wherefore we ſeldom hear of pitched Fields in theſe days, wherein whole Armies fight with all their Forces: And hence it is, that the Forces of ſuch as defend an aſſaulted Country not being to be vanquiſh'd, nor much weakened but with time, unleſs they want fitting defence, no great progreſs is made therein. which is not done more by time and induſtry then by open force. Where likewiſe it is to be weighed, that the neceſſity which is now adays put upon Armies of bringing along with them a great Train of Artillery, all their proceedings muſt be much more ſlow, and without them they can neither keep themſelves from being offended by the Enemy, nor yet can they undertake any enterpriſe, wanting ſuch Inſtruments without which no Town nor place of importance can be taken.

Let us wind about a little, and ſee what hath been done by the Antients. What a voyage did *Pompey* the Great make in the purſuit of *Mithridates*? He with his Army overran abundance of new Countries, continually conquering and ſubjecting them, with as much eaſe, as if he had gone to viſit them upon pleaſure, and not to wage War with them. When *Alexander* the Great would go into *India*, he made his Soldiers leave all the Booty which they had got in *Perſia*, and all their Baggage behind

behind them, and chooſing out ſome of his nimbleſt men, he with them made that long and difficult journy, and ſent many back, thinking that a few (but thoſe valiant) Soldiers, would ſuffice him for that purpoſe; for in that Age, 'twas only worth and power which bore away the weightieſt affairs. So as ſuch Princes and Conductors of Armies as had a ſtrong and able Militia, as was that of *Alexander* the Great, and that of the *Romans*, not meeting with any ſtrong Holds to withſtand them, nor with any Soldiers of like worth and experience as they were, nor which could withſtand their aſſaults, they ſuddenly bereft the Countries which they aſſailed of all defence, by worſting their Armies wherein their ſole ſecurity lay, and ſo made themſelves eaſily maſters of them; and by the reputation which their men won, and the terror which they cauſed in their Enemies, who had no where whereunto to flie or to have refuge, they made one Victory make way for another, ſo as they might in a ſhort time lay the ground-works of thoſe great Monarchies which the World doth now ſo much wonder at.

To theſe things it may be added, That the chiefeſt ſtrength of the Antients, and that wherewith they atchieved their chiefeſt actions, lay in their Infantry, which could eaſilieſt and with greateſt expedition winde about every where, and be made uſe of at all ſeaſons. But changing their cuſtom afterwards, ſo as thoſe that commanded great Armies would have their Foot aided continually, and back'd by good ſtore of Horſe, they could neither begin, nor finiſh great enterpriſes, as made beſt for them; being to conſider the Seaſon, the Country, and other conveniencies, and their Horſes being to have meat, which they could not always, nor in all places come by. Wherefore now that by reaſon of the greatneſs of their Empire, the *Turks* Confines are ſo ſeparated, and ſo far diſtant one from another, it may be hoped that other Princes may reſt the quieter, and the more ſecure from their incurſions, for that their Land-forces conſiſting much in Cavalry, they cannot move ſo ſuddenly, nor lead on their numerous Armies ſo eaſily nor ſo commodiouſly, nor do ſuch notable things by Land; and which the ſelf-ſame reſpect may make it be doubted that they may bend their ſtudies more to Sea-affairs.

Together with all theſe reſpects, the condition of Times and of Potentates is not ſlightly to be conſidered, if therein we meet with a generous Prince, and one that is deſirous of military glory. For if he chance to make trial of his arms and worth with a Prince of equal, or not much inferior ſtate, valor, and military diſcipline, he cannot hope by any power he hath to make any great acquiſitions, becauſe he will meet with a juſt counterpoiſe to his worth and power: For though he may peradventure be puffed up with ſome good ſucceſs, yet is he not ſure but that he may have ſome adverſe fortune, whilſt his Enemy is ſtill ſtrong, though as yet wo.ſted. What did *Francis* King of *France* leave unattempted to get footing in *Italy*? how many Armies did he lead thither? how much treaſure did he ſpend in thoſe attempts? when was he ever weary or ſatisfied with warfaring? Yet being withſtood by the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, who was of equal force and worth, and was reſolute to keep the *French* out of *Italy*, all his endeavors proved vain, finding it very hard to get any thing, and impoſſible to keep what he had gotten, that State being befriended and back'd by too great Princes. Whence it was, that by reaſon of the reſiſtance which each of theſe great Potentates made againſt the other, knowing that they could not much exceed one another, and each of them having an eye upon the affairs of *Italy*, they both of them did ſtill much endeavor friendſhip and confederacie with the Princes of *Italy*, and chiefly with the Commonwealth of *Venice*. For, what neither of them could effect of themſelves, which was to keep the others Forces ſuppreſſed in *Italy*, they thought they might the eaſilier do it, by joining with ſome other Italian Potentate; ſo the many Wars which happened between them, and chiefly in *Savoy*, and in the State of *Milan*,

muſt at laſt be ended by agreement without any advantage to either party, both their Forces being weakned, but neither of their hatreds or emulations ſlackned; though *Charls* the Fift, by the unexpected death of *Franciſco Sforza*, did at laſt reduce that State to his Dominion.

Hence it was alſo that *Charls* and *Solyman*, greatly fearing to encounter each other, did very much ſhun the having to do together, and to hazard that glory to the uncertain events of War, which they had with ſo much labor arrived at. And this was the cauſe why *Charls* though he was a bold and valiant Prince, when his Brother *Ferdinand* was in great danger by reaſon of *Solymans* Forces, reſolved importunately to paſs into *Africa*; for being reſolute that he would not march againſt *Solymans* Forces, nor contend with them, he would witneſs to the world that it was neither labor nor danger, that kept him from turning to the defence of *Hungary*, and *Auſtria*, which were then aſſaulted by the Turks; but becauſe he eſteemed the buſineſs of *Africa* very neceſſary. And when a greater neceſſity wrought it ſo that they were to take up Arms one againſt the other, and that numerous Armies had taken the field, yet they kept ſtill aloof off, the fear, and apprehenſion which each had of the others power and fortune being alike; ſo as at laſt ſo great an accumulation of Soldiers disbanded, neither party having ſeen the face of an Enemy; whilſt *Charls* would not give way that his Army ſhould go from before the walls of *Vienna*, to go find out the Enemy, nor would *Solyman* advance further to meet him, though he had at firſt publickly given out that he went from *Conſtantinople* to fight with *Charls* the Emperor before his own doors. So as you may clearly ſee, that it was the counterpoiſe of theſe two great Princes of one and the ſame Age, which kept their Forces confined within certain bounds, which for their valor and other reſpects might have carried the Trophies of victory into the furtheſt remote Countries.

Now on the other ſide let us examine the condition of Times and Potentates with whom thoſe famous Commanders of old had to wage War. *Alexander* the Great, found the Kingdom of *Perſia*, wherein he ſucceſsfully made his firſt expeditions, for extent of Empire very rich and powerful, but wherein was an ill diſciplined Militia, and commanded by unexperienced Leaders, and men of no valor; wherefore exceeding the *Perſians* in worth and diſcipline, though he came ſhort of them in numbers, he may be ſaid to have been better then they for matter of War, and therefore willingly imbraced all occaſions of joyning Battel with them. And for what concerns the Eaſtern Kings and Nations, which he afterwards brought under his power, who knows not how unfit they were for War, of themſelves weak, not joyned in confederacie for common defence, nor ſuſtained by ſtrong holds, nor by the ſtrength of a well ordered Militia? Inſomuch as the greateſt glory that can be attributed to *Alexander*, is for the generoſity of his mind, which moved him to venter upon ſo many enterpriſes, in deſert and almoſt unknown Countries, rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight, and brought them to an end.

The ſame almoſt may be obſerved by the things done in the Eaſtern parts by *Pompey* the Great. It is true that *Cæſar* met with greater difficulties in the things he did in *France* and in *Spain*, for he waged War with people who knew how to manage their Arms, and who were till then thought unvanquiſhable; wherefore he ſpent more time there. Yet theſe Provinces were divided into many Kings and Popularities, none of which were very ſtrong of themſelves, nor were they very ſecure by the aſſiſtance of others to make them able to reſiſt an Army of veteran, and excellently well diſciplined Soldiers, as was that which was commanded by *Cæſar*: So as it ſeems we may with reaſon conclude that if theſe cried up Commanders had met with powerful and valiant Armies, able to be compared with theirs, and

that

that theſe had been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great Commanders, their fames would certainly have been leſs, nor would they have ſo eaſily have aſſubjected ſo many Countries, and erected their Trophies of victories in ſo many Regions as they did.

But beſides all theſe conſiderations, we may perhaps with reaſon weigh, the arts and waies which theſe antient Warriers made uſe of (to boot with what belonged to the Militia) to make their acquiſitions and glory the greater: for he who ſhall conſider their actions, may therein diſcern ſo inflamed a deſire of praiſe and glory as it ſeems this was the onely thing which they propounded to themſelves for reward of all their labor and danger, and for the end of all their undertakings; for they have left many noble examples behind them, not onely of military valor, but of equity, clemencie, temperance, and of other glorious vertues which aſſiſted them very much in winning favor and affection with the people, and likewiſe the love of many of thoſe very Princes who were overcome by them.

Thus we read of *Alexander*, that he confirmed their Kingdoms to many *Indian* Kings whom he overcame, and did increaſe them to ſome others; and being contented with obedience from them, and receiving ſuch things as were neceſſary for his voyage, he ſeemed rather to aſpire after the glory of new acquiſitions, then to reap any advantage by what he had already won: But *Pompey*, not like a victorious Chieftain in War, but rather like a Friend and Arbitrator, compoſed the differences between thoſe Princes of the Eaſt, reſtored the antient Lords to their Kingdoms, and gave new States to ſuch others as did deſerve them. Inſomuch as it was from his liberality that *Pharnaces* was to acknowledge the Kingdom of *Boſphorus*, *Antiochus*, that of *Sileucia*, *Tygranes*, the Kingdom of *Armenia*, *Ariobarzanes*, that of *Cappadocia*, *Diotarus*, the like of *Galitia*, and did onely reduce ſuch Countries into Provinces, and made them immediately ſubject to the Senate and People of *Rome*, wherein he found no legitimate Lords and Maſters, as it fell out in *Syria*, *Judea* and ſome other Regions. It was by reaſon of theſe proceedings, that many People and Princes, did voluntarily ſubmit to the Empire of *Alexander* and of the *Romans*. Wherefore *Darius* when he was overcome by *Alexander*, admiring his great Continencie and Humanitie, prayed the gods that if the fall of that Empire was deſtined, the glory and ſucceſſion of the Kingdom of *Perſia* might fall upon *Alexander*. All Hiſtories are full of ſuch examples of worth and vertue in things done by the *Romans*; But now adaies Princes and Commanders do but little mind the imitation of theſe men, and wage War, not out of a deſire of glory, as did thoſe magnanimous Attients; but onely out of revenge and cruelty, or elſe to turn all the fruit and benefit of Victory upon themſelves leaving nothing ſafe nor intire to the conquered. Whence it enſues that they who fears theſe extreams, deſperately reſolve to do their utmoſt, and hazard all, rather then to ſubmit themſelves to the power and diſcretion of thoſe on whom they ſee their ultimate ruine depends. By this means, proceedings march a ſlower pace, and all acquiſitions become more difficult, ſo this immoderate deſire of having all things for their own ſervice, working a contrary effect to their intentions, keeps the Confines of their Dominions more narrowly bounded, and thereby leſſens that glory which they ſeem to aſpire ſo much at. If then our Princes and Chieftains will walk in the waies of the Antients, they will finde that Juſtice Clemencie, and moderate Empire, are ſtronger and more ſecure Engins to take ſtrong Holds, then thoſe which they in theſe times make uſe of. And if they be not faulty in the truſt worth, they will find ſufficient valor and diſcipline in their Soldiers, to bring to paſs whatſoever great Enterpriſes, and to exalt their name to ſuch a height of glory, and ſo illuſtrate themſelves and their Age as they may in all things be deſervedly compared to the famouſeſt and moſt cried up of the Antients.

The Seventh DISCOURSE.

What the cauſe is why Italy *hath enjoyed ſo long Peace and Quiet in theſe latter Times.*

HE who ſhall call to mind what troubles *Italy* for a long time hath ſuffered under, which after the paſſage of *Charls* the eight King of *France*, till the Peace made at *Bolognia*, was for the ſpace of thirty five years continually infeſted with bitter Wars, and ſubject to all thoſe greater evils which the wickedneſs of man hath found out to his own undoing, may juſtly think her very happy in this preſent, and the laſt preceding Age, wherein after ſo long a combuſtion ſhe hath enjoyed ſo happy and quiet a Peace: For though in this time ſome little ſparkles may have broken forth, yet have they not ſpread much, nor laſted long; but being confined within ſome ſmall circuits, the greater and more noble parts of *Italy* have remained ſafe and untouched by this flame. Wherefore thoſe Princes who this mean while have had the government of the ſeveral States of *Italy*, are certainly much to be praiſed, and the people of *Italy* are chiefly to acknowledg ſo great a benefit from their wiſdom and vigilancie. Yet becauſe there have divers accidents happened, which have opened the way to Princes wherein to walk directly on to this right end of Peace and Concord, it may be worth the while, particularly to examine from what cauſes this good hath proceeded; for thereby it may likewiſe be known how the like may be preſerved.

It is a Propoſition ſufficiently known, and indubitably true, that *Sublata cauſa tollitur effectus*; Take away the cauſe, and the effect which proceeds from thence will ceaſe. Wherefore by truly examining the cauſes from whence the Wars and moleſtations of *Italy* did proceed, we may perceive how theſe ceaſing, ſhe hath remain'd in that peace and quiet, which may be ſaid to be the true, proper, and moſt natural condition of a State; all other workings in a good Government, and even War it ſelf being ordained for Peace: whereby as Cities and Kingdoms enjoy Civil felicity, ſo muſt that State be moſt perfect, wherein the perfecteſt workings are exerciſed to the moſt perfect end. Peace is of it ſelf introduced into a State, by taking away the impediments which do diſturb it, juſt as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away thoſe ill humors which keep them from their perfect and natural condition. Now if we will take into our conſideration, whence, as from the principal occaſions, that Harmony (if I may ſo call it) which the Concord of the Italian Princes had ſo long produced, and preſerved with ſuch liking and conſolation of all men, was ſpoil'd and corrupted, we ſhall find that two affections which do uſually accompany Empire, and which at this time grew very powerful in ſome Princes, were thoſe roots from which ſo many miſchiefs did afterwards put forth, to wit, Fear and Ambition; Fear of loſing ones own State, Ambition of poſſeſſing what belongs to another. The fear of the King of *Aragons* juſt indignation made *Ledovic Sforza* think upon Novelties, made him have recourſe for help to *France*, and made him believe that was beſt for him, which proved his ruine: But it was ambition of adding new Territories to that Crown, and glory to himſelf, which made *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, but young both in years and experience, think upon nothing but how to effect his deſires, by accepting of *Sforzas* proffer of paſſing into *Italy*, which proved the Sepulchre of ſo many Soldiers, and of ſo many gallant Commanders of that warlike Nation, by the ſo many Wars which

aroſe

arose from that Spring-head, and which brought no other advantage to the Authors.

But let us make a little further enquiry. The so famous, and as it may justly be termed, so pernicious War to all *Italy*, made by the League of so many Christian Princes, who had all conspired the ruine of the Commonwealth of *Venice*, whence did it arise but from these two wicked seeds, Fear and Ambition? Many Princes apprehended the greatness of the Republick, which was already much increased by the prosperous success in War wherein she was associated by the *French*, whereby she was become very formidable, especially to the Princes of *Italy*; wherefore they all desired her abasement for their own security. Nor was the Emperor *Maximilian* totally free from this fear, who had learnt by late experience how powerful the Forces of the Commonwealth were grown, which had bereft him of some Towns belonging to him. But *Lodovick* King of *France* (the thirst after Empire being always unquenchable) growing still more desirous to possess the whole State of *Milan*, whereof he had already gotten the greatest part, and repenting himself that the Cities of *Cremona* and *Giaradada* were fallen to the *Venetians*, was egg'd on by this spur of Ambition to join in conspiracie with the other Princes against the Commonwealth, which had so lately and so many several ways deserved so very well at his hands. After these ensued many long Wars, though not equally grievous, which had many various and uncertain events, and which were fomented and maintain'd by these seeds of all discord, fear and ambition. When the greatness and power of the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth was increased and confirm'd in *Italy*, the Commonwealth apprehended that her State in *Terra firma* would not by reason thereof be very safe: she therefore willingly took up Arms, accompanied by the *French*, to secure herself from the danger she conceived she lay under by reason of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powerful neighbor, by having a particular Prince of that State, who might be Duke of *Milan*. *Francis* King of *France* desired likewise to see the Emperor bereft of that State, but out of other respects; to wit, because his ambition was such as would never suffer him to give way to the fortune of *Charls* the Emperor, and to see *Charls* so much superior to him, especially in *Italy*, where his Predecessors the Kings of *France*, and he himself with no less fervencie, though with worse success, had labored so long, with such expence, and with the loss of so many men, only to retain and keep some Territories.

This was the tree, from which the boughs or sprouts could not be so fast cut off, but that one War soon succeeded another; wherewith *Italy* was long perplex'd, till in the year 1529. the Princes being tyred, and the People ruin'd, agreement was made in that famous Meeting at *Bolognia*, in which so sound foundations of the peace and quiet of *Italy* were laid, as they may almost be said to have continued till now, with fair hopes of longer continuance. For though for thus many years there have been some commotions in *Italy*, made both by her own Inhabitants, and by Foreiners, yet in respect of the calamities she underwent in those former Ages, they may rather be termed uprores then wars. This condition of affairs and of affections being changed, and the materials being removed by which the fire of war was fed, *Italy* remained in great tranquillity. Soon after this introduction of Peace, the State of *Milan*, by the immature death of *Francisco Sforza*, who left no issue behind him, fell into the power of *Charls* the Emperor, and afterwards into his son *Philip's*; in which Princes no such respect concurr'd as lately have been mentioned, whereby the peace of *Italy* might be troubled, as it had been before: For these Princes, by reason of their other great possessions, being peacefully Masters of so fair and noble a part of *Italy*, as is the Kingdom of *Naples*, and Dukedom of *Milan*, they had no reason to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs, either out of any apprehension of

their

their own buſineſſes, or out of a deſire to enjoy what appertained to others. They were freed from fear not onely by the friendſhip ſolemnly eſtabliſhed, and ratified by the other Potentates of *Italy*, but much more by their own power and greatneſs, and the knowledge that to intrench upon one, might eaſily move all the reſt, and afford occaſion of bringing forein Forces into *Italy*, whereby to diſturb their own ſetled poſſeſſion of ſo large and noble a ſhare thereof, kept them from dreaming upon the poſſeſſing of other mens eſtates. So likewiſe the Commonwealth of *Venice* was at this time in ſuch a condition, as being only to covet peace, ſhe might hope to injoy it ſafely, becauſe ſhe was neither ſo great nor powerful, as to hope after new acquiſitions, being counterpoiſed by greater Forces in *Italy*, who upon the leaſt diſcovery in her of taking up Arms, would oppoſe her, and not ſuffer her to increaſe, to their prejudice; neither was ſhe yet ſo weak, as ſhe might dread being eaſily oppreſt by others, ſo as to ſecure herſelf from ſuch a danger, ſhe might be conſtrained to think upon novelties, or to procure new friends. The Church Territories, being ſecured no leſs by the reverence due to religion, then by force of Arms, remained ſafe and quiet; nor had the Popes any reaſon either to tear their own affairs, nor yet to deſire a greater temporal eſtate; for having recovered many Cities which the Church had formerly loſt, diſcords being ceaſed, and the faction wherewith ſhe had been troubled being almoſt extinguiſhed, and the authority of the Barons of *Rome* being moderated, that holy See was in a condition of as great dignitie and ſafety, as ſhe had been at any time before; and Duke *Coſmo de Medici*, Duke of *Florence* being allied to the favor and friendſhip of a potent Prince, wherein he was very fortunate, was ſafe enough: and being likewiſe a new Prince in *Tuſcany*, he was to think, as he wiſely did, rather how to ſettle himſelf well in his noble Dominon, then to dream of becoming the Author of new Wars, and of increaſing his State.

Hence it was that the Forces of theſe greater Potentates being ballanced and their thoughts tempered, all occaſions of making any great change or alteration of States in her was taken away, ſuch as had hapned in the former Ages, through the commotions of the very Princes of *Italy*. As for ſuch dangers as might happen from abroad, *Italy* was at this time ſecured by various accidents. If we ſhall firſt conſider the Empire, from whence her greateſt troubles had often times come, thoſe Emperors knew very well, by what had ſucceeded to *Charls* in the Imperial dignity, that they had not Forces ſufficient wherewith to betake themſelves to forein enterpriſes out of any particular intereſt or ambition, without the help of *Germany*, which was but little inclined to increaſe their power and authority. But (though the moderate minds of thoſe Princes, which was always inclined to Juſtice and Equity muſt be greatly praiſed) the eminent danger their States lay in by reaſon of the Turks Forces, was above all other things able to keep them from thinking of moleſting other mens States; which Turks, being ſo near and ſo powerful neighbors, have kept them buſied and moleſted, and in a condition of thinking rather how to ſecure their own affairs, then to increaſe their fortune by new acquiſitions, not onely when they were forced to take up Arms for the defence of *Hungary* and *Auſtria*, but even in time of peace, and greateſt ſecurity. The *French* I muſt confeſs have been more intent to trouble the peace of *Italy*, on which they had a long time ſet their minds, out of a deſire to get ſome footing there. But though the Forces of that flouriſhing and powerful Kingdom were very formidable before theſe Civil Diſcords, yet experience hath ſhewed that their attempts, when they have had none to receive and to uphold them in *Italy*, have cauſed more dread then damage; for their Armies being to be furniſhed with all neceſſaries from a far off, they have been overcome by weaker Forces, and oftimes by their own wants. Therefore becauſe in theſe later times, when they paſt

over

over the Mountains, they were not confederate, as formerly they had been, with any great Potentate in *Italy*, therefore have they been able to tarry there but a while, nor have they made the noiſe of their Trumpets be heard a far off, though they have never let ſlip any occaſion out of a deſire of Novelty and glory; ſo as all thoſe who have at any time been ill ſatisfied by the Imperialiſts, and then by the *Spainards*, have been eaſily received into friendſhip with them. Thus was the defence of *Sienna* imbraced, a City oppreſt by the ſevere Goverament of *Caſars* Officers.

Thus were the *Ferneſes* taken into protection, to keep them in their poſſeſſion of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, out of which the Emperor would have driven them: Thus was the Prince of *Salerno* liſtned unto, who by his favor, and the inſurrection of the people furthered the hopes of great acquiſitions in the Kingdom of *Naples*. Thus *Paul* the Fourth met with good correſpondencie in *Henry* King of *France*, as ſoon as he diſcovered himſelf to be ill affected towards *Cæſar*, and that he would take up Arms againſt him; for he hoped to attain thoſe things by the friendſhip and conjunction of a powerful Prince, and one, who according to his deſire, was apt to commotions, wherein he had had but ill ſucceſs at the ſame time in *Italy*, by reaſon of the weak aſſiſtance of the *Seneſi*; but all this while, and upon all theſe ocaſions, it may be truly affirmed that theſe were rather Tumults then Wars; which (as hath been ſaid) was occaſioned chiefly, for that ſuch a diſpoſition of mind and of affairs, was found in the Princes of *Italy*, as they did not much, nor all at a time intereſs themſelves in theſe Wars. And though ſome of the Popes did buſie themſelves therein, yet ſince theſe Wars were not treated of as any thing belonging to the Church, or immediately appertaining to the Apoſtolick See, they were neither favored by the other Princes of *Italy*, nor yet imbraced by the ſucceeding Popes, with the ſame thoughts, becauſe their ends, nor intereſts were not the ſame; nay they did rather endeavor to appeaſe, then to foment them. And thoſe who were the raiſers and furtherers of theſe novelties, and of the coming of forein Forces, being weak of themſelves, and not being ſeconded by any, they could not long make good the War, not having ſufficient Forces of themſelves, nor being able to make ſuch uſe of the Tranſalpine Forces, but that they were exceeded by thoſe who oppoſed them, and who were of greater force and friendſhip in *Italy*; as was particularly ſeen in the Wars of *Sienna*, which laſted longeſt, and were the ſoreſt that happened in theſe latter times. For the *French* having no other receptacle in *Italy* then what was given them by the *Seneſi*, who had called them in, and being ſtoutly oppoſed by *Charls* the Emperor, who was ſtronger by reaſon of the many opportune aids which he received from the Duke of *Florence*, they could not long continue, nor fix their abode in *Italy*. In which occurrences the State of *Venice* may juſtly challenge no ſmal ſhare of commendation. For that notwithſtanding the ſo many offers, and preſſures made unto her, to take up Arms, and to make uſe of ſuch occaſions as preſented themſelves, to augment her fortune, ſhe notwithſtanding, with leſs aſpiring thoughts, but certainly with very wiſe and ſafe advice, continuing in her newtrality did rather endeavor by her many good offices to withdraw fewel from the fire which had already burſt forth in *Italy*, then to make it flame the higher by intereſſing herſelf therein, and by joyning with either party. Whereby ſhe did not undoubtedly advantage herſelf onely, but whole *Italy*, where ſhe being one of the chief Potentates; by keeping quiet and newter, not inclining to either party was the reaſon why the Imperial and *French* Forces, counterpoiſing each other, could not effect any of their deſigns, which might have proved prejudicial to the liberty and peace of *Italy*.

Hence then it enſues, that the beſt advice for the preſervation of this peace and quiet of *Italy*, is to keep affairs ſo equally ballanced, as that the Princes who have

Dominion,

Dominions there, may neither have reaſon of fear, nor of ambition, which (as hath been ſaid) have in former times been cauſe of her perturbances. In which happy condition ſhe will ſtill continue, if the Princes of *Italy* ſhall know ſo to moderate their deſires, and keep themſelves ſo cloſely annexed together by an union of mind, and by good intelligence, that the one may not fear the other for any deſire of novelty which may be found in them, nor diſcover themſelves to be ſo weak by their diviſions as out of the eaſineſs of the prey, ambition may move others to aſpire after their States.

The Eghth DISCOURSE.

Whether Citadels and Strong Holds, much uſed by our modern Princes, be commodious, and of true ſafety to a State, or no?

FOrts and ſtrong Holds are of late grown into ſo great eſteem, as Princes ſeem now adaies to mind nothing more then theſe for the ſecurity of their States. Yet this buſineſs may admit of ſuch various conſiderations, as it is not peradventure eaſie to be diſcerned, whether a Prince that is thus adviſed be in the right way to effect that which he propounds unto himſelf, which is, the ſecuring of his affairs. To know then what ought truly to be thought in this caſe, we muſt firſt conſider what this art of Fortification is of it ſelf, on which ſo much ſtudy, and expence is beſtowed, and whether it be grounded upon ſuch undeniable principles and reaſons, as by means thereof the benefit at which it aims, of preſerving Cities and States in ſafety, may be expected from it. Certainly this firſt conſideration admits of no ſmal doubt or difficultie; for we are taught by modern experience, that all the waies whereby a ſtrong Hold may be aſſaulted and taken, are not yet ſo well known, as being reduced under general terms, as that it may be aſſerted, that thereby an art is found out which contains all ſorts of poſſible offence, and which is governed by a certain and true rule to effect the intent thereof, and to come to the perfection thereof. Nay, rather we find to the contrary, that the profeſſors of this Art do not agree well in their principles; and that time makes it ſubject to ſuch alterations, by reaſon of the new waies which the wit of man finds out as well for offence as defence, as it ſeems it muſt be confeſt, that this is not in reality a true art, or at leaſt, that it is ſo imperfectly known and uſed, as that ſtrong holds are but a weak foundation for the ſafety of a State, though they be never ſo many, and be in eſteem by military men. For, ſay nothing elſe does it, the experience of more then one Age doth evidently prove, that in a ſhort time they become vain and uſeleſs; ſince a Fort which was formerly greatly eſteemed, and held to be almoſt impregnable, hath now by the invention of new engins, and waies of opugning it, loſt that reputation, and is thought little leſs then ridiculous: and it may be beleeved, that the ſame may befal any ſtrong holds which are in theſe daies built, by reaſon of the new waies of offending which many do daily with much ſtudy and induſtry labour to finde out.

Whence it is that Princes find they have often ſpent much time, workmanſhip and moneys, in a buſineſs, which in time of need can but little avail them; and if they will reap any benefit thereby, they muſt continually be at new expence both of monies and men, keeping them continually buſied in new works and Fabricks, adding alwaies, or altering many things about their Forts, to fit them to the uſe of

the

the preſent times and Militia. But give it for granted, that ſuch ſtrong Holds may be brought to rather an imaginable, then a poſſible perfection and ſecurity, certainly they are no way ſerviceable of themſelves, but are like dead and uſeleſs things, which have need to be as it were inanimated and be made uſeful by good Gariſons, who may keep and defend them.

And if otherwiſe, they ſerve for the conveniencie and ſervice of the Enemy: which makes it yet more queſtionable, whether ſtrong Holds be a greater ſafety or weakening to a State; and where there are many and very great ones, the doubt is made the greater; ſince ſo many Soldiers muſt be imployed in their defence, as if the Prince be not very powerful, he ſhall hardly find Forces ſufficient to keep ſeveral Armies (as they may be termed) on foot, ſome within the Forts, and ſome in the Campagnia. Nor can it be made good, that ſtrong Holds are of themſelves ſufficient to ſecure the whole State; for though they may entertain the Enemy for a while, and ſtop the firſt brunt of an impetuous aſſault, yet at laſt, unleſs they be back'd with Forces from without, and timely ſuccored and relieved, being overcome either by power, length of time, or neceſſity, they muſt yield and fall into the power of the Enemy, which cannot be denied, no not by the very Profeſſors and Favorers of Fortification. And yet it cannot be denied, but if a Prince have ſufficient Forces to keep the Field in his own Country, he may thereby keep himſelf from being injured; for men do not eaſily put things to hazard, where they think to meet with ſtout oppoſition; and the only opinion and reputation of ſuch Forces, is able to keep off the greateſt dangers: For the Enemy who did deſign to aſſault ſuch a State, becomes jealous and doubtful, nor is he bold enough to enter far into ſuch a State as is guarded by a good Army, and chiefly in ſituations (ſuch as are almoſt in all Countries), as are naturally fortified by Hills, Vallies, or Rivers, where it is hard to enter, and harder to retreat. And if any well experienced Captain command over ſuch Forces, he will be likely enough to defeat the Enemy, without endangering himſelf, by keeping him from victuals, and ſo imployed and buſied in ſundry ways, as he ſhall neither be able to keep long in the Country, nor much leſs imploy himſelf in the taking or ſacking of any Cities; ſince he knows he is hourly ſubject to ſurpriſals, and to be ruin'd; and ſtrong Holds ſecuring nothing but thoſe quarters where they are ſituated, they do not ſecure the State, if they be but a few; and if many, they require all the Forces for their own defence, and leave the Enemy maſter of the Field, to the Prince his prejudice, and the Peoples deſpair. So alſo, if they be but little ones, and incapable of ſuch Works, and ſo many men as are requiſite to make them hold out long, they and the Soldiers which defend them are loſt; and if they be great, and contain large plots of ground, as is moſt in faſhion in theſe days, they may be more perfect in themſelves, but they need ſo many men to defend them, as thoſe Forces which ought to be imployed for the ſafeguard of the whole Country, or a great part thereof, are bounded within a little compaſs, in defence of ſome City or Citadel. And yet theſe very Soldiers, when drawn out into the Field, may do much better ſervice; for being faſhioned into the body of an Army, they become as it were a moveable Fort, which ſecures at once many Cities and a great Tract of Country: nay, by theſe the Enemy is much indamaged, and the troubles and danger of War are kept far from a mans own home. For (as hath been ſaid) diverſions, and preventions may be made by theſe Forces, they may be carried into another mans State, and ſet another mans houſe on fire, before it take head in ones own houſe; but he who placeth his ſafety in ſtrong holds, puts himſelf into a condition of being at his Enemies diſpoſal, in whoſe will it lies to chooſe what ſhall make moſt for his advantage, with great prejudice to the oppoſing party: For he may either paſs by the Forts, overrun the Country, enrich his Soldiers by booty, impoveriſh the Subjects of that Country

which is aſſaulted, and cannot be releived, by reaſon that the Forces thereof are diſperſt and imploid in the defence of the ſtrong Holds; or if he will make any certain atchievement, he may ſit down before any Fort, and without indangering his own men, whilſt he ſhall live upon the Enemies Territories, he may in time, take it by ſiege, and effect his own deſires (for as hath been ſaid) no ſtrong Hold can promiſe it ſelf long ſafety where no ſuccour is ready at hand.

But let us come a little cloſer to the buſineſs, and let us ſuppoſe that theſe ſtrong Holds may be brought to ſuch a condition as they may be aſſuredly able to reſiſt any open force which ſhall come againſt them, and not be deceived in that their beleef, as often times they are; How can they ſecure themſelves from treacherie, and from ſuch dangers as they may be ſubject unto by the negligence of Soldiers, or falſehood of the Commanders that have the cuſtodie thereof? in which caſe the Princes danger is ſo much the greater, and more irreparable, for that his Enemy is in the Dominions, in a well munited ſeat, from whence he cannot hope to drive him, without much labor and difficultie. But in greater Cities wherein are a multitude of people, and where theſe cautions and ſuſpitions are not to be found, others no whit inferior to theſe do ariſe, for ſuch quantities of victuals is requiſite to feed the many men that are therein incloſed, as no Prince is able to provide for ſo, as may ſerve them for a long time; and if this fail, to what end ſerves Walls, Weapons, or Soldiers? To this may be added that the ſafety of ſuch ſtrong Holds, does in a great part depend upon the pleaſure of the people, who being of themſelves naturally fickle, do often favor forein Princes out of very ſlight reaſons, and ſometimes out of a meer deſire of noveltie; and plot by ſedition, and by open force againſt the preſent State, and deliver themſelves, and the City into another mans power: And though they may afterwards repent themſelves of their folly, they know not how to mend it, when a powerful Army is within the City Walls; nor can this be done by him who defends the State, becauſe he cannot keep ſo many Forces together as are able to defend ſeveral places at once, and becauſe loving his Subjects, as a legitimate Prince ought to do, he is loath to deſtroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein.

But if the State be open and not peſtred with Fortifications, though it may the more eaſily be loſt by ſudden aſſaults, or by ill affected Subjects, it will be the more eaſily regained, and as ſoon as the Prince who is deprived thereof, ſhall have means to rallie his Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten, he ſoon makes head again, and recovers what he had loſt, the Enemy not having any ſafe hold wherein to abide. And of this there are many apparent examples. If the Commonwealth of *Venice*, in the times of her greateſt calamitie, had had her State in *Terra firma* ſo well provided of ſtrong Holds, as now it is, ſhe might not peradventure have run ſo great a misfortune, ſhe had not ſo ſoon loſt ſo many and ſo noble Cities as ſhe did; but it may be alleadged on the contrary, that if in that evil Criſis of affairs wherein ſhe was brought to ſuch adverſity, ſhe had had ſo many important Forts as now ſhe hath, and that they had faln into the power of the Enemy, ſhe would not certainly have ſo ſoon recovered her loſſes, and reſtored herſelf into her priſtine power and greatneſs as ſhe did. We likewiſe ſee the State of *Milan*, which fell ſo often into the power of the *French*, it ſtaid not long under their Dominion, for not finding any ſtrong and Royal Forts, wherein they could make any ſafe abode, nor having time to erect any by reaſon of their continual Wars, or for want of monies, the defenders of that State did often times prevail; and every accident, either of the change of the peoples minds, or of their Enemies increaſe of Forces, were ſufficient to drive them out: Which would not have happened if they had but once been Maſters of any ſtrong Holds, from whence they could not have been expel'd, without a long and hard ſiege. *Guido Ubaldo* D. of *Urbin*, a Prince

but

but of ſmall Territories, but very wiſe, and well experienced in War, moved by theſe reſpects, after he had recovered his State which was formerly taken from him by Duke *Valentine*, he reſolved to ſlight all the ſtrong Holds that were there, knowing that they could not at firſt preſerve his State unto him, and when hee ſhould loſe it, they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater.

When *Charls* the Eighth, King of *France*, going to win the Kingdom of *Naples* paſt through *Tuſcany*, the Forts which the *Florentines* had built for their own ſecuritie, were the very things whereby they were moſt indamaged, and theſe falling into the power of the *French*, whoſe Forces they thought they were not able to withſtand, they put the *Florentines* to vaſt expence, and made them undergo great ſlavery, out of a deſire of recovering them. Whereas if that State had lain open, the King, who was bound upon other enterpriſes, paſſing forward, would no waies have troubled the affairs of that Commonwealth. The like, and almoſt out of the like reſpect, did afterward befall Duke *Coſimo*, when the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth would keep ſome Caſtles belonging to that State in his own power, which ſhould otherwiſe have been left free to *Coſimo*; and which was the occaſion of that ſaying, *Che le fortezza ſono i ceppi della Toſcana*, That ſtrong Holds are the fetters of *Tuſcany*.

Theſe are the greateſt miſchiefs which ſtrong Holds uſe to bring with them; but there are others not altogether ſo grievous, but more certain and irreparable. For who can deny but that the exceſſive charge which Princes are at, not onely in building Fortreſſes, but more in muniting, and guarding them doth ſufficiently exhauſt the publick Exchequer, and neceſſitate the diſburſing of ſuch moneys in times of peace, as ought to be kept for the more urgent occaſions of War. And certainly he who could ſee what vaſt ſums the Commonwealth of *Venice* hath ſpent for ſome late years paſt in making and muniting ſo many Forts both by Sea and Land, would be very much aſtoniſhed, and would confeſs that ſo great a maſs of treaſure would be ſufficient to provide for any War how great ſoever, and to withſtand for a good while any potent Enemy. It may peradventure likewiſe be ſaid, and not untruly, that whilſt a Prince repoſes much confidence in being able to maintain his State by means of theſe ſtrong Holds, and by the aſſiſtance of a few Soldiers, he is not ſo careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the Militia, which are notwithſtanding real and ſecure foundations of a State. The *Lacedemonians* would not therefore ſuffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall, becauſe they beleeved that by the thoughts of ſuch ſecuritie, their Citizens would become more careleſs and negligent in managing their Arms, by ſole means whereof they thought that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off. Which that wiſe man would likewiſe infer who ſaid, That the walls, which ought to ſecure a City ſhould be made of iron not of ſtone. And a *Spartan* being demanded by an *Athenian*, what he thought of the walls of *Athens*? anſwered, That he thought they were very handſome for a City which was to be inhabited by women; inferring, that it is not neceſſarie, nor honorable, for able, valiant men, to ſecure themſelves from their Enemies by ſuch means. It is likewiſe uſually ſeen, that a Prince, who thinks he ſhall be able to curb his Subjects, to govern them and rule them as he pleaſeth by means of Bulwarks and Caſtles, and that therefore he needs not the love of his Subjects, is much leſs mindful of thoſe things which become a good Prince, and which purchaſe affection. Yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth moſt preſerve unto him, or bereave him of his State, and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient; as is of late ſeen in *Flanders*, which ſo many Fortreſſes, and Armies hath not in ſo long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligitimate

Prince. And it may generally be obſerved, that ſuch Governments as have laſted longeſt, have been preſerved, not by the advantage of ſtrong Holds, whereof ſome have not had any, but by vertue of a good Militia, and of the Subjects love.

The *Romans* were accuſtomed, when they had won any new Country, to ſend new Inhabitants thither, who being placed either in the antient Cities, or in others built by themſelves, they called Roman Colonies; and by theſe mens valor, as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People of *Rome*, out of remembrance of their deſert, and in gratitude for the good which they had received, they eaſily kept the new Subjects in loyalty to the Commonwealth, and the Countries which they had won by their Arms, in obedience. The which, being moved thereunto by the ſame reſpects, the *Venetians* did likewiſe in *Candia*, ſending many of their own Gentlemen thither to make Colonies, and to defend and maintain that Iſland. But the *Turks*, in a very violent manner, but anſwerable to the cuſtom of their Government, do almoſt totally deſtroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Countries, chiefly the richeſt and the moſt noble, from whom they take their Lands and poſſeſſions, and give the revenues thereof to be made uſe of by the Soldiery, making *Timari* thereof (as they term it) which are Pays or Revenues aſſigned over to the Soldiers, upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horſe, by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot, who ſerving for Garriſons for the ſafety of the new acquired Country, are notwithſtanding always ready to ſerve in any other place, and upon all occaſions as they ſhall be commanded, to the greater benefit and ſafety of the State, than Forts and ſtrong Holds can do to thoſe other Nations which make moſt uſe of them. But other Princes, who have had greater abundance of Territories, if you will reſpect their Inhabitants, did uſe to leave great ſtore of Land upon their Confines deſert and unmanured, as at theſe times the *Perſians* did upon their Confines towards the *Turks*, to render it more difficult for a numerous Army to paſs through them to their prejudice, or in caſe they do, to make any long abode there: which hath often been of great uſe to them, as hath been ſeen, when very mighty Armies have been led on by the Ottoman Emperors againſt the Perſians, they have moſt commonly been waſted and deſtroyed by their own ſufferings and wants.

From theſe things it appears it may be inferr'd, that there are other Arts and ways which may much better do that for which Fortifications were firſt found out, and for which they are now a-daies ſo much uſed, eſpecially amongſt Chriſtian Princes. And yet if we will face about, ſome other, and thoſe no contemptible arguments will be found, which will plead for the very great advantage which Princes and States receive from Fortifications. It is moſt aſſuredly certain, that to ſecure a mans ſelf by all means poſſible from offence, is a precept not only taught by Reaſon, but dictated by Nature, which, as it were by ſome occult and miraculous counſel, hath pleaſed to divide thoſe Nations by a long ſeries of high towring Mountains, and to ſecure them from the injuries which the diverſity of Climate hath produced in their ſeveral affections and cuſtoms, and conſequently a certain natural enmity; and hath likewiſe provided in all parts more eminent ſeats amongſt Mountains, and more incloſed ones amidſt Vallies, wherein the Inhabitants may preſerve themſelves ſafe from the force and violence, which the ſtronger uſe to exerciſe upon the weaker. So as Fortification may be ſaid to be an Art which doth imitate and help Nature, becauſe her operations are like thoſe of the others, and do ſometimes reduce the workmanſhip of Nature to more perfection and uſe. And though this be not grounded upon ſo certain principles as thoſe of the Sciences, yet doth ſhe govern herſelf by a kind of Reaſon in ſuch things wherein ſhe is verſed.

And

And thus much may ſerve to prove that ſhe deſerves the name of Art; neither ought ſhe to be ever a whit undervalued, becauſe new things and new rules are daily found out by the induſtrie of thoſe that ſtudy her, ſince it is proper to natural and eternal things to keep themſelves always in ſuch a condition, as that they ſuffer not any alteration. But ſay what thing it is, which of all humane operations, wherein ſuch certainty and conſtancie is to be found? No man will notwithſtanding ſay, that men are to live idly, or totally to betake themſelves to Contemplation, and deſpiſe ſo many Arts, which are the ornaments of Civil life, becauſe we cannot proceed therein by way of demonſtration to one only and certain truth. Nor can it be ſaid that this Art of Fortification is of late invention, for it is very antient, and hath been known almoſt in all Ages, and by all Nations; but ſometimes in leſſer, ſometimes in greater perfection, according to a certain variety and viciſſitude which Time cauſeth us well in Arts, as in all other things. The Antients had their Forts, and Engines of War to take them, which by a general name they called *Tormenta*: Amongſt other Engines which ſerved to batter down Forts, the Rams were much known and uſed; and we find mention made of many other ſorts of Inſtruments belonging to the offence and defence of Cities; and of theſe ſome ſo miraculous, as their force may be ſaid to cauſe no leſs wonder, then do our Guns now a-daies. To this purpoſe we read, that when *Scipio* would vanquiſh a certain City in *Spain*, the Defenders thereof threw certain Irons over the walls, ſo artificially ordered, as they therewith drew up ſuch of the Enemies Soldiers as came neer the walls, to the top thereof. And it is related of that famous *Archimedes*, that he invented an Engine which was uſed in defence of his Country *Syracuſa*, by which an armed Gally might be raiſed by force out of the water, and drawn up on the Town-walls. How can it be then ſaid, that ſuch Art of Fabricking was unknown to the Antients, if they uſed ſuch ſtudy and induſtry in defending and in oppugning Forts? Nay, many of their moſt cry'd up Commanders have been praiſed particularly for this; and the *Romans*, who were very excellent at all things belonging to the Militia, were very good at this alſo, and did thereby preſerve their State, which they had almoſt loſt by fighting: For *Hannibal* in his proſperous courſe of victory, was forced to keep ſo long, and ſpend ſo much time before ſome ſmall, but ſtrong and well-walled Caſtles, and Colonies of the *Romans*, as the ſafety of the City of *Rome* was in a great part attributed thereunto.

But to ſpeak no more of theſe antient proceedings, do we not ſee that many Forts and Caſtles have been built in not many Ages ago in many places, and chiefly in *Italy*? Which though the uſe of Cannon renders now of no uſe, yet compare ſuch Fortreſſes with the manner of warfaring in thoſe days, and they may be held almoſt equal to ours, or at leaſt they ſhew that men did ſtudy as much then to ſecure themſelves from being injured by the Enemy, and the better to maintain their States and Territories by that art, as they do now. The ſo many Sieges and beleaguering of Cities, whereof mention is made in all Ages, do cleerly prove that the uſe of Fortification is of very antient uſe, and hath been continued in all Ages, though it be now reduced to much greater perfection. Now if we ſhall conſider what advantage is made by Fortifications, we ſhall find them to be many, and of great importance: For it is ſufficiently manifeſt, that a Country wherein are no ſtrong Holds, is alwaies in apparent danger, and left almoſt at the diſcretion of the Enemy; who whilſt they may ſafely at unawares enter thereinto, not meeting with any obſtacle, have it alwaies in their power, if not to prejudice the main affairs of that State, at leaſt to vex the people by fire and rapine, of whoſe ſafety and preſervation the Prince ought alwais to be careful.

We may find ſad example of this by the late and well known paſſages of the Country of *Friuli* in the late Wars which the State of *Venice* had in *Terra firma*; being

being totally deſtitute of ſtrong Holds, it became a prey to whoſoever would aſſault it; inſomuch as it was not onely ruined and deſtroyd by regular Armies, but by ſuch as paſſed tumultuouſly over the mountains; the Inhabitants thereof being only ſo long ſecure, as the *Venetian* Army was permitted to remain amongſt thoſe Confines; but as ſoon as being ſummoned from thence, upon other occaſions, it behoved to be gone from thence, the Enemies returned again to freſh and ſecure depredations; which will likewiſe befal any Region which is not defended, and maintained by Fortreſſes. And where the members of a State are far aſunder, if it muſt be defended onely by the Soldiers ſword, many Armies will ſcarcely be able to ſecure it; whereas by means of ſtrong Holds, the ſame people who are able to defend them, will likewiſe ſerve in a great part to preſerve the Country; as well becauſe many of the Inhabitants may there finde ſafe refuge, as likewiſe for that is no good advice nor uſually imbraced by good Commanders to advance forward, and to leave the Forts of the Enemy placed in fitting parts upon the Frontiers behinde them, the State is preſerved from greater dangers. As on the contrary, the State wherein there are no ſtrong Holds, though it be provided of a good and valiant Militia, yet muſt it depend upon the various chance of War, and hazard all upon the uncertain event of Battel; and if any thing of misfortune befal, the whole Country is left to the diſcretion of the Enemy, and the Armies not having any ſafe place whereunto to retreat are totally defeated by one rout; as it happened in the laſt Age in the Soldan of *Cairo's* moſt famoſt Empire, which Soldan being overcome in ſeveral Battels by *Selymus Ottoman*, and wanting time to rally his Army, and ſtrong Holds whereunto to have refuge, did in a ſhort time loſe his whole Kingdom and the Empire of the *Mammalucchi* was overthrown; which was before very famous for military diſcipline, and eſteemed very ſecure, by repoſing its ſafety in the valor of ſtrong and able men.

To this may be added, That ſtrong Holds do not onely ſecure States from theſe utmoſt hazards of adverſe Fortune, but make very much for the keeping it away, and often-times they reap the intention of true ſecuritie, without any hazard; for when he who intends to aſſault a State, ſhall conſider that his attempts are likely to prove tedious and difficult, and that it is doubtful whether he ſhall be therein victorious or no, he does not ſo eaſily fall upon the buſineſs; but when the War is once begun Fortreſſes do aſſuredly ſufficiently keep from comming to join Battel; for the aſſailant will not eaſily hazard himſelf upon the danger of a pitch'd Field; becauſe he ſees he ſhall be debarr'd the chief fruits of Victorie (which is the getting of ſome City or place of importance) by ſtrong Holds: And ſo alſo he who is aſſaulted, the more he ſees his affairs in a good poſture by the means of ſtrong Holds, the more he endeavors to prolong the time, to the end that he may defeat him by his own incommodities, without much uſe of weapons: Whence it is that in theſe times, wherein the perfection of fortifying is much increaſed, field Battels are ſeldom fought; for to fight makes not for the advantage of either of the parties out of the above ſaid conſiderations; Since the wit and induſtry of the Commanders ſeems to prevail over Fortifications and do in a great part take that uncertainty from War which uſeth to be found therein. In the condition of the preſent affairs and times, it is alſo ſeen that as much time is ſpent in the taking of one onely Fort, as in former Ages, and when another manner of Militia was in uſe, was ſpent in taking in whole Provinces. Which peradventure is likewiſe the cauſe why the Princes of theſe later Ages, though ſome of them have been very powerful and valiant, have not made any great progreſs in all the Wars which they have made: Wherefore it ſeems it may be affirmed that Fortification is a very noble and excellent Art, becauſe it helps to compaſs the ultimate and true end which ought to be the aim of War in a well regulated State, to wit, peace and ſecuritie.

What

What is then to be reſolved upon in this diverſitie of allegations? It is a true and general rule, that all things cannot ſuit with all things, nor ought we in the actions belonging to civil life to ſeek for that which is ſimply, and of it ſelf good, for it would be in vain to do ſo; divers things prove uſeful to divers ends, and to divers perſons, and they ought to be accommodated to the condition of times, quality of cuſtoms, and to other particular accidents. Therefore the ſame manner of proceeding in the Government, and preſervation of their States becomes not ſeveral Princes, but ſeveral waies. Such Princes as have large Dominions, and powerful Forces, may ſecurely repoſe their ſafety in their Militia, and Soldiery, they have no great need of Caſtles or ſtrong Holds; and if they will have any, it may ſuffice them to have them placed upon their utmoſt Confines, to ſecure their Country from ſudden incurſions, and for the opportunitie and ſecuritie of ſuch Gariſons as ſuch Princes uſe to keep in their provinces, which are furtheſt remote, and at a great diſtance from their Imperial Seate; as the Roman Emperors did in former times, and as the *Ottoman* Lords do now, who truſting in their own power, do endeavor much more the taking of Forts which do appertain to other men, then the making of new ones themſelves, which they ſtand not ſo much in need of, for that their greatneſs keeps them free from being injured by others. But leſſer Princes ought to govern themſelves by another rule, and ſtand more in need of ſtrong Holds; for not having any large Territories, nor much money to keep a great many Soldiers continually in pay, what they cannot do by force or reputation, they do by the advantage of Fortifications; for they keep what belongs unto them ſo well guarded by a few Soldiers, as ſometimes the Forces of any whatſoever powerful Prince are not able to pluck them out of their neſt, nor yet to bereave them of any part of their State: Whereof we have had many examples in theſe later times. and amongſt the reſt, the defence of *Malta* is very remarkable, which being aſſaulted by the Forces of ſo great a Prince as was *Solyman*, the few Knights of *Malta* were ſo able to defend it, as the Turks were forced not without ſome ſhame, and much to their prejudice, to quit it, after having ſpent much time, and loſt many men before that Fort.

And the Turks having learned by the experience of others, the good of ſtrong Holds begin now to have a better eſteem of them, then formerly they have had, eſpecially in places furtheſt off from the Seat of the Empire, where all things neceſſaie cannot be provided for, but in a long time, and with much inconveniencie. They have to this purpoſe built many Forts in the parts which they have lately gotten in *Perſia*; and have therein done very wiſely; for whereas the former *Ottoman* Emperors, reaped no good by their enterpriſes upon *Perſia*, but as ſoon as their Armies were withdrawn, the Country which they had over-run, but not gotten, returned to the obedience of its former Lords, now, by degrees from time to time, they have by their Forts ſo confirmed themſelves in the poſſeſſion of ſuch places as they have once taken, as the *Perſians*, being a people little verſt in the expugning of ſtrong Holds, have but ſmall hopes of ever driving them out from ſuch ſpacious Territories, firſt gotten by force of Arms, and afterwards by ſuch means maintained by them, & by a ſafe poſſeſſion ſecured unto them. So as the uſe of Fortreſſes are ſometime according as place and occaſion ſhall ſerve of no ſmal ſervice, not only to petie Princes, but even to the greateſt. But as for the number of theſe ſtrong Holds, for the time, form, and other accident, which ought to be obſerved in the building of them, no ſuch certain rule can be given as can ſerve all men at all times. Only this may be ſaid, that a wiſe Prince ought to conſider herein, not only what he deſigns to do, but what his Eſtate, and what his Forces are; otherwiſe that which was intended for a cure and ſuſtenance, may prove poiſon and ruin to the State. As when a Prince will make ſuch, and ſo many Fortreſſes, as that by

reaſon

reaſon of too great and inconſiderate expence in time of Peace, in maintaining them, he muſt of himſelf conſume; then that will prove true which hath formerly been conſidered, that a Prince of no great fortune, not being able to garriſoniſe or furniſh ſo many Fortreſſes with things neceſſary, nor to draw forth the body of a well-adjuſted Army into the field, in greateſt danger of War, will find he hath not ſecured, but increaſed his own dangers, and hath put the total of his affairs in great diſorder and confuſion.

Fortreſſes then, as all other things in a well ordered Government, ought to be diſpoſed of with good judgment, and a well regulated temper; ſo as their number and greatneſs may be proportionable to the condition of the State, and of the Prince his Forces: They muſt not be placed idly in all places, but only upon the Frontiers, and in places fit for that purpoſe; and ſo as the natural ſituation of the place may aſſiſt Art as much as may be, and be alſo thereby aſſiſted; for ſuch Fortreſſes may be maintained in greater ſecurity, and with fewer Soldiers. But above all things, all poſſible care muſt be had, that in time of greateſt need they may be ſuccor'd; for no Fort can hold out long againſt a great force, unleſs it be ſupplied by new Garriſons, Munitions, and with all other neceſſaries. It is alſo very advantagious for Fortreſſes, that there be good ſtore of good Earth or Mould within them, whereby they may ſeveral ways accommodate themſelves for defence, according as the approaches to take them are made; and alſo to have ready opportunity to uſe the benefit of many retreats, and to gain time, which is the proper and greateſt convenience for Fortreſſes. So as if fitting proviſions and reſpects be had, Fortreſſes ſo built will prove advantagious for a Prince or State, not only in the opinion of Soldiers, but even of Statesmen. But when they are made without judgment or art, it is not the fault of the Work, but of him who knows not how to uſe it, if ſuch good effects do not enſue thereupon as are deſired: Which happens not only in ſtrong Holds, but in all other things, which being ill uſed, loſe their efficacie. Thus then theſe arguments are eaſily anſwered by theſe diſtinctions, and by what hath been alleadged in the behalf of ſtrong Holds, which might at firſt occaſion any doubt: For the Art of Fortification ought not to be deſpiſed, becauſe it hath not alwaies been the ſame; rather it ought to be ſo much the more eſteemed, becauſe we ſee it grows every day to greater perfection by new inventions, and by experiences. Thus it fares alſo with the Art of building of Ships and Houſes, with that of Sculpture, Phyſick, Painting, and of all other excellent Diſciplines, which (Experience being the beſt Introductreſs) did not arrive at ſuch excellencie and eſtimation ſuddenly, but in proceſs of time.

And notwithſtanding, this Art of Fortification hath in this our Age gotten ſome more ſetled Rules, and (as a man may ſay) more certain Principles, ſince the uſe of Batteries and of other manner of Attaques introduced by modern men, whereby ſhe doth govern herſelf in the whole, and in every one of her particular members, in form, diſtance, proportion of parts, and in other things, which are alwaies the ſame, where the ſeat will permit it. Variety of noble Wits have added ſo much of ornament and of perfection of late to this noble Profeſſion, as all doubts which may be put whether there be a true Art thereof, or no, are evidently cleered: And though ſometimes ſhe may vary by reaſon of the diverſity of ſituations, or by any other accidents which cannot be compriſed within one and the ſame Rule, this ought not to detract from the dignity of the Artificers thereof, then it doth from the Politician (who certainly is the chiefeſt Architector in all our Civil operations) to proceed by probable arguments, and oftentimes alter his advice, that he may fit his actions to the circumſtances which do accompany them. Nor doth it follow, that ſuch an Art ſhould be the worſe thought of, becauſe it doth not alwaies compaſs its end, which is the preſervation of ſuch a City, or ſuch a Country where

ſuch

ſuch Fortifications are erected; ſince that likewiſe depends upon various accidents, which no humane art or wiſdom is able to foreſee nor when foreſeen, to provide alwaies by any induſtry a due remedy againſt them. It may as well be ſaid, men ought to forbear building of Ships, and deprive themſelves thereby of the Traffick and Commerce which is held with far diſtant Countries, becauſe many Ships periſh in the Seas. The Phyſitians care doth not alwaies cure the ſick party; the Orator doth not alwaies compaſs his ends by his perſwaſive oratory: Ought men therefore to forbear Navigation, Phyſick, or Perſwaſion? If a wicked and perfidious man betray a Fort unto the Enemy which was recommended to his truſt, ought this to be attributed to the evil and imperfection of Forts? What thing is there ſo good, as may not be abuſed by wicked men? 'tis only Vertue which hath this priviledg; all other adornments of Humanitie would be extinct, and expell'd the World. If a Fort be loſt for being badly garriſoned, ill defended, or by ſome other ſiniſter accident; ought the fault which is committed by the Prince his negligence, the Commanders ignorance, or by the Soldiers cowardiſe, be laid upon the defect of the Fort, which is of it ſelf well made? But ſay, I beſeech you, are ſuch diſorders and dangers as may ariſe in a State, by want of care in a Prince, by the perfidiouſneſs of Commanders, or cowardiſe of Soldiers, become ſo peculiar to Forts and Citadels, as the ſame by the ſame occaſion may not happen in Armies, and in all other defences howſoever attempted? Wherefore then by ſeeking for ſuch perfection in Forts, as is not found in other things, ſhall we by the loſs of that advantage which may be thereby received, and is often received, leave the State in the hands of Chance, and to the diſcretion of him who doth deſign to aſſault it. Nor ought it to be ſaid, that ſtrong Holds ſhould be deſpiſed, and the whole ſafety of the State be placed in the Militia, as in a thing of firmer foundation, becauſe it is not every Prince that can alwaies keep an Army in pay, nor would this be ſufficient to keep a State from unexpected aſſaults, which hath many ſeveral Confines. Moreover, he who placeth all his hopes of ſecuring his State in Armies, and in openly fighting his Enemies, muſt oftentimes (as it hath been ſaid) hazard all to Fortune, and put himſelf upon the danger of a thouſand accidents; and unleſs Field-forces be back'd by ſtrong Holds, and equal to thoſe of the Enemy who doth aſſault them, they muſt remain idle and of no uſe: For not being able to withſtand the ſhock, what can they do elſe but retreat, and ſuffer him who ſhall be ſtronger to make himſelf Maſter of the whole Country? whereas by the help of Fortreſſes, a few are able to reſiſt many, and to gain time, the only true remedy of him who is the weaker, and who is to reſiſt and withſtand the Forces of one that is more powerful.

Nor ought the example of the *Spartans* be of any validity to perſwade the contrary, who would not ſecure their Cities with Walls, or any other Fortifications; becauſe having only to do with other people of *Greece* who were weaker then they, they thought themſelves ſafe without ſuch helps; and that by doing ſo, they purchaſed more praiſe and reputation: But when they were to wage war with the *Perſians* and *Macedonians*, who were powerful Enemies, even they ſought to put themſelves in a poſture of defence, by having recourſe to narrow paſſages, and to keep off the Enemy, aſſiſting the natural ſituations of the places by Fortifications. Moreover, the *Spartans* had but ſmall Territories, and but a few places to guard, and were much given to the Militia; ſo as they who will reap advantage by following their counſels, muſt be Lords of Cities, all the inhabitants whereof muſt be Soldiers, and all of them deſirous to preſerve the State, as were the *Spartans*. But the reaſon why the Duke of *Urbin* did ſlight ſome of his Forts, was peradventure becauſe he knew himſelf too weak to defend them; and beſides, becauſe he thought it better not to invite others to wage war with him, either out of a jealouſie of them, or out of a deſire to make themſelves maſters of them, he being to conſider all

Forces as they related to his, or if he would make uſe of other mens aſſiſtance he muſt depend upon them. And for what concerns the ſtrong Holds of *Tuſcany*, it may be ſaid in the firſt place, that it was the imprudencie of *Pietro de Medici*, not the Caſtles which did trouble and diſorder the *Florentines*: And ſecondly, that it may be Duke *Coſimo* would not ſo eaſily have gotten *Caſar* to have confirmed him in the poſſeſſion of that State, had it not been that he might thereby ſecure himſelf of his faith in that new Dominion; But the accidents which may occur are ſo many, as it is impoſſible to comprehend every particular under one and the ſame rule. And is it not a vain thing to affirm, that ſtrong Holds ought not to be made uſe of, becauſe if it ſo fall out as the State which wants them be loſt, it may be the more eaſily recovered? For that is no more then to expoſe a mans ſelf to mortal wounds, out of hopes that when he is hurt he may find a cure. And what Prince can aſſure himſelf that though he hath been negligent in muniting his State with Forts, his Enemy when he ſhall have made himſelf Maſter of his State, will not fortifie ſuch ſeats as he ſhall find commodious for his ſafety.

But if it be ſaid, that a Prince grows wicked, covetous, and cruel towards his Subjects through his too much confiding in ſtrong Holds, it is not eaſily to diſcern that theſe ſo far remote affairs have any thing to do with the vices of the mind, and if they ought to be taken into ſuch conſideration, the reaſon would reach no further then to Caſtles and Citadels; but in greater and more important Fortifications, the Prince is ſo much the more bound to preſerve the love and loyaltie of his Subjects, in that he ſtands in the more need of them for the ſafety of the City thus fortified, for if it ſhould fall into the Enemies hands by the peoples rebellion, the loſs would be the greater. But it may be the conſideration of expence which that Prince puts himſelf unto, who builds many ſtrong Holds, may ſeem to bear more weight with it then any of the reſt, whereas his chief care ought to be, to accumulate treaſure in time of peace, againſt Wars ſhall happen; to which it may be anſwered, That States cannot be preſerved without charges and expence; and that if a Prince ſhould go about to procure the like ſecuritie to himſelf by his Militia, as he doth by his ſtrong Holds: he muſt be at infinite more expence, and ſuch as none but great Kingdoms and Empires are able to undergo. But if a Prince proceed therein with ſuch temper and judgement as hath been ſpoken of, and which is alſo requiſite in all things elſe, he can incur no danger by Fortifications, of running into thoſe diſorders and neceſſities, which many careleſs men, and ſuch as know not how to govern do fall.

We will then conclude, that Fortifications are very uſeful in all States, but chiefly in ſmall ones, and in thoſe more then any others, which have many Confines, and powerful neighbors, for ſuch States have need of good guards, and have not wherewith to keep Armies perpetually on foot, as the Turks do in theſe times, nor to make Deſarts as do the *Perſians*, nor to inſtitute Colonies in ſeveral parts, as was the cuſtom of the antient *Romans*; and if the Commonwealth of *Venice* did imitate them therein, it was but once; and with more deſire to the ſelf-inhabitants of the Iſland of *Candia* at her devotion, then to defend it from forein Forces; But now that the Turks power is grown ſo formidable, it would be altogether unuſeful, and not of any moment, without ſtrong Holds, and a well paid Militia; therefore the care and ſtudy which Princes take more in theſe latter times then they did formerly in Fortification muſt needs be praiſed by whoſoever conſiders things with a right judgment.

The Ninth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo *the Tenth were good or no, and his counſel ſafe, of driving forein Nations out of* Italy, *by the help of other* Tranſalpine *Forces.*

Italy had been moleſted with Wars by forein Nations, almoſt continually for the ſpace of Thirty years, when in the time of the Popedom of *Leo* the Tenth, ſhe ſeemed to have ſome hopes of quiet, and of enjoying ſome better condition, after her ſo many and ſo grievous vexations and ruines, which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which ſhe had undergone by the invaſion of the Northern Armies. But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured; for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes, the State of *Milan* being at the devotion of *Francis* King of *France*, and the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth being poſſeſt of the Kingdom of *Naples*; which Princes being now weakned and weary with ſo many Wars, ſo as the one could not exceed the other, and having at that time their thoughts elſewhere bent, being governed more by neceſſitie peradventure then by their own wills, they ſeemed to reſt ſatisfied with what they did already poſſeſs in *Italy*, and that they would ſuffer her to enjoy at leaſt ſome reſt after her paſt moleſtations.

In this poſture of Affairs, Pope *Leo*, who had often negotiated with ſeveral Princes about the buſineſs of Arms, and had endeavored (as he ſaid) the liberty of *Italy*, and chiefly the preſervation of the Dukedom of *Milan* in the Government of the *Sforza's*, was much diſpleaſed to have the power of ſtrangers any longer continued, and particularly that the Church ſhould be bereft of two noble Cities, *Parma* and *Piacenza*, which were become members of the State of *Milan*. Therefore with a haughty and generous mind, he reſolved not to prefer an unſecure quiet, before ſome preſent troubles, ſo to ſhun other moleſtations and dangers, which he thought might grow the greater by ſuch a peace, in future, if not to himſelf, at leaſt to the Church. And knowing that he ſhould not be able either of himſelf, nor by joining with other *Italians*, to drive forein Potentates out of *Italy*, he reſolved to join with ſome foreiners againſt ſome other foreiners, with deſign (as he ſaid) that when ſome of them ſhould be forced to forgo *Italy*, it might be the eaſier to expel the reſt.

Leo having thus put on this noble and generous reſolution, it may ſeem to merit praiſe by all men, as to the intention; but as for the means he took to compaſs it, it is not ſo eaſily to be agreed upon; for many and weighty reſpects do concur thereunto; for ſome of which, this action may ſeem to be as wiſe, as glorious; and if we will reflect upon other ſome, there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein, then of ſecurity and hopes. That all Tranſalpiners might be driven out of *Italy*, was a thing deſired, and not without cauſe by all *Italians*, and which ought to be his chiefeſt care and endeavor who had ſuch Territories, degree and authority in that Province, as *Leo* had. The antient dignity of the *Italian* honor ſeemed to appear in the Popes majeſty, and in the ſplendor of the Court of *Rome*: but as for the effecting of this buſineſs, it did plainly appear that all the power of the *Italian* Potentates was too weak; ſince two great Princes and warlike Nations, had for many paſt years, though with various fortune, got footing there, and ſtill kept their poſſeſſion, ſo as their power could ſuffer no diſturbance, but muſt be confirmed

and conſolidated, and muſt become more formidable to the Church, and to all the Italian Princes, unleſs it were by ſome of the ſame forein Nations. If the ſole Forces of the Italian Princes, when *Italy* by reaſon of a long Peace did flouriſh moſt, were not ſufficient to ſtop the French Forces, which were then but new in thoſe parts, and but meanly aſſiſted; what reaſon was there to believe, that this Province ſhould ever be raiſed up again of herſelf, and ſhould by means of her own Forces return to her priſtine fortune and dignity, after having been ſo long vexed by cruel Wars, and having loſt two of her nobleſt Members.

Wherefore though to adminiſter freſh fuel, as it were, to this fire of War, as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apoſtolick Sea, if they ſhould join with *Ceſar*, or with the King of *France*, might be troubleſom and dangerous, yet might it be beneficial, or at leaſt hopeful, ſince it might ſo fall out, that the fortune of War being various, and ſubject to unexpected chances, ſome good effect might enſue thereupon for the liberty of *Italy*; the Forces of thoſe Princes who did oppoſe her, growing much the weaker, or elſe by their growing weary of the work, and by their turning themſelves to ſome other undertaking. Whereas on the contrary, to ſuffer them to ſettle there, and to get in time greater authority over the people, and more love to the States which they had gotten, was a certain and irreparable ruine, and an utter aboliſhing of all hopes of ever reſtoring the States which were poſſeſt by ſtrangers into the hands of the Italian Princes. But the fear leſt both theſe Princes, who were grown ſo powerful in *Italy*, might join together againſt the Territories of the Church, or thoſe of other Italian Princes, to divide them amongſt themſelves, as had happened not many years before, when the Emperor *Maximilian* and *Lewis* the Twelfth, King of *France*, who had been formerly at ſuch great enmity one with another, grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the *Venetians*; might chiefly perſwade the Pope to quit neutrality, and to ſide with the one or the other of theſe Princes. *Leo* knew, that upon many paſt occaſions he had done things not only of but little ſatisfaction, but of much diſguſt to both theſe Princes and Nations, more particularly to the *French*, who were alwaies jealous of his cunning; ſo as great emulation growing in them both, and a deſire of commanding over all *Italy*, and finding that affairs were ſo equally poiſed between them in this Province, as the one could not much exceed the other, nor make any new acquiſition, it was with reaſon to be feared, that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to ſide with either of them, from whoſe friendſhip they might for many reaſons expect very conſiderable aſſiſtance, they might at laſt convene together to the total oppreſſion of the Liberty of *Italy*. Nor was *Leo's* Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to ſecure him from ſuch a danger, ſince he had formerly openly declared himſelf and taken up Arms in company with others; and chiefly ſince the *French* knew, that he was no waies pleaſed with their Dominion in *Italy*, as well for the common affairs, as for his own particular diſlike that they had poſſeſſed themſelves of the Cities of *Parma* and *Piacenſa*, which were returned to the obedience of the Apoſtolick Sea by his Predeceſſor *Julius*. So as the Churches State, and that of the *Florentines*, which was under the ſame Popes protection and government, grew to be thoſe alone which were expoſed to the injuries of all men; for the *Venetians* were ſtill firm to the *French*, and the other leſſer Princes adhered ſome to the fortune of the *French*, ſome to that of the Imperialiſts. It was then the moſt uſeful, ſafe, and requiſite counſel, to join in friendſhip by particular and reciprocal obligations, either with *Ceſar*, or with the King of *France*: By doing which, to boot with ſecurity, many good effects might follow, to wit, that the adverſe party being ſuppreſt and driven out of *Italy*, that party which ſhould yet remain there as friend, and free from the jealouſie or rivalſhip of any forein Prince, was likely to afford a long Peace (a thing very

very neceſſary in reſpect of the many late afflictions) and ſuch accidents might the more probably happen in proceſs of time, whereby *Italy* might more eaſily free herſelf from the ſervitude of one only Lord and Maſter, then ſhe ſhould have done from the like of two; it being unlikely that two Principalities ſhould meet with one and the ſame fortune, at one and the ſame time. But if nothing elſe of good had happened during this diſcord and contention between theſe two Princes, their States muſt be ſubject to the expences and troubles which do neceſſarily accompany War; ſo as ſome revenge would be had upon theſe forein Nations, for the ſo many calamities which they had brought upon *Italy*; and that ſaying of the Scripture would be verified, *To revenge a man upon his Enemies, by other Enemies.*

The Emperors of *Rome*, when the Empire began to decline, and the antient Italian worth and diſcipline was almoſt loſt, they not having Forces ſufficient of their own to withſtand the Northern nations, made uſe of the Soldiers of the ſame Northern nations to drive their Fellow-foreiners out of *Italy*; as particularly of the *Goths*, of whom they had ſeveral times great numbers in their Armies. But ſay that one of theſe forein Princes could not have worſted the other, though aſſiſted by the Apoſtolick Sea, even in this condition of affairs hopes would not be wanting, whilſt War ſhould continue between them: For after having long wreſtled together, eſpecially ſince the quarrel aroſe out of hatred and warlike emulation, it was not unlikely that they would rather quit the Territories which they held in *Italy* to ſome third perſons, then to yield one to another, ſo as it might remain in their own power: Concerning which ſurrender, particularly of the State of *Milan*, many Treaties had been formerly. *Leo* had likewiſe a very freſh example of councels taken by the Venetian Senate, which in the ſame caſe was confirm'd by experience to be very wiſely done: For that Senate finding that their State was fallen into great misfortunes, and reduced to ſo low an ebb, as ſhe was not able to recover of herſelf, they joined with ſome of their very Enemies, againſt other ſome of their Enemies; whereby they did not only ſeparate them, but did revenge themſelves much to the prejudice of thoſe that they had excluded from their friendſhip, and did thus recover the State which had been uſurped from them. But *Leo's* advice was afterwards the better approved of by the particular iſſue of this very buſineſs: For having after many ſeveral cogitations of mind join'd in confederacie with *Ceſar*, the City of *Milan* was taken from the *French* by their joint-forces, and the Cities of *Parma* and *Piacenſa* were recovered to the Church; not without great hopes, had it not been for the unexpected and unfortunate death of Pope *Leo*, that the *French* ſhould have then been totally expulſed out of *Italy*, and *Maximilian Sforza* reinveſted into the State of *Milan*, according to agreements made by the Pope, which would have greatly ſecured the liberty of the Church, and of whole *Italy*. Which when it ſhould have ſo ſucceeded, there was reaſon enough to hope, that the *French* would join in driving the *Imperialiſts* out of the Kingdom of *Naples*, being ſatisfied (without any other reward) with having revenged themſelves for their received injuries, and with ſeeing the *Imperialiſts* reduced to their condition, for what concerned the affairs of *Italy*. And it might be hoped that this might the eaſilier be done, by reaſon of the far diſtance of *Ceſars* Territories, and by reaſon of many ill humors which began already to grow in ſeveral places; whereby he might be neceſſitated to bend his Forces and thoughts elſwhere, and leave his affairs in *Italy* but weakly defended. *Leo* then may ſeem to have grounded his councels well, like a wiſe Prince (as he was) upon good foundations, for as much as may be effected by humane wiſdom, where ſo many other accidents do concur. Yet were there not wanting ſome who did greatly blame this reſolution of Pope *Leo's*, taxing him with inconſiderateneſs, becauſe being led on by vain hopes, he had unneceſſarily imbroil'd himſelf

again

again in War: And if we ſhall look more narrowly into this buſineſs, we ſhall find that many Conſiderations were wanting; which may raiſe at leaſt ſome rational doubts, whether the Pope were more to be praiſed, or to be blamed for this action.

It is moſt certain, that War in it ſelf is troubleſom to Princes, grievous to the People, and ſubject to many various and uncertain chances. So that as every wiſe Prince ought alwaies to avoid it, where there is no expreſs neceſſity, it appears that this Prince ought to have had it in more horror then any other, in reſpect of the times, and of his degree and place, which ought rather to have made him endeavor peace and quiet between Chriſtian Princes. The Dominion of the Church was by his Predeceſſors means arrived already to ſuch a largeneſs, as it might ſeem better to become the Succeeder to augment the ſafety thereof by procuring friendſhip with other Princes, and by a conſtant neutrality, then to expoſe himſelf to new troubles and dangers, by adding more States thereunto. *Italy* having been much afflicted, and brought in almoſt every of her parts to great miſery and calamity, for having been the ſeat of War for the ſpace of thirty years, did not onely much deſire peace and quiet, but did chiefly expect it from the Popes councels and actions, by reaſon of his ſupreme authoritie, and of the zeal he ought to have born to the publick good.

How could it then deſerve praiſe, that when forein Princes ſeemed to be inclined to ſuffer *Italy* to remain quiet, he ſhould afford them occaſion and means of imbroiling her in new troubles and calamities, which were certainly to inſue by reaſſuming Arms, where the advantage which might thereby be gotten was very doubtful and queſtionable? But, that which in this caſe is chiefly to be conſidered, is, that *Leo's* intention being to drive the foreiners out of *Italy*, and to vindicate her liberty, he ſhould have choſen ſome good means to have done it. Many antient and modern experiences might have taught him, how hard a matter it might be to keep the *French* on the other ſide of the Mountains. The *Romans* were not more troubled with any other Nation then with the *French*, in freeing *Italy* from forein invaſions; for ſhe was oft-times aſſaulted by them, and many of her parts poſſeſt by them, and the Empire it ſelf was endangered by their Forces. And of late years ſince the paſſage of *Charls* the Eighth, though they had proved variety of fortune, yet kept they ſtill the ſame reſolution of waging war in *Italy*, and of keeping footing in this Province, not being frighted from this reſolution by any misfortune how great ſoever; but being once beaten back, they returned with great fury to ſeek out novelties; and at this very time that we now ſpeak of, they were poſſeſt of the Dutchy of *Milan*. Therefore to ſecure himſelf from the *French*, it was not ſufficient to drive them once out of *Italy*; for the Forces of that large Kingdom being ſtill very powerful, and they being alwaies prepared for novelty, their deſire bore them chiefly thereunto, where it had done formerly, ſo as *Italy* remained ſtill expoſed to new incurſions, and ſubject to the miſeries of War. Therefore this intention of Pope *Leo's*, of keeping the *French* long out of *Italy*, could not peradventure have been compaſſed but in a long proceſs of time, and with much variety of ſucceſs, no, not though *Italy* had been all of a peece, and in greater power and proſperitie then ſhe then was.

Whereas at this time the Commonwealth of *Venice* being now returned to great power, was joined in confederacie with the King of *France* by vertue of antient Capitulations; nor was it to be hoped for, that out of any uncertain hopes, and of long expectation, ſhe ſhould eaſily forgo ſuch a friendſhip: And as for other Princes, they were but weak, and their ends not conſtant nor conformable. And on the other ſide, *Cæſar* was very bare of monies, and had many other irons in the fire, ſo as the greateſt weight and care of managing this War was likely to fall unto

to the Popes ſhare, wherein if he ſhould ſlacken never ſo little, all that had been done would have been to no effect; and thoſe places, which by reaſon of this confederacie with the Church, were taken from the *French*, would quickly and eaſily have faln into their hands again. But ſay that *Charls* had been able to have imploied all his Forces about this buſineſs, the greater they had been, the greater ſhare would he have pretended in the buſineſs: and the leſs able had the Pope or any others been to oppoſe his Forces.

Charls the Great, a Prince of excellent worth, freed *Italy* from the ſlaviſh yoke of the Northern Barbarians, driving the *Lombards* from thence, who had had the chief command there for Three hundred years; but he would therefore make the greateſt advantage thereof unto himſelf, creating his Son *Pipin*, King of *Italy*; nor ought any of *Charls* his promiſes to be thought ſufficient to ſhun ſuch a danger, to which it was known he was much more moved out of a fervent deſire to draw the Pope into this confederacie of excluding the King of *France*, then that he had any waies quitted his deſire to the Dukedom of *Milan*. What reaſon was there then to beleeve, that when *Cæſar* ſhould be become more powerful in *Italy*, and ſhould have driven out the *French*, he ſhould likewiſe be expell'd from thence, when his Territories and Authority ſhould be there the greater? It is rather to be beleeved, that by his increaſe of power, *Italy* ſhould be in a worſe condition, and the danger thereof the more, for whilſt theſe two Princes ſtood upon equal terms, and with an inveterate mind did counterpoiſe one another, the other States were the more ſecure, it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others ſhould increaſe, or be heightned by the ruine of any of the Princes of *Italy*; but he that ſhould be aſſaulted by one was ſure to be aſſiſted by the other; ſo as *Leo* ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjuncture of affairs to have kept theſe ſcales even by his neutrality; for whilſt the buſineſs ſtood thus, it behoved the very Enemies of the *Italians* to value their Friendſhip, for their own good, and for the preſervation of their States.

It is not eaſie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of *Italy*, that the Pope ſhould continue in his neutrality, or by his joining with ſome one of theſe forein Princes who at that time had ſo great an influence upon *Italy*, the ſucceſs being to depend upon many very much differing accidents; for ſince humane wiſdom is not able to provide againſt them all, ſhe cannot find any ſecure way which leads to that deſtin'd end. Let us ſay then (ſtill keeping our ſelves within ſome general rules) in the firſt place, that to join in friendſhip and confederacie with a more powerful Prince, and one who is a near neighbor, when the increaſe of power is intended by this conjunction, is never to be done without danger, nor ought ſuch a reſolution ever be taken but out of great neceſſity; eſpecially not by ſuch Princes, who are not ſo weak, as they need a leaning ſtock, nor to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune. Now *Leo* had no ſuch reaſon to forgo the little quiet which he had then purchaſt by plunging into a Sea of Leagues and Confederacies, which are very hard to be laid faſt hold of with Princes of great power, deſirous of glory, who pretend the ſame things, and between whom War is not ſo eaſily ended, as it is reaſſumed. The Churches Patrimonie was ſufficiently ſecured by the majeſty of Religion, by Pontifical power, by the moneys which by many waies ſhe may be ſupplied with, and by her Dominions, being at this time much inlarged by *Julius* the ſecond. So as *Leo's* intention is to be praiſed for having his thoughts ſo carefully bent upon the Libertie of *Italy*. It is likewiſe to be deſired that he had had either more judgement or temper, to know and chuſe an opportune time, and a fitting occaſion; and yet it is likewiſe a general rule, that to wait for the advantage of Time, when Affairs are upon great ſtrieghts, do uſually bring notable advantages, and ſometimes by new and unexpected waies.

Italy

Italy was long under the obedience of the Weſtern Emperors: If at that time when their power and authority was ſo great, the Popes would have call'd in forein Forces, and made uſe of them to reduce the Government of *Italy* under the Churches power, or elſe into the hands of ſome other Italian Princes, *Italy* would in the firſt place have certainly been given in prey to the inſolencie of foreign Soldiers, and at laſt ſhe would peradventure have been brought to a worſe condition. But by temporiſing, ſuch occaſions aroſe, as the Church increaſed her Dominions by certain lawful Donations without the ſhedding of blood, and all *Italy* remained ſubject to her own proper and particular Lords; and the Weſtern Emperors being long vex'd and troubled by the Wars of *Germany*, were forced to forgo the affairs of *Italy*.

Moreover, though *Cæſar's* fortune and power was then very great, yet was it ſubject to great alterations, by reaſon that he was a new Prince in his Dominions, becauſe that they were far divided one from another, and for that many were apprehenſive of ſo faſt increaſing greatneſs. So as many more opportune and better grounded occaſions might peradventure ariſe of compaſſing ſuch an intent, and the War made againſt him by the *Germans*, which tended ſo much to his danger, might prove ſuch a one. By making fit uſe of which accidents, *Cæſar's* power might receive a rebuke as concerning the affairs of *Italy*, if the French forces had been any ways received, or that the *Italians* had been of the ſame mind as formerly they had been more unſeaſonably. Therefore to ſeparate the friendſhip of the *French* totally from the *Italians*, as *Leo* did for as much as in him lay, diſcovering a double injury to them, ſince the King of *France* might think that fraud was join'd to ill will, could not be but an ill-taken advice. He had done better to have ſomewhat allaied their power as to the affairs of *Italy*, then to have quite extinguiſh'd it, till the *Italians* might get ſome better light how to recover their liberty. The *Venetian* Senate took another courſe, though they had therein the ſame intent: For whilſt the affairs of theſe two Princes, *Charls* the Emperor, and *Francis* King of *France*, were in the greateſt heat of War in *Italy*, they would apply themſelves to each of their fortunes, and according to the condition of time and affairs, they often changed friendſhip; being ſtill conſtant in their aim, which was to keep their Forces as equally ballanced as they could, and that they ſhould both be weakened by their contention one with another: But when occaſion was offered of falling upon one without too much advantage to the other, (as it did in the laſt Wars made by the *Venetians* in *Italy*, after King *Francis* was let out of Priſon) they ſtood firm and reſolute, not being eaſily perſwaded upon any conditions to lay down Arms. For on the one ſide, *Cæſars* power did decline by reaſon of many adverſe chances, and the affairs of *Naples* were in great confuſion and danger: And on the other ſide, the affairs of *France* were not much bettered as to the prejudice of the liberty of *Italy*; for a chief Article in this Confederacie was, That the State of *Milan* ſhould be reſtored to *Franciſco Sforza*, as at laſt it was. But *Leo* in this conjuncture of affairs did precipitate himſelf into friendſhip with the *Imperialiſts*, and drew the enmity of the *French* upon him, ſo as his danger became almoſt equally the ſame, whatever event the War ſhould have; and the ſequel did more demonſtrate this by the impriſonment of *Clement*, and by the ſlavery which *Cæſars* greatneſs threatened to all *Italy*.

So as it appears to reaſon, and by the ſequel, that a noble and magnificent fabrick, as *Leo's* propoſition touching the freeing of *Italy* from the ſubjection of Foreiners, was really to be eſteemed, was not built upon ſo true and ſolid a foundation as was able to ſupport ſo great a weight. But for the preſent, after many various accidents, the condition of affairs may be eſteemed either good, or at leaſt leſs bad; foraſmuch as *Italy*, through *Philip* the King of *Spains* great wiſdom and moderation of mind,

hath

hath enjoyed a long and peaceful condition, and flouriſheth now as much as ſhe hath done in many preceding Ages, to the Peoples great comfort, and to the ſingular praiſe of the late Princes.

The Tenth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Counſel taken by the Emperor Charls *the Fifth, and by his Commanders, of not parting from the walls of* Vienna, *when* Solyman *was come with very great ſtrength from* Conſtantinople *to aſſault it, deſerve praiſe, or blame.*

AS two great and famous Princes, not only for the largeneſs of their Dominions, but for their particular warlike valor, the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, and *Solyman Ottoman* the Grand Signior of the *Turks*, did both of them flouriſh in one and the ſame Age; ſo amongſt the moſt memorable things of thoſe times, the ſtupendious preparations for War made by the above-named Princes in the year 1532. was moſt remarkable, and variouſly thought of. All poſſible means was uſed by both of them, and the whole World put into Arms; ſo as the fortune of theſe two Empires was judged to depend upon the worth and proweſs of theſe two Armies. But the ſucceſs did no ways anſwer the fame of ſo great Princes, and the noiſe of the preparation; for neither did the Imperial Army ſtir at any time from the walls of *Vienna*, nor did the Turkiſh Army come within many miles of them.

Now ſince more recent buſineſſes have recalled this to memory, it may prove no unuſeful Conſideration to repreſent what of praiſe, or of blame may be given to this reſolution put on by the Emperor *Charls*, and his Commanders. Many were of opinion then, and the ſame may now be thought, that in this caſe, or in the like, the managing of War in this manner, ſtanding only upon defence, and expecting to be aſſaulted by the Enemy, did much withdraw from the reputation of the Chriſtian Militia, which was already much in the wane, and was ſufficient to awaken freſh ſpirits and boldneſs in the *Turks* to undertake any thing the more eaſily againſt them in the future; ſince the flower of all the Soldiery of all the ſtrongeſt and moſt eſteemed Nations of Chriſtendom, being aſſembled under the conduct and auſpice of a mighty Prince, the Head of all Chriſtendom, and in a buſineſs of ſuch weight, which had drawn the eyes of the whole World upon it, not any the leaſt thing was put forth againſt theſe Enemies, no Army brought to face them, nor put in a poſture of ſeeming really to deſire battel; none of their Forts were aſſaulted, no Country of theirs prejudiced: Why were ſo many valiant men brought from their own homes into far diſtant Regions? why ſuch expence? why ſuch preparation for War? Was it that ſo ſtrong and flouriſhing an Army ſhould rot and moulder away about the walls of *Vienna*? What could have better decided the queſtion which till then was diſputable, in behalf of the Ottoman Princes, and of the Turkiſh Militia, and againſt the true honor of War, which our Princes and Soldiers have long laid claim unto, and ſometimes atchieved, then after ſo great a preparation of Arms, after ſo cried up an enterpriſe with intention to quell the Turkiſh forces, to halt ſo long, and to ſo little purpoſe, not knowing what reſolution to take, but that that Camp, then which no former Age had for a long time ſeen a greater, nor a more noble one, ſhould ſtand ſtill, like an unmoveable Fort? Being overcome by truth,

we muſt confeſs that the hopes of Victory for Chriſtian Princes was loſt, or at leaſt brought to this paſs, as not to loſe, muſt be termed Conqueſt; but neither could this be done by taking this courſe.

No Chriſtian Prince had uſually ſo great and ſo ſetled a Militia, as could continually maintain ſuch an Army in the field, as was at this time put together with much pains and induſtrie; ſo as by drawing out the War in length, they might think to weary and diſorder the Enemy, and finally to overcome at laſt. But on the contrary, the Turks, who have continually a numerous well ordered Army, may eaſily upon whatſoever occaſion ſend forth very powerful Armies to vex the Chriſtian Princes, taking ſometimes one place, ſometimes another, without ever quitting them, or being driven out from them: whereof there hath been ſo many proofs already made, whilſt we do nothing but make a defenſive War againſt the Turks, as till this time hath moſt commonly been done in this very buſineſs, and by thoſe very Princes who managed this War; the experience whereof hath been too evident, and too much prejudicial, by the affairs which unhappily befel King *Ferdinand*, whoſe whole Army being cut in peeces in *Hungary*, and the nobleſt Cities of that Province totally loſt, might teach for certain, that whilſt the Turkiſh Forces ſhould remain ſafe and intire, the danger of *Vienna*, and of the other Cities of *Auſtria* and *Hungary* was not quite over, but onely deferred for a ſeaſon, which delay might peradventure prove unfortunate, by reaſon of the weakneſs which is brought upon the Forces of Princes by long lying idle, and eſpecially thoſe of ſuch Princes as keep not a continual Militia on foot. Whereas the Turks, who have an Army alwaies ready and well paid, and who by making one War continually ſpring from another, keep them alwaies well diſciplined, might at another time with greater Forces aſſault the ſame Territories of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, as it happened not many years after. So as had they not been freed from greater, and more eminent dangers by *Solymans* death, the authors of this advice might have repented it, and all the reſt might have had cauſe of greater ſorrow, for having loſt ſo fair an occaſion of making trial of the valor of Chriſtian Commanders and Soldiers in a pitch'd Battel; whereas we want not clear and memorable examples, how far the true zeal of Religion, and a noble forwardneſs hath been often favored from Heaven with proſperous ſucceſs; as when divers Princes of *Europe* croſt the Seas to wage War with the *Saracens*, and to recover, as they did, the holy Land from the Infidels, driving them out of divers Cities of *Aſia*, whereof they were poſſeſt.

But theſe are not the ſole examples; for he who ſhall call to memorie greater actions done by famous Commanders, will know that they were well adviſed when they aſſaulted the Enemy, not waiting for him at their own doors; ſince the advantages, and damages are great and evident which do accompanie thoſe who manage the War diverſly in this principal point. He who aſſaults the Enemy within their own Confines, enheartneth his Soldiers, infuſeth fear into the Enemy, carries all loſs and danger from his own home to that of his Enemy: But he that ſtaies expecting that the Enemies Forces ſhould come home to him, minding onely to withſtand him, encourageth the very Enemy, and makes him the more bold and inſolent, puts his own Subjects in deſpair, by making them maintain their own Armies, and expoſing them to the rapine of the Enemy. Moreover if any adverſe chance befal whilſt the Enemy is in the bowels of their State, all that they have is made a prey of, and irrecoverably loſt.

We read of *Cyrus*, in whom we have the character of a moſt excellent Commander, that King *Cyaxares* being encamped in his friends Country, and ſtaying there to expect the Enemy, he adviſed him to change his reſolution, and to enter the Confines of the *Aſſyrians*, and ſet upon them at their own doors, and ſhewing him

him the advantage he might make thereof, perſwaded him to do ſo, by which means he got a notable Victory, worſting a great many of the Enemy with a much leſſer number. It was alwaies *Cæſars* courſe, who was the true Maſter of good Militia, both to pre-occupate the Enemy, and to be the firſt that ſhould aſſault, when Battel was to be given; thinking that the courage which the ſo doing infuſed into the Soldiers, did to boot with other benefits, help much to the getting of the victory; wherefore he taxed *Pompey* of an error, becauſe he did not ſo in that famous Battel of *Pharſalia*. The *Romans* underſtanding that *Hannibal* was coming with a powerful Army to prejudice them in *Italy*, though the firſt defence was made by mountains and craggy ſituations which he was to overcome, yet they thought fit to fight him before he could get into *Italy*, and ſo keep the War the furtheſt off them that they could. But *Scipio* not being able to bring him to Battel, though he met with him at the banks of *Rhodanus*, as ſoon as they heard that the Enemy was got on this ſide the mountains, the *Romans* would not notwithſtanding withdraw their Armies, as if they had been afraid to come before the walls of *Rome*, which *Hannibal* gave out he would aſſault, but ſent their men with the ſame Conſul *Scipio* to beyond the River *Po* to fight him, wiſely knowing that the danger doth increaſe ſo much the more, by how much nearer the Enemy approaches to the heart of the Country. And the ſame *Romans* underſtanding afterwards that *Aſdrubal* was coming with a great Army in *Italy* to aſſiſt his Brother *Hannibal*, they reſolved to meet him beyond the River *Metaurus*, to prevent the Enemy, knowing that to eſchew this danger, was to occaſion other great dangers. Thus the victory gotten over *Aſdrubal* bereaved *Hannibal* of the victories which he was likely to have gotten, if the *Romans* had been ſlower, or leſs reſolute in encountring the Enemy. The Imperial Commanders ought to have taken the ſame advice, and might have done it; for the Turks muſt make a much longer march into *Hungary* and *Auſtria*, then we to aſſault their Confines, which are now grown too near us. Moreover the Turks chiefeſt ſtrength lying in their Horſe, which cannot march till the earth afford fodder for their Cavalry, and being to come out of hotter Countries into a colder Region, they cannot without much difficulty and incommodity march into the field in the firſt ſeaſon of the year, as others may do, whoſe condition doth differ from theirs, both in the condition of Militia, and in the temperature of the Air, wherein the firſt skirmiſhes are to be made.

So as it appears to be very ſtrange, nay, indeed a very great wonder, that having made ſo great a preparation for War, they would not ſo much as in thought pre-occupate the Enemy, and enter into the upper *Hungaria*, from which Country they might have been furniſhed with many commodities, and upon occaſion, ſecure themſelves by a fortunate day, a long time from Turkiſh Incurſions; for it was not likely that by *Solymans* departing that year without having done any thing, he ſhould forſake the Guardianſhip and protection which he had taken upon him of the King of *Hungary*, but rather aſpire to make himſelf Maſter of that Kingdom, as he did, being more encouraged thereunto by the weakneſs and backwardneſs of the Imperialiſts, who if when they had done their utmoſt, had done nothing at all, and the Turks knowing that *Charls* the Emperor being imploied in other very conſiderable Wars, would not be alwaies able to afford his Brother ſo great aſſiſtance, was not this a great incitement to them quickly to renew the War, to the greater prejudice and danger not onely of *Hungary*, which *Ferdinand* laid claim unto, but even to the like of *Ferdinands* own Territories? and not long after the fact it ſelf ſhewed what might have been foreſeen by reaſon? for *Solyman* could not onely not be perſwaded to quit the protection which he had taken of his Pupil King *Steven*, but before he ſhould come to any accord with *Ferdinand*, demanded tribute from *Auſtria*; and the conditions both of War and

Peace growing daily worſe and worſe, the greateſt part of *Hungary* being loſt after the notable diſcomfitures of the German Armies at *Eſſechio* and *Buda*, and the other part continuing ſtill in great danger, the certain loſs was known which did redound unto them by not hazarding a Battel at this time, when the fears and hopes were at leaſt alike on both ſides.

But ſay that this had been too raſh, or too difficult a thing to have been effected, what hindred them or diſſwaded them from paſſing through their own Countries, and marching with their Army to between *Dava* and *Sava*, a Country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late Wars, and therefore fit to furniſh their Army with victuals, and where there are many mountainous ſeats, which were advantagious for the *Imperialiſts*, and incommodious for the *Turks* in reſpect of their Cavalry; whereby they might have preſerved two Provinces, which were Patrimonial States of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept, *Carinthia* and *Stiria*; which being abandoned, were left a ſecure prey unto the *Turks*, who utterly deſtroyed them by fire and ſword, endangering likewiſe the loſs of ſome of their chief Cities; for the way would have been block'd up, and kept *Solyman* from coming thither, if it had been firſt poſſeſſed by the *Imperialiſts*; and *Solymans* reputation would have been much leſſened, if he had tarried behind, leaving that Country untouched, which he was come to aſſault with ſo great an Army. But to do as the Imperialiſts did, to keep ſo many men with ſo great a Train of Artillery and all neceſſaries for War, barely to defend one City, which lay not open, but was begirt with walls, which was held to be a ſtrong Fortreſs, and which being but meanly provided of men, had formerly repulſed great Turkiſh forces; what was it, but by this new and prejudical example to confirm the Turks, and even our own men, in the opinion, that the Chriſtian Militia was inferior to that of the Turks, and that our Princes, being intent upon their own defence, and not without ſome fear to imploy their utmoſt endeavors therein, were for their parts to ſuffer the Turks to enjoy their large Empire in peace and ſafety? Which the Ottoman Princes have brought to ſo vaſt a greatneſs, not by letting their Forces lie idle, and by being content to defend that Title which they had gotten at firſt, but by going every where to find out the Enemy, fighting him upon all occaſions, and by making their way by their ſwords into other mens Countries. How oft have the Turks entred into the Confines of *Perſia*, nay, wrought themſelves in even to her inmoſt parts, chiefly intending to come to a day of fight with the *Perſians* Armies, which they have often effected? though the *Perſians* were rather to be feared, then to be deſpiſed, for their antient honor in War, and for the manner of their Militia; and yet at laſt they have in theſe laſt Wars got ſafe poſſeſſion of the chieſeſt part of this moſt noble Kingdom.

What then is more to be ſaid, but that if this way of proceeding have proved proſperous to thoſe that have walked therein, he who takes another way walks on towards deſtruction, and either through ignorance, or too great a thirſt after quiet and ſecurity, involves himſelf into greater troubles and difficulties? And though the loſs be made by peece-meal, which may peradventure make it appear the leſs, yet at laſt the whole falls into more certain, though a later ruine. And to ſpeak of more modern affairs; how had not only the Commonwealth of *Venice*, but ſeveral other States of Chriſtian Princes been preſerved from the Turkiſh power and inſolencie, if the Leagues Fleet, ſhunning all occaſion of fight, had retreated without that famous Victory of *Lepanto*? But it was afterwards more clearly ſeen, that *Charls* his intention in this War was far from joining battel with the *Turks*, either that he would not hazard his glory and honor, or manifeſtly confeſs himſelf inferior to *Solyman* in Forces, when *Hungary* and *Auſtria* being aſſaulted at another time by the ſame *Solyman*, inſtead of ſuccoring or aſſiſting his Brother who was in emi-

nent danger, he went to try new adventures in *Africa*, of a much more inconsiderable nature. If a day of Battel be ever to be had, what else was there to be done to keep off the ruine which doth threaten Christendom every day more and more? He who hazards, may lose; but he may also win: And he who stands idly, and does nothing, whilst he endeavors security by useless means, does by degrees daily fall into new dangers, and doth as it were voluntarily (but for certain, basely) submit himself to the yoke of a grievous and unworthy slavery. If *Germany* and *Italy* had been so forward to furnish men and monies for this enterprise, (the authority of so great a Prince who was the chief Author and Head thereof, being considered) as upon other occasions which did happen not long after, these assistances might have been sooner hoped for. When were the whole Forces of *Germany* seen so united, as they were at this time? Nay, it was rather to be doubted that many seeds of discord were to grow, which were already spread abroad throughout this Province, by reason of Religion and State-policie, whereby *Germany* might be weakned and divided. From whence then was there any good to be hoped for against this so formidable Enemy, if so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain and useless? The condition of present Times, and of long Custom, will not suffer us now to hope that we may see what formerly fell out in that famous Council of *Clermont*, that at the words of an Hermite, at the bare exhortations of a Pope, Christian Princes and people should readily take up Arms against the Infidels, being content for bond of firm union to be all of them signed with the sign of the Cross. But now when any such thing is treated of, such disputes are made upon every point, every one looks so much to their own particular ends (not measuring things aright, nor minding the common interest in comparison of their own) as Leagues and Unions being contentiously handled, slowly concluded, and untimely dissolved, there comes no good of them.

Wherefore it cannot be said, that they thought by delay to reserve occasions prepared for Victory, to which the Cause which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them; to wit, the maintaining of King *Ferdinand* in his just pretences to the Kingdom of *Hungary*; from whom, without any right, and unprovoked by any injury, it was attempted to be taken. Very shame should likewise have been able to have made them not suffer so miserable a spectacle of such devastations and ruines as were made by the Barbarians in *Carinthia* and *Stiria*, whilst they stood looking on with so great an Army; at which the Imperial Commanders being at last moved, they went about (though late) to revenge these injuries; and their boldness being assisted by fortune, the Freebooters were routed, and almost quite discomfited in all places where they were assaulted. So as it appears it may be pleaded by this late example, that they might have done greater things, if they had attempted it. Moreover, so many military men might very well have known what advantage might have been gotten by giving Battel, since in this posture of affairs great rewards were to be expected from the Victory, and but small loss, had they been beaten: For the Christian Army, if victorious, might have penetrated into the *Turks* Dominions, where there are no strong Holds, save some few upon the Frontiers; and not meeting with any obstacles, might have marched even to before *Constantinople*, planting their Trophies in sundry places, by one sole Victory. Whereas on the contrary, the *Imperialists*, upon any adverse fortune, had many strong Holds whereunto to have retreated, and by maintaining them, might have retarded the course of the *Turks* victories, and have recruited their broken Forces. But say, I pray you, who could assure the *Imperialists* that they should avoid the hazard of a Battel? Was it not rather to be believed, (especially if we will consider the boldness of the *Turks*, who are wont to meet but with weak resistances) that answerable to what they gave out, they would advance and force the Christians to

give

give Battel, as the Voyage taken by *Solyman* did promiſe, who kept not within his Confines, but was entred into the Imperialiſts Country, ſo far as ſome of his Horſe-Troops made inrodes even to *Newſtat* a Town ſtanding in the ſame Champaine Country, and not far from *Vienna*? And ſay that being aſſaulted by the Enemy, they had been forced to fight, who can deny but that both before, and after the conflict, the buſineſs would have proved hazardous to the Imperialiſts, ſince they were to fight at their own homes, and in their own defence? For great is that aſtoniſhment which is cauſed by the bold coming on of an Enemy, and men are alwaies readier to run away there where they have beſt means of ſaving themſelves; and in caſe of adverſe Fortune, the danger is greater when the Enemy is in the bowels of the State; and if the inhabitants overcome, the leſs good redounds by the victory, becauſe the enemy hath time to rally, and to defend himſelf. Theſe were therefore notable diſadvantages, which were unaviodable whilſt the Imperialiſts Camp remained fixt before the walls of *Vienna*, and thereby made themſelves to depend upon the Enemies reſolution.

Notwithſtanding all this, he who ſhall duely conſider the preſent condition of the Affairs of the Empire, of the Militia, and of all other things which belongs to ſuch a buſineſs, may peradventure be of a different opinion, and judge otherwiſe, and if not commend, at leaſt excuſe the reſolution taken by the Imperialiſts, of not parting with their Army from before the walls of *Vienna*, and from the River *Danubius*. That the Turkiſh Empire is very great, and potent, is a thing too well known by us to our coſt; but the care how to prevent the maladie and weakneſs into which Chriſtendom is fallen by the greatneſs of ſuch an enemy, hath been ſo long in cogitation, as to uſe violent means, might bring ruine upon her, rather then procure her ſafety. Chriſtian Princes have not in this age a ſetled, well diſciplined, well ordered Militia, and kept in perpetuil pay, as the Turks have, and as the *Romans*, and ſome other Empires have formerly had; Whence it is that numerous Armies cannot be raiſed without length of time, and much difficulty; and for want of continual exerciſe, by which the Soldiers of one and the ſame Nation have been known to be able to ſupply every military Office, recourſe muſt be had to ſeveral Nations, for men fit for ſeveral actions in War; ſo as it is thought that either by natural inclination, or by antient Cuſtom, or by meer opinion, every Nation is beſt, ſome for one thing, ſome for another; as alſo becauſe there are but very few in any place, who are well inſtructed in Military affairs. For no Militia is entertained except it be in time of need, or ſome few who are kept in Garriſons, with little or no exerciſe.

The charge alſo of aſſembling Soldiers from ſeveral, and far diſtant Countries, as alſo all things which belong to War, is much the greater; and whereof not any one State of our Princes is compleatly furniſhed. So as put all theſe together, it is from hence, that when any enterpriſe hath been to be taken againſt the Turks in theſe times, with numerous and powerful Forces, they have not been able to be got together in any reaſonable time, nor well ordered; which delay ariſing from neceſſity, hath hindred our preventing the Enemy, and our aſſaulting them at their own doors. But particularly, is it not very well known, that at this time whereof we now ſpeak, *Cæſar* was to aſſemble Soldiers from ſo many Nations, ſubject to other Dominions, and to joyn together the Auxiliary Forces of *Germany* and *Italy*, as in doing thereof ſo much labor and time was ſpent, as before the Imperial Army was muſtered at *Vienna*, *Solyman* was already come to *Belgrade*? ſo as, to have reſolved upon preventing the Enemy, and of aſſaulting his Confines before the arrival of his Army, was impoſſible, though it had been thought expedient to have done ſo, nor ought reaſon to prevail over experience; and this ſo much the leſs, for that there wants not other reaſons to prove that the Turks are readier at

their

their counſel, and ſpeedier at their executions, then we can be. But let us ſuppoſe that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped, and that it had depended upon the free-will of the Imperial Commanders to aſſault the Turks within their Confines; ſay, I beſeech you, what deſign could the Imperialiſts have had to enter into the Enemies Country? Should they perhaps have ſtood idly expecting the ſhock of the Turkiſh Army, if it ſhould advance towards them? or if *Solyman* ſhould not have advanced, but have ſhunned the encounter, ſhould they have marched on and forced him to fight? Or ſhould they have endeavored to have taken ſome of the Towns, or Forts which were held by the Turks, by aſſault; and carry the prejudice home to him, who would have brought it to them in the defence of another man? Let us examine all theſe things, by conſidering the laſt propoſition.

In what place ſhould the Imperial Army have incamped, which would not have been very incommodious for them, and far off? they were not yet abſolutely poſſeſt of divers Cities upon the Frontiers of *Hungary*, as they were afterwards. But let us argue the buſineſs in general; if the place were weak which they ſhould aſſault, what honor ſhould they win thereby? Or would the advantage of ſuch an acquiſition have been anſwerable to the expence, and to the expectation had of ſuch an Army? Beſides, ſuch purchaſes are to little purpoſe; for ſuch places are ſoon regained by him who is maſter of the field; and if the Imperialiſts would have attempted the taking of any ſtrong place, and ſhould not have effected it ſoon and eaſily, to how great danger did their Army expoſe it ſelf? they muſt either raiſe their ſiege, with loſs of honor, and with thoſe other bad conſequencies which follow in ſuch like caſes; or elſe they muſt keep their ſtation, and be cut in peeces, when a powerful Turkiſh Army ſhould come, and find the Imperialiſts ſcattered and buſied about the taking in of ſtrong Holds; as afterwards fell out upon the like occaſion of *Buda*, which might teach Commanders, with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon ſuch affairs, and when they have to do with a potent Enemy. But it may be yet more ſtrongly urged, that whilſt the Turkiſh Forces ſhould keep themſelves ſafe and intire, the Imperialiſts had but little hopes of keeping what they ſhould happily have gotten. Were not *Modone* and *Corone* recovered from the Turks by the Imperial Forces, under the Enſigns of the ſame *Charls*? yet theſe very Towns were ſoon after abandoned, and forſaken, becauſe they knew they were not able to maintain them againſt the Turkiſh puiſſant Forces. Have not the Imperialiſts and Spaniards made oft-times many attemp s in *Africa*, and had good ſucceſs therein? Yet in whoſe poſſeſſion are theſe very places now, which were gotten with ſo much charge and danger? Did not the Turks ſoon repoſſeſs themſelves of thoſe places from whence they were driven? The League made againſt the Turks in the year 1537. wherein the fame and forces of the ſame Emperor *Charls* were intereſſed, did it not win *Caſtel nova*, a Fortreſs fit for their greateſt deſigns? But how long were we able to keep it, though it were ſtrongly garriſoned? Theſe experiences may ſerve to ſhew, that the good gotten by ſuch coſt and labor, hath not at laſt proved any thing, ſave diſhonor in forgoing what was gotten.

But to fall upon the other head; If the Imperial Army ſhould have continued incamped in any ſtrong ſituation of the Enemy which they might have taken, without attempting any thing more; how would it have been in any better condition, then it was when incamp'd before *Vienna*? rather on the contrary, the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty diſorder, eſpecially for want of victuals, by their going from the Banks of *Danubius*, from whence alone they could have been ſafely and opportunely furniſhed therewithal; for they were to provide for the victualing of a great many, and the Enemy did abound in Horſe,

whereby

whereby their ſuccors might have been cut off. It may peradventure be alleadged, that they might have preſerved a great tract of Country from the inrodes, plunder, and firing made by the *Turks*. But firſt, they were not certain to make this advantage, the Country being large, and expoſed to ſuch accidents as theſe; nor were they able, without dividing their Forces, to ſupply all places: And the *Turks* ſeeing this place well guarded, if they ſhould have taken their way above the *Danubius*, as they did beneath it towards the *Alps*, finding the fields more large and open in thoſe parts in *Moravia*, *Sileſia*, and *Auſtria*, they might have made larger inrodes, and with leſs danger: whereas having quartered themſelves in the mountainous ſituations of *Stiria* and *Carinthia*, they might at leaſt revenge the injury, and in ſome ſort preſerve their honor by killing many of them, who being disbanded, were gone to pillage the Country.

It is commonly advantagious to advance towards the Confines of a State, where the Paſſes are narrow and difficult, either by the ruggedneſs of the ſituations, or by reaſon of Forts upon their Frontiers, ſo as the Enemy may be by theſe advantages kept afar off. But what was there in King *Ferdinands* States, which could perſwade him to take this courſe; the Country being large, open, and where many Armies would not have been ſufficient to have kept out an Army which was reſolved to enter, as theſe did? But it may be ſaid again, that this was not a loſs which would counterpoiſe (as might very well have happened by reaſon of their own inconveniencies) the breaking up of that Army, whereon the defence of King *Ferdinands* States did relie, and which was of ſo great a concernment to all Chriſtendom. And it may be alſo added, that the further the *Imperialiſts* had advanced, whereby they might the better have met with the Enemy, and have fought him, if they ſhould not afterwards have done it, their fear would have appeared to have been ſo much the greater, and that they had repented to have proceeded ſo far; whereby they ſhould not only not have increaſed, but have leſſened the reputation of the force and worth of that Army. But for what concerned their marching forward to encounter the Enemy, with a reſolution of giving him battel at his own home, at which the Conſiderations made to the contrary do ſeem chiefly to aim, it is a buſineſs of ſo weighty, and ſo numerous conſequences, as it deſerves to be well examined. It is a general Rule, That it is requiſite the Aſſailant ſhould have greater Forces then he who is aſſailed, or at leaſt equal Forces: And is there any one ſo blinded with deſire, as that he does not ſee the *Imperialiſts* diſadvantage in this behalf? *Solyman* brought with him an Army conſiſting of One hundred and forty thouſand fighting men, and almoſt as many men more for other Camp-occaſions, furniſhed with Artillery and all other Requiſites for War, an Army verſt in Victories, and which was then to fight in the ſight of their Lord and Maſter, a fortunate and valiant Prince; and who are promiſed by their Law, that whoſoever dies fighting for his welfare and glory, ſhall be eternally rewarded in heaven: An opinion which hath much advantaged the Turkiſh affairs in point of War. Entire obedience, excellent military diſcipline, patient undergoing all wants, and great toil and labor, are things whereunto the Turkiſh Armies are accuſtomed; in vertue whereof it is, and not by chance, that they have had ſo many victories: And it was the opinion of all men, that theſe things did at this time abound in that Army. Now on the other ſide, the Imperial Army was far ſhort of this in numbers, the fighting men not exceeding the number of Fourſcore and ten thouſand, whereof there were but Thirty thouſand Horſe. It is hard to ſay what men might promiſe to themſelves from the Commanders and Soldiers gallantry, ſince no precedent nor ſubſequent trial hath been known to be made againſt this Enemy: Marry, ſuch diſorders as are uſually ſeen in our preſent Militia, might eaſily be therein ſeen; the *Spaniards* mutinies before they were come to the Camp, the like of the *Italians* after their arrival, great and

open

open hatred amongſt the Nations which were in the ſame Camp, as if they had been in two Enemies Camps, inſomuch as they were like to fall together by the ears more then once, the *Spaniards* and *Italians* being jointly highly incenſed againſt the *Dutch*; the Commanders at variance amongſt themſelves, envying one anothers glory, raiſers of commotions and diſobedience amongſt the Soldiery, as was ſeen by the laſt of puniſhments inflicted upon ſome of them. Now what the iſſue in likelihood might prove betwixt two ſuch Armies as you have here deſcribed of the *Imperialiſts* and of the *Turks*, any man may judge, who is capable of ordinary reaſon, without any further experience of War.

But to proceed to the other heads: What ſituation could there be choſen which was not diſadvantagious for the Imperialiſts? The parts of *Hungary*, *Wallachia*, and of the neighboring places where the Armies were to meet, conſiſted all of open Champaigns, where moſt aſſuredly the Horſe (wherein the Turkiſh Camp did ſo abound) have the better of Foot; and worth is overcome by numbers, where the leſſer Army may be circumvented by a greater multitude, and better uſe may be made of Horſe, which may either advance where they find advantage, or retreat without any prejudice where they cannot withſtand the Enemy. Therefore the Imperial Commanders knowing the diſadvantage thereof in that ſituation which they had taken, though they were ſecured by the City of *Vienna*, and by the River *Danubius*, yet they ſtood alwaies with their Squadrons in order for any aſſault; their Foot was divided into three great Squadrons, whereof one ſtood firm in the midſt, and betwixt this and the other two were the Horſe quartered, ſo as they did incloſe the whole body of the Army, which was ſurrounded and ſecured by great ſtore of Artillery. Another reaſon may be added, which is, That in caſe of miſfortune, the Imperialiſts Army might ſuffer a greater diſcomfiture then that of the Turks; for it would be harder for the former to keep any of their Foot entire, or *Gens d'Arms*, then for the Turks to preſerve their Light-horſe, which were always ready according as occaſion ſhould ſerve, either to charge, or ſuſtain a charge, and ſave themſelves. Wherefore it may be ſaid, that the hazard was not the ſame, and therefore not to be put to the trial, as affairs ſtood. And if it be advantagious to aſſault an Enemy at his own door, the affording reſt to Soldiers, whereby to be the better able to withſtand and to repell with victory thoſe who come to aſſault them, and are wearied by their long march, and the inconveniences thereof, hath alſo ſomething of good in it.

Nor muſt we be govern'd by examples wherein the ſame accidents meet not; for general Rules are not to be obſerved at all times, and eſpecially not in War, which is ſubject to ſo many variations. If *Cyrus*, and the *Romans*, when the firſt went to fight the *Aſſyrians*, and the other the *Carthaginians*, had been in that condition as thoſe were of whom we now ſpeak, we may perſwade our ſelves (ſuch was their known wiſdom) that they would have done otherwiſe: And if the *Romans* choſe to meet *Hannibal* firſt on the other ſide the Mountains, and afterwards at his firſt entrance into *Italy*, it may be ſaid, beſides the diverſity of accidents which counſell'd them ſo to do, that our Princes have no ſuch Militia, nor ſo ready, as the *Romans* had, nor had they means of recruiting their Armies ſo ſoon as the *Romans* could do in caſe of adverſe fortune; and that they were able to maintain ſo many Armies, not only in *Italy*, but in *Spain*, *Africa*, and *Greece*, at the ſame time when *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, ſhews, that as they were forward in giving Battel, ſo they knew how to ſupply themſelves again: which the Imperialiſts could not at this time have done, if they ſhould have loſt that Army, which they had taken ſuch pains to aſſemble together from ſo many ſeveral parts. It is acknowledged, that to put ones ſelf upon the hazard of a Battel, is a thing which is done by wiſe Commanders, when they are back'd with another Army, which may afford them means of fighting a

ſecond time, or at leaſt whereby they may eaſily recruit in caſe of adverſe fortune; elſe a whole State is adventured upon one only Battel. As for the ſucceſs of the Battel of *Lepanto*, it was accompanied with ſome accidents which are ſeldom ſeen to happen: For the *Turks* gave our men battel, which was willingly entertained by us, becauſe we might make uſe of the advantage of the Venetian Gallions, by whoſe Artillery their Fleet was divided and ſcattered, before they could come to a further conflict. But the next year, the condition of affairs being altered, they took another courſe: For the *Turks*, who were taught by their former bad ſucceſs, not being willing to join battel with our greater Veſſels, and our men being wiſely well-adviſed not to divide nor ſeparate their ſlighter Gallies from the greater, as finding themſelves either weaker therein, or at leaſt not ſtronger, there was nothing done, though the Fleets were ſeveral times very neer. In this point likewiſe, the Land-Militia, and that of the Sea doth differ; for as for Sea-fights, the Chriſtian Forces are in number equal in Shipping to the *Turks*, but ſufficiently beyond them for matter of worth and diſcipline: Marry, in Land-Armies the *Turks* do far exceed the Chriſtians in numbers; and as for valor and good diſcipline, they cannot as yet be accounted inferior, unleſs we will, to detract from the Enemy, add to our own ſhame, as having been ſo oftentimes beaten by ſo baſe and unexpert men. But howſoever it be, we cannot but have a great eſteem of the Turkiſh power, which their continued proſperitie hath made ſo. What reaſon was there then that a new Army, made up of ſo many ſeveral Nations, wherein the Soldiers did hardly know their Captains, and were much leſs known by them, who had not as yet done any military act jointly, nor well learnt how to know, nor follow their colours, not acquainted with the Country, and wanting all thoſe things through which, by the true Art of War victories are gotten, ſhould advance, and give Battel to an Enemy ſo formidable both for fame and forces? nor can the event of a ſet Battel be truly judged by what befel thoſe of the Turkiſh Camp, who disbanding from the reſt, went, though in great parties, to pillage the Enemies Country, the buſineſs not being any thing alike; the Turks had the diſadvantage of the Countries ſituation, of being loaded with prey, of being in diſorder (as commonly befals thoſe who go to plunder, not to fight) and of other accidents. But beſides all this, he who relates this buſineſs, mentions not any baſeneſs in the Turks, but ſaies, That notwithſtanding all theſe diſadvantages, they defended themſelves generouſly to the utmoſt of their power.

But what did the ſame *Solyman* (who cannot be denied to have been very valiant, and greatly experienced in matter of War) though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned? he did not advance with his Army as near us, as he might have done, nor did endeavor to enforce others, nor to be enforced himſelf to fight, but rather went out of his direct way, which he had taken to come to *Vienna*, and kept for the moſt part in ſtrong and commodious ſeats, as between the two Rivers of *Sava* and *Drava*; and if a powerful and vain-glorious Prince, who profeſſed that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a deſire of glory would make uſe of hæſitatious counſels, where the conſequences were ſo great and ſo heavie; how would it have becomed *Charls*, a Prince no leſs wiſe then valiant, and who was neceſſitated by many other important affairs of ſome other States of his, to leave *Germany* ſuddenly, as he did, to have put himſelf upon the dubious events of Battel, whereby to indanger almoſt his whole Fortune? When *Marius* was ſent againſt the *Cymbrians*, who were faln down into *Italy* (which was thought to be as conſiderable a War as any that the *Romans* had made) the ſame circumſtances concurring thereunto, whereby to infuſe terror, as do now to make the Turkiſh Forces ſo formidable; as cruelty, barbariſm, the great number of the Enemy, and the fame of the victories which they had won;

the

the wiſe Commander would not (though many occaſions had offered themſelves, and that he was taxed by the unexperienced, of timerouſneſs) come to a pitch'd field with ſuch an Enemy till for many moneths ſpace he had kept the Army accuſtomed to the performance of duties, and to Military actions, and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aſpect of the Enemy, and how to have the better of them in light skirmiſhes, which were not notwithſtanding attempted but upon great advantage.

And if *Caſar* uſed to prevent the Enemy, and to be the firſt that ſhould aſſault; it is to be conſidered that he commanded a veteran Army, of whom he had by long Wars had much experience. So as the ſame example is not to be made uſe of in a new and tumultuous Army, and of ſo different conditions. But let us likewiſe conſider what were the reaſons which made theſe two Princes take up Arms; for by the firſt riſe of Wars the reaſon of their adminiſtration, and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end, is beſt known. The War was offenſive on the Turks behalf, undertaken with great ſurquedrie, and with great hopes of victory and glory; *Solyman* having propounded unto himſelf to revenge the injuries done by *Ferdinand*, then King of *Bohemia*, to *John* King of *Hungary*, who reigned under his Guardianſhip and protection. But whether this was his true intention or no, or but pretended, that he might poſſeſs himſelf of the Kingdom of *Hungary* (as afterwards he did) it was moſt certain, that he could not compaſs his end of beating the Forces of theſe two *Auſtrian* Brothers, *Charls*, and *Ferdinand*. *Caſar* on the other ſide, being uſually diſtracted and buſied, as now in particular, in other Wars, had betaken himſelf to this, to defend the aſſaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories, as alſo the honor of his family, or rather that of all *Germany*; or, to confine ones ſelf to narrower bounds, it may be ſaid, that this contention of War did particularly concern the oppugning, and the defence of the City of *Vienna*. *Solyman*, who had formerly little to his honor, been driven from before the walls of that City, profeſſed to return thither with greater Forces, being firmly reſolved to reduce it to his power, and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel. *Charls* on the contrary, having brought his Forces about that City, had propounded unto himſelf the keeping of it, and to fruſtrate this ſo great furie and boaſting of *Solymans*. Now then, whilſt *Vienna* was preſerved, and that ſhe was kept free from all dangers, and that *Solyman* was ſo curbed and frightned by the Imperialiſts Forces, as that he durſt not advance, or make good his word which he had publickly profeſſed, did not the Imperialiſts effect the buſineſs they had taken in hand, without the effuſion of blood? Did they not preſerve their own honor, and do ſervice to all Chriſtendom? If this Army (as the ſucceſs of Battel is more uncertain and dubious, then any whatſoever other humane action) had received any notable defeat, when would this wound have ever been cured? The afflicted body of Chriſtendom muſt have its wounds long kept open, and have ſtill ulcerated more and more. How would *Caſars* particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories, and to have endangered and moleſted his own particular affairs, whilſt he ſhould have ſhewed courage enough, but little good counſel in defending another mans right, which did not immediately concern himſelf? Had the Turks in former times been made retreat to their own Confines, as now they were, without having made any acquiſition, they had not been maſters of ſo many Chriſtian Kingdoms, as now they are. And had their Forces proved ſtill vain, their Militia would have been imbaſed, and they would have been diſcouraged from troubling others without any good to themſelves; which peradventure would have been the ſafeſt and ſecureſt way of weakning ſo great a power as that, by temporizing, affording them thereby occaſion of growing idle, and of falling into domeſtick diſorders, ſo as they might the

more eaſily have received a blow, and have been overcome both by cuning and force. Nor will it avail to affirm the contrary, as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened, or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of War; for it was more anſwerable to reaſon, that when *Soly-man* ſhould have done his utmoſt with his whole Forces, aſſiſted by his own preſence, he would have ſuffered the Eſtates of *Auſtria*, and of *Germany* to have remained quier, if King *Ferdinand* had reſted content with his own Patrimonie, and with the Kingdom of *Bohemia*, together with the hopes of ſucceeding in the Empire, without intricating himſelf in new troubles, by obſtinately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom of *Hungary*, drawing thereby the fury of the Turkiſh Forces upon him, as he often did. So as King *Ferdinando* and his Councellors are more to be blamed for thoſe many miſchiefs which enſued afterwards, and for thoſe which we are ſtill threatned with by the ſo near neighborhood of the Turkiſh Forces, then *Charls* the Emperor and his Commanders. For they ſeeing King *John* taken into ſo powerful a protection as that of the *Ottoman* Empire, ſo as it was impoſſible to put the *Dutch* in poſſeſſion thereof by driving of him out; all anger and ambition ought to have been laid aſide, contenting themſelves rather with the neighborhood of ſo weak a Prince as the King of *Hungary*, then with that of ſo powerful and formidable a Potentate, to whom four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms do yield obedience.

Theſe things may be on all ſides variouſly conſidered, as various Judgments may be given on thoſe actions which are not of a ſetled, ordinary, and natural condition, but which through various accidents do flote up and down, as it happens in counſels concerning War. The truth is, that the Forces, hopes, fears, and almoſt all other conſequences of theſe two Empires were (as it were) equally ballanced in this behalf: So as it was a work not diſcernible by humane wiſdom, or by any true grounds, whether to have come to a pitch'd field, or to abſtain from doing ſo, would have been the better advice. In either of the Armies, the Flower of the Militia of the warlike Nations both of Eaſt and Weſt was aſſembled, a vaſt number of Soldiers, excellent Commanders, moſt valiant Princes, and of as great renown as any of whatſoever former Age, and who had both of them won famous Victories. Great were the rewards, great the inconveniences, which were propoſed on all ſides according to the various ſucceſs of ſuch a days fight; immortal glory, ſhame not to be raſed out, high hopes, greateſt fears. So as it is no wonder if in this parity of objects which preſented themſelves before the eyes both of the *Imperialiſts* and *Turks*, a Battel, for which both parties were prepared and diſpoſed, did not enſue. In which caſe he who will detract any thing from the *Imperialiſts* in not daring to fight, muſt praiſe their wiſdom as much, and their mature advice; it being a Rule generally approved of by the univerſal conſent of all men, That where the buſineſs is doubtful and difficult, we muſt rather adhere to that which holds us from doing any thing, then to what eggs us on: For, *Had I wiſt*, comes too late, and is always to no purpoſe; whereas whilſt things are whole and entire, place is left for new Counſels.

PAULA

PAULA PERUTA
A
Gentleman of *VENICE*
HIS
SOLILOQUIE;

Wherein he makes and takes a brief examination of the whole courſe of his Life.

WHAT do I do? What think I? What do I look for? My Age haſtens already apace to the end of my life, and I mind not that end of Glory to which I am ordained. Thoſe good things which I muſt ſhortly forgo, ſtand alwaies fixt before my bodily eies, and I turn not the eyes of my mind towards thoſe things which are prepared for me to injoy eternally; it is high time to know my error, and then to amend it. Old Age which uſeth to dead the affections of the fleſh, ought now to quicken the zeal of the Spirit? O my ſoul ſummon thy thoughts about thee, which have ſtraid ſo long in the affairs of this world; know thy noble condition, and the true end for which thou wert created; Let all things that proceed from thee be worthy of thee. Throw from thee that vail, which as if thou hadſt been blind, hath made thee go groping and groveling through the waies of worldly deſires, in danger of falling into the ditch of ſome habitual ſin; whereby it would have been the harder for thee to riſe again, and reaſſume the right way. Great are the acknowledgments which thou oweſt to thy Creator, who hath made thee out of nothing; made thee ſo much more noble then the ſouls of all his other creatures, he made thee partaker of ſo many excellent gifts, chiefly of liberty, whereby thou maiſt increaſe the merit of thy good works, as he never ſuffers his grace to forſake thee, which thou mayſt very often be aware of, finding remorſe of conſcience as often as thou falleſt into any ſin, and ſo many incitations to excite thee to the deſpiſal of earthly things, and to the love of ſuch as are celeſtial, as certainly thou art very much unworthy ſo great a benefit, if thou doſt reſiſt it any longer, or elſe a very bad friend unto thy ſelf, if knowing the truſt good, thou chuſeſt to deprive thy ſelf thereof.

Aſſuredly

Aſſuredly, if I ſhall take a true ſcrutinie of my life, I ſhall find that I have made my ſelf a receptacle of all vanity; Thou who oughteſt to have been a temple of perpetual prayer, of immaculate goodneſs, of pure love to divine things. I do not conſider my firſt and tender Age, wherein the uſe of Reaſon being but weak, that which ariſeth from thence is not much conſiderable; yet the tears and crying to which thoſe very years are ſubject, might afford me occaſion when I was greater of contemplating the miſtery, and of knowing that the condition of this worldly life, whereinto I was marching was but a valley of tears, a fountain of miſerie; Wherefore I ſhould have taken the greater heed not to have ſuffered my ſelf to be inſnared in the love of thoſe things, where Wormwood lies hidden under Honey, and where weeping attends alwaies nigh upon laughter. In the Pueritia, which ſucceeded mine Infancie, I did not accuſtom my ſelf (as I ought to have done) to labor and ſufferings, to humble and devout thoughts, whereby the power of the fleſh might have been weakened, and the ſoul exalted; but I was detained by pleaſures and effeminacie; I betook my ſelf ſo to follow and love vanity, as I began to ſuck in what corrupt cuſtoms taught me, more then what was learnt me by my Tutors. I thought Riches, Honors, and all worldly Greatneſs, to be the garniſhings wherewith men, and chiefly ſuch as are nobly born, ought to adorn themſelves; I called the lives of ſuch as lived better, and more retired from the world, meer madneſs.

Theſe conceptions grew more firmly fixed in me afterwards, when paſſing through the other Ages, I ſaw them praiſed and practiſed by mens common conſent, and chiefly by thoſe who were eſteemed the wiſeſt, and moſt happy; ſo as it was harder for me to pluck out thoſe thoughts from out my heart, which had in proceſs of time taken ſo deep rooting. But if I reflect upon the years of my youth, which are as it were the Spring of our Age, on which every thing ſeems to ſmile, and doth, as it were grow green, what can I remember which may make me ſatisfied with my ſelf, or from whence I may affirm, that I have gathered ſuch fruit, as I would now in my old age be fed withal? As I firſt entred into my youth, I was, as it were challenged and defied to a gallant wreſtling by the ſences, and worldly delights, and parted from them very many times overcome, ſeldom with the victorie. I betook my ſelf to my ſtudie, and chiefly to that of Rhetorick, and of Philoſophie; wherein having the luck to light upon excellent Maſters, I made ſome advancement; I will not ſay, that now I am ſorrie for it, for the fear leaſt the time that I imploied therein might have been ſpent worſe: but ſurely, I cannot deny but that I did thereby foment that affection which doth ſometimes prevaricate better; to wit, to the deſire of praiſe, and of ſelf-eſtimation. Knowledge doth oft-times puff up him that is maſter of it, ſo as he forgets to glory in the Lord: I dare not ſay I poſſeſſed it, for hardly could I taſte the waters of the over-flowing fountains of learning, through the ſhallowneſs of wit, and other affairs that I was buſied in; yet man doth eaſily flatter himſelf, and attributes unto himſelf more then falls to his ſhare. Which is the cauſe why ambition is ſeen to get into all places, yea even into their moſt ſecret retirements who forſake the world, being a vice which is the harder to be cured, for that it keeps cloſe and hidden. But what ſhall I ſay more? What could I anſwer, if I ſhould be asked what fruit I reaped by theſe my ſtudies? I might peradventure ſay, that the little of Philoſophie which I learnt hath more awakened my underſtanding in knowing the truth of things.

But ſay I pray, what need hath he to have recourſe to the candle-light of humane knowledge, who hath the bright Sun-ſhine of Grace in him, and to whom infallible truth is revealed? I did for a while give my ſelf to ſtudy Moralitie, wherein I took ſuch delight, as I wrote a book thereof, which I was afterwards perſwaded

to

to print, and ſo to impart it unto others: I learned how to become morally good; it is true I did; but is not the firſt precept in this knowledge, that the doctrine of manners, is it of ſelf very vain? For it conſiſts in doing, in action, not in knowing; it had been much better, that ſetting his commandements before mine eies, who is the true and real Maſter of that Chriſtian life which I live, and have yet to live, I ſhould have imploied my time in obſerving the precepts of the divine Law, rather then in collecting the Documents of Philoſophers; who wanting the taſte of that trueſt, chiefeſt, and moſt excellent vertue, which divine love doth ſo much the more afford, as it is the more ardently inflamed, applied themſelves to a certain mediocritie, which is better diſcerned or known in their Idea, or in their writings, then in the affections or actions which they go about to moderate. Afterwards, when I was come to mans Eſtate, being commanded ſo to do by him whom I ought to obey, and it being a thing alſo which I my ſelf did much deſire, I betook my ſelf to write the Hiſtory of my Country; a good and gallant work. But what proportion can the good reward which I hoped for thereby, bear with the pains I took, which was truly very great? Had I ſpent part of the time and ſtudy which I imployed therein, in the reading of divine Books, I cannot doubt but that I ſhould have been inflamed with the love of ſpiritual things, which for ſo long a time I did ſo little reliſh. And to paſs by other things, I cannot deny, as beſt knowing mine own intrinceal affections, but that whilſt I labored ſo much to celebrate the fame and glory of others by theſe my Writings, I often felt within my ſelf a certain tickling and delight out of the hope which I flattered my ſelf withal, and wherewith I nouriſhed my thoughts, that by theſe my labors I my ſelf might likewiſe reap ſome honor; and (as the Poets ſay) live in my fame after my death. Oh groſs vanity! and when this affection (with which I muſt confeſs I was ſometimes drunk) gives place to reaſon, I acknowledge, that amongſt all vanities none is greater then wordly glory; which is vain, becauſe man glories of that which is none of his, for he hath received every good thing, eſpecially the endowments of the ſoul, from God: Vain, becauſe it is nothing of it ſelf; it hath no true exiſtencie, it is made up of various opinions of men, and of theirs moſt, who know leaſt; Vain, becauſe it reflects upon that which is not in us, upon that which is a trivial and common accident, to wit our Fame, the memory whereof we do with ſo much vanity deſire to propagate. Tell me thou humane ſoul, which art ſo much inamored of this bare ſhadow of good, which doth not at all belong unto thee, if after thou art departed out of this world, thou couldſt have any thing to do with humane affections, what good would this falſe glory do thee, which thou doſt ſo much dote upon, as thou doſt ſometimes loſe the way which leads to true heavenly glory? If thou ſhalt be damned, and in the eternal torments of Hell, thinkeſt thou that the ſatisfaction of this thy glory ſhall be able any waies to eaſe thoſe immenſe and unconceivable Torments? and if thou ſhall be fixt in heavenly bliſs, what need in that abode hath he of worldly glory, who is glorified with eternal glory? who is ſatisfied, who is content, who is for ever bleſſed? But ſince I examine mine own waies, I return to conſider my life.

Some few years ſince I gave my ſelf to the government of my Country; wherein I found the way ſo plain and eaſie, and the favor and grace of my Country ſo far above my merits, as I ſoon got into great Honors, and into the chiefeſt Imployments, which I ſtill continue in, and do imploy my time. But my Talent is ſo ſmall, as though I ſpend it all, I know it is but little. And if I ſpend all, how can I, according to humane reſpect, be blamed? Or what reaſon have others to complain more of me, then I have of my ſelf? Since ſo little a part of my life remains, or almoſt none at all, wherein I may recollect my thoughts, what time have I to think of my end? to repent me of my ſins? to endeavor amendment? and yet I ſee I am not diligent in doing any thing. The moſt troubleſom, yea, and

the

the moſt contented thoughts wherewith my mind is now incumbred, will vaniſh as a ſhadow, or as ſmoak before the winde, and ſhall be withered as flowers by the Suns beams; and yet whilſt this mind of mine is continually involved in theſe aſſiduous cares, it is ſo filled with the fantaſms of thoſe things wherein I imploy my ſelf all the day long, as I muſt meditate onely upon them, and though unwillingly, have them alwaies before mine eies, at all times, in every place, and upon all occaſions: So as all contemplation of nobler and better things which I ſometimes turn my ſelf unto, is alwaies mixt with theſe baſe affections, and troubled with theſe clouds of worldly thoughts.

Alas, how hard is it to ſerve two Maſters, God and the World? The world meaſures its actions by its worldly reſpects; he who makes that his ſtay, who lives according to that, can make no new laws to himſelf, but muſt govern himſelf by thoſe which are commended, and practiſed by thoſe who walk in the waies of the world. But how far different from theſe are Gods waies? Patience, Humility, Poverty, Obedience, Self-denial, and the giving over of all worldly care, are things which are abhorr'd by the worldly wiſe, but otherwiſe to God. How badly do the fallacious rules of worldly wiſdom agree with the inſtructions of true Chriſtianitie, eſpecially thoſe of this corrupt Age, wherein heavenly and divine things are often troubled and confounded with a certain vain name of Reaſon of State. Crowns, Empires, Kingdoms, and all power is given by God; and though the weakneſs of our reaſon be ſuch as it cannot penetrate into the infinite abyſs of his wiſdom, yet does he diſpoſe and order all things with certain and infallible ends, though unknown to us. Therefore unleſs that great, and omnipotent Lord God, by whom Kings do not onely reign upon earth, but the earth it ſelf is ſuſtained and held up with a miraculous equality of weight, do not keep the City, how vain is all this your learning, O ye wiſe men of the world? and you Princes, how vain are all your Forces to maintain your Lordſhips and States? Thou, whoſoever thou art, who doſt manage the weightieſt affairs of Principalities, put thy heart into the hands of thy God, and he will infuſe worthie and becomming thoughts into thee; He will give thee true Wiſdom and true Fortitude. The World builds nothing but Towers of *Babell*; nor is it aware thereof, till its deſigns, and many years labors, being overthrown by its own confuſion, it ſees its raſhneſs laid low; and thoſe thoughts which aimed at Heaven thrown down to Hell.

But I return again unto my ſelf. I ſee that theſe many years paſt wherein I approach to old age, I imploy my time in ſtudies, thoughts, and imployments, of differing natures in themſelves, but all conformable to what tends to my prejudice. For they robb'd me of my reſt, have ſtill oprеſt me with many cares, and led me aſtray from more holy deſires, to which, if I had bent my mind in time, I might hope now to ſit and feed at the Table of thoſe true good things which now I want. What do I then do? What do I think? What do I expect? Why do I not change my thoughts and exerciſes, if I know that thoſe wherein I have hitherto ſpent my time do me no good; nor for all the labor I have taken, have made me ere a whit more happy then I was at firſt? Nay, I may ſay, they have made me more wretched, ſince I have conſumed the greateſt part of my life wofully, and without any profit. Do I peradventure hope, that whilſt I my ſelf do not change, the nature of thoſe things wherein I am verſt ſhould alter? That trouble ſhould turn to delight? That the Affairs of the world, ſo full of anxious cares, ſhould turn to the peace and ſolace of the ſoul? That worldly good ſhall aſſume a new vertue of makeing their poſſeſſors well apaid and ſatisfied? That theſe brackiſh waters of the pleaſures of the Age, of which the more we drink, the more we are athirſt, ſhould become ſweet and ſavory, and afford any true delight or content? Men

who

who are blind in what concerns their own good, are wont to pervert the nature of things; to make them their Masters who are given to them to be servants. Such are the goods of Fortune, as the common people call them, because they know not how to raise themselves up to the knowledge of that mystery whereby their supreme Author and free Donor doth dispense them. But what greater misery is there then this humane felicity? The true Lord and God is made known unto us, and yet we continue to adore the Idols of Avarice, Ambition, and Vain glory: Look but upon those huge heaps of ruine which thou maist every day see in the City of *Rome*, who was once the Queen of the World, where are now her immense treasures? Where the majesty of her Empire? Where the pomp of so many Triumphs? the memory of so many victories? all these, being made the prey of time and death, lie buried in these ruines. But thou who livest by other precepts, and who haste a truer knowledge of thy eternal life, and eternal death, consider better what the nature of these goods are, to which thou hast been sometimes carried, with a less moderate affection, by the torrent of continual custom. If they be not of great worth, as truly they are not, why dost thou so much love them? Why endeavorst thou so much to be master of them? Why dost thou dread the loss of them so much? And if they have any thing of good in them, why dost thou not call to mind how soon thou art to forgo them? How comes it to pass this our happie worldly man is not aware, that if the increase of these goods could make him happy, he makes himself miserable, whilst through overmuch loving them, he is more intent upon purchasing the little which he lacks, then in injoying the very much which he possesseth, whilst the fear of loosing it doth continually molest his mind? a greater vexation then, which the soul hath none, because it hath no bounds. We look upon their outside onely, and are enamored of a certain handsome, but vain appearance which is in them, taking them for the guids of our life. But if we would consider their inside, and discover the deceipt and cousenage which is woven therein, we would shun them, as some holy men have done, least we be by them, and with them hurried down into Hell and damnation. We have our happiness within us, and seek for it elsewhere. He who will search his own house well, what wealth shall he find there whereby to inrich himself with precious treasure, which is hidden from us because the darkness of our affections leads us astray. If thy heart be fraught with pure thoughts, if thy soul be purged of all earthly passions, so as the raies of that true and lively Sun which is alwaies ready to illuminate thee, may penetrate thereinto, thou shalt soon discover there jewels of such vertue, price, and worth, as thou maist thereby purchase the worlds peace and heavens glory. Thou shalt find those affections which now rage tumultuously within thee, become quiet and obedient to reason; and those dissonant sounds which do so perturb thy mind, will agree with so just proportion, as they will make a sweet harmonie in thy soul, and will prove a refreshing to the troubles of the world, a figure of heavenly melodie, and of the glory of Paradice. O you Fathers, you good and holy Fathers, who being within your Cloister live in peace and quiet, far from the World, and the cares thereof, not onely in your persons but in your very thoughts; if there may be any affection found without affection, and envy without sin, I do assuredly envy in you those your leasure times, wherein you give your selves wholly to prayer and meditation; an idleness, which is true business, true entertainment, and the true nutriment of the soul. What are Crowns, Scepters, and to be clothed in purple, but bonds whereby to keep those miserable ones, whom the world terms happy, fastned to perpetual vexation, and troublesom cares? With you, O Fathers! it is that peace doth inhabit; peace which keeps you at unitie within your selves, keeps your Affections obedient to Reason, and your Reason a devout hand-maid to God. How can he who lives in the worlds Militia, taste of

theſe fruits of true peace? So full of cares, and deſtracted with ſo many thoughts? Who is continually to combate with thoſe Enemies who wage within him, to wit the affections of worldly things, to the which we our ſelves, do as it were furniſh Forces againſt our ſelves, by finding out new objects, and new materials whereby to increaſe them. We worldly men will feed the ſoul with meat which belongs not to her, wherefore it is no wonder if we be never ſatisfied, and if one appetite beget another even *in infinitum*; You, you are they who teach us by your lives and examples, that nature is ſatisfied with a little; and that man can never be ſaid to be rich by abundance, nor poor by want; other goods, other endowments, other ornaments are requiſite then thoſe the world ſeeks after; the further a man advances therein, the further he finds himſelf entred into an intricate and confuſed Labyrinth, and after having made a long voyage, he findes himſelf further from his journies end then when he firſt ſet forth. But I perceive that I praiſe *Mary*, and follow *Martha*; I know which is the right and ſafe way, and I take an intricate and dangerous way to lead me to my deſired end. I am buſied, ſollicited, and troubled with many things, and yet I know that one thing is onely neceſſarie, that there is but one thing which can ſo become the companion of my life, as it will never forſake me. I ſerve the world, and being given over to cares I entertain them more and more; love of Children, Houſhold government, adminiſtration of goods, the Commonwealths buſineſs, are things which I would fain free my ſelf of; but I neither know how, nor when to do ſo. I endeavor to be leſs affectionate in having to do with worldly things; to taſte them for nutriment, not to be drunk with them; but how hard is it to fix the ſlippery appetite ſo, as it fall not from the uſe to the abuſe of thoſe things, whereunto it is continually excited by the provocation of its perpetual companion, Sin? He who ſtands alwaies near the fire, though he thruſt not himſelf into it, ſo as he be burnt and conſumed, yet he muſt feel a troubleſom heat; and which is worſe, the ſoul which is outwardly warmed with theſe earthly affections, freezes inwardly for what concerns divine things: Prayers grow luke-warm, alms-deeds ſcarce, faſtings not uſual; and in brief, the thoughts of the ſoul are choaked by the cogitations of the body. Yet I am much comforted, that I find in my ſelf continually a deſire of becoming better; which is a ſign that I have not loſt the principles of well doing, and that I am not given over by the immenſe grace of my Creator. Though I ſail through the troubleſom Sea of this world; though my actions and thoughts flote up and down, not knowing where to find a Haven to put into; yet (thanks be given to God) this ſhip of my ſoul which contains many precious wares in her which were aſſigned over unto her, hath not made ſhipwrack. The integrity of communication, puritie of conſcience the knowledge of the trueſt good, things which I have not uſed according to their worth, are yet preſerved at their true price and value; ſo as they may one day enrich my ſoul. Thou my Lord, thou my Creator, thou my Redeemer, to whom my thoughts are better known then to my ſelf, let this my reverent affection be acceptable to thy charitie; through thy great goodneſs pardon my imperfections, and ſupply my defaults by thy infinite merit, ſo as I may totally deſpiſe theſe earthly things; free me from theſe fetters; keep not mine eyes fixt upon the earth, but turn them unto thee that art the *ſummum bonum*, and my ſouls ſole felicitie; ſince thou knoweſt far better then my ſelf what way I had beſt walk in to purchaſe ſalvation. If I be called to take pains in this State, and to uſe my talent in this Civil life, do thou, O Lord, ſo aſſiſt my weakneſs by thy great grace and goodneſs, as that acknowledgments may onely be made to thee, the Author of all my goodneſs for all my happy ſucceſſes; thine be all honor and praiſe; and ſuffer me not to loſe that reward of my worldly labors, which thou thy ſelf haſt bin pleaſed that I ſhould purchaſe by undergoing them in thy name, and by directing all my Actions to thee. Grant, O Lord, that I may

ſo

ſo think upon my mortal Children, as that I may not forget thee, my eternal Father; govern thou all my Faculties ſo, as I may know thou gaveſt me them, that thou preſerveſt them to me, and that it is my dutie to make uſe of thy Graces; that I may love my earthly Country, yet not ſo, as to make leſs eſteem of my heavenly Country; that I may ſerve and obey my Commonwealth with integritie of conſcience, with an intention to ſerve her, and not my ſelf, and for thy glory, not for mine own. This is a miraculous work of thy hand, and which is onely to be acknowledged from thee. She is the onely example, in having for ſo long a ſeries of years, preſerved her ſelf in Libertie, in Power, and in the true Religion: therefore if I cannot with fervor of ſpirit ſerve thee immediately, grant yet that I may ſerve thee not unworthily nor unuſefully in this moſt excellent creature of thy making. And ſince it now falls to my ſhare to ſerve my Country in this holy City of *Rome*, as her Ambaſſador to Pope *Clement* the Eighth; Grant that by ſerving this thy Vicar upon earth, I may ſerve thee the better, who art the true and ſupreme Lord of Heaven. Of thy great goodneſs give me that which I do not deſerve, accept of my good will, for the good works which I ought to do; and infuſe thy Spirit into this thy Vicar, the common Father of thy People, and Shepheard of thy Sheep, who is ſo full of zeal and charitie; ſo as that he may be able to draw this weather-beaten ſhip of Chriſtianitie out of the ſtorming Sea of theſe troubleſom times, and that ſhe be being gotten into the Haven of peace and ſafety, may with hands lifted up to Heaven ſay, *This is the day which the Lord hath made, let us rejoyce therein, and let us always bleſs his moſt holy Name.*

FINIS.